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'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
Abstract 
A key issue for climate policy, central to this thesis, is the right choice of policy 
and the appropriate balance between non-coercive and coercive instruments (i.e. 
regulatory, voluntary, economic and information instruments) - referred to as 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments in this thesis. Leaders in every country are seeking to make the 
right choices of instruments at the domestic and international levels, and a study on 
instrumental coerciveness is necessary for improving these decisions. However, there 
has not yet been a method developed for simply defining the influences of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions. Especially when mixed 
instruments are involved, both the level of coerciveness and the effectiveness of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments are difficult to distinguish. 
This thesis involves creating new assessment methods: Identification & Trend 
Analysis/ Method is developed to assess how a nation allocated its adoption of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments over a certain period; and Effectiveness Analysis/ Method is 
developed to examine the effectiveness of the 'soft' versus 'hard' policy instruments, 
in order to evaluate influences in terms of reducing GHG emissions. These two 
innovative methods will allow policy makers to be able to identify 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments, and their trend uses and effectiveness, in relation to climate policy. 
This thesis also undertakes empirical studies, firstly by looking closely at 
Australian climate policy under the Australian government during 1997-2007. The 
domestic policy of this era reflects Australia's carbon intensive circumstances, and its 
need for a significant reduction in GHG emissions. However, in this period Australia 
was largely reliant on voluntary based actions, at a time when the rest of the world 
was demanding strong initiatives from developed nations. Identification & Trend 
Analysis/ Method, and Effectiveness Analysis/ Method are applied in the Australian 
context for assessing the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. This analysis also 
reveals whether the policy with voluntary based actions encourage a significant 
reduction of GHG emissions. 
The thesis finds that large numbers of policy instruments used in Australia's 
climate policy during 1997-2007 were mixed instruments. The thesis also finds that 
Australia's national initiatives on the policy during the period examined were largely 
reliant on relatively 'soft' instruments, and showed a tendency to increase the use of 
softer instruments over time. In terms of the effectiveness of instruments, although the 
overall emission trends showed the country increased emissions over this time, the 
few 'hard' instruments employed were relatively more effective than 'soft' 
instruments. The results also show that policy based on voluntary-based instruments 
during 1997-2007 did not encourage a significant reduction of GHG emissions. The 
thesis concludes that although 'hard' instruments in Australia seem to be more 
effective than 'soft' instruments, the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments may 
vary elsewhere depending on circumstances. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] concluded that climate 
change is 'unequivocal'. They have declared with more than 90 percent confidence 
that human activity is the main driver. The major cause of the increase in GHG 
[Greenhouse Gas] emissions must therefore be considered immediately. More an 
effective policy option is one of the key solutions to the problem (IPCC 2007). An 
effective GHG mitigation policy in tum requires the use of a variety of policy 
instruments to cope with the many related activities dealing with climate change in 
each nation (UNFCCC 2007). 
Policy instruments are recognised tools of government in the field of public policy 
(Howlett 1991). These tools are designed and implemented by policy makers in order 
to achieve a particular policy target (Vedung and van der Doelen 1998; Carter 2001; 
Lascoumes et al. 2007). Climate change policy requires policy makers to employ 
sophisticated and complicated combinations of policy instruments to implement the 
most effective policy action for an immediate reduction of GHG emissions, 
considering economic, social, environmental, local and global interests [i.e. 
circumstances of national economic growth, cost and benefits, international 
obligations (the Kyoto Protocol) and the global financial crisis]. In order to deal with 
these complex issues, a variety of policy instruments and programs has been designed 
by policy makers worldwide. However, choosing the right instruments and programs 
to reduce GHG emissions is still problematic, and the influence of these instruments is 
still poorly understood (UNEP 2007). 
A key issue for climate change policy, central to the current thesis, is the right choice 
of policy with the appropriate balance between non-coercive and coercive instruments 
(i.e. voluntary and regulatory-based instruments). These are referred to as 'soft' and 
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'hard' instruments1 in this thesis. However, a method has not yet been developed for 
simply defining the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG 
emissions. Leaders in each country are seeking to make the right choices at domestic 
and international levels, and a study such as this thesis presenting on 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments is necessary for improving these decisions. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the case of Australia. 
In December 1992, Australia signed the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change [UNFCCC]. Australia is a developed country and one of the most 
carbon intensive countries in the world. The UNFCCC suggests immediate action to 
reduce GHG emissions at the domestic level which will also contribute to reducing 
emissions globally. The Australian government discussed the idea and squght the 
most effective policy instruments to respond to international obligations. In December 
1997, at the third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Japan, the Kyoto 
Protocol was agreed, and it again emphasised the international response to climate 
change, including the introduction of greenhouse gas emission commitments for some 
signatories. However, the Australian government signalled its intention to respond to 
international obligations via a number of voluntary-based instruments, while 
continuing not to ratify the international carbon reduction obligation inherent in the 
Kyoto Protocol during the period 1997-2007. 
One of the major criticisms of Australian government initiatives is whether voluntary-
based instruments actually encourage domestic action to reduce GHG emissions 
(CWLTH 2000; Hon et al. 2002; Curran 2003; ANAO 2004; Hunt 2004; Christoff 
2005; Sullivan 2007 and Crowley 2007). The influence of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments has become a critical question in Australia. Moreover, a critical carbon 
intensive developed country such as Australia must consider a significant reduction in 
GHG emissions and must be responsible even for leading a strong global response. 
Given this, there is a compelling need for an evaluation of the effectiveness of 'soft' 
1All instruments contain a certain level of coerciveness and are based on two individual streams: 
'mandated and voluntary' (Hatch 2005). This supports the notion of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
adopted in this study. Each instrument should be positioned based on its level of coercion (i.e. the 
degree of 'soft' and hard' instruments in this thesis is viewed according to the level of government 
power and intervention, legal binding and penalties). 
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and 'hard' instruments in Australia's own greenhouse policy. This study intends not 
only to help better instrument choices for the future in Australia, but also the future 
instrument choices of other carbon intensive countries. 
1.1 Research aims 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the influences of both 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments on reducing GHG emissions. A special focus is placed on 
Australia's greenhouse policy from 1997 to 2007. This study has a number of inter-
related aims. The first methodological aim is to develop methods for identifying the 
influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on the reduction of GHG emissions. In 
doing so, this thesis will clarify which aspects of these methods should be addressed 
in order to examine tlk influence in the context of climate change policy and will 
examine how they should be developed by the most relevant disciplines to reduce 
GHG emissions. 
The second instrument analysis aim is to determine the relative influences of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following the methods 
developed under the first aim. In order to achieve this second aim, greenhouse policy 
in Australia during 1997-2007 under the conservative Howard Coalition Government 
is discussed in considerable detail, recognising that the Australian government 
emphasised largely voluntary-based instruments in response to global GHG 
mitigating activities, while simultaneously increasing national emission trends and 
continuing not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
In this empirical case study, two aspects are examined by the method developed. The 
first aspect is to assess how the Australian government allocated their adoption of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments during the period in order to reduce GHG emissions. The 
second aspect of the case studies addresses the actual impacts of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument activities on reducing GHG emissions. These aspects in the case studies 
provide useful empirical data for determining the relative effectiveness of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments 1997-2007, and allow for some more general conclusions to be 
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reached regarding the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG 
em1ss10ns. 
1.2 Arguments 
This thesis argues that the government has tended to use more mixed instruments in 
its climate policy, resulting in a situation where policy makers cannot easily address 
or distinguish the actual class of coerciveness2, which is also described as a form of 
instrumental power relations between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. This thesis also 
argues that 'soft' instruments largely dominated in Australia's climate policy during 
1997-2007, and hypothesises that they did not encourage the reduction of GHG 
em1ss10ns. 
Research here firstly indicates that large numbers of policy instruments used during 
1997-2007 were mixed instruments 3 . An analysis employing the six instrument 
categories4 is used to illustrate the types of instruments but not their level of relative 
dominance (i.e. 'soft' and 'hard'). The study also finds that not only does the 
government uses more mixed instruments in climate policy but that policy makers 
cannot easily recognise which instruments are 'soft' or 'hard' regarding clear 
instrument characteristics and their effectiveness. In other words, policy makers can 
fail to recognise that voluntary measures are not always 'soft' instruments, and that 
regulations are not always 'hard' instruments, depending on the class of instrument 
2 The actual class of instrument coerciveness/ power relations is regarded in this thesis as the level of 
social control by instrument uses by governments. Policy instruments are a package of techniques 
under the power of government authorities to ensure support and to effect social change. Policy will not 
work appropriately if a government does not utilise its power with respect to policy instruments in 
terms of social achievement (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998: 1-21). Furthermore, policy instruments 
reveal a theorisation of relationships between the governing and the governed. Every instrument 
involves a form of knowledge about social control and ways of practising it. Policy instruments thus 
mean a form of power (Halpern et al. 2008). Given this, the understanding of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments reveals the actual class of instrument coerciveness/ power relations: the level of social 
control by instrument uses by governments. 
3 Mixed instruments indicate that a policy activity is classified as a selecting multiple instrument choice. 
This categorises a policy program as a mixed approach and is not counted within more precise 
categories by the other five instruments which were described above. In the Australian national reports 
(AGO 2002 and 2005a), mixed instruments are referred to as various instruments. 
4 Six instrument categories are regulatory, voluntary/voluntary agreement, economic, research, 
information-based and mixed instruments 
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coerciveness/ power relations; namely, government intervention, regulation/legal 
binding instruments, and penalties, which is examined here. 
This thesis also demonstrates that Australian climate policy initiatives 1997-2007 
largely reliant on relatively soft instruments, were an increasing trend over time. Most 
of the instruments used in this period were also designed without strong articulation 
with government intervention, regulation 5 , and penalties. Moreover, there was a 
strong preference by government for focusing on incentive-based, information-based 
and auditing based approaches (i.e. information, education, incentives, guidelines and 
auditing). In terms of the effectiveness of instruments, although the overall emission 
trends showed the country increased emissions over the period, the few 'hard' 
instruments employed were relatively more effective than the 'soft' instruments in 
reducing GHG emissions in the country. This research also shows that the policy 
design based on voluntary-based instruments during 1997-2007 did not encourage a 
significant reduction of GHG emissions. Although 'hard' instruments in Australia 
seem to be more effective than 'soft' instruments, the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments more generally vary in other countries depending on their circumstances. 
1.3 Significance 
This study is significant for a number of reasons. First, it contributes to an 
examination of coerciveness in policy instruments. This better enables policy makers 
to classify various policies and their impacts (Okinomous and Jepma 2007), to 
determine the actual class of coerciveness and to clearly interpret effectiveness 
(Macdonald 2001). However, causality between policies and outcomes is often 
unclear, particularly where mixed or varied instruments are applied for a policy 
design (Sullivan and Wyndham 2001). Too much focus on mixed instruments (more 
than one instrument combined) also results in complicated combinations and 
difficulty for classification (Okinomous and Jepma 2007), since an optimal mix 
(Howlett 2004) has become accepted as an effective policy instrument design in 
common thinking (Van Nispen and Ringeling 1998; Gunningham, Grabosky, and 
5 Regulation in this thesis is also referred to as legal binding. 
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Sinclair 1998; and Howlett 2003, 2004). When analysing instrument mixes, 
researchers have however neglected to recognise the absolute power relations between 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments as discussed above. Therefore, there is a need for further 
development of methods to classify the degree of 'softness' and 'hardness' of policy 
instruments with an illustration of their effectiveness. This study contributes to 
development of the field of public policy with respect to climate change. 
This study is also significant because an understanding of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments represents a manner of appreciating governmental control by instrument 
choice (Hatch 2005). The balance of power between coercive and non-coercive 
instrument type is essential in relation to reducing GHG emissions (Edenhofer et al. 
2009). A clear identification of the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments thus 
helps to address the extent of governmental control during a certain period of time, 
and to identify strengths and weaknesses of instrument design by government in terms 
of urgent action in order to reduce GHG emissions. This study is for instrument 
analysis theory as it also allows policy makers to develop ideas for further discussion 
about the most appropriate climate change policy. 
The third reason that this study is significant is that a study on Australia's climate 
change policy is critical, Australia being one of the most carbon intensive countries in 
the world. When the rest of the world was demanding strong initiatives from 
developed nations to immediately implement actions to reduce greenhouse gases, 
Australia was taking predominantly voluntary action in this regard. This thesis will 
critically reflect on case study material in order to demonstrate how the 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments adopted by the government influenced reduction of GHGs from 
1997-2007. This thesis is the first study to explore the design and effectiveness of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments in Australia, but will also generate results, which may 
allow other countries to develop methods for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in the reduction of GHG emissions elsewhere. 
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1.4 Research design and method 
In the literature review, this thesis addresses theoretical understandings of policy 
instruments, and subsequently considers approaches to, and critiques of, 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments, in climate change policy. This approach provides a unique way of 
conceptualising and analysing public policy and identifies three aspects of analytic 
methods for identifying the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions which need to be developed, namely (i) overcoming the lack 
of Classification of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments; (ii) overcoming the 
lack of examination of the trend use 6 of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments; and (iii) 
overcoming the lack of examination of the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' 
instruments. These aspects were the key elements considered when developing the 
methods adopted in this thesis. The methods used within this thesis are employed for 
a study of policy instrumentation. There are two major methods developed in this 
thesis from a consideration of the three aspects identified here, to which we now turn. 
The first analytic method [Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method] is developed in 
order to assess how a nation allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments for 
reducing GHG emissions over a certain period, and develops two further aspects (i.e. 
the classification and examination of trend use). 'Trend use' refers in this thesis to 
recognition of historical trends in use of policy instruments in climate change policy. 
The Identification & Trend Analysis/ Methods is derived from the instrumentation 
approach using 'instrumentalism' (Vedung and van der Doelen 1998) incorporated 
with 'coercive analysis' (Cushman 1941). In the style of 'Instrumentalism', this thesis 
classifies climate policy instruments (e.g. regulatory, economic and information based 
instruments) to evaluate how particular instruments influence their particular 
circumstances and how decision makers interpret their commitments (Linder et al. 
1998). 'Coercive analysis' (regarded as 'degree of coercion'; Doem and Phidd 1992) 
enables policy makers to illustrate the manner by which policy instrument choice is 
integrated with the use of coercion by governments (Doem and Phidd 1992), and 
which reveals the power of government authorities in supporting and effecting social 
6 
'Trend use' refers in this thesis to recognition of historical trends in use of policy instruments in 
climate change policy. 
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change with respect to their goals (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998: 1-21 ). This allows 
this thesis to determine which instruments or programs are 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in the policy domain. 
The second analytic method [Effectiveness Analysis/ Method] is developed to 
examine the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' climate policy instruments and 
supports the third aspect of this study which is to develop analytic methods for 
considering instrument effectiveness. Instrument analysis itself is always a central 
issue in public policy. However, the study of instrumentation needs to be developed in 
terms of what the fundamental components essentially demand for instrumentation 
analysis, in order to interpret policy behaviour (Hood 2007). The study of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in this thesis has thus emphasised a simple and basic instrument 
analysis. The main analytic approach adopted is derived from the thinking of 
Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007). They acknowledge five fundamental approaches that 
exist as the basis of instrumentation study, namely: a) focusing on instrument analysis 
as a central issue in public policy and its particular political behaviour for a certain 
period; b) analysing relevant instrument choice for meeting the policy objectives; c) 
evaluating the effectiveness of instruments; d) seeking innovative, effective, 
instruments applicable to particular policy development; and e) focusing on 
discussing influences of instruments for particular policy network. 
It is necessary for an instrumental approach to public policy to have different 
categorisations for different policy purposes (Hood 2007). Given that, this thesis adds 
to this fundamental approach by introducing two principles, which can be used for the 
instrument analysis of climate change policy. The first is priorities and the second is 
criteria. Both are required, it is argued, in order to evaluate policy instrument 
effectiveness for reducing or mitigating GHG emissions. The first principle, 
priorities ensures the most appropriate instruments for climate change policy for the 
best emission reduction achievement (SYKE et al. 2007), in order to identify specific 
priorities in the field of policy (Hood 2007). This thesis considered four priorities for 
climate policy, namely: instrument design, successful GHG mitigation, program 
achievement and economic efficiency. These priorities help to analyse instrument 
design. 
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The second principle is criteria. An examination of the analytic criteria is essential for 
policy evaluation. There is a need to determine which evaluative criteria are the most 
suitable for application to environmental policy, in particular to climate change policy 
(IPCC 2007). This thesis selected four criteria, namely: effectiveness for reducing 
GHGs, cost effectiveness, administrative feasibility and political acceptability. Each 
criterion measures a different aspect of climate policy, and is required in order to 
achieve successful GHG mitigation. 
Given these thoughts regarding the fundamental approach and the two principles 
(priorities and criteria), this thesis has furthermore synthesised a variety of key 
aspects into five analytical perspectives: Synthesised Instrument Analysis [SIA], 
namely: descriptive perspective; transformative perspective; analysis of instrument 
design; evaluation of actual effectiveness and discussion. A refinement of this 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Methods is to address the actual impacts of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instrument activities on reducing GHG emissions during a particular period. 
In summary, the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method which identifies the trend 
use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in a climate change policy and the Effectiveness 
Analysis/ Method which examines how these instruments have influenced the 
reduction of GHG emissions are developed in this thesis. These analyses allow this 
thesis to achieve its purpose of examining the influences of both 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments on the reduction of GHG emissions. 
1.5 Scope and limitations 
This research assesses the trend use and examines the effectiveness of climate change 
policy instruments rather than address policy process or influences of internal and 
external factors. The scope of this thesis is limited to examining domestic climate 
change policy in Australia during 1997-2007. However, further study beyond this 
thesis is needed to examine more cases of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in other 
countries in order to more broadly understand the relative effectiveness of these 
instruments. The effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments will very likely be 
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different in different countries. Although the UNFCCC secretariat broadly reviews 7 
policy instruments used in contracting countries, a deeper comparison of the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments among different states and countries 
would also contribute significantly to a global understanding of the ability of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments to reduce GHG emissions, especially in carbon intensive 
countries. 
The usual limitations that affect the instrumentalist methodological approach have 
been identified here and attempts have been made to improve the relative lack of 
theoretical analysis. As described above a method derived from 'Instrumentalism' is 
incorporated here with 'coercive analysis', and a new synthesised Identification & 
Trend Analysis/ Method developed and incorporated with two principles (priority and 
criteria) for examining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. This 
analytic approach is intended to be regarded as a new, all-encompassing theoretical 
approach for analysis of climate change policy in Australia and potentially other 
nations. 
In addition to the limitation of methods, this thesis emphasises determining the simple 
classification of 'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments. It focuses on establishing the 
specific key elements of functional policy activities, such as examining whether a 
national program is a 'soft' or 'hard' instrument, by looking at a number of key 
elements such as setting targets and monitoring systems, rather than measuring 
degrees of carbon reduction targets, reliability of persuasion or regulation/ legal 
bindingness or the balance between the restriction and cost effectiveness under an 
instrument. These latter concerns, whilst significant, are not without their own 
analytic challenges but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Another limitation of the analysis is the application of instrument categories, based on 
the instrument category in the UNFCCC guidelines. 8 The data in the Australian 
National Communication Report (2002, and 2005) acknowledged a range of national 
7 The Complication and synthesis report reviews detailed information on policies and measures of 
Parties included in Annex I to the UNFCCC as given in their latest national communications 
(UNFCCC 2003, and 2007). 
8 UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change]. 1999. Review of the 
Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions of the Convention. 
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initiatives including existing and future programs. However, the definitions of policy 
instruments under the UNFCCC instrument category are not the same as those 
proposed by this thesis. The intention of this study was not to categorise all the 
national initiatives during the period; instead thus this thesis uses selected instrument 
categories similar to instrument categories from the Australian national 
communication reports. The other reason for selecting these instrument categories is 
that there has not yet been a strong move to adopt a clear, simple and formulated 
categorisation of types of climate policy instruments9 at the international level, for 
contracting parties to the UNFCCC to use for their national reports. Indeed different 
countries have used different instrument categories in such reporting (UNFCCC 2003; 
and 2007). 
Another limitation of this thesis is the difficulty of finding an entire relevant 
instrument list to be used for data collection, due to limitations in the availability of 
the data in national reports and inconsistency in the instruments used. The Howard 
government [1997-2007], provided only three national communication reports, in 
199710, 2002 and 2005. Each report listed a number of initiatives and described their 
implementation but some were incomplete and others were never actually 
implemented during the period. Thus the process of data collection presented some 
difficulties for this analysis. Although limited interviews were conducted concurrently, 
by the researcher and meetings were held with several relevant bureaucrats in the 
federal government, these were for clarification purposes only. These meetings 
provided useful advice and material, such as additional measures not included in the 
communication reports up to 2007, to supplement the data collection to some extent. 
9 The instrument categories used in the national communication reports are based on the 'UNFCCC 
guidelines on reporting and reviewing', which have been provided by the UNFCCC for Annex I parties. 
These guidelines suggest what a national communication report should contain, and include 
illustrations of 'type of policy instrument' (UNFCCC 1999). Although these guidelines show that 
Annex I parties should describe their instrument types, they do not clearly formulate the categories of 
according to international standards. Moreover, their suggestions do not apply to all the contracting 
countries. The Complication and synthesis report also describes the difficulty of a review of 
instrument activities, especially of an classification of instrument types (UNFCCC 2003; and 2007) .. 
10 Although this thesis has recognised one of the national communication reports provided by the 
Howard government [1997-2007], the 1997 report did not include Howard's new National Greenhouse 
Strategy, which was expected to finalise mid 1998. Thus, the data collection used for the empirical case 
study is based on national communication reports in 2002 and 2005 to the UN which particularly 
illustrated the Howard initiatives during his regime between 1997 and 2007. 
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Another limitation is the focus on the effectiveness of the climate policy 1997-2007. 
Only the period 1997-2007 is selected for this thesis because the domestic greenhouse 
policy of this era reflects one of the most critical periods in terms of GHG mitigation 
policy by one of the most carbon intensive nations. When the rest of the world was 
demanding strong initiatives from developed nations to immediately implement 
actions to reduce GHGs, the former Prime Minister, John Howard designed and 
implemented an individual domestic approach largely dominated by voluntary-based 
activities, without taking global responsibility as a developed nation for reducing 
GHG emissions through the first world international agreement on climate change 
action (i.e. the Kyoto protocol). 
The other limitation of the analysis is a consideration of only two key programs as 
instruments: the Greenhouse Challenge Program [GCP] and the Mandatory 
Renewable Energy Target [MRET]. The analysis reveals the GCP as a 'soft' 
instrument, the MRET as a 'hard' instrument. Given this, the MRET was an entirely 
mandatory framework, a 'hard' instrument. In contrast, the GCP was intended to be a 
completely voluntary framework, a 'soft' instrument. They were expected to be the 
most important instruments under national initiatives during the period, and to make a 
strong contribution to the reduction of GHG emissions over the long term. Thus, a 
comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the two instruments was a decision which 
was made in order to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments. Although other major critical programs such as Eco-Efficiency Program, 
Emission Tax and Emission Trading Scheme [ETS] could be used for the analysis, 
some of them were not implemented over the period, and others were mostly short-
term initiatives. Thus, the analysis selected only the GCP and MRET programs. 
1. 6 Structure 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter One comprises an introduction, 
research aims, argument, significance, research design and method, scope and 
limitations, and the structure of the thesis. The thesis continues as follows here: 
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Chapter Two introduces the details of the background and significance of this study 
and the analytical framework by outlining the conceptual development of its 'soft' 
and 'hard' instrument study. This chapter is divided into three sections in order to 
address the primary research questions. The first section describes the background and 
significance of the adopted approach to the major questions of this thesis, by looking 
at policy instrument literature and 'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments. The second 
section then presents clues as to what frameworks and principles should be considered 
in order to provide the most suitable soft and hard policy instrument approach to 
climate change policy. The third section concludes with the most relevant approach to 
'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis, especially for climate policy. This chapter 
determines two methods as offering the most relevant approach, which are further 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Three develops the two methods identified in Chapter Two. The purpose of 
the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method is to classify and identify trend use of 
soft and hard instruments, illustrating how a government allocates its adoption of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments during the design period of a climate policy. The concept 
of 'Instrumentalism' is examined, as is 'coercive analyses'. The purpose of the 
Effectiveness Analysis/ Identification & Trend Analysis/ Methods to examine the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in a policy which aims to reduce GHG 
emissions. The synthesised analytical method adopted is based on Lascoume's and 
Le Gale's (2007) fundamental approach and incorporates two principles for climate 
change policy, namely priorities and criteria in order to develop the most appropriate 
evaluation framework for addressing the relative effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in reducing GHG emissions in this study. The details of the methods in 
this chapter are critical to subsequent analysis of the thesis empirical studies. 
Chapter Four explores the development of Australia's climate change policy. This 
Chapter establishes the need to consider the effectiveness of the climate change policy 
in the chosen period of 1997-2007. All developed countries are responsible for 
leading significant action for reducing GHG emissions. Since the Kyoto Protocol 
came into force, developed countries have been expected to lead by acting to achieve 
GHG emission reductions (Taplin 2004). An understanding of the unique 
circumstances in Australia is necessary, including, the rapid population growth and 
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land use patterns, and the dominance of economic resources by large energy intensive 
and carbon intensive manufactures and products. However, domestic greenhouse 
policy of this era reflects one of the most critical periods in terms of GHG mitigation 
policy by one of the most carbon intensive nations. The Australian government 
designed and implemented an individual domestic approach largely dominated by 
voluntary-based activities, without taking global responsibility as a developed nation 
for reducing GHG under the Kyoto Protocol. These findings were essential for the 
following case studies in order to address and appreciate background and significance. 
Chapter Five turns to present analysis of two empirical case studies. In these studies, 
two methods are applied, which were developed in Chapter Two and Three, namely: 
the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method to classify and identify trend use of soft 
and hard instruments; and the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method to examine the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in reducing GHG emissions. The major 
purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method, 
which examines how the Australian government allocated their adoption of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions during 1997-2007, in order to 
fulfil the second aim of the overall thesis to determine the influences of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments on the reduction of GHG emissions by following the methods 
developed in the first aim. 
In order to complete its analysis, this chapter considers three themes: a) the types of 
policy instruments utilised by the Australian government during the period 1997-2007; 
b) how such instruments varied according to the criteria developed in this thesis for 
assessing 'hard' and 'soft' policy instruments and c) what the trend usage was of such 
instruments was over time. This chapter illustrates how the Australian government 
allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments during 1997-2007 to design 
climate change policy for reducing GHG emissions. The findings of this chapter were 
essential for the following case studies in order to identify whether a climate program 
is 'soft' or 'hard'. This helps with the selection of particular case studies ofboth 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments in order to demonstrate the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method for 
examining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in a policy which aims to 
reduce GHG emissions .. 
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Chapter Six further demonstrates the application of the Effectiveness Analysis/ 
Method for the identification of the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in 
reducing GHGs during the given period. Then two case studies are selected from the 
results in Chapter Five: The MRET is identified as a 'hard' instrument and the GCP 
as a 'soft' instrument. In terms of making an examination of the effectiveness of each 
program, five analytical perspectives of the SIA method are considered in each case 
study: a) the descriptive perspective; b) the transformative perspective; c) analysis of 
instrument design; d) evaluation of actual effectiveness; e) and discussion. The results 
in this chapter allow this thesis to conduct a further discussion on the relative 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments. 
Chapter Seven continues the case study examination regarding the effectiveness of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments and conducts a further discussion on the results from the 
SIA Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method identified in Chapter Six. It then 
concludes with findings on the relative effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
in the case of Australia's Greenhouse policy during 1997-2007 in terms of the two 
key instruments employed. Chapter Seven also draws together and develops the 
arguments of main importance to this thesis. These discussions in Chapter Seven lead 
this thesis to its conclusions. 
Chapter Eight, as a conclusion of this thesis, returns to assess the primary research 
question outlined in this introduction in terms of the empirical research detailed in the 
preceding chapters, namely: to develop methods for identifying the influence of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions; and to determine the 
influences of these instruments by following the methods developed. It also illustrates 
and supports the thesis arguments and significance of examining the influences of 
both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on the reduction of GHG emissions and provides a 
special focus on Australia's climate policy during 1997-2007. 
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1. 7 Conclusion 
This introduction has provided some background to the study that follows, and 
outlined its essential aims, scope and limitations. The chapter has also outlined the 
core arguments and structure of this thesis. The following chapter introduces the 
details of the background and significance of this study, and its analytical framework 
by outlining the conceptual development of its 'soft' and 'hard' instrument study. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
The current chapter presents the details of the background and significance of this 
study and the analytical framework, by outlining the conceptual development of the 
'soft' and 'hard' instrument study. This also clarifies which aspects of methods should 
be addressed in order to examine influence in the context of climate change policy 
and gives a clear picture of fundamental analytical frameworks in this study. This 
chapter fulfils the first aim of this thesis which is to develop methods for identifying 
the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms ofreducing GHG emissions. 
Three themes are considered in this literature review: a) introducing the details of the 
background and significance of this study and the analytical framework by outlining 
the conceptual development of the 'soft' and 'hard' instrument study; b) addressing 
policy instrument theory, with a subsequent focus on approaches to, and critiques of, 
'soft' and 'hard' instrument theory; c) and establishing the most relevant approach to 
answer the methods for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in 
terms ofreducing GHG emissions. 
The results of this chapter reveal three aspects in terms of developing methods for 
identifying the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, namely (i) overcoming the 
lack of their classification; (ii) overcoming the lack of examination of their trend use; 
and (iii) overcoming the lack of examination of the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 
'hard' instruments. In considering these three aspects, two major analytical methods 
are developed for adoption in this thesis. 
The first analytic method [Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method] is to identify 
trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments. This method assesses how a 
nation allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments for reducing GHG 
emissions over a certain period. The second analytic method [Effectiveness Analysis/ 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Methods] is used to examine the effectiveness of 
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'soft' versus 'hard' instruments in the policy, in order to analyse relative effectiveness. 
The framework with the two methods adopted in this chapter and throughout the 
thesis is fundamentally located within a 'soft' and 'hard' policy analysis framework, 
something which remains underdeveloped within policy instrument studies more 
generally. Further development of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis, such as is 
undertaken here, will potentially help to present a clearer picture of instrument design 
and its effectiveness, more broadly, in response to GHG emission reduction. 
This chapter concludes that Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method will be derived 
from the instrumentation approach using 'instrumentalism' incorporated with 
'coercive analyses', which will be further explored in the following chapter. In terms 
of the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method, this thesis adopts its own Synthesised 
Instrument Analysis [SIA] approach, as the most fundamental and relevant method for 
evaluating the effectiveness of the 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. The further details of 
SIA will be described in the following chapter. 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, it presents the 
background and significance of this study and its analytical framework by outlining 
the conceptual development of the 'soft' and 'hard' instrument study, and by looking 
at policy instrument literature and 'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments. A look at 
policy instrument literature confirms the importance of the contribution this thesis 
makes, and of what should be achieved throughout this study. The second section then 
presents clues as to what analytical frameworks and principles should be considered 
in order to provide the most suitable 'soft' and 'hard' policy instrument approach to 
climate change policy. Finally, the chapter concludes with the most relevant approach 
to 'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis, regarding the policy. 
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2.1 Section One: Background and Significance of 'Soft' and 
'Hard' Instruments 
2.1.1 Policy instrument literature 
The following section will describe the background and significances of this thesis, by 
looking at policy instrument literature, and 'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments. In the 
first part, policy instrument analysis, historical context and approaches, and 
importance of the study of policy instruments will be explored. These aspects are very 
important in terms of understanding the relevant contexts of the field of instrument 
study and analysis. In the second part, soft and hard instruments, policy instrument 
transformation, and significance of soft and hard instruments will be discussed. 'Soft' 
and 'hard' instrument analysis is an underdeveloped, but potentially rewarding, way 
of viewing the categorisation and usage of climate change policy instruments. The 
section will conclude by describing the background and significance of the adopted 
approach to the major questions of this thesis. 
2.1.1.1. Policy instruments 
Policy instruments are a critical component in the field of public policy. In a policy 
action, governments affect affairs in society by using various policy instruments as 
tools. If the consequences are the ends of the policy process, policy instruments 
represent the influence of means, programs, staffing, budgets, organisations, 
campaigns and laws' on policy decisions. Moreover, all instruments contain strengths 
and weaknesses (Howlett 1991). Professional judgment by decision makers and 
authorities in the government must determine whether an instrument is appropriate or 
not, in considering ends as well as means. 'Policy goals are often defined in terms of 
the available means', and if the goals do not show clear direction and a realistic 
solution, it would be hard to meet their measures and could fail (Majone 1989). 
Furthermore, policy objectives are frequently defined only as deliberately symbolic; 
however, instrument choice is also delivered within the context of political and 
ideological concerns (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998). 
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Thus, policy instruments are a critical element in the field of public policy. Policy 
instruments are not only government tools for policy achievements but also the means 
of setting the process in action. The instrument choices are also required to be 
conducted by appropriate policy actors under the government authority, and need to 
be carefully discussed in terms of the political circumstances and ideological concerns. 
The following section will present the historical context of policy instrument study. 
2.1.1.2 Historical context and approaches 
Policy scientists have developed studies on policy instruments in order to improve 
public policy decision-making process. Other policy analysts, notably economists, 
have researched choosing the right policy instruments, using an approach focused on 
broad economic efficiency and 'social welfare' considerations. However, most tend to 
believe that there is not 'theoretical purity' concerning inputs but a response to all 
social, political, economic, and administrative concerns (Howlett et al. 2003). A 
number of models have also aimed at finding 'general' theories in the sense of action 
being limited by particular circumstances to national territories or states on policy 
instrument study, and since their different values in different countries have been 
identifying as 'nation-bound' (Howlett et al. 2003). A range of different schemes 
identifying various types of instrument choice by many political scientists in different 
countries have been identified in Canadian research (Doern et al. 1983), American 
research (Salamon 1981; Linder and Peters 1989), and British research (Dunsire 1977; 
Hood 1986; Maynth 1975) associated with the original ideas of policy instrument 
choices from American researchers, Lowi (1966) and Charles Anderson (1971). These 
represent the broad historical contexts and approaches in policy instrument studies. 
The following section will describe the importance of the study of policy instruments, 
and will confirm the importance of instrument studies to the field of public policy. 
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2.1.1.3 Importance of the study of policy instruments 
Three important elements of studying policy instruments in the field of public policy 
can be identified. Such study examines the: critical components of good policy; 
means of social goals; and understanding of historical policy change. 
Policy instruments are key components of good policy. Policy is a dynamic rather 
than a static process, so that good process can assist good policy. A policy cycle can 
help to identify the basic steps any policy must complete in idealised fashion as it 
evolves from an idea to an instituted program (Davis et al. 1992). Bridgman and 
Davis (1998) for example describe an eight phase policy cycle starting with 'identify 
issues' to 'policy analysis', 'policy instruments' 'consultation', 'coordination', 
decision', 'implementation', and 'evaluation'. 
Adapted from Bridgman, P. and G. Davis. 2004. Australian Policy Handbook 3rd edition. 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin. 
As shown, policy instruments are positioned in the process after 'identify issues' and 
'policy analysis', as significant components. Policy analysts must identify appropriate 
instruments 11 • Some issues require legislation, others require modification of the 
activities of government agencies (Bridgman et al. 2004). Further processes in 
'consultation', 'coordination', and 'decision' concern the choice of policy instruments, 
by which government targets its policy objectives, so that policy instruments can be 
enforceable, effective and educative (Carter 2001). 'Implementation' then ensures 
11e.g. 'advocacy', 'government action', 'funding' and 'legislation' adapted from Bridgman, P. and G. 
Davis. 1998 
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policies become practice (Howlett 1995). 'Evaluation' judges the effectiveness of a 
policy and starts the cycle afresh by looking again at the issue and available 
instruments (Bridgman et al. 2004). Therefore, policy instruments are the critical 
components within the process for a good policy. 
Understanding of policy instruments is important to achieve social goals. Policy 
instruments are a package of techniques under the power of government authorities to 
ensure support and effect social change to their goals. "The discourse on public policy 
instruments is a discourse on political 'power'. Central government is drawn as 'a 
mediator between interests', 'a client-oriented manager', 'responsive' and 
'consultative' to all appropriate actors and stakeholders" (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 
1998: 1-21). Thus, policy will not work appropriately if a government does not utilise 
its power with policy instruments to lead the public into social achievement 
(Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998: 1-21). Policy instruments are interventions by public 
authorities, which interpret and implement clear actions (Vedung and van der Doelen 
1998). Policy instrument choice reflects basic political or administrative action as 
reflected in general aims and the means of action. There are certain types and degrees 
of intervention: 'from reserved, cautious, minimalistic and subsidiary intervention, 
and from repressive forms of intervention to preventive action, implying the creation 
of conditions that favour preferred behaviour'. Thus instruments represent the way of 
leading actions to social targets (Vedung and van der Doelen 1998). Therefore, 
understanding policy instruments means understanding governmental power, and its 
various interventions, toward social goals. 
Of other major importance, the study of policy instruments means understanding 
historical policy change. Instrument activities such as instrument choices and their 
effectiveness cannot be done without a government. Furthermore, instrument 
activities by a government do not ~nly represent government power but also political 
behaviours and manners in a certain period of time and cannot be generalised in any 
activities or situations (Hood 2007), and have to meet the demands of particular 
situations (Linders et al. 1989). Further, policy instrument and implementation 
approaches specifically point to a stronger focus on the procedural concept of policy 
centralised on the idea of establishing instruments. This enables the policy actors 
involved to take responsibility for defining policy targets (Lascoumes et al. 2007). It is 
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acknowledged as essential to accepting alternative instrument selection for political 
decision making for a particular issue for a particular place (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 
1998) These show that policy instrument study is important to understand historical 
policy change. 
It is therefore important to pursue the study of policy instruments because the study 
can investigate: a critical part of policy processes for a good policy, means of social 
goals; and understanding historical policy change. 
2.1.1.4 Summary 
The background and significance of the major questions of this thesis are firmly 
positioned within the overarching context of policy instrument analysis in public 
policy. This part of the chapter suggests that policy instrument study is a critical part 
of the field of public policy. Furthermore, policy instruments are essentially a means 
and ends matter, that is recognised as a central issue in public policy and policy 
management. This section has found that policy instrument study is very important 
because instruments and the conceptualisation of policy in a means and ends fashion 
are critical to good policy process; a means to achieving social goals; and a way to 
understand historical policy change. 
2.1.2 'Soft' and 'hard' policy instruments 
This thesis points out the need to develop policy instrument studies, in particular the 
study of 'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments. The following section will now present 
background and significance found in the field of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument studies. 
This section will describe the reasons why this thesis will attempt to further develop a 
study of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, especially in climate change policy. It will then 
explain the significance of the adopted approach to the major questions of this thesis. 
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2.1.2.1 'Soft' and 'hard' instruments 
The study of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments has questioned the demand for availability, 
variability and productivity of these tools for a long time, especially when analysts 
started to question the relationships and influences of the characteristics of each 
instrument and individual instrument effectiveness; for example, any links between 
regulatory, economic and information instruments (Vedung and van der Doelen 1998). 
Various expressions used to represent 'soft' and 'hard' instruments can be found in 
the policy instrument literature, including: 'deregulation and regulation' 
(Gunningham et al 1998), 'coercive' and 'less coercive' or 'non-coercive' (Cushman 
1941; Hood 1986; Doem and Phidd 1983), or 'voluntary, mandatory' or 'compulsory' 
(Anderson 1977; Howlett, 2004). 
Hatch (2005) summarised the relationships between 'soft' and 'hard' classification 
and policy instrument activities when he said that the 'most fundamental and salient 
distinction' found in policy instrument activity is dominated by two streams: 
'mandated and voluntary'. Mandated actions are based upon legal sanctions. On the 
other hand, voluntary actions are often nonbinding and have more flexibility. 
However, in a particular policy context such as environmental policy, 
recognition of the classification often becomes more complicated. Furthermore, the 
definition of 'soft' and 'hard' classification cannot be simply defined and 
effectiveness still remains a huge uncertainty. Scientists often accept three main types 
of instruments: regulatory, economic and information-based. They frequently describe 
regulatory instruments as the most traditional and strongest instruments in instrument 
literature. Furthermore, information or economic instruments are often recognised as 
weaker instruments (Vedung et al 1998; Howlett 2004). However, the background 
discussion still questions: what are the relationships are between 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments classification, and individual instruments (e.g. regulatory, economic and 
information-based). Answering this, the following section will examine 
preconceptions of 'soft' and 'hard' classification and the transformation of policy 
instruments in an historical policy context. 
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2.1.2.2 Policy instrument transformation 
In the public policy instrument literature, 'soft' and 'hard' instrument classification 
between each policy instrument have been considered to enable better instrument 
selections in different circumstances over time. Howlett (2004) concluded that three 
instrument generations dominated in the literature, namely: restricted by 'regulatory' 
actions (first generation); modified with softer instruments by 'deregulatory' actions 
(second generation), and the pursuit of a more comprehensive combination between 
'soft' and 'hard' (third generation). The following section reviews the historical 
changes in 'soft' and 'hard' instrument classification. 
In the early years of policy instrument research, recognised as the first generation, 
economists largely studied business-government relations, as well as the influences of 
regulation and economic policy on business efficiency. Despite the dispute between 
'neo-classical' and 'welfare' economists over the concept, economists tended to focus 
on 'market failures' in the short term (Howlett 2004). Policy analysts also neglected 
to strike a balance with economic implications but interacted with rational 
instrumental choice in a political sense (Salamon 1981; Balch 1980). After these, 
most 'neo-classical' literary accounts focus on governing instruments that became 
inefficient due to unbalanced decisions regarding production and consumption in the 
marketplace. This brought about a preference for direct control of public goods 
through government power (Wolf 1988). On the other hand, policy analysts also 
questioned the domination of governments and recommended switching to softer 
instruments (Hood 1986). 
In the second generation, studies of 'instrument choice' also focused on the concepts 
of instrument selection and instrument combination as a basis for 'regulation and 
deregulation' (Van Nidepen et al. 1998; de Bruijn et al. 1998; Bressers et al. 1998). 
This resulted in more demand for a combination of strong government intervention 
and less stress on the public (Wood 2004). During times of change, regulatory 
instruments dominated at first, however, because of too much focus on governmental 
power, there was more demand for softer instruments. 
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In the third generation, instrument study of a combination with 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments, a so called 'optimal mix', became more common (Howlett 2004); for 
instance, 'marketable instruments, regulatory and deregulatory' actions (Grabosky 
1994; Gunningham and Yong 1997), due to achieving policy goals as well as cost 
effectiveness (Wood et al 2004). Some studies introduce a more sophisticated mix of 
instrument choice based on 'smarter regulations', which has been developed out of 
the necessity for instrument selectivity as well as to mix with a number of market 
solutions and public and private demands, especially in the field of environmental 
policy (Gunningham et al 1998). More recent instrument study thus demands more 
mixed instrument uses combined with 'soft' and 'hard' instrument classification. 
The historical background described strong connections between 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument classification and showed that the demands of instrument activities 
changed over time. This also suggested the classification is dependent on the level of 
governmental power, stress on the public and government intervention. However, 
practical applications require more individual attention. The following section will 
further examine how the 'soft' and 'hard' classification exists in a particular policy 
context, especially in environmental policy. 
2.1.2.2.1 'Soft' and 'hard' instrument classification in Environmental Policy 
In practical terms, in the field of environmental policy, much emphasis was placed on 
using regulatory instruments (harder instruments), so called 'command and control'. 
However, these tools became much less common in the 1970s when the focus shifted 
to utilising more market-based instruments, such as 'polluter pays', and damage 
compensation. In recent years, more 'soft' instruments have become more popular in 
the environmental policy context with a wide variety of instruments, however, such as 
voluntary agreements, eco-labels, information campaigns and green public strategies 
(Gunningham et al 1998). Moreover, a critical issue for environmental policy is the 
need to ensure a balance of the instrument activity between the international and 
domestic contexts in terms of the global achievements (Stavins 1997). A number of 
studies have been undertaken to develop methods of theoretical analysis to measure 
the effectiveness and efficiency of a variety of instruments for environmental policy; 
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however these tended to be very complicated (OECD 2001; Jordan et al. 2003; 
Sterner 2003). 
In this light, although studies of instrument choice, 'soft' and 'hard' classification 
have been considered over time, there are now demands for more mixed, 
comprehensive solutions using a full range of financially, legally, and socially 
effective instruments, depending on policy focuses. In practical terms, environmental 
policy not only places more emphasis on simple economic devices and optimal 
interactions with voluntary approaches using a number of different instruments, but 
also gives more consideration to global solutions with both domestic and international 
implications. 
Given this, the classification of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments cannot be simply defined, 
but always exist in policy instrument activity. Understanding the influences of 'soft' 
and 'hard' classification is very important in terms of identifying the manner of 
government power for achieving a particular policy target, but identifying the level of 
governmental power becomes more complicated, once multiple elements are required 
for an approach such as the demands for the international and domestic contexts. 
There is a need for the further development of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis, 
which is urgently required in the field of climate change policy. The following section 
will describe why this thesis focuses on analysing 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the 
policy. 
2.1.2.3 'Soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis 
Instrument analysis itself is evidently one of the most important issues for public 
policy and management (Hood 2007), and evaluating instrument effectiveness is a 
basis for analysis (Lascoumes et al 2007). However, it tends to involve more 
comprehensive methods used, which result in more complicated solutions such as too 
much focus on political issues or external factors. Specifically, environmental policy 
analysis requires indication of 'success and failure' factors by examining instrument 
effectiveness with empirical case studies that can assist in delivering sustained 
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improvements in critical environmental issues (Bailey, I 2008; Krarup, S. 2001; 
Folmer et al. 2001). 
As identified in Chapter One, this thesis will conduct a case study on climate change 
policy to reduce greenhouse gases [GHGs] for the Australian national context. This is 
because, in order to achieve the policy outcomes at a global level, reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions cannot be ignored and a global solution must be found on 
both international and domestic levels (Stavins 1997). If each nation achieves its goals 
in terms of reduced emissions, this will lead to global outcomes. On a domestic scale, 
industry and the public are the main actors who actually bring about the reduction 
outcome; however, nothing will occur if government is not prepared to lead the nation 
(OECD 2004). It has been largely accepted that greater 'ex post' empirical evaluation 
of instrument effectiveness with various instrument uses on national level activities 
for environmental policy, is essential but greatly neglected (Hatch 2005). 
With particular emphasis on 'soft' and 'hard' policy instrument analysis in the context 
of climate change policy, understanding of 'mandatory and voluntary', namely 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments, represents a manner of governmental control by instrument 
choice (Hatch 2005). A mandatory instrument in the policy often fails in its 
achievements but the balance of the power with other instruments is essential in terms 
of reducing GHGs (Edenhofer et al. 2009). A clear identification of the influences of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments will thus help to address a manner of governmental 
control during a certain period of time, in terms of being required for urgent action in 
order to reduce GHG emissions (IPCC 2007b ). 
2.1.2.4 Significance of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument approaches 
There is a demand for identification of the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
in the field of public policy, in particular, of climate change policy. While such 
research on mandatory and voluntary actions has largely been accepted as a major 
approach to policy instrument analysis, lack of this approach still exists in 'soft' and 
'hard' instrument analysis theory in terms of considering the examination of how soft' 
and 'hard' instruments bear influence in the context of the policy: in terms of-
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• Lack of classification of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
• Lack of examination of the trends in use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
• Lack of examination of the effectiveness between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
First, there is a lack of classification of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. Although 
modem instruments have been relatively mixed with many alternative combinations 
of instruments due to the complex political and practical issues arising from the need 
to satisfy historical demand (Van Nispen and Ringeling 1998; Gunningham et al 1998; 
Howlett 2003, 2004), it was believed that 'optimal mix' would be a better solution, in 
meeting a particular circumstance such as environmental (Gunningham et al 1998), 
and climate policy (Stavins, 1997; Jordan et al, 2000; OECD, 2001; Okinomous and 
Jepma 2007; and IPCC 2007b). However, too much focus on mixed instruments has 
also resulted in more complicated combinations and more difficulty in classification 
(Okinomous and Jepma 2007). Despite a number of schofars suggesting that such 
modem uses of mixed instruments can be effective (Van Nispen and Ringeling 1998; 
Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair 1998; and Howlett 2003, 2004), they have 
neglected to recognise the actual class of coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments when designing instrument mixes. For instance, information or education 
instruments are generally defined as non-mandated policy; therefore, some 
researchers rank these instruments m the weakest position. However, these 
instruments are often integrated with other powerful instruments (i.e. mixed with 
incentives or regulatory instruments), and thus should be positioned in stronger ranks. 
Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) acknowledge that identification or interpretation of 
environmental effectiveness in different ways and to solve a problem, for example 
whether the policy targets achieved or failed in 'a comparative sense', is often 
problematic. Moreover, 'causality between policies and outcomes' is often unclear, in 
particular, where mixed or various instruments (more than one instrument combined) 
are applied, thus necessitating improvement in terms of unclear class of instrument 
coerciveness and the illustration of instrument effectiveness into something simpler 
and clearer to distinguish. 
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A clear illustration of the level of the instrument coerciveness includes a combination 
(mixed), and individual selection (applying only one instrument for a particular target), 
which is necessary to examine the clear effectiveness of instrument uses (V edung et al 
1998). Furthermore, researchers often acknowledge that a variety of instrument mixes 
have the potential for successful delivery in their own right and can guide their own 
direction toward targets including financially, legally and socially effective 
perspectives (De Bruijn and Hunfen 1998; Van Nispen and Ringeling 1998; Bressers 
and O'Toole 1998). This may also be true for 'optimal' instrument mixes associated 
with a sound combination of a number of public and private demands and market 
solutions resulting in better delivery with the most comprehensive methods (Grabosky 
1994; and Gunningham et al. 1997). However, this theory strongly emphasises 
Hatch's statement that all instruments contain a certain level of coerciveness and are 
based on two individual streams: 'mandated and voluntary'. In this sense, mixed 
instruments do not therefore exist independently, but should be positioned based on 
their level of coercion, depending on the degree of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument use. 
Therefore, there is a need for further development of classifying the degree of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments in the study of policy instruments. 
Secondly, there is a need for a method to evaluate the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments. The absence of public understanding of the direct and indirect influence 
of government power arises from the need to estimate the distribution and allocation 
of resources to particular policy targets and provide the results to the public. It is 
essential to examine how governments allocate their instruments during certain 
periods of time in terms of: preparing better decisions; making improvements; and 
understanding the 'nature' and 'types' of the political circumstance of governing 
resources and management tools (Lasswell 1958). The importance of instrument 
choice ('statecraft') represents an effective evolutionary function of the process of 
resolution for problems in the policy implementation (Howlett et al. 2003). Analysis 
of government designed policy instruments over a certain period of time reveals the 
nature of government tools and their strategy (Balch 1980). Moreover, the most 
important analysis of the impact of regulation should consider the actual effect of the 
distribution and allocation of resources to their intended goals (Hartle 1979). This 
suggests that there is a need to develop a method for examining the trend use of 'soft' 
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and 'hard' instruments, incorporated with the classification of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments. 
Thirdly, there is a need to assess the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. In 
terms of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, Macdonald (2001) argues that instrument 
analysis has been largely concerned with the relations of coerciveness or non-
coerciveness and effective use. However there is a need to further develop methods to 
address the actual impacts of instrument activities, in terms of implementation and 
enforcement to determine the actual class of coerciveness and its clear interpretation 
of effectiveness. Hatch (2005) further stated that observing 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument effectiveness over a certain period of time will contribute to better 
instrument analysis; although he also concluded that there is no single clue for 
judging best instrument use. Empirical evaluation of various instrument uses requires 
a critical recognition of 'success and failure' which can provide sustained 
developments in environmental performance and changes (Krarup 2001 ). However, 
the simple and clear demonstration of the relationship between 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument ideology is still yet to be determined as is its effectiveness, especially in 
estimating goal achievements. Moreover, examining individual cases with extreme 
models of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in a nation will illustrate the precise 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in particular national circumstances, a 
theory which still needs to be developed in instrument study, especially to illustrate 
the preference of a nation for particular instruments (Lascoumes et al. 2007). Given 
these circumstances, there is a need to identify in summary effectiveness, namely 
whether the policy instruments achieve their ends or not. There is a critical demand 
for developing a simple method for examining instrument effectiveness of policy 
instruments in particular circumstances. 
2.1.2.5 Summary 
Given these details, this section has identified the lack of approaches by which 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments bear influence in the context of climate change policy. More 
specifically, three significant factors are also addressed: 
34 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
(i) The lack of classification of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
(ii) The lack of examination of the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
(iii) The lack of examination of the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments 
The following section will summarise the objective of the first section in this chapter. 
2.1.3 Summary of Section One 
In the first section of this chapter the background and significance of 'soft' and 'hard' 
policy instrument study was presented. Firstly, policy instrument literature described 
the background of policy instrument study as well as the relationship between public 
policy and instrument study. The first part of this section concluded that policy 
instrument study is critical in the field of public policy, and has been recognised as the 
central issue of policy achievement. The second part of the section established that 
'soft' and 'hard' policy instrument analysis, as an element of policy instrument 
literature, provides a unique and underdeveloped way of conceptualising and 
analysing public policy. A major contribution of this thesis is an attempt to develop 
'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis, regarding climate change policy. Such a 
development has the potential to facilitate (i) the lack of classification of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments; (ii) the lack of examination of the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments; and (iii) the lack of examination of the effectiveness between 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments. 
2.2 Section Two: Developing Methods for 'Soft' and 'Hard' 
Instrument Analysis 
The second section of this chapter aims at developing the foundation for an approach 
to 'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis, within the context of climate change policy. 
In the previous section of this chapter, this thesis addressed three elements of 
instrument analysis for identifying the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in 
response to the reduction in GHG emissions which need to be addressed and 
developed, namely: (a) the lack of classification of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments; (b) 
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the lack of examination of the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments; and (c) the 
lack of examination of the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments. In 
considering the three elements which have been addressed in order to develop 
methods, this thesis has selected two analytical methods for further examination, 
which are the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method and the Effectiveness 
Analysis/Method. 
The purpose of Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method is to assess how a nation 
allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments for reducing GHG emissions 
over a certain period, which develops the first and second aspects (i.e. the 
classification and examination of trend use). The purpose of the Effectiveness 
Analysis/ Identification & Trend Analysis/ Methods used to examine the effectiveness 
of 'soft' versus 'hard' climate policy instruments and supports the third aspect of this 
study which is to develop analytic methods for determining instrument effectiveness. 
The first part of the second section of this chapter will develop the Identification & 
Trend Analysis/ Method. This Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method is drawn from 
a typology of instrumentation approaches, in order to select the most appropriate 
analysis for identifying the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments. 
Following this, the second part of this section will develop the Effectiveness Analysis/ 
Method. This involves the refinement of a method that will be based on a fundamental 
approach to policy instrument analysis, with the incorporation of relevant elements to 
the policy, as well as program evaluation techniques. Finally, it will conclude with the 
development of analytical framework for 'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis, in 
relation to the context of the policy. 
2.2.1 Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method: identify the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' 
climate policy instruments 
This section aims to develop Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method, which is to 
assess how a nation allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments for the 
reduction in GHG emissions over a certain period. It will address, firstly, what 
approaches to the study of policy instrumentation currently exist. It will then discuss 
which approaches can be adopted for the development of a method of identifying 
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trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the general context. In the 
instrumentation approach literature examined here, a range of theoretical analysis can 
be seen to have developed over the last three decades. Five main frameworks will be 
identified here as the main historical instrumentation approaches to instrumentation 
from the literature, namely: 
• 'instrumentalism' 
• 'contextual and institutional analyses' 
• 'coercive analysis' 
• 'policy diffusion', 'policy transfer', or 'learning perspectives' and 
• 'public choice analysis'. 
2.2.1.1 Typology of instrumentation approaches 
Firstly, 'instrumentalism' is a more traditional framework for instrumentation analysis. 
This type of approach is recognised as the 'first generation of instrumentalism' 
(Vedung and van der Doelenl 998). It is concerned with assuming how particular 
instruments (Howlett 2003), 12 influence their particular circumstances and how 
decision makers interpret their commitments (Linder et al. 1998). The traditional 
approach also focuses on analysing 'hierarchy' objectives. The 'goals-means' or 
rationality is the fundamental factor affecting instrument selection, which also decides 
instrument 'usability' (Bagchus 1998). Furthermore, policy scientists predominantly 
attempted to use this instrumentation approach by concentrating on a comprehensive 
typology of instruments, because every instrument has implementation issues, 
influence, central activities and sub-processes. However, this approach is frequently 
criticised for not satisfying the instrumental doctrine because the categories in this 
typology are mutually exclusive. Another critical point to this approach, is that 
lawyers tend to prefer more legal tools and economists more market-based tools 
(Linder et al. 1998). This shows that instrument choices are dependent on who 
decides. 
12First generation is individual approach based on 'regulatory', 'economic', or 'information'. Second 
generation focuses on the alternative combinations. Howlett, M. 2003. Studying Public Policy: Policy 
Cycles and Policy Subsystems. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
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More normative concepts in instrumentation approach can be found in the tools that 
government decision makers have at their disposal (Elmore 1987). These concepts 
focus on generating plural and comprehensive choices of instruments and take into 
account the dynamics and unique characteristics of each instrument (Salamon et al 
1989). These two elements of instrumentation analysis are used by decision makers to 
produce a relevant evaluation process for each instrument on particular policy issues. 
In addition, these two approaches have been considered less 'administrative 
techniques', but more concerned with rational choice, based on 'goals and means'; 
and their policy effectiveness in terms of the decision making. Thus, 'normative-
instrumentalism' has been recognised as a wrong approach in terms of policy 
instrument selection by governments (Macdonald et al. 2006). This may be an 
incomprehensive approach due to the absence of attention to underlying values and 
norms, and uncertainty of relations between contexts and policy instruments (V edung 
and van der Doelen 1998). 
Secondly, 'contextual and institutional approach' together with: 'refined 
instrumentation', 'national policy style', 'policy network' and 'institutionalisation', 
were also recognised as important factors in instrumentation literature. This type of 
approach is recognised as the 'second generation of instrumentalism' (Vedung and 
van der Doelen 1998). The early study by Hood (1986), introduced the 'contingent 
approach', and asserted that problems exist in policy and politics, which can be 
identified by the disclosure of relationships between governments and target groups. 
In terms of instrument selection, he identified some key functions based on legal 
constraints, political stresses and learning from past experience (Vedung 2005). The 
contingent approach focuses on contextual perspectives, and can also be categorised 
as 'refined instrumentation', (Linder and Peters, 1989; De Bruijn and Hufen, 1990) 
which evolved from instrumentalism and further developed into the differentiated 
approach (Peters 1998). Moreover, the more contextual instrument approach has 
several key factors. First, it emphasises the consideration of 'value and norms'. 
Second, it attempts to form more comprehensive relations 'between contexts and 
policy instruments' (Vedung and van der Doelen 1998). Third, it analyses instrument 
choice by identifying 'pushing and pulling', illustrating the relations between policy 
actors, who will act for their state benefit, rather than between 'goal and means' in the 
traditional instrumentation approach (De Bruijn et al. 1998). Fourth, it is concerned 
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about only limited alternative instrument choices evaluated by the actors, who will 
select the appropriate instrument. Fifth, this contextual approach is distinct from the 
traditional instrumentalism; which provides unlimited alternative choices. Lastly, in 
order to evaluate instruments, the contextual approach analyses both the effectiveness 
of policy instruments and the contexts in which the instruments are used (Bagchus 
1998). However, a contextual approach is criticised as: lacking consideration of: 
attitudes; the values and morals of the people that affect instrument uses; the limited 
involvement of the factors in design, which should not be focused on only the 
effectiveness of instruments but also their influence (Donaldson 1982); and the 
tendency for 'unmanageable complexity and oversimplification' that is caused by less 
attention to the role of the people or the important position of governments (Bagchus 
1998). 
The 'National policy style' approach (Linder and Peters 1989; Howlett 1991; and 
Vedung et al 1998) is another type of contextual approach. This approach improved a 
design comprising contingent approaches, incorporated with additional perspectives 
such as 'cognitive factors', which are intended to demonstrate instrument 
performance level. This observes the institutional framework allowing for the 
organisational culture of implementation of the policy as well as the 'policy 
community' functions; these issues are strongly related in particular events with their 
policy contexts (Howlett 1991). This contextual approach has been considered as an 
appropriate progression but has also given rise to concern with the approach 
becoming overcomplicated. This suggests the instrumentation approach needs further 
research in order to better establish the role of policy instrument analysis, by adopting 
a more simple approach without overcomplication, overdiversification and 
overcomplexity (V edung 2005). 
The 'Network approach' is another contextual instrument approach. Majone (1976, 
1989) argued that the performance of an instrument cannot be assessed using solely 
the nature of its technical characteristics, since it is dictated by both institutional 
context and process of instrument selection. The fundamentals of instrument choice 
thus are: relations of coerciveness between government and target groups; political 
constraints; and the capacity of decision makers to control the political function. This 
approach observes the governance structure associated with its implementation 
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process in terms of instrument choice. Bressers and O'Tool's (1998) research also 
developed a number of assumptions about the nature of networks and outcomes; 
considering non-governmental actors in regard to instrument selection; and with 
emphasis on more characteristics of the policy networks, particularly 'cohesion and 
interconnectedness'. 
Another contextual approach is 'policy networks' or 'policy subsystems' theory (e.g. 
Howlett 2003). Howlett stressed contextual variables as well as an 'optimal policy 
mix', which he recognised as the 'second generation instruments' 13 • He also 
distinguished two streams: 'substantive' and 'procedural instruments'. Substantive 
instruments are designed on the basis of delivery of goods and services in the society 
as inputs; and procedural instruments to deliver actual substance for network 
configuration in terms of providing legitimacy. He concluded that both the capacity of 
the state and the complexity of the policy subsystem decide the selection of the 
traditional substantive instruments. Procedural instruments have become a 
fundamental feature of modem governance (Howlett 2003). The legitimacy of the 
government style is a governmental variable, and observing procedural and 
substantive instruments will reveal which implementation style each government 
adopts (Howlett 2000). 
Towards the end of the development of instrumentalism and the contextual approach a 
new theory called 'institutional approach' or 'institutionalisation' emerged (Bagchus 
1998). This type of approach is recognised as the 'third generation of 
instrumentalism' (Vedung and van der Doelen 1998). This :framework synthesises a 
number of contingencies and perspectives and suggests that analysis consider how an 
instrument is gradually institutionalised into a policy community where a particular 
instrument may dominate as an appropriate tool (Bagchus 1998). For example, 
Ringeling, who particularly emphasises the strong ideological image of instrument 
choice, associated the institutional characteristics of the country, with its culture, its 
traditions and its 'politico-administrative structure' (2005). The institutional approach 
can, therefore, be recognised by its consideration of a sophistication of the previous 
13First generation is individual approach based on 'regulatory', 'economic', or 'information'. Second 
generation focuses on the alternative combinations. Howlett, Michael. 2003. Studying Public Policy: 
Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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approach such as traditional instrumentalism and refined-instrumentalism. These 
factors are: improving the lack of attention to people, values and morals; measuring 
levels of behaviour patterns and routines in the members of the policy community; 
selecting 'appropriate' choices by government in the context of a policy community 
with strong government intervention rather than in terms of 'optimal fits'. On the 
contrary, this approach is often criticised as: less relevant to exploring policy 
instrument contexts; over-focusing on the policy community of the characteristics 
dominated into particular governance context in each country; and less able to find 
alternative policy instruments or account for the costs of altering instruments, which 
can be very high. However, these explanations still have many uncertainties (Bagchus 
1998). 
Thirdly, a 'degree of coercion' can be identified in early studies on policy instrument 
choice. A classical feature of public policy is how it attempts to illustrate that the 
power of actors is based on government. Doern and Phidd designed a model of policy 
instrument choice integrated with the framework of coercion by governments, which 
has been used frequently since the end of the 1970s (Howlett 1991 ). A more recent 
study on 'degree of coercion' was completed by Vedung (1998). Vedung concluded 
that governments may prefer to use more coercive tools, which results in a gradual 
increase in coercive instruments (Howlett 2003). However, these assumptions have 
often proved to have the opposite consequence, since more coercive bases are used in 
the first place. This may represent an 'ideological neo-liberal assumption', demanding 
more flexible choice; which suggests that government intervention into the market is 
not a productive solution (Macdonald 2001 ). 
Fourthly, 'policy diffusion' (Tews et al. 2003) together with 'policy transfer' and 
'learning perspectives' (Fiorino 2001; Jordan et al. 2003), can be categorised as 
another type of instrumentation in terms of process. These studies emphasise the 
influence of international developments and defining and exploring the process of 
instrument choice, incorporated with policy instrument choice. These studies observe 
politics and dominant international relations as significant and emphasise the 
particular circumstances for the adoption of similar policy tools in different countries. 
The most recent study, for instance, was conducted by Tews et al's idea of policy 
diffusion. This particularly emphasised identifying and analysing the rapid diffusion 
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of soft instruments (i.e. voluntary instruments), based on introducing New 
Environmental Policy Instruments [NEPI]; its analysis suggested better interpretation 
and understanding of the impact of policy diffusion (Tews et al. 2003). By contrast, 
Jordan et al. (2003) argued that the policy diffusion approaches, so far, have not 
satisfied the question of why decision makers in a particular nation choose certain 
instruments from their repertoire of policy instruments. However, Macdonald 
suggests that institutional analysis can demonstrate the paradigm. Ideal institutional 
theories are distinguishable by two perspectives, namely: the acceptance that NEPis 
could be an instrument process of putting new ideas into effect, and national 
institutional legacies which play a role in the acceptance of instrument choice. 
However, these can be concluded with two factors: one is the common idea of how 
implementation produces various outcomes in society with various institutional 
allocations, and the other is how instruments and ideas can be only compatible with 
particular institutional adjustments, which have likely been widely accepted 
(Macdonald et al. 2006). 
Finally, 'public choice analysis' can be classified as a policy instrumentation 
approach. Trebilcock and Hartle (1982) particularly stressed the self-interest of 
decision makers or politicians and their attempts to maximize their 're-election', in 
terms of instrument choice. This approach provides direct incentives to groups of 
specific voters, when announcing policy to the public. Woodside (1986) argued that 
there was however an unsatisfactory explanation of the benefits of each instrument 
according to this implementation. Atkinson and Nigol (1989) also note that this 
approach fails to identify the institutional constraints and the particular policy 
instrument choice by government. Given these five major approaches in the school of 
instrumentation thought, these five elements comprise the historical approach to the 
instrument study and any further development must depart from this original 
framework. The methods developed in this thesis are also based on these elements. 
2.2.1.2 Discussion 
With respect to the method for classification and examination of the trend use of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments, this thesis takes into account some key points of significance 
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of the research contribution discussed above. These are: a way to distinguish 'soft' 
and 'hard' and a way to recognise historical trend use of policy instruments, in 
particular policy fields and government activities. In order to cover these points, two 
approaches can be selected from policy instrument literature; 'instrumentalism' and 
'coercive analysis'. 'Instrumentalism' can be conceptualised as enabling policy 
makers to classify which instruments are based on particular policy circumstances 
such as instrument classification (e.g. regulation, economic, and information 
instruments). 'Coercive analysis' enables policy makers to determine which are 'soft' 
and which are 'hard' instruments. Results from the two approaches thus can reflect 
the situation of the trend use of policy instruments in particular nations and policy 
fields during a certain period of time. Thus, this thesis will develop a method for 
classification and examination of the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. The 
detail of the refined approach will be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter Three: 
Methodology). 
2.2.1.4 Summary 
The first part of the second section of this chapter attempted to develop Identification 
& Trend Analysis/ Method, which is to identify the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' 
climate policy instruments. More specifically, it examined a typology of 
instrumentation approaches. The section concluded that the method utilised 
throughout this thesis will be derived from 'instrumentalism' and 'coercive analysis'. 
The second part of this section will attempt to identify methods for examining the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the policy. 
2.2.2 Effectiveness Analysis/ Method: to evaluate effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' 
instruments in climate policy 
This section will attempt to develop the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method for 
evaluating the actual impacts of the instrument activities on reducing GHG emissions. 
More specifically, this involves the refinement of a method that will be based on a 
fundamental approach to policy instrument analysis, with the incorporation of 
relevant elements to the policy. 
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2.2.2.1 A fundamental structure 
In order to develop a method for evaluating the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' 
instruments in climate policy, this thesis has established that there is a critical 
demand for developing a simple method for examining instrument effectiveness of 
policy instruments in particular circumstances. Thus, developing Effectiveness 
Analysis/ Identification & Trend Analysis/ Methods intended to consider a simple and 
basic instrument analysis. 
There is a fundamental approach that can be taken towards evaluating the 
effectiveness of policy instruments. Hood (2007) suggested that every instrumentation 
approach is related to a 'generic approach'. This generic approach aims to consider 
the roots of instrumentation management with what are the most basic and key 
elements of instrumentation analysis. His further thoughts for the development of 
instrumentation analysis include: the need for an instrument approach in public policy 
to be understood by using different categorisations for different purposes to 
implement policy; an instrumentation approach gives 'pre-conditions' for further 
instrumentation analysis to be more convincing. Instrument analysis itself is always a 
central issue in public policy, with its complexities acknowledged by political 
scientists. According to Hood, the study of instrumentation needs to be developed in 
terms of what the fundamental components essentially demand for instrumentation 
analysis. Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007) also emphasise the need to consider the 
fundamental meaning of instrumentation study in the field of public policy. Given 
these, instrument analysis itself is always a central issue in public policy. However, 
the study of instrumentation needs to be developed in terms of what fundamental 
components are required for instrumentation analysis, in order to interpret policy 
behaviour. 
Although Lascoumes and Le Gales argue that the instrumentation approach of public 
administrative literature needs to include more social aspects, they still believe that an 
instrumentation approach should be at the centre of public policy. However, they 
acknowledge five fundamental approaches that exist as the basis of instrumentation 
study: 
44 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
1. Focusing on instrument analysis is a central issue in public policy and represents 
its particular political behaviour for a certain period. 
2. Analysing relevant instrument choice is critical for meeting policy objectives. 
3. Evaluating the effectiveness of instruments is also a key concern. 
4. Seeking innovative, effective, instruments applicable to particular policy 
developments is a central aim. 
5. Focusing on the influences of instruments for particular policy networks (i.e. 
country) is a worthwhile effort. 
These five fundamental points can be used as an analytic approach for evaluating the 
effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments in climate policy. Meanwhile, Hood 
also suggests that any generic approach should consider different principles for 
different purposes (2007). Furthermore, Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007) 
acknowledge that, in principle, every instrumentation approach should identify a 
particular policy target; which is based on policy outcomes, instrument choice, and 
instrument effectiveness, depending on the particular policy purpose. As discussed 
before, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' 
instruments in relation to the policy. Thus, this thesis needs to examine further key 
elements for a particular policy target regarding to the policy in terms of the most 
appropriate instrument analysis. 
2.2.2.2 GHG mitigation policy instrument evaluation 
The fundamental structure found in the previous section suggests a need to consider 
principles of instrument analysis applied to climate change policy. This section 
examines two principles of instrument analysis applied to the policy. The first is 
priorities and the second is criteria. Policy actors need to identify specific priorities 
of the field of policy in order to achieve policy outcomes. Appropriate criteria are 
essentially required to employ the most relevant evaluation for analysing the 
effectiveness of policy instrumentation. Both are significant in terms of evaluating 
policy instrument effectiveness for reducing or mitigating GHG emissions. Specific 
priorities and criteria relevant to climate change policy will be discussed in the 
following section. 
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Firstly, the section will examine priorities for evaluating policy instrument 
effectiveness for GHG mitigation policy. It will then examine evaluating criteria for 
instrument influence on GHG mitigation. Finally, it will conclude with the basic 
principles (of priority and criteria) that are needed to properly evaluate the 
effectiveness for the policy. 
2.2.2.2.1 Priority of instrument analysis for GHG mitigation 
This section will examine priorities for evaluating policy instrument effectiveness for 
reducing or mitigating GHG emissions. A basis for instrument analysis requires 
examination of particular policy circumstances (Hatch 2005), and its principles 
(Lascoumes et al. 2007). As mentioned previously, this thesis focuses on the 
effectiveness of instrument activities for the policy. The policy has been globally 
recognised as urgently needed (Stavins, 1997; Jordan et al, 2000; OECD, 2001; 
Okinomous and Jepma 2007; IPCC 2007b), and instrument analysis is one of the most 
essential platforms for the further steps toward implementation (IPCC 2007b ). Studies 
on the policy instruments will become more popular than ever, and are intended here 
to enable government to optimise the dynamics of a variety of policy instruments 
(VROM et al. 2005), which verifies influences of policy instruments on the reduction 
of GHG emissions and also to some extent on energy systems (Neij et al 2006). In 
addition to these ends, this study needs to ensure the most appropriate instruments for 
the best emission reduction achievement (SYKE et al. 2007), as well as analysing a 
particular policy circumstance for instrument analysis; which policy actors need in 
order to identify specific priorities of the field of policy (Hood 2007). In terms of 
conducting relevant instrument analysis, this thesis recognises four priorities by which 
to compare the fundamental principles for GHG mitigation policy. These are: 
• Instrument Design 
• Successful GHG mitigation (outcome) 
• Program Achievements (implementation) 
• Economic Efficiency (cost effectiveness) 
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Instrument design 
Instrument design is one of the most important priorities of instrument analysis for 
GHG mitigation policy. Instrument activities represent government approaches, and 
the fundamental meaning of 'normative-instrumentalism' has been recognised as an 
instrument choice by government for a means to an end (Macdonald 2007). Every 
instrument approach contains a capacity to seek appropriation of instrument choice 
and design as a central issue. Capacity needs to be understood by using different 
categorisations for different purposes in terms of policy implementation in the field of 
public policy (Hood 2007). Analysing instrumentation activities is a basis for 
consideration by decision makers to produce a relevant evaluation process and 
prepare for the better challenge for each instrument on particular policy issues 
(Salamon et al. 1989). Instrument design is a critical priority of policy instrument 
analysis, in terms of the successful policy activities as well as: of selecting the right 
choices; targeting a particular goal; and assessing and preparing for the better choices. 
This suggests that a further priority of instrument analysis can be addressed depending 
on the targets of instrument approach. In terms of instrument analysis regarding the 
policy, this thesis argues that successful GHG mitigation would be another priority, 
which is examined below 
Successful GHG mitigation 
The second priority is successful GHG mitigation. The main concern of the policy 
instrument effectiveness is to examine the influences of human actions which 
contribute to increasing greenhouse gas em1ss1ons, and achieving specific 
environmental goals within policy implementation in order to reduce overall 
emissions (IPCC 2007b ). If there is no strong contribution to global mitigation for 
example, then a policy may have failed, unless we are to be satisfied with lesser 
changed circumstances. Mitigation could also include changing public behaviour, 
institutional restructure, or global integration, which could be recognised as related 
outcomes if not central outcomes. 'Successful GHG mitigation' should therefore be a 
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critical and central point for these particular policy circumstances. Furthermore, a 
significant criterion of success would include meeting policy goals, as well as 
achieving adequate policy design (CUSOTA 1995). Program achievement is very 
important in identifying whether a policy meets its goals. It includes two significant 
aspects; direct contribution and indirect contribution (EEA, 1996; Aldy et al., 2003; 
OECD, 2001), Although, it depends on a different focus on the different targets and 
some activities do not target direct reduction effects but others do, the impacts of 
direct reduction should not only become the central solution for reducing GHG 
emissions, but also targets for indirect reduction for social improvement. Therefore, 
program achievement with these two aspects will help in understanding the more 
accurate influence of individual climate policy activities, and will better describe 
successful GHG mitigation (Konidari 2007). In this sense, the further priorities of the 
instrument analysis for GHG mitigation policy may depend on whether successful 
GHG mitigation is brought about by achieving policy programs. This thesis addresses 
program achievements as the third priority, which is examined below. 
Program achievements 
The third priority is program achievements. Policy is a guidance of social targets, and 
the targets should be achieved through the governance efforts with public 
implementation between government and its public (Howlett 2003). Promoting a 
successful program represents an activity of policy implementation in terms of policy 
outcomes, resulting in meeting policy targets (Vedung 2005). Achieving the reduction 
of GHG emissions thus depends on achieving policy goals and programs (CUSOTA 
1995). In this sense, in devising climate change policy, the reduction of GHG 
emissions is thus the main policy target, which needs to be addressed and achieved 
through policy implementation associated with effective public governance. Every 
single policy program must then at least contribute to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions otherwise it has no meaning in terms of what government has designed and 
committed to with various programs (EEA, 1996; Aldy et al., 2003; OECD, 2001). In 
terms of the instrument analysis, program achievement is thus one of the key priorities. 
However, program achievements for the policy with a failure of cost effectiveness 
should not be accepted in political movements, which are often concerned in a 
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government decision (IPCC 2007b ). Therefore, a further priority of the instrument 
analysis for GHG mitigation policy can be economic efficiency, which is examined 
below. 
Econom;c efficiency (cost effectiveness) 
The last priority is cost effectiveness. Addressing cost matters is also critical, and 
should not be isolated from the main factors of policy evaluation for the policy. 
Identifying critical cost dimensions can help to create alternative approaches for GHG 
mitigation which are politically acceptable and feasible (PCGCC 2003). In strict terms, 
the most cost-effective activity means achieving policy goals at the least cost. Cost 
effectiveness may also include a range of components including: the costs of 
administration and implementation for the policy as well as indirect costs, such as 
how the policy makes cost-reducing technological development feasible (IPCC 
2007b ). Cost effectiveness also means the process of choosing specific goals with 
affordability (Sterner 2003). Policy implements particular environmental policy 
targets, and considering cost effectiveness and any estimation of the financial factors 
involved is one of the critical challenges of political movements, which would also be 
the ideal approach (Davies et al. 1998). Therefore, cost effectiveness should be 
considered in instrument analysis. 
Given this, this section found four priorities for evaluating policy instrument 
effectiveness in reducing or mitigating GHG emissions as principles of instrument 
analysis applied to the policy, namely: i) instrument design ii) successful GHG 
mitigation iii) program achievements and iv) economic efficiency. The following 
section will further examine the principle of evaluation criteria for instrument 
influence on GHG mitigation. 
2.2.2.2.2 Evaluation criteria/or instrument influence on GHG mitigation 
This section will examine the evaluating criteria for instrument influence on GHG 
mitigation. An examination of relevant criteria is essential for policy evaluation. 
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However, there is no clear guidance as to which evaluative criteria are the most 
suitable for application to environmental policy, in particular to climate change policy 
(IPCC 2007b). However, a range of evaluation efforts driven by climate policy 
demands have been developed and introduced over the last decade (Konidari et al 
2007). For example the following: The Governmental Department of the Netherlands 
(1990) considers cost effectiveness, equity, tlexibility, transparency of GHG 
mitigation policies; the Government of New Zealand (2001) considers economic 
efficiency, equity, feasibility, environmental integrity and competitiveness (Konidari 
et al 2007); Philibert and Pershing (2001) consider environmental effectiveness, cost 
effectiveness, contribution to economic growth and sustainable development and 
equity on fixed binding, dynamic, non-binding, sectoral targets, policies and measures 
for climate change mitigation policy. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (2001, 2007) considers environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness, 
distributional equity, and institutional feasibility; Nordhaus and Danish (2003) 
consider environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness, distributional considerations, 
administrative and political feasibility; Jaccard et al. (2007) consider environmental 
effectiveness, cost effectiveness, administrative feasibility, and political acceptability. 
The UNEP et al. (2007) emphasise environmental effectiveness and cost effectiveness. 
Although numerous evaluation methods have been proposed for GHG mitigation 
policy, this thesis attempts to employ the most critical and simple evaluation criteria 
for analysing the effectiveness of policy instrumentation as described below. 
From a number of the critical elements for GHG mitigation, the following criteria can 
be identified: 'environmental performance', 'political acceptability', 'cost 
effectiveness', 'dynamic cost efficiency', 'competitiveness', 'equity', 'flexibility', 
'stringency for non-compliance and non-participation' and 'feasibility of 
implementation'. These will be briefly described in the following section as a means 
of working towards a determination of effective mitigation instrumentation. 
'Environmental performance' aims to identify whether a policy instrument is 
successful in meeting its goals. Possible sub-criteria can be identified including direct 
contribution to reducing GHG emissions and indirect effects. These measures can also 
be accounted for by considering tco2eq, or energy intensity per sector, percentage of 
reduction of energy consumption, proportion of renewable energy sources and so on 
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(OECD 2001). 'Political feasibility' shows the level of attitude of involved 
stakeholders according to the instruments. In the case of national instruments, target 
groups will be identified such as stakeholders particularly related to policy activity 
(EEA 1996). 'Cost effectiveness' is classified as achieving individual 
instrument/policy measure goals within the most financially acceptable and affordable 
contexts. 'Dynamic cost efficiency' is defined as the function of promoting 
technological or research development, in terms of innovative technological solutions 
(Duncan 1999). 'Competitiveness' represents the ability of financial performance to 
give or motivate benefit from products or services solutions externally and internally 
(Zhang et al. 2004). 'Equity' is defined as the ecological and administrative fairness 
of policy instruments in allocating emission rights, and the compliance benefits and 
costs under individual policy actions for achieving GHG emission reductions 
(Vaillancourt 2004) 'Flexibility' is classified as adaptability that enables government 
or target groups to consider a range of compliance options for reducing GHG 
emissions under a time frame adjusted in agreement with their own priorities (UN 
1997). 'Stringency for non-compliance and non-participation' is classified as rigidity 
in terms of implementation provisions for emitters that did not succeed in complying 
with or participating in the action. In terms of full involvement and participation in 
activity towards effective solutions, this focus on preventing non-compliance or non-
participants can be judged or verified by certain criteria (Haites 2001 ). Lastly, 
'feasibility of implementation' refers to the overall applicability of the instrument 
within an institutional and legal framework (Konidari 2007). For example, 'financial 
feasibility' is judged by institutional efficiency (OECD 2003a). 
In this light, given the number of criteria for instrument analysis of GHG mitigation 
policy, this thesis will select the most critical and simple criteria. According to Hatch 
(2005), for policy instrument analysis with regard to environmental policy the 
following criteria are critical: effectiveness, efficiency, political feasibility, and 
technical innovation (Hatch 2005). The IPCC has also suggested a number of key 
elements in terms of overall performance for environmental policy instruments: 
'design' 'implementation', 'participation', 'stringency' and 'compliance' (IPCC 
2007b ). These fundamental concerns are adopted here for instrument effectiveness on 
GHG mitigation. This thesis has thus adopted the five criteria for analysing the policy 
at national level. These are: 
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• Effectiveness for GHG Mitigation 
• Cost Effectiveness 
• Distributional Equity 
• Political Acceptability 
• Administrative Feasibility 
'Effectiveness for GHG emissions' represents policies that achieve particular 
environmental objective and targets (Sorrell et al. 2003). This analytical element 
includes direct and indirect contribution to GHG mitigations (OECD 2001). It can be 
useful to judge (ex-post) and estimate (ex-ante) to what extent a particular instrument 
could influence GHG mitigation (Harrington 2004). 'Cost effectiveness' allows us to 
analyse whether a particular program achieves a goal, including the direct and indirect 
costs of administration and implementation of the policy (IPCC 2007b ). Cost 
effectiveness also enables policy makers to determine what instruments can be cost-
effective to an overall the policy. This is because often a specific environmental target 
provides a huge impact on the total cost of a policy, even if the target is achieved with 
cost-effective environmental instruments (Sterner 2003). 
'Distributional equity' gives policy makers an idea of whether the instrument choice 
considered the distribution of emissions rights, compliance costs, and interest among 
countries or sectors (Vaillancourt et al. 2004). In terms of 'policy acceptability', 
Jaccard et al. stated that, in terms of evaluating GHG policy effectiveness, some 
prefer to define 'equity' instead of 'political acceptability'. However, they also 
recognised that defining political acceptability makes it much easier to identify 
instrument values and effectiveness, because more likely, only looking at a particular 
level of equity is hard to define in terms of value and sometimes invisible but still 
significant elements. It is also important that policy makers define the value of 
political acceptability which is essential to ensure whether politicians can precisely 
recognise sufficient support to implement a policy (Jaccard et al. 2004). The last 
element is 'administrative feasibility'. It is essential to be effective and efficient in 
implementation, and evaluation of 'administrative feasibility' pertains to whether the 
legal, institutional, and practical means exist in a policy implementation in an 
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effective and cost-effective manner (De Coninck 2007). Although the IPCC (2007) 
referred to institutional feasibility generally involving equity and administrative 
feasibility, these elements are separated in this thesis, in order to emphasise a clear 
recognition of each of their contributions. Further details of the characteristics in these 
five criteria will be identified in the methodology chapter in this thesis. 
2.2.2.2.3 Summary 
This section aimed to begin developing a method for examining the effectiveness of 
'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments, in the context of climate change policy. To begin 
with a fundamental approach to policy instrument examination was identified. This 
foundation constitutes a basic form of instrumental evaluation that incorporates five 
important elements. 
In addition to these key elements of evaluation, there is a need to look at principles for 
a particular policy, in this case, climate change. With regard to the policy, there are 
arguably two relevant principles of policy evaluation: priorities and criteria. This 
thesis has identified four significant priorities, including i) instrument design, ii) 
successful GHG mitigation, iii) program achievement, and iv) economic efficiency. 
These are very important priorities in terms of conducting the most relevant approach 
for instrument analysis regarding the policy. This thesis has also addressed five 
criteria, namely effectiveness for a) effectiveness for GHG Mitigation, b) cost 
effectiveness, c) distributional equity, d) political acceptability and e) administrative 
feasibility. These two aspects, recognised as principles of climate change instrument 
analysis, are thus important and should be considered in terms of the most relevant 
approach in this thesis. 
The following section will present a refined and practical method for examination of 
the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the policy through the 
incorporation of Lascourmes (2007)'s fundamental approach, which will be examined 
below in terms of specific policy principles relevant to climate change policy. 
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2.2.2.3 Refining methods for 'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis in Climate Change Policy 
This section aims to refine the most applicable approach for exam1mng the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, in the context of climate change policy. 
This refinement will be considered through two key elements of the instrument 
analysis as found in previous sections, including: Lascoumes's fundamental structure; 
and two principles for the instrument analysis. Four priorities are i) instrument design 
ii) successful GHG mitigation iii) program achievement and iv) economic efficiency. 
Five criteria are effectiveness for a) effectiveness for GHG Mitigation b) cost 
effectiveness c) distributional equity d) political acceptability and e) administrative 
feasibility. Firstly, this section will review characteristics of these three key elements 
in this chapter. It will then attempt to refine the most appropriate approach by 
transforming these key elements into an applicable method. 
In respect of the first key element of the instrument analysis, in this chapter, the main 
significance of developing Effectiveness Analysis/ Identification & Trend Analysis/ 
Methods to demonstrate a simple approach to identify influence of instrument 
activities based on 'soft' and 'hard' classification due to the lack of method used for 
the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. Therefore, this thesis firstly 
identified an approach from Lascoumes's five primary elements for fundamental 
structure of instrument analysis, as discussed previously, including: 
1. Focusing on instrument analysis is a central issue in public policy and represents its 
particular political behaviour for a certain period. 
2. Analysing relevant instrument choice is critical for meeting the policy objectives. 
3. Evaluating the effectiveness of instruments is also a key concern. 
4. Seeking innovative, effective instruments applicable to particular policy 
developments is a central aim. 
5. Focusing on the influences of instruments for particular policy networks (i.e. country) 
is a worthwhile effort (Lascoumes et al. 2007). 
This framework thus meets the demand for an essential and simple effectiveness of 
instrument activities, which can clearly identify influences of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments over time. 
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For the second key elements, as discussed previously, this thesis found two principles 
in terms of the instrument analysis for the policy. First, four priorities need to be 
considered for the analysis. These are: instrument design, successful GHG mitigation, 
program achievement and economic efficiency. These priorities recognised that there 
is a need to analyse instrument design at the bottom line. Meanwhile, successful GHG 
mitigation also requires the achievements of individual policy programs and with its 
cost effectiveness. Second, four criteria for analysing instrument influence on GHG 
mitigation, namely: effectiveness for reducing GHGs, cost effectiveness, 
administrative feasibility and political acceptability. Each criterion measures a 
different aspect of the instrument activities, and is required in order to achieve 
successful GHG mitigation. Given these principles, instrument design is an essential 
tool for instrument analysis, and in respect to climate change policy, the consideration 
of successful GHG mitigation, program achievements and cost effectiveness are 
inevitable. Moreover, with respect to evaluating instrument effectiveness, policy 
actors need to look at the four criteria in order to make better decisions. Given these, 
this thesis will now, in the following section, refine the most relevant approach by 
considering these elements. 
These theoretical thoughts regarding methodology and the two principles above 
(priorities and criteria), have led to the establishment here of the most relevant 
approach to methods for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
This thesis has furthermore synthesised a variety of key aspects into five analytical 
perspectives, which it presents as the Synthesised Instrument Analysis [SIA]. 
This refined method, the SIA, is fundamental in determining the actual impacts of 
'soft' and 'hard' instrument activities on the reduction in GHG emissions during a 
particular period. SIA has considered the three key issues from the theoretical 
thoughts discussed above, namely: a need for simple and fundamental instrumentation 
analysis; a need for identifying specific priorities of instrument analysis in terms of 
climate policy for the best emission reduction achievement; and a demand for finding 
the most suitable evaluative criteria for application to climate policy. In considering 
these theoretical thoughts, the SIA has developed five analytical phases, namely: 
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Descriptive perspective; Transformative perspective; Analysis of instrument design; 
Evaluation of actual effectiveness; and Discussion. 
The SIA can be seen to comprise five phases: 
Synthesised Instrument Analysis [SIA] 
• Descriptive perspective (background of a program with its instrument approach) 
• Transformative perspective (trend use) 
• Analysis of Instrument Design (theoretical instrument analysis) 
• Evaluation of Actual Effectiveness (impacts of instrument activities) 
• Discussion (discussion about influences of instruments) 
Each phase evaluates a different aspect of influence of a particular policy instrument 
in order to achieve successful GHG mitigation. The Descriptive perspective is the first 
stage of the method aims. The Descriptive perspective covers backgrounds of a policy 
program including: primary target; cost commitment; and instrument approach, which 
are necessary to provide the most relevant data of particular programs in order to 
conduct an instrument analysis. The Transformative perspective as the second stage 
will then identify the trend use of instrument activities, which is required in 
identifying periodical trends of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in this thesis. The 
Analysis of instrument design will then address instrument designs for a particular 
program and how the design can be influenced from the theoretical point of view. 
This analysis also considers relevant choice of instrument design by the five climate 
change policy criteria: effectiveness for reducing GHGs, cost effectiveness, 
distributional equity, administrative feasibility and political acceptability. 
The Evaluation of actual effectiveness then examines the effectiveness of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in the policy. It will examine five criteria; effectiveness for 
reducing GHGs, cost effectiveness, distributional equity, administrative feasibility and 
political acceptability. In terms of the criteria for effectiveness for reducing GHGs 
and cost effectiveness, distributional equity, administrative feasibility and political 
acceptability, this thesis will utilise individual benchmarks of the criteria and analyse 
how these elements are influenced during policy implementation. In considering 
governmental literature qualitatively, the methods will be further described in the 
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following chapter. Such qualitative analyses are also important to evaluate how policy 
activities are improved or delivered in terms of a successful policy instrument analysis 
in the policy. 
Discussion considers all the results from each stage of the instrument analysis of a 
particular program and discusses the influence of activities of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in considering the effects on the reduction of the national GHG emission. 
The details of the method will be further demonstrated in the next chapter. 
With respect to the development of the refined SIA approach, the thesis firstly 
considers the first element of the fundamental structure including that: focusing on 
instrument analysis is a central issue in public policy. More specifically, the 
Descriptive and Transformative Perspectives consider an analytical component of 
instrument trend uses of instrument activities for a certain period. Secondly, it also 
covers the second element of the fundamental structure: analysing relevant instrument 
choice in Analysis of Instrument Design. Thirdly, the third element of the fundamental 
structure: evaluating effectiveness of instruments is applied in Evaluation of Actual 
Effectiveness. Fourthly, this refined approach also establishes a discussion of the 
effectiveness of instruments, which considers the fourth element of the fundamental 
structure: seeking innovative, effective, applicable instruments to particular policy 
development. Lastly, this thesis will apply its SIA approach to Australian climate 
policy at the national level, which meets the demand for the fifth element of the 
fundamental structure of focusing on analysing instrument analysis for particular 
policy network. Furthermore, this approach also contains four priorities for GHG 
mitigation analysis, namely instrument design, successful GHG mitigation, program 
achievement and economic efficiency. These priorities will help the further 
development of each phase of the refined approach, in the context of the policy (i.e. 
descriptive, transformative perspectives, analysis of instrument design, actual 
effectiveness of instruments and discussion). This SIA method adopted is proposed as 
a fundamental approach for evaluating the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in climate change policy. The following chapter (Methodology) will 
further develop the detail of the SIA method. 
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2.2.2.5 Summary 
In respect of Effectiveness Analysis/ Method used for examination of the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate change policy, this thesis 
considers some key factors of the research contribution as discussed previously. Three 
key elements for the thesis approach were established, including: Lascoumes's 
fundamental structure and two principles for the instrument analysis for the policy (i.e. 
four priorities and five criteria). This thesis refined the most relevant approach for 
examination of the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the policy, by 
considering these three key elements of the instrument analysis. Finally, in 
considering these theoretical thoughts, this section has furthermore synthesised a 
variety of key aspects into five analytical perspectives: SIA method, which includes 
descriptive perspective, transformative perspective, analysis of instrument design, 
evaluation of actual effectiveness and discussion. 
2.2.3 Summary of Section Two 
Clues as to what frameworks and principles should be taken in order to provide the 
most suitable soft and hard policy instrument approach to the policy were provided in 
the second section of this chapter. This mainly attempts to develop the Identification 
& Trend Analysis/ Method and the Effectiveness Analysis/Method. Identification & 
Trend Analysis/ Method was derived from the 'instrumentalism' and 'coercive' 
analyses. Effectiveness Analysis/ Method synthesises a variety of points into five 
analytical perspectives: the SIA approach including: descriptive perspective; 
transformative perspective; analysis of instrument design; evaluation of actual 
effectiveness and discussion and innovation. The details of the Identification & Trend 
Analysis/Method and the Effectiveness Analysis/Method will be explained in the 
methodology chapter. The following section will conclude this chapter. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the details of the background and 
significance of this study and the analytical framework by outlining the conceptual 
development of its 'soft' and 'hard' instrument study. This clarifies which aspects of 
methods should be addressed in order to examine influence in the context of climate 
change policy, in order to fulfil the first aim of this overall thesis to develop methods 
for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
The first section of this chapter presented the background and significance of this 
study and the analytical framework by outlining the conceptual development of the 
'soft' and 'hard' instrument study, by looking at policy instrument literature and 'soft' 
and 'hard' policy instruments. A look at policy instrument literature confirms the 
importance of the thesis's contribution, and of what should be achieved throughout 
this study. In order to develop a soft and hard instrument approach to the policy there 
is a need to address a number of important and specific points: (i) overcoming the 
lack of their classification (ii) overcoming the lack of examination of the trend use 
and (iii) overcoming the lack of examination of the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 
'hard' instruments. 
In considering these three aspects, two major analytical methods are developed in this 
thesis. The first analytical method [Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method] is to 
assess how a nation allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments over a 
certain period, which develops the first and second aspects (i.e. the classification and 
examination of trend use). The second analytical method [Effectiveness Analysis/ 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Methods] is used to examine the effectiveness of 
'soft' versus 'hard' instruments in the policy, which develops the third aspect of 
developing methods for this study. 
The second section of this chapter aimed to address these essential points by 
attempting to examine clues as to what frameworks and principles should be adopted 
in order to provide the most suitable 'soft' and 'hard' policy instrument approach to 
the policy. It concluded the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method will be derived 
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from the instrumentation approach usmg 'instrumentalism' incorporated with 
'coercive analyses, which will be further examined in the following chapter. 
Moreover, a foundation for a method of examining the effectiveness of soft and hard 
instruments was developed through a synthesis of basic and policy specific principles 
of assessment for climate policy called the SIA method, which will be further 
described in the following chapter. The present chapter thus can conclude, having 
established a manner of developing a basis for classifying, identifying and examining 
soft and hard instrumental analysis, especially for climate change policy. 
The next chapter will further demonstrate the two methods and their applicability, and 
present ways to complete the first aim of this overall thesis, that is to develop methods 
for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in response to the 
reduction in GHG emissions. This will present a clear explanation of how it is 
possible to demonstrate the thesis outcome. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to develop the two methods selected in Chapter Three, 
namely: The Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method to identify trend use of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments, illustrating how a government allocates its adoption of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments during the design period of a climate change policy; and the 
Effectiveness Analysis/ Method to examine the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in a policy which contributes to reducing GHG emissions in a nation. The 
results in this chapter incorporated with the findings from Chapter Two complete the 
first aim of this overall thesis to develop methods for identifying the influence of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
There are three sections to this chapter. The first section develops and describes the 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method for identifying the trend use in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions. The second section of this chapter develops and describes 
the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method for examining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in climate policy. Finally, this chapter concludes, having presented 
the methods for addressing the first aim of this overall thesis to develop methods for 
identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG 
em1ss10ns. 
3 .1 Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method: to identify the 
trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments 
The following section develops the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method for 
examining the trend use in terms of reducing GHG emissions. In terms of developing 
the method, this thesis addressed two key aspects, namely: classifying policy 
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instruments; distinguishing 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. This section will firstly 
develop an approach for classifying instrument categories. Secondly, it will develop 
an approach for distinguishing 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. Both approaches will be 
considered from existing approaches in the historical context, and new instrument 
classification criteria, namely: 'instrumentalism' incorporated with 'coercive analysis' 
from the instrumentalist approach. Finally this chapter will conclude with a method 
for identifying the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate change policy. 
3.1.1 Approach for classification of climate policy instrument categories 
This section aims to introduce the method of classifying policy instrument categories 
in climate change policy. This is essential to classifying types of instruments, which 
helps to determine 'soft' or 'hard' instruments. In the previous chapter, this thesis 
concluded that a method for classifying instrument categories would be derived from 
an 'instrumentalist' approach as found in policy instrumentation literature. This 
section will thus consider ways of developing a classification of instrument categories 
by 'instrumentalism'. 
This section will firstly describe critical aspects of classification of instrument 
categories by 'instrumentalism'. Secondly it will describe a number of classification 
methods from the instrument literature, in the context of climate change policy, and 
will introduce six key instrument categories, including regulatory, 
voluntary/negotiated agreement, economic, research, information based and mixed 
instruments. It will then summarise the characteristics of these six instruments. 
Finally, this section will conclude with the approach of classifying climate policy 
instruments. 
3 .1.1.1 Critical aspects in 'Instrumentalism' 
With respect to a critical aspect of 'instrumentalism' in policy instrument study, this 
may be instrument categories in a particular policy context. Categorising instruments 
means identifying resources that governments can use to achieve their policy goals, 
which is very important to analysing a government policy approach (Bemelmans-
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Videc et al. 1998). Policy actors need to select instrument categories depending on 
particular policy objectives, such as climate change policy (Stavins 1997). Identifying 
characteristics of policy instruments is also essential in terms of understanding the 
abilities of government resources (Anderson 1977). Thus, categorising policy 
instruments is essential in terms of this thesis's analysis. The following section will 
attempt to select what instrument categories can be most applicable in terms of 
instrument analysis for climate change policy. 
3 .1.1.2 Instrument categories for Climate Policy 
Various categories for climate policy instruments at the national level14 can be found 
in the fields of academic and practical study: for instance Stavins (1997), The United 
Nations Environment Programme [UNEP] (2007), Okinomous and Jepma (2007) and 
The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change [IPCC] (2007). 
The classification of instrument categories tends to emphasise particular aspects of 
design and intention, depending on policy outcomes, delivery and process. 
Furthermore, these show merit when considering the different interventions of 
instruments in different ways (DEFRA 2005). However, five useful instruments can 
be distinguished here for the analysis of five useful instrument initiatives in order to 
identify the national instrument, including: regulatory, voluntary/negotiated 
agreement, economic, research, information based and mixed instruments. There are 
two reasons for this determination. Firstly, because these five classifications were 
basically used as indicators of classifying instruments in the Australian national 
reports to the United Nations in 2002 and 2005 (AGO 2002 and 2005). Another 
reason was to avoid the complexity of too much classification which becomes too 
14 Stavins (1997) identifies 'command and control and voluntary instruments (energy efficiency 
standards, product prohibitions, voluntary agreements) and market-based instruments (charges, fees, 
and taxes; tradable rights)'. The United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP] (2007) developed 
policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions in four categories including: 'control and regulatory 
instruments (normative and informative); economic and market-based instruments; fiscal instruments 
and incentives; and support, information and voluntary action'. Okinomous and Jepma (2007) 
developed six instrument categories emphasising their idea of 'policy interaction' for energy and 
climate change policy including 'subsidies, awareness, prescriptive, organisational measures, market-
based, and command-and-control". The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change [IPCC] (2007) 
suggested eight levels of instruments for reducing GHGs at the national level, including 'regulations 
and standards', 'taxes and charges', 'tradable permits, voluntary agreements', 'subsidies and 
incentives', 'information', 'research and development (R&D)' and 'non-climate policies'. 
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complicated and merely provides a more precise categorisation (Kirschen et al. 1964). 
Therefore, this thesis has adapted six categories to comprise its Classification of 
Climate Policy Instrument Categories [CCPIC] in considering these thoughts, as 
follows: 
Classification of Climate Policy Instrument Categories l~CPICJ 
• Regulatory 
• Voluntary/negotiated agreement 
• Economic 
• Research 
• Information based instruments (i.e. information and education) 
• Mixed instruments 
The following section, will summarise the characteristics of the six key instrument 
categories in CCPIC. The categories are described here in the following order: 
regulatory, voluntary/negotiated agreement, economic, research, information based 
and mixed instruments. 
Regulatory Instruments: Regulatory instruments cover a wide range of approaches, 
as the most traditional instrument, the so-called 'command and control' approach 
(IPCC 2007b). There are two phases of regulation types: 'performance standards' 
which set a limit on emissions and allow an emitter to choose how to meet the 
standards; and 'technology standards' which are requirements for specific design and 
operation (IPCC 2007b). Government ensures individual emitters must undertake to 
meet their environmental targets and to control their non acceptance by demanding 
financial penalties for non compliance (Okinomou et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
regulatory activities provide for direct or indirect intervention to achieve emission 
control15 . 
Voluntary/negotiated agreements: Voluntary instruments include voluntary and 
negotiated agreements. They are usually conducted by providers or individual firms in 
consultation or negotiation with a public authority and agency. Their effectiveness is 
15 Direct and indirect intervention include: '[rationing and prescription (e.g. emission quota, mandatory 
technologies and procedures), performance standards and benchmarks (e.g. total material requirement 
and building performance standards)'. Perrels, Adriaan 2001. "Efficiency and Effectiveness of Policy 
Instruments: Concepts and Practice". Workshop on Good Practices in Policies and Measures, 8-10 
October 2001, Copenhagen. 
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enhanced if they are implemented with other policies in terms of achieving their 
desired performance (Okinomou et al. 2007). Not all voluntary instruments are purely 
voluntary; some agreements can contain penalties or rewards systems along with 
participation in the agreement or accomplishment of the commitments between firms 
and government (IPCC 2007b ). Voluntary instruments delegate a large degree of 
freedom to companies, the public or agencies within the framework of persuasion or a 
negotiated context such as emission permit trading, green certificates and other 
negotiated agreements, and can be mixed with other instruments (Parrels 2001). 
Voluntary instruments can be described as 'unilateral commitments', 'self-regulatton', 
'public voluntary schemes or voluntarism: voluntary challenge', 'voluntarism: 
voluntary challenge', 'voluntarism: negotiated agreement', and 'co-regulation or joint 
liability agreements' .16 
Economic instruments: Economic instruments are defined as pnce signals to 
consumers and producers and reminders of the external costs, benefits of goods and 
activities (OECD 2002). Two dimensions exist in the phase of economic instruments: 
'incentives' and 'disincentives' (Bemelmans et al. 1998) or market-based instruments' 
(OECD 1994). Incentives are defined as 'affirmative, promoting, encouraging' such 
as subsidies, grants, and loan exemptions. On the other hand, disincentives are defined 
as 'negative, restraining, discouraging' such as taxes, charges, and fees (Bemelmans et 
al. 1998). In terms of climate change policy, carbon tax and charges and carbon 
emission trading permits are critical fiscal interventions (Okinomou et al. 2007). Thus 
incentives in climate change policy are subsidies, tax credits and vouchers, grants and 
loans. Disincentives include emission tax and charges, and carbon emission trading 
permits and quotas. The range of functions can either increase the price of polluting to 
the polluter or decrease the price of being cleaner, and thereby encourage more action 
16 Unilateral commitments: Unilateral commitment between individual companies or associations. Self-
regulation: Individual codes of practice between individual companies and/or NGOs. Voluntarism: 
Voluntary challenge: Initiatives set by governments for rules and conditions but free-participation. 
Voluntarism: Negotiated agreement: formal contracts between industry and public sectors and 
authorities but no penalties for non achievement. Co-regulation or joint liability agreements: formal 
contracts between industry and public sectors and authorities with penalties for non-meeting objectives 
and/or noncompliance, depending on existing constitutions. These are based on: Borkey and Leveque 
(2000) with 'unilateral commitments, public voluntary schemes, and negotiated agreements'; Bailey 
and Rupp (2005) with 'Joint liability agreements' or 'coregulation'; and Paton (2002) with 'unilateral 
initiatives, provide codes, voluntary changes, and negotiated agreements'; Gunningham and Grabosky 
(1998) with 'unilateral initiatives, self regulation, voluntarism/voluntary changes, and 
voluntarism/negotiated agreements'. 
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to invest in energy efficiency, abatement and fuel switching or renewable energy 
(Perrels 2001). 
Research instruments: Research instruments are often termed Research & 
Development [R&D] instruments, which are significantly useful for developing 
energy efficiency (Okinomou et al 2007) and have the potential to contribute to the 
transformation to a low carbon society with reduced greenhouse gas emissions 
(European Communities 2007). This type of instrument involves direct government 
funds and investments that are intended to generate innovative approaches for 
mitigation and adaptation, and the physical and social infrastructure for greenhouse 
gas emission abatement (IPCC 2007b ). 
Information-based instruments: Information-based instruments include education, 
awareness and campaigns. These may contribute to the public's standard knowledge 
of climate change policy (Okinomou et al. 2007). Information devices can be 
acknowledged as public disclosure requirements, and may positively affect 
environmental quality by informing consumers or polluters of the lack of information 
availability for the environmental consequence of their activities, initiatives, and 
support, but are criticised as well as inefficiently costly and burdensome. However, 
the instruments themselves basically do not have any capabilities for penalising 
environmentally harmful behaviour (IPCC 2007b ). Three phases of information-based 
instruments can be described as 'publication availability', 'education and awareness', 
'public disclosure' .17 
Various Mixes: Mixed instruments indicate that a policy activity is classified as a 
multiple instrument choice. This categorises a policy program as a mixed approach 
and is not counted within more precise categories by the other five instruments which 
were described above. The table below illustrates simple instrument classification. 
17
'publication availability': information availability is supplied to the public. 'education and awareness' 
includes public education, awareness and campaign and training. 'Public disclosure' includes 
certification, award, licence, reporting requirements and labelling and rating. 
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Chart 3.1: CCPIC 
Instruments Elements 
Regulatory instruments Technological standard: Rationing and prescription (e g Em1ss1on quota, mandatory 
technologies and procedures) Performance standards and benchmarks (e.g. total 
material requirement and building performance standards) Financial penalties for non 
compliance 
Voluntary/negotiated Voluntary part1c1pat1on, initiatives and act1v1t1es Negotiated agreement between emitters, 
agreement between emitters and government 
Economic instruments 'Incentives' includes· subs1d1es, grants and loan exemptions 'D1s1ncent1ves' include. 
em1ss1on tax and charges, and carbon em1ss1on trading permits and quotas 
R&D instruments Research and Technology Development 
Information-based instruments Education, tra1mng, awareness and campaigns, publication ava1lab11ity 
Mixed instruments Combine more than one single instrument 
This section described the types of instruments and types of instrument classification 
in historical contexts. In terms of classifying climate policy instruments, the CCPIC 
approach developed here has included six instrument categories, namely: regulatory, 
voluntary/ negotiated agreement, economic, research and information-based and 
mixed instruments. The six categories are essential tools in order to demonstrate the 
trend use of instrument design and will form the basis here of identifying 'soft' and 
'hard' instrument activities for climate change policy. These types are useful in 
identifying general trend use in climate change policy but are not sensitive to levels of 
government coercion in policy programs, which is an important factor to consider 
when looking to analyse policy use and effectiveness. Thus, the following section 
further develops an approach for determining the level of coerciveness between 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments. 
3.1.2 Approach for determination of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments 
The objective of this section is to introduce the approach used to distinguish 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in order to examine the trend use of instrument coerciveness 
utilised in climate change policy. Firstly, this thesis will examine ways to characterise 
the relations between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the historical context of 
'coercive analysis' in the instrumentation study. Secondly, it will demonstrate the 
approach to determine whether an instrument is 'soft' or 'hard'. Finally, this section 
will conclude with the thesis's proposals for how instrument design can be classified 
as either 'soft' or 'hard' in the context of climate change policy in a particular nation. 
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3.1.2.1 Historical studies on 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in 'Coercive Analysis' 
As decided in the previous chapter, this thesis, developed a method for distinguishing 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments, derived from 'coercive analysis' in the policy 
instrumentation study. In the historical context of 'coercive analysis', a range of 
schemes has been proposed for 'instrument categorisation' to determine the relations 
between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
With respect to the basic knowledge and frameworks used for government resources 
under policy instrument categorisation, Cushman (1941) classified the differences as 
'coercive' and 'less coercive' or 'non-coercive' from the institutional perspective with 
regard to size, structure and interim mechanisms. Anderson (1977) further developed 
theories for 'voluntary' instruments utilising 'non-intervention' methods (i.e. market 
mechanisms, civil society and household) and 'mandatory' instruments utilising 
'intervention' (i.e. structured options, biased options and regulation). Hood (1986), 
categorised criteria for distinguishing the level of 'soft' and 'hard' with four elements, 
including 'nodality, authority, treasure and organisation'. McDonnell and Elmore 
(1987) explored the differences in relations in terms of instrument effectiveness and 
classified 'mandate, inducements, capacity-building and system-changing'. Schneider 
and Ingram (1990) suggested that the differences are based on 'behavioural demotions 
of policy instruments'; which can be categorised into these elements 'incentives, 
capacity-building, symbolic and horizontal learning'. 
After these developments, analysts started to question the 'degree of coercion' of 
instruments, and further work was developed as a basis for these historical instrument 
studies. Doern and Phidd (1992) offered an explanation of relations between 'self-
regulation' through to 'public ownership' and indicated that all policy communities 
can be divided into two streams: governmental and private knowledge. Ayers and 
Braithwaite (1992) also classified instruments with three levels of restriction by 
'power, incentives persuasion and education'. More specifically, Howlett and Ramesh 
(1995) focused on the relationships between regulatory and non-regulatory 
classification, and considered 'voluntary instruments' and 'compulsory instruments' 
based on 'voluntary (i.e. family and community, voluntary organisation); mixed based 
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(market, information and exhortation, subsidies, action of property rights, tax and user 
charges offsets); and regulatory (regulation, public enterprise and direct provision)'. 
In practical terms, with respect to environmental policy, including climate change 
policy, instrument studies tend to focus more on an 'optimal mix', whereby 
environmental instrument design requires a better use of environmental regulations 
with uncertainties regarding the voluntary basis for complex issues. While 
environmental instrument design focuses on more mixed solutions, identifying the 
relations between 'soft' and 'hard' classification becomes more complex. However, 
Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) identified 'unilateral initiatives, self regulation, 
voluntarism, voluntarism with negotiated agreements', with emphasis on a smart 
design of regulation. Welch and Hibiki (2003) further distinguished coercive and non-
coercive bargaining relationships between government and industry by using more 
institutional factors in order to make better voluntary environment agreements and 
ensure that they are effective. 
Price (2005) divided relationships based upon implementation with voluntary 
agreements programs into three broad categories: completely voluntary; persuading 
actions such as threatening the future implementation of regulations or GHG emission 
taxes as a motivation for involvement; and strong policy frameworks incorporating 
incentives and penalties. It is concluded here that it is essential for voluntary 
agreements to include stringent requirements for firms to manage their energy use and 
GHG emissions in order to meet their reduction targets and to report their progress to 
government. The relationship between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments can be examined 
for differences in instrument characteristics, however, they can also become more 
mixed and complicated, with analysis attempted to identify relationships between 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments such as the level of government control. More 
specifically, with respect to environmental policy, analysis has focused on relations 
based on connections between government, private firms and the public in order to 
meet specific policy targets such as reducing GHG emissions. 
Sullivan and Wyndham (2001 ), acknowledged how illustrating the relations between 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments including policy influences and outcomes, tends to lead 
to uncertainty, especially where mixed instruments are applied. This is because 
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regulatory or voluntary instruments generally do not exist individually in a given 
context and are usually combined with a variety of other instruments which again 
depend on policy targets (Sullivan and Wyndham 2001). This reveals that the 
historical context of 'coercive analysis' including 'instrument categorisation' and 
'degree of coercion' has not yet proposed a clear means of illustrating how to 
distinguish whether an instrument is 'soft' or 'hard'. Thus there is a need to develop a 
simple and clear method of identifying how 'soft' and 'hard' instruments can be 
classified. In the following section, this thesis examines how such a method could be 
developed to distinguish between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
3.1.2.2 Determination of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments 
This section will demonstrate an approach that can be used to distinguish between 
'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments. As described in the previous chapter, the 
classification of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments can be defined as: the level of 
governmental power, pressure and stress on the public. Moreover, policy instruments 
are a package of techniques under the power of government authorities to ensure 
support and effect social change to their goals. Policy will not work appropriately if a 
government does not utilise its power with policy instruments to ensure the public 
meets its own social expectations (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998: 1-21). Furthermore, 
policy instrument analysis reveals a theorisation of relationships between the 
governing and the governed. Every instrument involves a form of knowledge about 
social control (i.e ownership by governments and/or privates) and ways of practicing 
it. Policy instruments thus mean a form of power (Halpern et al. 2008). Given this, the 
actual class of instrument coerciveness or power relations can be regarded as the level 
of social control by instrument uses associated with the power of ownership. In other 
words, policy instruments provided by a government means the government has the 
ownership of the instrument coerciveness. Therefore, the government provides social 
control by using instruments in order to achieve its policy goals. The understanding of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments thus reveals coerciveness/ power relations: which in this 
thesis will refer to the level of social control by instrument uses by governments. 
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In order to devise a simple and clear method of identifying power relations, this 
section attempts to distinguish between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. It will examine 
several perspectives: government intervention; environmental and climate change 
policy; and consideration of studies on the power relations of instruments. The 
examination will also consider adapting any relative identities between 'soft' and 
'hard' whereby 'soft' instruments may be recognised as non-coercive and less 
coercive, non-mandatory and voluntary, and 'hard' instruments may be recognised as 
coercive, mandatory and regulatory. 
3.1.2.2.1 Governmental Intervention 
Coercive ('hard') instruments are often referred to as rules or any interventions by 
government to steer the economy and can be seen as mechanisms of social control 
(Scott 2003). Moreover, regulations are simply the legal tools that support the 
functions of forming structure, monitoring and enforcement (Foley 2004). On the 
other hand, voluntary 'soft' instruments are intended to have a sense of non 
coerciveness or less coerciveness in order to avoid costly policy actions for 
environmental policy; private companies especially do not typically wish to accept 
legislated consequences. This type of instrument is therefore often based on: non legal 
binding rules; stringent monitoring and enforcement with guidance to meet objectives; 
timeframes; and public disclosure (OECD 2003b). Furthermore, 'soft' instruments 
also avoid negative impacts in terms of administrative costs for regulators, excessive 
regulation and afford greater flexibility to avoid objectives-specific target setting and 
achieving, controversial implementation, and also remove the necessity for legislation 
(Nunan 1999). Judgment regarding the level of governing intervention is essential in 
order to classify whether an instrument is binding or non-binding (Highley and 
Leveque 2001). In terms of identifying governmental intervention, it is also important 
to address whether there is strong educational and financial support (incentives) 
attributed by government, including technical support or training for the public or 
firms, which may encourage further public awareness and development of new 
technologies and practices. Furthermore, there is a need to ensure that there is strong 
intervention to support particular actions that give the public and private firms 
incentives to take further initiatives (Burritt et al. 2005). Governments need to 
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legislate for penalties for non involvement and noncompliance from the private and 
public sectors (Price 2005). 
Given this background, it is obvious that 'soft' and 'hard' instruments can be 
classified as the level of government intervention. More specifically, several 
parameters can be determined by the level, including legal requirements, financial 
penalties, administrative rules, -prohibitions and market solutions. However, 
Gunningham et al (1998) state that governments controlling the level of their 
interventions are dependent on purposes of different policy outcomes for the 
appropriate policy activities. Thus, in order to understand a particular distinction of 
whether instruments are 'soft' or 'hard', it is necessary to know particular policy 
circumstances and outcomes. The following section will examine levels of 
coerciveness in the field of environmental and climate change policy. 
3.1.2.2.2 Environmental and climate change policy 
With respect to environmental policy instruments, 'soft' instruments are more popular 
than 'hard' instruments. A voluntary environmental policy such as climate change 
policy tends to aim at meeting its targets without employing direct coercion through 
law or inducing change by altering relative prices, and includes voluntary, procedural 
and information-based policy (Hertin et al. 2004). The voluntary approach ('soft') by 
government is sometimes found to have no penalties for noncompliance, and freedom 
to create 'windfall win-win systems' by individual industry approaches to find 
equitable approaches for polluters taking responsibility for their actions (O'Brien and 
Vourc'h 2001). These voluntary based instruments ('soft') can also be defined as 
'persuasive instruments' that seek to motivate more environmentally friendly 
behaviour without imposing direct policy 'sticks' or 'carrots' (Rupp and Bailey 2003). 
The 'soft' instrument model in the field of environmental policy is also not intended 
to restrict participation, but rather to encourage industry and the public to maintain 
their social responsibility (Jordan et al. 2005). In the context of climate change policy, 
the non-binding model does not stress competitiveness or levy systems (i.e. tax, 
trading permits and trading green energy certificates), which might have a negative 
impact on industry or the general public ( e.g there could be a costly burden if there 
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are not enough incentives) (OECD 2001a). Moreover, legally binding 'contractual 
improvements' are essential for strong governmental support that may restrict 
companies in terms of their desired outcomes but allow further enhancement of the 
effectiveness of GHG policy, which is not meant to be restricted in a non-binding 
model (Taplin 2004). On the other hand, these systems may promote environmental 
equity and encourage the public or industry to take action regarding GHG emission 
abatement (OECD 2001b). In the meantime, in analysing the relationships between 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments, a number of analysts have also demonstrated the 
particular effectiveness of the level of coerciveness of policy instruments including: a 
better regulatory framework for environmental policy; alternative regulatory systems 
for environmental policy; and effectiveness of environmental voluntary agreements 
influenced by government incentives and penalties (Gunningham et al. 1998). These 
aspects should not be ignored in this study, and will be further explained in the 
following section. 
3.1.2.2.3 Consideration of studies by other analysts of instrument power relations 
In the context of the power relations between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, Ayers and 
Braithwaite (1992) have developed an improved regulatory framework for 
environmental policy. Their 'responsive regulation' explains certain stages where 
governments utilise and self regulate without non-direct and non-invasive responses. 
According to this approach, analysing the level of regulation is very important to how 
effectively individual firms have self motivated to regulate themselves. It also 
suggests that initial response to the demanded behaviour arises from persuasive 
classification to encourage self-action, and then may need to escalate to more punitive 
responses that1 directly influence behaviour. Gunningham et al. (1998) also 
reconceptualise alternative regulatory systems for environmental policy, and 
emphasise a shift from traditional, hierarchical regulation towards a different set of 
instruments in making environmental policy by expanding enforcement faces. 
Accordingly, three types of faces are on a pyramid for regulatory instruments: 
'government as regulatory', 'business as self regulator', and 'external agents as 
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regulator,1 8. Utilisation of traditional government intervention is essential and can be 
effective. However, the authors also emphasise that it can be very effective when 
self-regulation places some restrictions on the business and there would be a more 
powerful restriction with integration with external agents controlling by their 
observation such as a governmental independent body, or professionals employed by 
government to monitor or report environmental actions. 
Another approach concerns power relations between government and emitters. Price 
(2005) demonstrated that relationships exist between the difference in power of 
voluntary environmental agreements and their effectiveness to meet private 
companies' GHG emission targets. Price also concluded that completely voluntary 
agreements have less government pressure for participation, which is associated with 
fewer incentives and no penalties. She also notes that more restriction, in practice, 
tends to contain a more incentive-based approach with less stress on regulated 
sanction. This results in having the strongest agreement with much higher incentive 
intervention and increased regulations or taxes similar to penalties. Welch and Hibiki 
(2003) also note that to ensure strong participation to achieve particular targets, 
government often considers more costly and legislated sanctions such as penalties for 
noncompliance and nonparticipation. 
In this light, government interventions have influenced policy instrument activities. 
Furthermore, they are better combined with voluntary agreement frameworks in the 
context of climate change policy; for instance, self-regulation and third party 
involvement can be considered as a significant factor of government intervention. 
This study should not ignore such 'alternative instrument uses' with various power 
interrelations as suggested by some analysts. However, in this study, self-regulation 
and third party involvement are not regarded as a government intervention. There is 
also a need to consider a broad level of government intervention integrated with a 
particular emphasis upon incentives and penalties not only for voluntary systems but 
also other systems such as regulatory ones, and a need to measure their influence with 
respect to their climate policy targets. However, this thesis will place more emphasis 
18 the first face is the traditional 'government as regulatory'; the second is 'business as self regulator'; 
and the third is 'external agents as regulator'; which has power to oversee self-regulation (e.g. 
Environmental Management Systems [EMSs ]). 
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on determining the simple classification of 'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments. This 
thesis will also focus on establishing the specific key elements of functional policy 
activities, such as examining whether a national program is a 'soft' or 'hard' 
instrument by looking at a number of key elements such as setting targets and 
monitoring systems, rather than measuring degrees of reliability of persuasion or 
restriction or balance between the restriction and cost effectiveness under an 
instrument. 
Given this background, this thesis will adapt four perspectives to distinguish the level 
of coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, through a number of functional 
elements for 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, namely: government intervention; legal 
requirements, financial penalties, administrative rules; prohibitions; market solutions; 
specific demands in environmental and climate change policy; and consideration of 
studies by analysts on the power relations of instruments. 
Chart 3.2: Determination between 'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Instruments [DSHCI] 
1. Information Provision (e g information support) 
2. Educabonal Support by Government (e g. technical support, training, and education) 
3. Incentives and Subsidies by Government (e g government's financial supports) 
4. Specific and Measurable Emission Reduction Targets in a program (e g quantified and ideal is realistic) 
5. Timeframe in a program (e.g clear measurable timeline identified as short, medium and long term) 
6. Guidance or Guidelines for implementation (e g details of 1mplementat1on audited or licensed by government 
authorities) 
7. Monitonng (e g act1v1t1es are monitored or certified by government authorities) 
8. Reporting and Certification (e g penod1cally, annually and with quantitative reports on their actions Targets are 
reported or certified by government authorities) 
9. Auditing, Reviewing and Cerbfication (e g reports are audited, reviewed or certified by government authont1es) 
10 Public Disclosure (e g public recognition mandatorily required by governments) 
11. Committed Contractual Improvement (e g. mandatonly committed to by government) 
12. Any Market Device or creation of competitiveness (e.g. em1ss1on trading, tax systems, green certificates) 
13. Government Regulation for Standards (e g building codes or energy performance standards) 
14. Government Penalty of Polluter Pays (e g legally required) 
.----~~~~~~~~~~~-'-~~~~ 
15. Government Penalty for Nonparticipation (e g same as above) Level of Instrument Dominance 
16. Government Penalty for Noncompliance (e.g. same as above) 
17. Government Penalty for Failure to Meet Targets (e.g same as above) 
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In terms of distinguishing between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy, the 
thesis has developed its own DSHCI approach with seventeen criteria, which focus on 
the level of instrument dominances with key criteria to classify the 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument designs of a national government in terms of reducing GHG emissions. All 
of the criteria listed above are to be considered together. These criteria may also help 
policy makers appreciate which level of coerciveness of policy instruments is 
employed by government initiatives. 
On the bottom right of the chart, it is also indicated that there are four levels 
established in each of the criteria, used for determining whether instruments are soft 
or hard, and these are: least dominant, moderately dominant, highly dominant and 
most dominant. Least dominant refers to the softest instruments. Moderately dominant 
refers to relatively softer instruments. Highly dominant refers to relatively harder 
instruments, whereas most dominant refers to the hardest instruments. As previously 
mentioned, they are simply defined in this study as functional key elements of 
evaluating the level of instrument coerciveness. The relative levels, moderately 
dominant and highly dominant, divide these two extremes. Instruments are 
categorised within this four level scheme in accordance with their makeup in terms of 
these 1 7 key elements in the criteria. This measurement scale allows for a simple and 
clear classification of the level of coercion between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
3 .1.2.3 Criteria designed in DSHCI 
Each criterion allows us to address a different aspect of dominance of a particular 
policy instrument in order to determine whether an instrument is 'soft' or 'hard'. 
Information Provision is defined as an information support by a government. 
Information provision may be a symbolic action of government intervention for any 
initiatives for emission activities. Voluntary initiatives often rely on this support 
(Hertin et al. 2004). Educational support is defined as an educational intervention by 
a government including technical support and training. This may promote 
technological development and public awareness but may also discourage a large 
industry if there is not enough power and knowledge in the government (Burritt et al. 
2005). Financial grants and Incentives and subsidies represent other government 
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interventions, used to ensure substantial development by promoting fiscal initiatives 
(OECD 2001a). These incentives can provide awards or financial support to develop 
technologies in firms and the public by way of encouragement (Burritt et al. 2005). 
Specific and measurable emission reduction targets: that governments enforce 
activities to ensure that clear objectives and targets are met, especially with quantified 
measures (i.e. government can easily measure the outcomes) for particular program 
activities regarding climate change policy. In the case of 'non-coercive' instruments, 
which allow for free choice, private or public interests often prefer to set their own 
targets rather than have targets set by government (Nunan 1999). Timeframe: refers to 
government-based timelines for short, medium and long-term targets. Guidance and 
monitoring, and reporting and certification: governments often intervene in private or 
public activities to provide guidance in order to make accurate adjustments and to 
enhance effectiveness (OECD 2004). For monitoring and reporting and certification, 
it is important that governments require: annual reports and quantitative reports on 
their actions toward the targets (Foley 2004). However, there are still some 
uncertainties regarding the quality of judgments under different institutional regimes, 
such as direct monitoring processes by governments, self reporting systems by 
individual emitters, or mediated reporting schemes between emitters and third parties 
(offered by government) (OECD 2004). With regard to the elements guidelines, 
monitoring and reporting and certification', these address whether direct government 
intervention dominates in an instrument design. 
Public disclosure is another key element of government intervention. Governments 
can enforce public recognition to expose the nature of policy activities, individual 
efforts, and progress (OECD 2004). Committed contractual improvement is a 
commitment with government between private and/or public interests, in which they 
must consider further improvement of addressed issues through their reviews (Taplin 
2004). Market competition includes carbon trading, tax systems and green certificates, 
and allows government control systems to encourage market activities in climate 
change policy activities in the private and public sectors. The elements may also 
encourage technology developments and create equity with environmental activities 
and sustainability integrated into economic solutions for global climate issues. 
However, there are still uncertainties regarding global integration and potential 
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financial risks; for instance, one country adapts and the other does not, which may 
render actions ineffective (OECD 2001b). Regulation for any standards in 
governments by which governments ensure that firms utilise their technology or 
products to establish a baseline for the minimum level of emission technologies and 
performances; such as building codes, labelling, and product standards (Bruneau 2005 
and UNEPCEU 2007). Penalty of polluter pays: government imposes environmental 
equity and polluter responsibility on emitters. Penalty for nonparticipation, penalty 
for noncompliance, and penalty for failure to meet targets; governments penalise 
firms for their activities with nonparticipation, compliance and meeting their targets, 
following powerful governmental intervention (O'Brien and Vourc'h 2001). 
This section developed an approach for determining 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy 
instruments. Firstly, it described historical approaches. It then examined clues to 
classifying 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, and found several key perspectives in order 
to determine the classification of 'soft' or 'hard', namely: government intervention, 
environmental and climate change policy and the considerations of instrumental 
power relations by scientists for policy instrument activities regarding climate change 
policy. Finally, this section established the DSHCI approach for determining 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments with 17 elements including four levels of instrument 
dominance: least dominant, moderately dominant, highly dominant and most 
dominant. The following section will summarise Identification & Trend Analysis/ 
Method for identifying the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
3.1.3 Summary 
This section has presented the first part of this current chapter. It aimed at developing 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method for identifying the trend use in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions in climate change policy. Two approaches are developed for 
the aim. The approach is used for classifying climate policy instruments. It concluded 
that this thesis has adapted the CCPIC approach comprising six instrument categories 
[regulatory, voluntary/voluntary agreement, economic, research, information-based 
and mixed instruments]. The second approach is used for distinguishing between 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate change policy. The DSHCI approach was 
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developed with the method with 1 7 criteria which focus on the level of instrument 
dominances under the instrument designs of a national government in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions. Both approaches will be incorporated in terms of 
examining the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate change policy as 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method. 
3 .2 Effectiveness Analysis/ Method: to evaluate the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy 
The second part of this chapter develops Effectiveness Analysis/ Method for 
examining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy. The 
method will develop key elements of the SIA approach, as concluded previously. Five 
stages are included in the SIA approach: descriptive perspective, transformative 
perspective, instrument intervention analysis, evaluation of actual effectiveness and 
innovation and discussion. Each stage requires different aspects. This section will 
firstly describe the SIA in each stage. This section will then conclude with the method 
to be employed in this thesis for an approach to analysing the effectiveness of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments in reducing GHGs in climate change policy. 
3.2.1 Descriptive Perspective 
Descriptive perspective is the first stage of the SIA approach for examining the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate change policy. The method 
aims to describe the background of a case study evaluating the effectiveness of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments. Vedung (2008) suggests that, in practical terms, an instrument 
analysis should emphasise 'ends and means'-analysis. More specifically, the analysis 
needs to identify what goals are centralised in the policy targets. It also needs to 
ascertain what performance indicators are clearly designed. Thirdly, it needs to reveal 
what range of instruments is incorporated. Lastly, it needs to show how these 
instruments are combined in terms of reaching targets in a particular period. 
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This thesis adapts a number of the above elements in broad terms, in order to 
construct a descriptive perspective of a particular case study, for example, primary 
target, time line, instrument approach and performance indicators. 
3.2.2 Transformative Perspective 
Transformative perspective is the second stage of the SIA. The Identification & Trend 
Analysis/ Method in this stage aims to illustrate trend use of policy instruments for 
case studies. This Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method identifies what types of 
instrument are adapted over time, and examines trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments over the same period. 
Firstly, the transformative perspective will describe what types of instrument are 
adapted in a case study over time by using the six key instrument categories, 
including regulatory, voluntary/negotiated agreement, economic, research, 
information based and mixed instruments. This approach allows this thesis to identify 
any change of instruments in the case study over the timeline. Secondly, it examines 
the transformation of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments during times of change by utilising 
the method previously developed for determining 'soft' and 'hard' instruments for 
climate change policy. This examination will clearly demonstrate the instrument 
adaptation (i.e. instrument classification and 'soft' and 'hard' ideology) over time. 
3.2.3 Analysis of Instrument Design 
This part will detail a method for analysis of instrument design, which is the third 
stage of the SIA. As discussed previously, this thesis adapts five major criteria19 for 
climate change policy regarding the reduction of GHGs. Furthermore, this thesis, in 
the previous section of this chapter, also categorised instruments into six types, 
19 These are effectiveness of reducing GHGs, cost effectiveness, distributional equity, political 
acceptability, and administrative feasibility. 
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namely: regulatory, voluntary/negotiated agreement, economic, research, information 
based instruments and mixed instruments2°. 
Jaccard et al. (2004) state that establishing criteria for describing and analysing both 
'conventional policy options' and 'critical instrument innovation', is necessary to 
create the most relevant instrument analysis for climate change policy theoretically 
and practically. The 'policy options' require instrument categorisations and should be 
selected in different ways for different policy purposes. They also state that a policy 
may be politically acceptable, but may not be able to achieve the intended 
environmental target. A policy may be productive, but may not be administratively 
feasible or cost-effective. While no policy performs perfectly against critical criteria 
for reducing GHG emissions, some do better than others. Thus the theoretical 
relationships between the selected criteria against the categorised instruments should 
be identified clearly in order to present the most appropriate instrument analysis. 
This section will firstly demonstrate details and characteristics of each of the five 
selected criteria for climate change policy (i.e. effectiveness of reducing GHGs, cost 
effectiveness, distributional equity, political acceptability, and administrative 
feasibility). It will then examine the particular characteristics of each of the 
categorised instruments (regulatory; voluntary/negotiated agreement; economic; 
research; information based instruments) against the selected criteria for instrument 
analysis, which covers characteristics, strength and weakness. Finally, it will conclude 
with the development of the method for theoretical instrument analysis for climate 
change instrument design. 
3.2.3.1 Characteristics of the five criteria 
The following section examines the characteristics of the five selected criteria for 
evaluation of climate change policy instruments: environmental effectiveness for 
GHG emissions, cost effectiveness, distributional equity, political acceptability and 
administrative acceptability. 
20 
'Various mixes' is not categorised as a particular characteristic of an instrument. Therefore, for a 
theoretical instrument analysis, it is not considered. 
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3.2.3.1.1. Environmental effectiveness for GHG emissions 
As mentioned before, to identify effectiveness for GHG emissions means that policy 
achieves particular environmental objectives (Sorrell and Sijm 2003). Addressing 
environmental effectiveness especially in terms of achievement or failure helps us to 
distinguish actual contribution to GHG mitigations (OECD 2001a). The results also 
allow policy makers to judge and estimate to what extent particular instruments may 
influence GHG mitigations (Harrington et al. 2004). Moreover, this criterion allows 
us to analyse the direction of particular program targets, which provides appropriate 
guidance for the future instrument selections for environmental effectiveness 
regarding climate change policy (Ellerman 2006). 
3.2.3.1.2. Cost effectiveness 
Cost effectiveness allows us to identify the instrument selection in achieving a 
particular program goal with the desired lowest costs, or with meeting the determined 
costs including the direct costs of processes for administration and implementation of 
the policy, as well as indirect costs (IPCC 2007b ). This criterion determines which 
instruments can be cost-effective for an overall environmental policy. This is because 
a specific environmental target often has a huge impact on the total cost of a policy, 
even ifthe target is promoted on the basis of cost-effective environmental instruments 
(Sterner 2003). This criterion also allows us to assess the timing for adapting costly 
instruments, given the need sometimes to wait for instruments until they become 
available. For instance, creating new institutions or establishing new high cost 
technologies will incur high economic impacts on policy compliance if no such 
facilities already exist. Thus, the ideal in terms of costs may be to ensure limiting the 
creation of facilities and simplifying the implementation process as much as possible 
(IPCC 2007b). Lastly, ex-ante and ex-post evaluations frequently reveal discrepancies. 
This criterion allows policy makers to judge whether the costs of particular program 
goals have been overestimated. An expense estimate given by instrument selection 
often shows that the cost of generating market-based instruments tends to be higher 
than estimates by other means (Harrington et al. 2000). Thus there is a need for 
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careful determination of the appropriate cost estimation for future selections by 
comparison with past records. 
3. 2. 3.1. 3 Distributional equity 
There are three dominant key elements in distributional equity: equity, responsibility 
and environmental sustainability. Equity is a key significant element for consideration 
in terms of instrument assessment for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and gives 
us an idea of whether the instrument choice has sufficiently considered distribution of 
emissions rights, compliance costs and interest among countries or sectors 
(Vaillancourt et al. 2004). The possible consideration of equity can be considered 
broadly as 'global & intergenerational' (IPCC 2001) 21 , and 'intra-country equity' 
(Scrimgeour et al. 2005). 22 Another key element, is responsibility (ability to pay), 
which can ensure whether there is power or the capability to control and limit 
polluters producing emissions, for example via penalties or levies (Goulder 2000). 
Environmental sustainability is another significant element deserving consideration in 
climate change policy. Sustainability requires an individual program to meet a long 
term perspective to reduce GHG emissions step by step considering social, 
environmental and economical aspects (IPCC 2007b ). If there is not enough financial 
support from governments for public or individual emitters, they may not reach either 
environmental or their financial and social goals. Therefore, in this case, the level of 
sustainability is inappropriate (Riggs 2004). These three key elements: equity, 
responsibility and environmental sustainability, should thus be considered in terms of 
estimating the level of distributional equity. 
2 1Global equity is defined as degree of fairness in international terms, while intergenerational equity 
addresses the immediate actions in jurisdictions at the same level (e.g. national, state and local), in 
terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. I IPCC. 200 I. Climate Change 200 I: Mitigation. URL: 
<www.grida.no/climate/ipcc tar/wg3/228.htmS.>. Consulted 12 July 2008 
22 
*Intra-country equity provides a national perspective, and has two aspects, namely that national 
instruments can be examined in terms of sector and social equity. Sector equity is defined as a level of 
equity among different national sectors, and social equity is defined as a level of fairness among 
different groups . For instance, one sector may use only incentive based instruments but the others may 
focus more on legislative or technical solutions, which should be horizontally equitable. Scrimgeour, F., 
L.Oxley, and K. Fatai. 2005. 'Reducing carbon emissions? The relative effectiveness of different types 
of environmental tax: the case ofNew Zealand'. Environmental Modelling & Software 20: 1439- 1448. 
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3.2.3.1.4 Political acceptability 
Jaccard et al stated that, in terms of evaluating GHG policy effectiveness, some policy 
analysts prefer to define equity instead of political acceptahility. However, the authors 
also recognise that defining political acceptability makes it much easier to identify the 
instrument values and effectiveness because elements of the level of equity may be 
hard to define and may sometimes be invisible. They thus suggested that a way to 
define the value of political acceptability is essential to ensure whether politicians can 
find sufficient assistance to implement a policy (Jaccard et al. 2004). 
Three major elements are used for the criteria of political acceptability in this thesis, 
namely: making a global contribution, market ideology and flexibility. Making a 
global contribution means that each nation should adopt the most responsible action in 
response to climate change. This signifies that there is a need to consider whether a 
policy instrument has the ability to achieve such a global commitment (Goulder 2000). 
Market ideology is another significant aspect of administrative feasibility. Policy 
makers need to consider appropriate market mechanisms such as imposing penalties, 
taxes or carbon trading when taking a long term perspective. Market mechanisms 
theoretically secure cost efficiency of program implementation with fewer economic 
impacts. Ideally, it depends whether a particular instrument is capable of providing a 
great deal of economic benefits or of sharing of the cost burden in the most cost-
effective way (Goulder 2000). Flexibility is another key element for political 
acceptability. This allows policy makers to ensure whether a particular instrument is 
flexibly adapted in cases of compliance policy measures or immediate modification 
(Konidari et al. 2007). Policies often involve political uncertainties; for instance, 
politicians sometimes prefer to change the angle to a more effective or efficient way, 
and might change their direction based on global and political trends (Ulph et al. 
2007). Considering the context of these ranges of ideas, this thesis will adopt three 
key elements for estimating the level of political acceptability, namely, making a 
global contribution, market ideology and flexibility. 
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3.2.3.1.5 Administrativefeasibility 
It is essential to be effective and efficient in terms of implementation. Administrative 
feasibility pertains to whether the legal, institutional and practical means exist for 
policy implementation to be effective and cost-effective in particular (De Coninck et 
al. 2007). This thesis suggests four elements for judging the level of administrative 
feasibility, including minimising administrative and transaction costs, enforceability, 
transparency, credibility and practicability. 
Minimising administrative and transaction costs is a key element of administrative 
feasibility. The level of institutional capacity involves planning, negotiation, decision 
making and a successful implementation system for large projects in regard to climate 
change. If implementation does not work there may be a complexity of problems and 
a range of interests and stakeholders involved. Whether these potential shortages can 
be covered in a timely manner (Ruth 2006), depends on the level of existing 
experience and social structures associated with similar policies enacted at a national 
or international level. (De Coninck et al. 2007). It is important to ensure that 'hybrid 
models' are considered in implementation, which help alternative approaches, create 
cost effectiveness and are administratively feasible, thus removing complexity (Lars 
2006). Moreover, it is important to ensure balanced consideration of economic and 
environmental benefits, which may result in a high degree of administrative feasibility. 
Taking more risks with a more alternative approach may be complex, and may result 
in less feasibility. Sharing responsibility causes less stress on administrative and 
transaction costs, but may be uncertain if it requires higher cost and more 
administratively complex issues within environmental policy such as complicated 
market mechanisms (e.g. tax standard or trading scheme) (De Coninck et al. 2007). 
Policy makers therefore need to consider a number of elements in order to minimise 
administrative and transaction costs. 
Enforceability is one of the elements in administrative feasibility. Jaccard et al (2007) 
stated that it is important to ensure the burden of administrative feasibility, in 
particular, whether enforcement is at an acceptable level. Ensuring a high level of 
compliance by enforcement may create administrative cost effectiveness (De Coninck 
et al. 2007). This may also reduce costs burden to further steps of policy 
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implementation (Heller et al. 1974). In order to recognise levels of enforcement, it is 
essential to look at the rigidity of the implementation framework. Identifying 
stringency for noncompliance and nonparticipation in each program allows policy 
makers to assess whether a program has the ability to determine the rigidity of 
participation; for instance, whether there is any regulation such as penalties, sanctions, 
and liability used in a program, in order to deter nonparticipation, contributes to 
achieving the specific program target (Haites et al. 2001). Thus enforceability is an 
important element in administrative feasibility. 
Transparency and credibility are further elements of administrative feasibility. It is 
also necessary to examine the availability of reporting and monitoring when 
considering the administrative feasibility of implementation (Jaccard et al 2007). 
Credibility allows us to determine whether activities of selected instruments are 
reported consistently in terms of the details of the activities, measurements, collected 
data for milestones and national compliance efforts. Transparency assesses whether 
effective feasibility is provided with clear information, including methods of 
operation and implementation for selected instruments to target groups with openness 
and with high reliability. Further, the transparency must satisfy the aforementioned 
matters of necessary, urgent issues (OECD 2003a). 
Practicability is another significant element of feasibility; it allows policy makers to 
assess whether a program has the ability to ensure the further improvement of any 
aforementioned matters with timely consideration. Possible indicators that can be 
considered include integration of 'co-operation' and 'co-ordination' between different 
sections, relevant allocation of responsibilities in the public sector, level of provision 
for establishing new authorities, modifications to current national legislation 
frameworks for climate change policy, intervention, timing, management of 
measurements, control and verification for practicability (OECD 2004). 
In summary, five criteria have been adapted in order to examine the effectiveness of 
instrument activities in terms of reducing GHG emissions, namely the environmental 
effectiveness of GHG emissions, cost effectiveness, distributional equity, political 
acceptability and administrative feasibility. 
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3.2.3.2 Categorised policy instruments against selected criteria 
The following section will turn to examine the particular characteristics of each of the 
categorised instruments (regulatory; voluntary/negotiated agreement; economic; 
research; information based instruments) against the criteria selected above for 
instrument analysis in the field of climate change policy. This examination will 
consider appropriate theoretical instrument analysis and enable estimation of which 
instruments were used for a particular policy program and its targets. 
Each category of instrument will be considered theoretically using a number of key 
elements of the criteria found in the previous section, namely: environmental 
effectiveness for reducing GHG emissions (achieving goals); cost effectiveness 
(achieving goals with low cost impacts); distributional equity (equity, responsibility 
and environmental sustainability); political acceptability (making a global 
contribution, market ideology and flexibility) and administrative feasibility 
(minimising administrative and transaction costs, enforceability, transparency, 
credibility and practicability). Chart 3.3 below describes a theory-based instrument 
analysis, which involves the characteristics of each instrument category against the 
key criteria in regard to reduction of GHG emissions. The following sections will 
describe the ways of establishing these characteristics for each key criterion. 
Chart 3.3: Theoretical Perspectives Used in Relation to Instrument Analysis 
Regulatory Voluntary Economic R&D lnfonnat1on 
agreements Incentives Disincentives instruments 
Environmental 
Effectiveness High Low Low Medium Medium High 
Cost Effectiveness 
Low High Low Medium Low High 
D1stnbut1onal Equity 
High Medium/ high Medium Med1um/h1gh Low Medium 
Political Acceptab1hty 
Medium Medium/low High High Medium High 
Administrative 
Feas1b1hty High Low Low Med1um/H1gh Medium/Low Med1um/H1gh 
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3.2.3.2.1 Regulatory instruments 
Regulatory instruments have a strong influence on em1ss10n abatements. These 
instruments involve integration with an emitter (IPCC 2007b ). They also ensure clear 
disclosure of instrument provision such as reporting, auditing and information 
prov1s1ons (Wheeler 2007). These potentially represent a strong contribution to 
reducing GHG emissions. They tend to be less cost-effective. Companies tend to incur 
huge costs dealing with the anti-pollution process (Stavins 1997). It also requires 
strong government involvement and extra administrative costs such as employment 
and financial assistance (Howes 2005). In terms of distributional equity, the 
instruments imposing penalties for emission charges reduce uncertainties for 
differentiated responsibility of emitters (Haines 2002). Governments use regulatory 
instruments, which do not focus on public preferences to get results which provide 
social and environmental equity. These signify that the instrument can be assumed to 
have a high distributional equity. 
Regulatory instruments have a moderate influence on political acceptability. An 
inflexible mechanism would make a difficult adjustment of the baseline, once the 
legislation has been passed (Sigman 2007). In general, a weaker market ideology 
involved in these instruments (Stavins 1997), which may not be politically acceptable, 
unless an instrument involves an economic device or creation of better goods and 
services (IPCC 2007b ). In terms of administrative feasibility, it requires strong 
enforceability by involving stakeholders and government which openly engage in 
policy actions (Goulder 2000), resulting in strong credibility and transparency. The 
instrument which can deal with a quick solution with the shortest time frame would 
also be feasible (Parminter 2003). Thus regulatory instruments may have a strong 
influence on administrative feasibility. However, the instruments can wield less 
influence, if they do not give sufficient knowledge and involvement to policy actors 
(Howes 2005), and require additional administrative costs for extra approaches to 
environmental results (IPCC 2007b ). 
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3.2.3.2.2 Voluntary/negotiated agreement 
Voluntary instruments encourage long-term perspectives on changing behaviours 
towards the responsibilities (Hertin et al. 2004). However, only a few estimations of 
the actual environmental impact have been made and these have not had much effect 
(Khanna 2001 ). An entirely voluntary scheme may not be expected to have a strong 
effect for reducing GHG emissions (Morikofer 2001). 
Voluntary instruments are in general cost-effective (OECD 2003a). The flexibility 
intends to reduce environmental responsibilities beyond legal pressures (Hertin et al. 
2004). This flexibility creates the cost from an organisation's own choice and 
requires lower cost requirements (Price 2005 and Phylipsen and Blok 2002). However, 
this does not mean the instrument achieves its targets as intended, and the economic 
efficiency of the voluntary approach, in practice, is often lower than policy makers 
expect (OECD 2004). In terms of the distributional equity, these instruments tend to 
be less effective. The conservative system for global contributions may cause loss of 
opportunities in global competition (Hertin et al. 2004); and the flexible mechanism 
tends to avoid equity, due to companies' preference for an adaptation process and 
costs (Braathen 2005). The result for a non-compulsory form may also be a lack of 
stringency towards a polluter's responsibilities (David 2005). 
In terms of their political acceptability, voluntary instruments may not be politically 
acceptable due to the lack of global contribution and market mechanisms for reducing 
GHG emissions. A flexible mechanism involves voluntary instruments which tend to 
have conservative forms with a non-binding basis (Hertin et al. 2004).The flexibility 
also allows emitters to select favourable options for their environmental actions 
(Carrara et al. 1999). In practice, the instrument tends to incorporate actions with 
stakeholders who aim to achieve environmental outcomes at their desired level of 
restrictions (Darnall et al. 2003 ). Voluntary instruments have, in general, less 
administrative feasibility. They are low in administrative and transaction costs 
(Price 2005; Phylipsen and Blok 2002). However, there is less transparency and 
credibility, enforceability and practicability in the absence of government 
involvement and strict monitoring systems (Hertin et al. 2004), although the action 
depends on the level of restriction imposed by the agreements (Annandale et al. 2004). 
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3.2.3.2.3 Economic Instruments (Incentives and disincentives) 
Incentives 
L 
Incentives may be less environmentally effective. Incentives are financial support for 
provision and dissemination of energy efficiency. Achieving program goals tends to 
focus more on financial support and compensation for the public and emitters than on 
the degree of productivity (IPCC 2007b ). Incentives may be cost-ineffective. In 
general, these types of fiscal instruments are regarded as costly instruments. In 
particular, government must invest a large amount of money in the long term as the 
private sector expects the continuation of financial support. (IPCC 2007b ). Incentives 
have a strong distributional equity. Equitably allocating financial support from 
governments improves practice in climate change targets (IPCC 2007b ). A low 
interest loan allows government financial support for individual emitters or members 
of the public who cannot undertake the targeted implementations otherwise (IPCC 
2007b ). This represents a long term perspective with high sustainability. In general, 
incentives are politically acceptable. Policy makers often utilise incentives to modify 
critical financial issues in market failure and social equity. The basis for government 
involvement via such instruments also helps enable industries or the public to afford 
knowledge and skills development (Damton et al. 2007). These represent a flexible 
mechanism involved in the instruments. However, in general, incentives are not 
capable of supplying market ideology (Enzensberger, et al. 2002). Incentives may be 
less administratively feasible. High administrative and transaction costs are required 
for implementation by government for a long term perspective (IPCC 2007b ). 
Moreover, the instruments are, in general, not capable of any enforceability unless 
mixed with other instruments (Damton et al. 2007). These may not have practicability 
because policy makers tend to keep relying on them (IPCC 2007b ). 
Disincentives 
Tax and trading systems are intended to change the social behaviour of emitters and 
governments (IPCC 2001), to reduce GHGs emission provisions (Bruvoll and Larsen 
2004). These systems are also expected to cover either emissions from a few sectors 
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of the economy or those from virtually the entire economy. Therefore, they can be 
very effective (IPCC 2007b ). However, achieving these goals may depend on social, 
economic and political effects. 
Tax and trading systems can be cost-effective. Market devices help to provide low 
financial pressures in terms of the approaches to the reduction of GHG emission at 
global level (Ekins and Dresner 2004), although these tend to focus more on 
incentives than revenue (Barde 1994). Disincentives may have strong distributional 
equity. The instruments give the most rational responsibilities to emitters by the 
polluter pays principle (Ekins and Dresner 2004). Trading systems may be less 
equitable than taxes for cost and household equity (Goulder and Parry 2008). Both 
instruments are also capable of having a market device, which meets demands for 
economic, environmental and social aspects with a long term vision (Okinomou and 
Jepma 2007). Moreover, taxes and trading systems are politically feasible. Frequent 
imposition of charges is politically acceptable but may have an insufficient effect on 
behaviour change (Damton et al. 2007). However, the basis for the market ideology is 
highly practical, comprehensive, and politically favourable (Sigman 2007). The 
instruments provide possible openings into global participation of international 
market systems (Ekins and Dresner 2004), which gives a global contribution. Both tax 
and tradable systems may be administratively feasible. The instruments often involve 
a market device to help lower administrative and transaction costs (Sigman 2007). 
Furthermore, enforceability and transparency may exist in the frameworks, such as 
emitters imposed upon if they do not meet their targets (IPCC 2007b ). 
3.2.3.2.4 R & D Instruments 
R&D instruments may moderately influence reduction of GHG emissions. These are 
very significant tools in order to transform a fossil energy society to a non fossil 
energy society (IPCC 2007b ). However, achieving targets depends on the level of 
governmental support such as incentives, training and auditing (CBO 2005). These 
instruments may be costly because of extensive facilitation, and the benefits should be 
anticipated to take two to three decades (Anderson and Bird 1992). An absence of 
government support would generally create the most expensive approaches. However, 
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achieving goals at the least cost depends on the level of governmental support (Fisher 
and Newell 2004). In terms of the distributional equity, R&D instruments may be less 
effective, due to their unpredictability and non-sustainability, because of uncertainties 
for climate change policy and political and global trends (Ulph et al. 2007). 
Consistency of long-term government policy may thus not be sustainable. 
R&D instruments may have strong political acceptability. The instrument often 
involves other nations or emitters to communicate about the development and 
participate in global competition based on market device (IPCC 2007b), which is a 
global contribution. Furthermore, utility of instruments generally requires strong 
government support; where politicians often choose their favoured action with the 
flexible systems (Ulph et al. 2007). On the other hand, R&D instruments may have 
less administrative feasibility in general. The extensive facilitation involved the 
instruments with a long term perspective (Fritsche and Lukas, 2001; Sakakibara, 2001; 
Ekboir, 2003; Justice and Philibert, 2005) and non immediate benefits (Anderson and 
Bird 1992). Expensive facility with a continuous cost burden causes a high cost for 
the administrative and transaction process (Fritsche and Lukas, 2001; Sakakibara, 
2001; Ekboir, 2003; Justice and Philibert, 2005). Transparency, credibility, and 
enforceability will depend on the level of government support. 
3.2.3.2.5 Information-based Instruments (i.e. information and education) 
Information-based instruments may result in a reduction in future GHG emissions by 
operating at an ideological level. These aim to make an indirect contribution to 
reduction of GHG emissions by improving awareness and collaboration of industry in 
relation to climate change issues (IPCC 2007b ). Achieving their goals may depend on 
governmental support, and social and political trends. On the other hand, these 
instruments may be cost-effective. Costs depend on the level of information required 
by a policy (Beierle 2003). These can be very cost-effective, if information requires 
less cost burden (IPCC 2007b). In terms of distributional equity, they may have a 
moderate influence. The instrument may also require individual emitters to disclose a 
certain level of information for social equity. However, some emitters prefer to limit 
their information provisions, thus the equity can be different according to the level of 
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cooperation (IPCC 2007b) Furthermore, the primary targets of changing social 
behaviour in order to gain environmental outcomes in the long term (OECD 2001b), 
may be sustainable. 
Information-based instruments may have a strong political acceptability. The 
instrument often involves a market ideology by providing environmentally friendly 
products, sharing knowledge of activities, having market competition, given 
opportunities to be involved in global participation (Okinomou and Jepma 2007), 
which provide a strong global contribution. They also tend to require free adaptation 
of information, meeting emitters' preferences, and a lower cost basis (Kennedy et al. 
1994), which may represent flexibility. In terms of administrative feasibility, they 
may be highly effective. The basis for government involvement may involve high 
transparency, credibility and practicability of policy implementation. However, it all 
depends on the level of restrictions by governments (OECD 2003a). In general, there 
can be low administrative and transaction costs (Pierre and Peters). However, results 
in practice will depend on the degree of restrictions to the public and firms levelled by 
the instrument that result in cooperation (Beierle 2003). 
Given these aspects, this section has presented the method for theoretical instrument 
analysis for the instrument design in terms of GHG emission reduction. The following 
section will describe a method for evaluation of actual effectiveness in the SIA 
approach. 
3.2.4 Evaluation of Actual Effectiveness 
Evaluation of actual effectiveness is the fourth stage of the SIA approach for 
examining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate change policy. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the four priorities for instrument analysis in 
climate change policy include: i) instrument design; ii) successful GHG mitigation; iii) 
program achievement; and iv) economic efficiency. In terms of identifying the 
instrument activities to reduce GHG emissions, this thesis concluded that program 
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achievement, that is reaching the targets with cost effectiveness and instrument 
interventions, may represent successful GHG mitigation. 
This section is intended to help identify a way of defining whether instrument 
activities under particular policy programs were successfully conducted. This section 
describes a method by which the selected instruments influenced actual results by 
examining five criteria: environmental effectiveness; cost effectiveness; distributional 
equity; political acceptability; and administrative acceptability. It is important that 
there are first and second priorities within these criteria. The first criteria can be 
environmental effectiveness and cost effectiveness. The second priorities are 
distributional equity, political acceptability and administrative acceptability. 
Firstly, this section will describe how these second priorities are examined for the 
instrument intervention. It will then present ways of identifying results for the highest 
priority criteria, consider program evaluation approaches and describe methods for 
each criterion (i.e. environmental effectiveness and cost effectiveness). Finally, this 
section will conclude with the methods for evaluation of actual effectiveness. 
3.2.4.1 Distributional Equity, Political Acceptability and Administrative Feasibility 
The priorities for climate change policy typically recognise that successful GHG 
mitigation requires the achievements of individual policy programs in a cost effective 
manner. In the meantime, there is also a need to analyse the effectiveness of 
instrument design in terms of political and administrative concerns. These criteria of 
distributional equity, political acceptability and administrative feasibility, will thus be 
critically evaluated. The method adapts key indicators for each of these criteria, which 
have already been identified in the section on analysis of instrument design. These 
indicators will be examined in terms of the effectiveness of instrument design in 
practical terms. Chart 3.4 describes the key indicators for evaluating the effectiveness 
of instrument activities, especially for distributional equity, political acceptability and 
administrative feasibility. 
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Chart 3.4: Key Indicators for the Criteria: Distributional Equity, Political Acceptability and 
Administrative Feasibility. 
Criteria Elements Indicators 
Equity Does the framework provide a level of equity? 
Distributional Does the framework provide stringency to emitters? (e.g. penalties or 
Equity Responsibility carbon tax etc). 
Sustainability Is the framework sustainable? 
Reaching Global Is the framework capable of accessing global participation? 
Political Contribution 
Acceptability Market ideology Do market mechanisms exist? 
Is the framework flexible? (e.g. adapting or adjusting time and 
Flexibility structure). 
Min1m1sing Does the framework provide minimum impacts on administrative and 
Administrative and transaction costs? (e.g. technological innovation or adaptation; 
Transaction costs considering impact from price standard/convention; sharing 
responsibility with other sectors; and avoidance of any complexity) 
Administrative Does the framework provide any enforceability for compliance? (e.g. 
Feasibility Enforceability penalty for noncompliance or meeting targets) 
Transparency and Is there consistency of reporting commitment, a reporting or reviewing 
Credibility system, and identification of issues during implementation? 
Is the framework capable of addressing issues immediately, and 
Practicability committing to rectify? 
3.2.4.2 Program evaluation approach and Vedung's approach 
Three criteria: distributional equity, political acceptability and administrative 
feasibility, are important factors but in order to most accurately examine the 
effectiveness of climate change policy instruments, we must look at 'goal attainment' 
and 'cost effectiveness'. The following section will present ways of examining the 
actual effectiveness of environmental effectiveness for reducing GHG emissions and 
cost effectiveness. 
With respect to identifying methods for environmental effectiveness for reducing 
GHG emissions and cost effectiveness, the two priorities may be key elements (i.e. 
program achievement and economic efficiency). These priorities recognise that 
successful GHG mitigation requires the achievements of individual policy programs 
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developed m an effective manner. A number of program evaluations 23 can be 
addressed, as by McNamara (1999), House (1983), Guba and Lincoln (1981) and 
Scriven (1993). All have influenced the categorisation of program evaluation 
approaches, especially of goal based evaluation and cost effectiveness. A variety of 
existing program evaluations is available in the field of political science, however, not 
many evaluations have been identified as a specific focus on policy instruments. Evart 
Vedung's (2005) description is focused on the effectiveness of policy instruments by 
program evaluation with more substantive models than procedural ones. The former 
describe government interventions resulting in a 'means to an end'. This may be most 
appropriate here because this thesis focuses in particular on government initiatives 
and contributions to Greenhouse Policy at the national level in Australia. More 
specifically, Vedung's 'goal attainment model' focuses on an examination of whether 
an instrument has 'succeeded or failed', rather than on the side effects of 
implementation. The 'cost-effective approach' emphasises estimating the cost 
effectiveness of a program achievement by measuring the value of program effects in 
physical terms. The following section will describe the details of the method used for 
examining environmental effectiveness of reducing GHG emissions. 
3.2.4.2.1 Criteria/or Environmental Effectiveness for Reduction ofGHG Emissions 
In order to analyse effectiveness of GHG mitigation, this thesis adapts a method from 
V edung' s 'goal attainment model'. This model is based on a concept of 'before versus 
after comparisons', which simply identify specific target outcomes in a particular 
jurisdiction at different times, once before the program was conducted and again at 
some time after. The model is also very useful for understanding program impacts and 
achievements as they are intended, but it is difficult to isolate other social impacts that 
may also have had an influence at the same time (Dye 2008). The approach firstly 
needs to identify performance indicators before implementation against targets at the 
end of the period. It will then examine how the performance indicators are met against 
23 Carter McNamara (2002) suggests goal-based evaluation, process evaluation and outcome 
evaluation. Another classification from House (1983) focused on individual evaluation approaches 
with six categories: objectives-oriented approaches, management-oriented approaches, consumer-
oriented approaches, expertise-oriented approaches, adversary-oriented approaches and participant-
oriented approaches. Numerous program evaluation typologies exist not only in the field of political 
science but also other fields, including Guba and Lincoln (1981),and Scriven (1993). 
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their intended targets (Vedung 2008). The result will then show the level of goal 
attainments, which represents the level of environmental effectiveness in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions. The following section, will describe the details of the 
method use for examining the criteria for cost effectiveness. 
3.2.4.2.2 Criteria for Cost effectiveness 
Cost effectiveness allows us to identify whether the instrument selection can achieve a 
particular program goal with the lowest costs or by meeting the decided costs 
including costs for administration and implementation of the policy, in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions (IPCC 2007b ). Cost effectiveness analysis does not require 
identifying values of costs and benefits but revealing the effectiveness of a policy 
program whether it achieves its intended goals of financing the program or not (Livin 
1975). Vedung's cost effectiveness model (2008) forms a simple algorithm to 
measure the degree of cost effectiveness which is described below. 
Cost effectiveness (program efficiency) = program effects in physical terms 
Costs ( e.g. AUD) 
Adapted from Vedung 
(2007) 
The initial intended goals of a program divided by the committed original expenditure 
gives an ideal productivity at minimal cost. Thus if the original expenditure was 
extended after the program was implemented and it did not achieve its targets, the 
result would be low effective productivity. On the other hand, if there was less 
expenditure than the committed costs applied to the implementation and if it achieved 
its targets, then the program would show more efficient cost effectiveness (Vedung 
2008). Therefore, in terms of evaluating the criteria for environmental effectiveness 
for reducing GHGs, the approach was derived from Vedung's 'goal attainment'. The 
criteria for cost effectiveness were also derived from his 'cost effectiveness approach' 
for evaluation of actual effectiveness. A limitation of this approach is its narrow 
interpretation of costs for example in debt considering the cost of failing to reduce 
emissions. 
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The evidence of this section presented the methods for an evaluation of actual 
effectiveness. The following section will describe a method for discussion in the SIA 
approach. 
3.2.5 Discussion 
Discussion is the fifth stage of the SIA approach. The 'discussion' stage aims at 
reflecting on all the results from each stage of the instrument analysis applied to the 
effectiveness of 'soft' or 'hard' instruments in climate change policy, following 
descriptive perspective, transformative perspective, analysis of instrument design and 
actual effectiveness. Having now identified these five stages of the SIA evaluation, 
the following section will summarise the second section of this chapter, which 
detailed Effectiveness Analysis/ Method for evaluating effectiveness of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in climate policy. 
In terms of applying the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method and Effectiveness 
Analysis/ Method for the examination of the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
in the case of Australia during the period 1997-2007, The Identification of Trend 
Analysis allows policy makers to determine a simple and clear classification of the 
level of coercion between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. It may also help policy 
makers to address the extent of governmental control during a certain period of time. 
The Effectiveness Analysis, which allows policy makers to identify strengths and 
weaknesses of instrument design by government in terms of urgent action in order to 
reduce GHG emissions. Thus, these methods are very significant evaluative methods 
for evaluating climate change policy activities. 
With regard to the empirical case study of this thesis, the data collection used for 
applying the methods are based on national communication reports from 2002 and 
2005 by the Australian Government to the UN. This thesis has addressed the fifty-two 
policy instruments during the given period. However, there is a difficulty of finding 
an entire relevant instrument list to be used for the data collection, due to limitations 
in the availability of the data in national reports and inconsistency in the instruments 
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used. The Howard government [1997-2007], provided only three national 
communication reports, in 199724, 2002 and 2005. Each report listed a number of 
initiatives and described their implementation but some were incomplete and others 
were never actually implemented during the period. Thus the process of data 
collection presented some difficulties for this analysis. Although limited interviews 
were conducted concurrently, by the researcher and meetings were held with several 
relevant bureaucrats in the federal government, these were for clarification purposes 
only. These meetings provided useful advice and material, such as additional 
measures not included in the communication reports up to 2007, to supplement the 
data collection to some extent. 
3.2.6 Summary 
This section has presented the second part of this current chapter. It has developed 
Effectiveness Analysis/ Method for examining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in climate policy. In terms of developing Effectiveness Analysis/ Method, 
this thesis has adapted the SIA approach with five stages and details of each stage 
which were described in this section: descriptive perspective; transformative 
perspective; analysis of instrument design; evaluation of actual effectiveness and 
discussion. Each stage evaluates a different aspect of influence of a particular policy 
instrument in order to achieve successful GHG mitigation. The SIA has thus been 
developed in this thesis, as a simple but the most fundamental and relevant method, in 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of the 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
The following section will conclude, having presented the methods for the 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method to identify trend use of soft and hard 
instruments in climate change policy; and for the Effectiveness Analysis/Method to 
examine the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in a policy which 
contributes to reducing GHG emissions in a nation. 
24 Although this thesis has recognised one of the national communication reports provided by the 
Howard government [1997-2007], the 1997 report did not include Howard's new National Greenhouse 
Strategy, which was expected to finalise mid 1998. Thus, the data collection used for the empirical case 
study is based on national communication reports in 2002 and 2005 to the UN which particularly 
illustrated the Howard initiatives during his regime between 1997 and 2007. 
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3 .3 Conclusion 
This chapter develops the two methods selected in Chapter Three, namely: the 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method to identify trend use of soft and hard climate 
policy instruments; and the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method to examine the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in a policy which contributes to 
reducing GHG emissions in a nation. 
In terms of the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method, this thesis has developed 
and adapted two approaches, namely: CCPIC and DSHCI. In terms of classifying 
climate policy instruments, this thesis has adapted the CCPIC with six instrument 
categories (regulatory, voluntary/voluntary agreement, economic, research, 
information-based and mixed instruments). With regard to distinguishing between 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate change policy, this thesis concludes with the 
DSHCI with 17 criteria, which focus on the level of instrument dominances under the 
instrument designs of a national government in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
These approaches allow us to illustrate how a government allocates its adoption of 
'soft' and 'hard' climate change policy instruments during the design period of a 
climate change policy. 
The Effectiveness Analysis/ Identification & Trend Analysis/ Methods examine the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in a policy which contributes to 
reducing GHG emissions in a nation. This thesis has utilised the SIA approach for 
examining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in reducing GHG 
emissions with five stages: descriptive perspective, transformative perspective, 
analysis of instrument design, evaluation of actual effectiveness and discussion. Each 
stage evaluates a different aspect of influence of a particular policy instrument in 
order to achieve successful GHG mitigation. This approach also allows us to utilise a 
simple but the most fundamental and relevant method, in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
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The results in this chapter further extended the findings from Chapter Two and have 
thus fulfilled the first aim of this overall thesis to develop methods for identifying the 
influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
The following chapter will demonstrate the background and significance of 
Australia's Greenhouse Policy, especially during the period 1997-2007, before 
conducting an analysis of the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the case 
study. This will describe: the background of national circumstance and historical 
policy development; and the significance for policy instrument activities. It will be 
very important in terms of analysing national policy activities and a clear 
understanding of critical aspects of a particular nation regarding 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument analysis in climate change policy. 
From the next chapter, this thesis moves onto a fulfilment of the second aim of this 
overall thesis to determine the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing 
GHG emissions by following the methods developed in the first aim. 
Chapter Four will explore the development of Australia's climate policy as an 
empirical case study. This Chapter will present the need to consider the effectiveness 
of the policy in the chosen period of 1997-2007, such as the rapid growth in GHG 
emissions and the voluntary-based initiatives. Australia's domestic climate policy of 
this era reflects one of the most critical periods in terms of GHG mitigation policy by 
one of the most carbon intensive nations. This Chapter will also address the unique 
circumstances in Australia, including, the rapid population growth and land use 
patterns, and the dominance of economic resources by large energy intensive and 
carbon intensive manufacturing and products. These findings are essential context for 
the following case studies in order to address and appreciate background and 
significance. 
101 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
Chapter Four 
Australian Climate Policy, 1997-2007 
4.0 Introduction 
This thesis now explores an empirical case study. The aim of this study is to fulfil the 
second aim of the overall thesis to determine the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following the methods developed in the 
first aim. In order to achieve this objective, climate policy in Australia during 1997-
2007 is discussed in considerable detail, given that the Australian government 
emphasised largely voluntary-based instruments in response to global GHG 
mitigating activities, while increasing national emission trends and continuing not to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
In Australia, critical concern was experienced for the period 1997-2007 about 
effective instrument allocation and choice by the national government when the rest 
of the world was demanding strong initiatives from developed nations to immediately 
implement actions to reduce greenhouse gases. However, one of the major criticisms 
that has emerged of Australian government initiatives is whether the voluntary-based 
instruments actually encourage domestic action to reduce GHG emissions (CWLTH 
2000b; Hon et al. 2002; Curran 2003; ANAO 2004; Hunt 2004; Christoff 2005; 
Sullivan 2007 and Crowley 2007). Thus, the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments are a critical question in Australia. 
Policy analysis integrated with 'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis on climate 
change policy is a central issue in this thesis. So, this thesis will critically reflect on its 
case study in order to demonstrate in subsequent chapters how the 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments adopted by the government influenced reduction of GHGs during this 
period. The results of considering this significance for instrument analysis theory, will 
allow policy makers to develop ideas for further discussion about the possible effects 
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of the 'soft' and 'hard' instruments for climate change policy, not only applied to 
Australia but also other nations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the background and significance of the 
implementation of Australian greenhouse policy at the national level over the period 
1997 to 2007. This chapter is very important in terms of analysing national policy 
activities and a clear understanding of critical aspects of a particular nation regarding 
'soft' and 'hard' instrument analysis in climate change policy. The case study 
including the details in this chapter and analysis in subsequent chapters helps fulfil the 
second aim of this overall thesis to determine the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments on reducing GHG emissions. 
The chapter is divided into four major areas, including national circumstances, 
emission records, the history of Australian climate change policy; and critiques of 
instruments and the policy in Australia. It covers each of these four aspects. It then 
concludes with the background to, and significance of, national initiatives under the 
Australian greenhouse policy during the above period before analysing the case study 
in following chapters. 
4.1 National Circumstances 
4.1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to describe the national circumstances of Australia in 
the context of climate change policy development over the period 1997-2007. In order 
to examine these circumstances, the section will examine a number of key aspects of 
national circumstance including: government structure; population profile; geographic 
profile; climate profile; economic profile; energy; transportation; industry; waste; 
agriculture and forestry. Selection of these key circumstances is based on the 
UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] guidelines. A 
clear picture of each key aspect will be presented through an examination of data 
based on Australia's national communication reports to the UNFCCC. The section 
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will conclude with a clear description of the national circumstances in Australia 
during the above period. 
4.1.2 The UNFCCC guidelines 
The UNFCCC identified that all parties here have 'common but differentiated' 
responsibility for dealing with climate change issues. International agreement on 
climate change requires that national responses meet the particular circumstances of 
each nation (CWLTH 1997). In 1999, the UNFCCC's guidelines recommended all 
parties should provide details of the various key circumstances of their nations 
including: relations between their circumstances and GHG emission impacts, how 
these events are changed by the impacts; and how these circumstances are changed by 
the impacts; and any possible information related to national circumstances and 
historic trend. Individual headings for the description of national circumstances under 
the guidelines: government structure; population profile; geographic profile; climate 
profile; ~conomic profile; energy; transportation; industry; waste; building stock and 
urban structure; agriculture; forestry and other circumstances (if applicable) 
( UNFCCC 2000). 
The aspects classified by the UNFCCC as 'other circumstances' have not been clearly 
recognised in the Australian national communication reports. This chapter will follow 
these UNFCCC's guideline headings except for this one aspect, in terms of 
identifying the national circumstances in Australia in regard to climate change policy 
over the period 1997 to 2007. This section will demonstrate the national 
circumstances in the following order: 
• Government structure 
• Population profile 
• Geographic profile 
• Climate profile 
• Economic profile 
• Energy 
• Transportation 
• Industry 
• Waste 
• Building stock & urban structure 
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• Agriculture 
• Forestry 
4.1.3 Government structure 
In terms of government structure in Australia, it is necessary to identify Australia's 
unique political system. The constitution was established for the operation of the 
Federal Parliament in 1901. The Prime Minister is designated to lead the 
Commonwealth Government, which includes Ministers who have responsibility for 
particular issues in federal activities ( CWL TH 1997). In the structure of the national 
constitution, the government involves eight states and territories, namely: the 
Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland, 
South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. Within these jurisdictions, 
there are more than 700 local governments. In terms of acting on climate change 
matters such as emissions reduction, environmental protection and developments, all 
the Australian Government, state and local jurisdictions are required to share the 
responsibility, and are designated to promote effective implementation efforts for 
climate change policy (AGO 2005). With respect to the implications of greenhouse 
activities in the constitutional system, a number of significant issues are often 
recognised due to the allocation of responsibilities to the states and local governments. 
Under the policy, the Commonwealth plays a role in national leadership and must take 
responsibility for consideration of international negotiations (CWLTH 1997). Beside 
the governmental systems, the country has recently found significant impacts from 
climate change, and one of these effects is due to the rapid population growth each 
year for the last three decades in Australia. 
4.1.4 Population profile 
The population in Australia is still relatively small compared to other nations. 
However, rapid population growth has been identified as a significant aspect of this 
country. In particular, comparison with the rates of other OECD countries shows the 
population rose by 64.3% from 1960 to 1990. On the other hand, European Union 
[EU] member states' increase was only 15.8% over time (CWLTH 1997). In the years 
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1990-2003, it was reported that the proportion of the population rise in Australia was 
17 .1 %. The population in this country reached over 20 million in December 2003. 
Projections for 1990-2021 show a similar change, expecting a growth of 36.8%. This 
will create a severe situation with pressure on resources and energy consumption in 
the future. Moreover, most of the population in Australia is settled in two separated 
coastal regions, basically located in the south-east and east. In both coastal regions, 
the population is focused in urban central areas, especially in the state and territory 
capital cities. 82% of the population occupies 1 % of the continent (AGO 2005). The 
high growth rate and spatial density of the Australian population will necessarily 
increase demands for resources and energy, which will, in turn, increase the 
likelihood of significant emissions growth. 
4.1.5 Geographic profile 
Australia's geographical background is also unique. The most significant feature of 
the geography in Australia can be discussed in relation to its geographical 
environment. In particular, features such as the unique geography and environment 
and the wealth of natural resources are bound up with climate change issues. Australia 
is the lowest and flattest (except Antarctica), of the world's continents, with the low 
humidity, and is the sixth largest country in the world (7,692,024 km2). Furthermore, 
a large area of the continent (from approximately 10° south to 43° south of the equator, 
including the island state of Tasmania) is desert, which results in most people living 
in coastal areas with long distances separating urban areas (AGO. 2005). These 
unique geographical circumstances increase the rate of transport related GHG 
em1ss10ns. 
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Figure 4.1: Geographic map of Australia 
JBrisb=ie 
New Son.t:h VVa1.cs: 
Adapted from CWLTH [Commonwealth of Australia]. 1997. Australia's Second National Report under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Canberra: Australia 
4.1.6 Climate profile 
Australian average temperatures have been estimated to rise by 0.6 to 1.5 °C by 2030. 
If global GHG emissions are continuously increased in this world, it may be projected 
the range of 2.2 to 5.0 °C by 2070. Warming is projected to be lower near the coast 
and in Tasmania and higher in central and northwestem Australia. During the period 
1981-2000, rates of rainfall are likely decreased overtime, in such areas as southern 
parts of Australia during winter, southern and eastern parts during spring, and south-
west Western Australia during autumn. An increase in the number of dry days has 
been expected across the country; however, it is likely that there will be an increase in 
intense rainfall events in many areas (CSIRO 2010). 
There is greater than 90% certainty that increases in greenhouse gas emissions have 
caused most of the global warming since the mid-20th century and such emissions 
have been the result of human activities. CSIRO research has addressed the fact that 
higher GHG levels are likely to have caused about half of the winter rainfall reduction 
in south-west Western Australia (CSIRO 2010). The information above indicates 
significant influences of the climate change on the country. 
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4.1.7 Economic profile 
The economic structure of Australia is a relatively closely associated product of 
history and geography, particularly of Australia's abundant natural resources. 
Australia recorded an economic growth of AUD 821 billion in 2004. This represents 
the fourteenth largest world economy in terms of gross domestic product [GDP] 
(AGO 2005). 
But there are significant differences in Australia's economic circumstance from other 
Annex I parties. These are the dramatic increase in population; the vast distances 
separating urban areas and also the greater distance from other countries; relatively 
stable patterns of land usage with significant recent changes; and the production and 
trading of natural resources (fossil fuels and mineral products) taking a significant 
role in the economy. For example, in comparison with most other OECD countries, 
Australia is a significant energy exporter, with nearly 68% of its total energy 
production exported in 2003-2004 (excluding uranium) (AGO 2005), which is 
critically significant to climate policy. The economic structure of Australia has a 
major exacerbating impact on its GHG emissions profile, and creates unavoidable 
problems for reducing emissions. Australia exports primary products that are both 
energy related and energy intensive goods. In particular, with respect to the energy 
intensive and export oriented industries, there are significant contributions to 
economic factors from: aluminium smelting, alumina reefing, liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), and coal and steel production. These have resulted in Australia's becoming 
one of the highest energy exporters in the world (AGO 2005). 
With respect to international trade affairs, Australia has strong trading connections 
(agriculture, minerals and energy) with developing countries, especially in the Asia-
Pacific region. Australia's exports have been well developed at around 7-8% per 
annum, with those to East Asia growing at an even faster rate. There is nowhere else 
among the OECD countries, which has this unique concentration of emission-
intensive goods in its exports (AGO 2005). These signify that Australia's economic 
profile is highly related to energy intensive trades domestically and internationally, 
which contribute to a global GHG emission provision. 
108 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
4.1.8 Energy 
Energy intensity is another important factor for climate change issues in Australia. 
Australia's emissions profile is highly dominated by the large energy intensive 
industries, such as aluminium, iron and steel production, and carbon intensive 
products. In terms of trading, there is also a wide dispersal of natural resources and 
remoteness from overseas markets: Australia's industry and consumers also rely on 
long distance transport. Australia has encountered high risk in terms of continued 
economic growth from its dependence on fossil fuel intensity, with national emissions 
intensity also declining compared to its total economic balance (AGO 2005). 
With respect to a high dependence on fossil fuels as an economic device, the country 
is far more dependent on fossil fuels than any other OECD country due to the low cost 
of the resource, the abundance of the resource and limited hydro-electric resources 
(resulting from Australia being one of the world's most arid countries). However, the 
country does not accept nuclear power. Given this background, Australia's CO 2 
emissions per unit of energy generated are double the OECD average. Similarly, fossil 
fuels account for nearly 94% of Australia's energy inputs with this far greater reliance 
on fossil fuels than for any other OECD country (AGO 2005). 
There is a high demand for energy consumption. In 2003-04 total energy use in 
Australia, comprising both primary and derived energy, was 5,346 PJ25 , of which 
around two-thirds (3,545 PJ) was delivered to end-users (households, commercial 
activities, transport and industry) and the remaining one-third was lost in conversion 
processes, transmission and distribution (AGO 2005). The chart below shows 
Australian energy supply, trade and consumption, by fuel in energy units, 2003-2004. 
25 petajoules (1015 joules); AGO 2005. Australia's Fourth National Communication on Climate Change: 
A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The AGO within the 
Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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Table 4. 1: Australian energy supply, trade and consumption by fu el in energy units, 2003-2004 
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The high demand for energy consumption requires more electricity in the country. 
The electricity generation sector was the largest energy consumer in 2003- 04, at 
1,629 PJ, as one of the fastest growing sectors. In 2003- 2004, 77% of electricity was 
generated by black and brown coal and their by-products, with limited energy sources 
from renewable energy, such as hydroelectricity, wind, solar, biogases (e.g., 
sugarcane residue). As for renewable energy, it currently contributes only 5% of 
Australia' s total energy supply, and represents 8% of Australia' s electricity generation. 
(AGO 2005) 
In terms of a national energy market, The National Electricity Market (NEM) 26 was 
established: a domestic energy market system to make a domestic energy trading 
common pool. Furthermore, Australia is a significant energy exporter in comparison 
with most other OECD countries. It was reported that nearly 68% of the total energy 
provision (excluding uranium) was exported, which represents about one fifth of 
Australia's total merchandise export earnings over the 2003-04 period. However, 
most energy products are highly dominant in fossil fuels such as crude oil and 
26The National Electricity Market (NEM) was established in 1998, and currently offers electricity to 
around 7.7 million customers in Australia in conjunction with a number of national links including 
Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian Capita l Territory, Victoria and South Australia, and 
Tasmania. The NEM is interconnected with a common pool , or spot market, for trading wholesa le 
electricity products . All e lectrici ty supplied by market generators must be traded through the pool. 
Energy market reform and a reduction in surplus coal-fired capacity have been considered, for the 
medium to long-term. Future additions to capacity are expected to come from a mixture of coal , 
cogeneration, gas and renewable sources (AGO 2005). 
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uranium, petroleum and coal products. (AGO 2005) Given these, there is a high 
demand for energy and carbon intensive products in Australia, due to the high 
dependence on fossil fuels; the high demand for energy consumption; the extensive 
energy trades with other countries. These results in Australia provide a huge 
contribution to the GHG emission provision. 
4.1.9 Transport 
Transport is a large part of the domestic economy. It consists of travel, with 
increasing numbers of people participating, in terms of its geographic size and 
dispersed population, as well as commercial travel to manufacturing and market 
centres, and over great distances. As mentioned previously, Australia's population is 
highly concentrated around its coastal cities, particularly its coastal state and territory 
capitals. Long distances between the cities are linked by road; Brisbane is 982 km 
north of Sydney, which is 872 km by road from Melbourne. Adelaide is another 731 
km from Melbourne, and road transport form Adelaide to Perth requires a trip of 
approximately 2,781km, while Adelaide to Darwin is 3,020 km. Hobart is separated 
from other capitals by both distance and the waters of Bass Strait (AGO 2005). Such 
long distances between population centres create a critical demand for expansive 
transportation systems (i.e. a high dominance of domestic travel by flights, private 
vehicle use, and trading commodities by coastal ships and railways), which then 
significantly contribute to the output of emissions. 
4.1.10 Industry 
Australia's economy is highly dominated by its industry trades. These accounted for 
about 74% (electricity, gas and water provision) of GDP in 2003-2004. 
Manufacturing produced 11 % of gross value added (GV A), mining produced 4% and 
agriculture, forestry and fishing supplied nearly 3%. It was reported that additional 
gross value provided by the services sector was over 50% higher in 2002 than in 1990. 
GV A from the more energy-intensive manufacturing sector was about 20% higher 
than in 1990. Short profiles of key Australian industries shows these industries are a 
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relatively significant part of both energy and greenhouse gas intensity, including 
mineral resources, the aluminium industry, the automotive industry, the chemicals and 
plastics industry, the wood, pulp and paper industry and the heavy engineering 
industry. Furthermore, Australia is acknowledged as one of the leaders of the mining 
industry in the world 27 • The Australian mining and mineral industry (excluding 
petroleum) represented around 23% of Australia's total exports of goods and services 
in 2003-2004. Moreover, mining is also the second largest export earner (after 
manufacturing), accounting for 29.6% of the total value of exports in 2003-2004, 
principally from the coal, oil and gas extraction industries. The mining industry had 
increasing GDP records of around 5% over the past 10 years (AGO 2005). Thus 
Australia's industries are highly dominated by energy and greenhouse gas intensive 
trades, which results in Australia being one of the most carbon intensive countries in 
the world. 
4.1.11 Waste 
With respect to waste, around 21 million tonnes of waste per annum enter landfills in 
Australia. This waste comprises 35% municipal solid waste (including household 
waste), 38% construction and demolition waste, and 27% commercial and industrial 
waste. Some 95% of Australian households recycle waste with over 70% of paper and 
cardboard, including around 70% of newspapers (over 1 billion newspapers), 63% of 
aluminium cans (2 billion), 29.8% of glass packaging and 44% of steel cans recycled 
each year. Over 100,000 people are employed by recycling related industries, 
supplying the recycling of millions of tonnes of steel annually, which provides energy 
savings to the Australian steel industry. 
4.1.12 Building stock and urban structure 
27The mineral resources in the nation consists of lead (25%), mineral sands (ilmenite (33%), rutile 
(43%) and zircon (42%)), nickel (36.3%), tantalum (94%), uranium (39%) and zinc (17%), while 
Australia's production of bauxite, black coal, copper, gold, lithium, manganese ore, niobium, silver and 
industrial diamond was in the top six worldwide in 2003. It is the largest provider of mineral sands and 
lead in the world and also the biggest traders for iron ore, nickel, uranium and zinc, contributing 
respectively18%, 14%, 21% and 17% of world production in 2003. 
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For building stock and urban structure, it was reported that the size of Australian 
dwellings is gradually increasing, however, the average number of persons per 
dwelling showed a steady decline from 3.5 persons in 1961 to 2.4 persons in 2001. 
Furthermore, it was also reported that the average size of new homes increased by 
40.3% to 227.6 square metres between 1984-85 and 2002-2003. This may cause a 
trend away from separate houses towards medium and higher density housing, and is 
linked to a range of key factors, including government planners and private 
developers considering the need for lower-cost accommodation and convenience for 
commuters. Such potential high density housing may provide sound opportunities for 
establishing efficient urban infrastructure and services, such as roads, lighting and 
waste removal, which can be an opportunity for greenhouse gas abatement through 
practical measures such as improved intensity for street lighting and higher 
dependence on public transport (AGO 2005). 
4.1.13 Agriculture 
With regard to agriculture, a traditional and significant element for the economy in 
Australia: it accounts for less than 4% of GDP. However it is very significant in terms 
of trade. It accounts for around 23 % of total Australian merchandise exports reported 
in 2004. In specific terms, Australia is the world's largest exporter of wool and beef, 
the second largest exporter of cotton, sheep meats and wheat and the third largest 
exporter of canola and barley, at the same as significantly exporting wine. It was 
estimated that the total area of establishments with agricultural activity was 439.5 
million ha or approximately 60% of the total land use in 2003. Livestock grazing 
accounts for over 75% of all agricultural land, reported in 2003-2004 (AGO 2005). 
GHG emissions by agriculture in Australia are a relatively more significant emission 
source than for most other OECD countries (except New Zealand). Despite the unique 
environmental circumstances in the country, such as floods, droughts and variable 
land use, agriculture is the most extensive form of land use. Employment in regional 
and rural area in Australia is also highly dominated by the agricultural sector. The 
large number of people employed in agriculture declined significantly in 2004 to 
345,700 persons, and dropped significantly in 2003 due to the drought disaster across 
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Australia, which affected large areas of rural and regional land, limiting agricultural 
productivity in some regions and causing it to become cost ineffective. According to 
scientific sources, the range of these degradation events may become worse in the 
future. This would result in a large amount of Australian agricultural land being 
negatively influenced in the next 50 years due to transformation by salinity and soil 
acidity events and potential ecosystem collapse brought about by climate change 
(AGO 2005). 
4.1.14 Forestry 
Forestry in Australia has a umque profile, rangmg from tropical and temperate 
rainforests to mulga scrub. Australia's forests have significant diversity in their 
species composition, structure and in the fauna they shelter and support. Many forest 
species are acknowledged as unique to Australia, with more than 2,800 of the 3,000 
species being endemic. As for eucalypts, these are highly dominant in forests, with 
over 700 species identified principally in Australia. The total area of Australian native 
forest is around 163 million hectares, about 21 % of the continent. Most of the forest 
consists of woodland and mallee. Australia also has 1. 7 million hectares of plantations, 
including about 59% introduced pines and 41 % native hardwood species (mostly 
eucalypts ), with the proportion of native hardwood species in the national estate 
increasing. Less than 1 % of available area in the native forests is harvested per annum, 
while total plantation sites increase each year (AGO 2005). Give this, a large amount 
of Australia's forest is regarded as unique ecosystem diversity. 
4.1.15 Summary 
To sum up, this section has demonstrated the national situation of Australia over the 
period. In order to give a clear picture of these circumstances, the section selected a 
number of key aspects reported under the UNFCCC guidelines, namely: government 
structure; population profile; geographic profile; climate profile; economic profile; 
energy; transportation; industry; waste; agriculture; and forestry. Furthermore, in the 
light of national background, it found a number of unique circumstances in this 
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country: rapid population and economic growth; changing land-use patterns; the 
necessity for long-haul transport across vast distances; a significant concentration of 
population density; limited hydro-electric resources, unutilised nuclear energy 
industry and a high reliance on inexpensive fossil-fuel reserves for power generation; 
huge exports of energy commodities and energy-intensive materials; and a high 
dependency on agriculture; and the fragility of its environmental systems all of which 
render it particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Therefore, Australia 
has unique circumstances and it is evident that the circumstances have to be 
considered in terms of devising the most suitable climate solutions for the domestic 
climate change approach. 
The following section will describe data for the national emissions of Australia. This 
will present a clear picture of how much Australia has contributed to global GHG 
emissions as well as its emission changes in a historical context, including over the 
period 1997-2007. 
4.2 National Emissions 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The objectives of this section are to describe the national emission trends in Australia 
as found in the most recent data. Firstly, it will examine the global position of 
Australia when comparing global national emissions and per capita GHG emissions. 
Secondly, it will examine national emission trends in Australia. Thirdly, it will break 
down emissions by sector, namely: energy; industrial processes; solvent and other 
product use; agriculture; land use; land use change and forestry; and waste. Fourthly, 
this section will demonstrate the consequence of national emissions based on the 
Kyoto accounting system. Finally, this section will conclude with the most recent data 
for national emissions in Australia. 
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4.2.2 The global position 
Australia is currently recognised as the fifteenth highest emitter in the world, emitting 
the equivalent of 491 Mt C02 . In comparison, the largest emitter, the United States, 
produces 6928 Mt C02 (Herzog et al. 2005). Moreover, Australia' s per capita 
emissions are amongst the highest in the world, at around 27 tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalent per person, compared to 10 tonnes in Japan and 21 tonnes in the US 
(CSIRO 2005). Therefore, Australia has a significant part to play in the global 
responsibility for reducing GHG emissions. 
As mentioned, Australia's per capita GHG emissions are among the highest of any 
OECD country and among the highest in the world. Only five countries in the world 
recorded higher, namely Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei, Kuwait and Qatar. The figure 4.4 
below shows Australia' s per capita GHG emissions in 2005 as compared to the 
OECD and world average (DCC 2008a). 
Figure 4.2: C0 2 Per Capita, C HG Emiss ions, 2005 
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Adapted from DCC. 2008a. Garnaut Climate Change Review: Draft Report. 8 Australia 's Emissions and the 
Economy . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. URL: < www.gamautreview.org.au.> . Consulted 25 
October 2008. 
ln 2005 , it was reported that Australia' s per capita emissions were twice the average of 
OECD countries, and more than four times the world average (DCC 2008a). 
4.2.3 The national emission trends 
Since Australia became a party to the UNFCCC [United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change] in 1992, and committed to report updated national 
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inventories each year, Australia has made provisions for these national inventories. 
Most recently, Australia updated and published the latest estimates of the national 
emission trends (GHG emissions) in 2006, in The National Inventory Report 2006. 
This report accounts for the period 1990 to 2006. The inventory report used the 
method described in the Australian Methodology for the Estimation of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions and Sinks 2006. The methodologies confo1111 to the requirements of 
the international guidelines under the UNFCCC. Currently, the Department of 
Climate Change is the main institutional climate policy actor in Australia. 
Furthermore, the methodologies used in the estimation of the national inventory have 
improved over time, and there is commitment to refine them as updated new data are 
issued, and systematically adapted whenever demands emerge internationally for 
example as a result of Kyoto style negotiations (DCC 2008b ). 
The National Inventory Report 2006 estimates the major GHG emissions as: carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons and sulphur 
hexafluoride. Furthermore, the report also covers indirect GHG emissions such as 
carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, and non-methane volatile organic compounds. 
Sulphur dioxide, an aerosol precursor, is also included, as are gas emissions which 
influence rising temperatures in the atmosphere. 
The emissions and removals have been categorised into six sectors, as defined by the 
IPCC. These sectors are regarded as representing the main human activities in terms 
of releasing or capturing of GHG emissions from the atmosphere and include: energy; 
industrial processes; solvent and other product use; agriculture; land use; land use 
change and forestry; and waste. Therefore, the data in the National Inventory Report 
2006 from the Department of Climate Change in Australia will be very important in 
terms of addressing the national emission trends in this country. However, it should 
be mentioned that there is another emission inventory which exists in this country, 
namely the inventory used for the National Greenhouse Strategy (DCC 2008c). 
The strategy was established for a successful prov1s1on in terms of reaching 
Australia's Kyoto protocol targets. Although Australia had not ratified Kyoto when 
the strategy was made, it still intended to accomplish its Kyoto targets through the 
national plan (DCC 2008c ). The results were that Australia met its Kyoto targets but 
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did not ratify the Protocol during Howard ' s political regime. However, the Kyoto 
accounting methods differ from those under the UNFCCC. The most different aspect 
is the way of accounting for forest sinks (DCC 2008c). However, this section does not 
intend to discuss the critical issues, but rather focuses on addressing national emission 
trends. Although, this section mainly examines the data for the national emission 
trends from the National Inventory Report 2006, later there will be a brief 
examination of the results of national emission trends based on the Kyoto accounting. 
4.2.4 National trends, 1990 to 2006 (UNFCCC accounting rules) 
The latest data from the National Inventory Report 2006 describes Australia' s 
emission changes over the period 1990 to 2006. Table 4.2 below describes changes in 
total net C0 2-equivalent (C0 2-e) emissions from greenhouse gas emissions over the 
period. In 2006, the total net emissions were 549.9 Mt CO 2 -e. This represents an 
increase of 6.6% from the 1990 levels of 515.9 Mt C0 2-e. This indicates a significant 
increase of greenhouse gas emissions in Australia (DCC 2008b ). 
Table 4.2: Changes in Total Net C0 2-e Emissions by Gas, 1990-2006 
1990 2006 1990% 2006% Ch:mge-.1 % 
GM@nhousagasl!i Mtro -2 MtCO -2 offot.al oflot.al Mt Change In 
l l ~~~ 
-- ---- ---- - -- --- - -- - -- - - --- - ----- ---
CO/II 371}3 39S.6 71..B 71.5 283 7.6 
rn, 11 9.9 110.4 13.l 21.9 11.S 11..4 
NO 2 10.1 15.1 l.9 4.fi 5.0 25JJ 
HFC.s u 4.6 Cll.1 O.S 15 3U.7 
Adapted from DCC. 2008b. National Inventory Report 2006- Volume I : The Australian Government 
Submission to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 4.5 below shows the largest contribution to net emissions was from CO 2 -e 
emissions comprising gas in 2006. The total was 398.6Mt or 72.5%. Emissions were 
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followed by methane, which contributed 120.4 Mt C0 2-e or 21.9%. Carbon dioxide is 
thus the most important source of GHG emissions in Australia (DCC 2008b ). 
Figure 4.3: Contribution to Total Net C02-e Emissions by Gas, 2006 
Adapted from DCC. 2008b. National Inventory Report 2006- Volume I : The Australian Government 
Submission to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Commonwealth of Australia. 
4.2.5 The sectoral trends 
As total net emissions increased, the energy, industrial processes, solvent and other 
product use, agriculture, land use, land use change and forestry and waste sectors have 
also shown individual changes over time. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.6 below describe 
trends in emissions and removals by sector over the period 1990 to 2006. 
In 2006, the inventory report acknowledged that Australia' s net GHG emissions were 
549.9 (Mt), (C0 2-e). Table 4.3 shows seven sectors were the main sources of the 
national net emissions. The inventory also categorised three subsections, including 
stationary energy, transport and fugitive emissions, into one as combined energy 
source. This combined energy source was the largest source of GHG emission by 
400.9Mt. Although this proportion is lower than in many countries, the fact is due to 
the relatively large contribution from the agriculture sector, of 16.4%. Other relatively 
small emission sources included industrial processes, such as from the manufacture of 
mineral products, emissions from waste disposal and land use, land use change and 
forestry (DCC 2008b ). 
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Table 4.3: Australian Net GHG Emissions by Sector, 2006 
Stationary energy 
Transport 
[ Fugitive emissions from fuel 
2 Industrial Processes 
3 So lvent and o ther p roduct use1•i 
285.3 
r76.8 5.8 22.6 
NA 
71.6 
19.3 
1.5 
5.7 
NA 
4 Agricultu re 4 NA ~NA 
S Land use, land use ch ange and forestry 8. 1 2.0 
6 Waste 0 .03 0.01 
(a) Emissions are Included In lndUS1J1al processes for confidentiality reasons. 
0 .1 
0.03 
1 .4 
0.003 
NA 
3.3 
0.2 
(b) HFCs, PfCs and SF, are not separately reported here but are Included in the CO,-<>totals 
0.9 0 .003 3.9 
I 0:1 t ::: 
0.0001 0.1 
05 
23.8 
0 .1 
NA IE IE 
58.0 0.1 l 80.7 
3.4 6 .1 
287.4 52.3 
79.1 14.4 
34.5 I 6.3 
28.4 5.2 
IE IE 
90.1 16.4 
13.8 2.5 
Adapted from DCC. 2008b. National Inventory Report 2006-Volume I : The Australian Government 
Submission to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 4.4: Contribution to Total Net C0 2-e Emiss ions by Sector, 2006 
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Adapted from DCC. 2008b. National Inventory Report 2006-Vo fum e / : The Australian Government 
Submission to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change . Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 4.6 shows the largest em1ss1ons sources m terms of total net em1ss1ons. In 
terms of the level of individual GHG emissions, the energy sector was the major 
contributor to carbon dioxide emissions at 367.8Mt or 92.3%. Agriculture is the main 
contributor of methane at 3.3Mt and nitrous oxide at 0.07Mt or 80.7% (DCC 2008b). 
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Figure 4.: Trends in Emissions and Removals by Sector, 1990-2006 
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Adapted from DCC. 2008b. National Inventory Report 2006- Volume I : The Australian Government 
Submission to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 4.7 also describes the trends in greenhouse gas emissions and removals by 
sector over the period 1990 to 2006. The stationary sector was the largest emitter, and 
shows a significant increase in carbon dioxide emissions (47.3% or 92.2 Mt) between 
1990 and 2006 (DCC 2008b ). This emissions data was produced in accordance with 
the accounting rules of the UNFCCC. An alternative system of measurement, which is 
an important addition to the UNFCCC scheme, is presented by the Kyoto accounting 
rules. The following section demonstrates this alternate system. 
4.2.6 The national trends (Kyoto accounting rules) 
This section will demonstrate trends in national net em1ss1ons under the Kyoto 
accounting. The trends under Kyoto accounting differ from the data reported under 
the UNFCCC rules, the major differences being the way forest sinks are treated. Table 
4.4 shows the data for Australian net GHG emissions in 2006 by sector under Kyoto 
accounting. 
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Table 4.4: Australian Net G HG Emissions by Sector under Kyoto Accounting, 2006 
Sector and Subsector 
1 All energy (combustion+ fugitive) 
Stationa energy 
Tram n 
Fugitive emissions from fuel 
2 lndustrlaJ processes 
3 Solvent and other product use"" 
4 Agriculture 
SWaste 
6t.and use, land use change and forestry 
-g. 
Mt 
367.8 
2853 
76.8 
5.8 
22.6 
NA 
NA 
0 .03 
37A 
Tota I net emissions"" I 427.8 
31 
Mt 
30.4 
1.1 
0.6 
28.7 
0.1 
NA 
69.8 
16.0 
2.1 
- - - -
N 0 HFCs/PFCs SF 
Mt Mt 
2.7 NA 
1.0 NA 
1.7 NA 
0.02 NA 
0.02 5.8 
IE NA 
20.3 NA 
0.6 NA 
0.6 NA 
. . 
Mt 
400.9 
287.4 
79.1 
34.5 
28.4 
IE 
90.1 
16.6 
40.0 
• I 
(a) Emissions are included In Industrial Processes for reasons of confidentiality (bJ Str1ctly speaking the net credits from land use 
change and forestry should only enter the account during the first comm itment period (2008-2012). Their inclusion in the 2006 
Inventory helps our understanding of Australia's emissions In relation to the Kyoto emissions target which ,(s estimated to be 597 
Mt each year over the first commitment pertod. 
NA = not applicable, IE = included elsewhere 
Adapted from DCC [the Department of Climate Change]. 2008c. National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory 2006: Accounting f or the Kyoto Target. Act: Australia. 
As shown above, by using Kyoto accounting, total emissions of 576.0 Mt C0 2-e were 
reported in 2006 against 552.6Mt C0 2-e in 1990, which is an increase of 4.2% (DCC 
2008c). On the other hand, the UNFCCC accounting reports 549.9Mt C02-e in 2006 
against 515 .9Mt C0 2-e in 1990 which is an increase of6.6% (DCC 2008b). The most 
significant difference in the two data sets is the results for land use, land use change 
and forestry [LULUCF]. Kyoto rules allow a decrease of 53.9% in land clearing from 
1990 to 2006, while only 45.5% is allowed under the UNFCCC accounting (DCC 
2008b ). Although this thesis emphasises the data for national emission trends under 
the UNFCCC accounting rules, these data comparisons between the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto accounting recognised above are very important in terms of identifying the 
most relevant data for national emission trends. 
4.2. 7 Summary 
This section has examined the most recent data for national em1ss10ns trends for 
Australia. To do so, the section firstly described the Australian national emissions 
profile in a global context and demonstrated that Australia is one of the most critical 
emitters at the international level. The section then presented national data reported 
under the UNFCCC accounting system. This section also described the national 
emissions by sectors, and identified a large increase in total national emissions with 
the emission increase most dominant in the energy sector. Furthermore, it was shown 
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that each sector has contributed to different levels of emission changes over time, 
because of different circumstances such as rising population and economic growth. 
Moreover, the section also contrasted UNFCCC data (UNFCCC accounting rules) 
with data collected by the Kyoto accounting system. The UNFCCC and Kyoto 
accounting rules apply emphasis to different factors in the measurement of emissions, 
especially with regard to land use and forest sinks. Even though this thesis mainly 
uses the UNFCCC data as the major source of emissions calculation in Australia, it 
also recognises the importance of variable data sources in attempting to best 
understand Australia's national emissions trends. 
The following section will demonstrate the history of climate policy development in 
Australia. The section addresses what the national government developed and how, in 
regard to national climate change policy. The focus is on addressing political 
circumstances and their implications for national initiatives over the period 1997-2007 
in the Howard political regime. 
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4.3 Australian Climate Change Policy 1997-2007 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section examines the development of climate change policy by the Australian 
government over the period 1997 lu 2007, which was chosen because the domestic 
greenhouse policy of this era reflects one of the most critical periods in terms of GHG 
mitigation policy by one of the most carbon intensive nations. Australia has been one 
of the most highly carbon intensive countries in the world. When the rest of the world 
was demanding strong initiatives from developed nations in terms of immediately 
implementing actions to reduce GHGs, Former Prime Minister, John Howard held 
power during this decade and designed and implemented an individual domestic 
approach largely dominated by voluntary-based activities, without taking global 
responsibility as a developed nation for reducing GHG emissions through the first 
world international agreement on climate change action (i.e. Kyoto Protocol). These 
findings were essential for the following case studies in order to address and 
appreciate policy background and significance. This section selects five major 
perspectives in terms of demonstrating his governments' policy impact in relation to 
climate change policy: i) backgrounds of international negotiation (the Kyoto Protocol) 
ii) domestic policy measures iii) proposed emission trading scheme iv) legislation by 
the federal government v) financial commitments. 
4.3.2 International negotiation 
During the Howard regime between 1997 and 2007, one of the most significant 
aspects of climate change policy was the background or context of international 
negotiations. The Kyoto Protocol is the first international treaty with binding country 
targets for the reduction of GHG emissions (Fletcher 2005). Under the Protocol, 
agreed in principle in 1997, 38 developed countries and economies agreed to an 
aggregate five per cent reduction in GHG emissions from 1990 levels by 2008-2012 
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(Aiba and Tatsuyoshi 2001), also known as the 'first commitment period' (FCCC 
1998). 
The agreement incorporates a number of methods, such as differentiated targets, the 
Clean Development Mechanisms [CDM], and the exception of developing countries 
during the initial commitment period. Specifically, in terms of the differentiated 
targets, Australia was allowed an increase up to 108 per cent against the 1990 levels, 
rather than a decrease. This means Australia has a huge advantage under the treaty 
compared to other countries. In contrast to Australia, Japan is required to achieve a 6 
per cent cut in emissions and the USA is expected to produce a 7 per cent cut (Aiba, T. 
and S. Tatsuyoshi. 2001). However, in spite of such leniency, the Australian 
government chose not to ratify the treaty during the Howard regime, although Howard 
did commit to achieving the differentiated target set for Australia as a part of his 
commitment to climate action under the UNFCCC (AGO 2001). A clear picture of the 
history of Australian climate change policy between 1997 and 2007 depends, to a 
large degree, on understanding the critical significance to the Australian government 
of the Kyoto treaty. The following section provides background on the Australian 
positioning on the Kyoto Protocol. 
4.3.3 The Kyoto Treaty 
The history of climate change policy in Australia over the last two decades has 
involved three governments (Hawke, 1983-1990; Keating, 1991-1996; and Howard, 
1997-2007) and significant change (Curran 2003). A first significant step occurred in 
the late 1980s, during Prime Minister Hawke's regime (Christoff 2005). As 
determined by global agreement, after the UNFCCC was established a world summit 
was held in 1992. Following this, the first Conference of Parties (COPl) to the 
UNFCCC was held in Berlin in 1995 during the Keating regime (Papadakis 2002). 
Elected in 1996, the involvement of the Howard government in the global response to 
climate change began at the time of the COP2 in Geneva. The government strongly 
argued at the COP2 on certain matters: the IPCC science, legal binding targets and 
differentiated target settings were all questioned. The reason for Howard's actions 
was the nation's reliance upon fossil fuel for its economic resource (McDonald 2005). 
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The government appealed against these matters with data for how unique the national 
circumstance is and how the treaty would create negative impacts on the nation. 
However, later it was found that this data was entirely uncertain, and dominated by 
information and suggestions from the fossil fuel industry and its lobby groups 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman 1998). At the end of the COP2 the government 
concluded with continued consideration of a legal obligation of compliance, and the 
necessity of differentiated targets (McDonald 2005). 
After these events, at the COP3 in Kyoto in Japan in 1997, Australia kept resisting 
legal compliance with Kyoto targets because of the significant risks associated with 
reducing GHG emissions (Christoff 2005). Finally, Australia won 'differentiated 
targets' because of its particular economic circumstances, and succeeded in achieving 
a target limiting its greenhouse gas emissions growth up to 108 per cent of its 1990 
baseline, which reached equal to nearly a 30 per cent reduction from its 'business as 
usual' 28 projections (Roarty 2002). Australia was one of only three developed nations, 
including Norway and Iceland, to be allowed increases in its emission levels on its 
1990 baseline, rather than reductions, while other developed nations accepted a 
reduction in their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5 per cent to the baseline 
(Stuart et al. 1998). 
Since the COP3 in Kyoto, the Kyoto treaty identified a range of actions to offset 
emission growth, including: growing forests; reafforestation; improved forestry; and 
cropland and grazing land management practices. The agreement did not consider the 
amount of sink credits, which was determined later on. Countries were, however, 
given quotas set out in Annex Z of the non-agreement that reflected their own 
circumstances (Roarty 2002). 
In COP6, a significant part of the negotiation was about 'carbon sinks', at the 
insistence of Australia and the United States (Egenhofer et al. 2001), and there was a 
28
"the IPCC has structured its projections about future trajectories for greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change under various scenarios. The IPCC scenario with assumptions of future economic 
growth and emissions intensity which analysis of the Review to-date indicates, is the most likely to be 
closest to the twenty-first century reality in the absence of any effective mitigation called ' business as 
usual ' or A I FI. In Garnaut Climate Change Review: Interim report to the commonwealth, state and 
territory governments of Australia, eds, The Commonwealth of Australia. 2008. pp.12. (Electronic 
copy: http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/files/garnaut.pdD 
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maJor conflict between the European Union and the US regarding the role of 
'flexibility mechanisms'. Members of a loosely aligned Umbrella Group including 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Iceland, Norway and Ukraine 
followed the United States position (Egenhofer et al. 2001). However, after the United 
States rejected ratification of the Kyoto treaty in 2001, but with the acceptance of the 
other countries, negotiations continued between the remaining Parties at COP7 in 
Marrakesh to become a possibly acceptable, further ratification (Justus et al. 2002). 
The final Marrakesh agreement on the process concluded that flexibility mechanisms 
should include: emissions trading, joint implementation and the Clean Development 
Mechanism [CDM] (Fletcher 2005). Most significantly, a mandatory base of 
'commitment period reserve' (the period 2008-2012) was imposed. "This requires 
parties to withhold from the emissions market 90 per cent of their assigned amount or 
100 per cent of five times the most recently reviewed inventory, whichever is lower" 
(Jakeman et al. 2002: 178). 
With respect to Australia's position, a number of key priorities for the sink outcomes 
can be incorporated. These are that no credit limits are allowed from afforestation and 
reafforestation activities, and included revegetation as an extra sink activity. This 
removed the potentially substantial and artificial country penalty for new fast-growing, 
short-rotation forest plantations, which would particularly affect Australia's eucalypt 
plantations (Mead, et al. 2001 ). Furthermore, sink credits would be specifically 
accepted as 'removal units' and unable to be accepted and transferred from the first 
commitment period (2008-12) to the second commitment period (post-Kyoto) 
(Crowley 2007). In a consideration at COP7 in 2001, a number of parties' accepted 
the negotiated achievements and outstanding efforts of the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action (COP4), but, the United States' withdrawal from the treaty saw the departure 
of the biggest emission contributor in the world (Babiker et al. 2002). 
Although Australia totally won their negotiation with respect to achieving a 
favourable outcome, the government then chose not to ratify Kyoto. Instead they 
committed to further global response without legal alignment with the international 
framework, and to its own approaches based on 'differentiated' achievement and 'no 
regrets' approaches (Crowley 2007). After COP7 was concluded, Kyoto discussions 
continued to develop a legal global outline, with COP8 in New Delhi, India, in 2002; 
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Cop9, Milan, Italy, in 2003; COPlO, Buenos Aires, Argentina in 2004; COP11 in 
Montreal, Canada in 2005 (After Russia finally ratified Kyoto, the Protocol became 
formally accepted and in February 2005 entered into force); and COP12 in Nairobi, 
Africa in 2006 (Hamada 2006). 
Australia had no positive response to the ratification until the end of the Howard 
government in late 2007, but kept pursuing its own approaches and interests whilst 
watching the progress of the Kyoto treaty and its target frames. Finally, Kevin Rudd 
became Labor Prime Minister, and ratified the Kyoto Treaty in late 2007 (ABC 
NEWS 2007), with implementation efforts now underway and that are not the subject 
of this thesis. Against the background of an historical development through 
international negotiation by the Australian government, John Howard put a range of 
efforts into negotiation during his political regime, in order to take account of his 
political interests in the international position over time. Prime Minister Howard also 
initiated various types of policy measures over time. 
Despite the fact that Australia did not until 2007 accept any international binding 
target under the Kyoto Protocol, the nation has an obligation to submit national 
communication on their domestic climate change affairs to the UNFCCC, which was 
formally decided at the World Summit in 1992. This required committed nations to 
provide their climate policy's national trends periodically to the UNFCCC (FCCC 
1998). Australia has made four communication reports so far; the Howard 
government conducted three reports during 1997-2008. These included: the second 
communication in 1997 by the Commonwealth of Australia; the third communication 
in 2002 by the AGO; and the fourth communication in 2005 by the AGO (AGO 2005). 
These national documents are very important as the most relevant data source for 
national activities on climate change policy. The following section will examine the 
Howard Government's domestic policy measures initiated over the period of 1997-
2007, from the data supplied in these national communication reports to UNFCCC. 
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4.3.4 Domestic policy measures 
The Australian Commonwealth Government initiated four major packages to tackle 
GHG emission reductions over the period 1997-2007 comprising: the '1997 
Safeguarding the Future: Australia's Response to Climate Change'; the '1998 
National Greenhouse Strategy'; the ' 1999 Measures for a Better Environment 
Package'; and "2004 Securing Australia's Energy Future Measures' (AGO 2005). 
These main approaches were based on the 'no regrets' policy, to which the Howard 
government was strongly committed during his political regime (Sullivan 2007). The 
concept of no-regrets means global environmental achievement is to be accomplished 
without economic risks or limits to development (McDonald 2005). However, it is 
often argued that the balance between environmental and economic objectives is not 
weighted at the same level, especially for the climate change policy process in 
Australia, which has placed great emphasis on the importance of economic growth 
(Bulkeley 2001 ). 
In November 1997, the Prime Minister announced the '1997 Safeguarding the Future: 
Australia's Response to Climate Change'. Howard was committed to implementing a 
range of policy activities through this measure (AGO 2002b ). A first significant 
initiative was delivered with the establishment of the Greenhouse Challenge Program 
[GCP] by the Commonwealth Government. This was an extension of the original 
voluntary measure from the previous ALP Keating government's climate policy 
approach based on a voluntary cooperative program between industry and government 
intended to either reduce or mitigate GHG emissions over the long term. The GCP 
was expected to reduce emissions by more than 21 Mt C02-e by 2000. At the time, 
Australia's greenhouse gas emissions were the equivalent of 3 80 Mt of carbon dioxide 
in 1990 and 403 Mt in 1995, representative of an increase of about 6% in that period 
(excluding land clearing) (CWLTH 1997). 
Under 'Safeguarding the Future: Australia's Response to Climate Change', a number 
of programs were implemented to place Australia's emissions within a range of 118-
120 per cent of the 1990 baseline of national targets and reduce Australia's net 
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emissions growth from 28% to 18% (excluding land use change) or some 39 Mt of 
emissions by 2010 (from 494 Mt to 455 Mt). This package also contained completely 
new measures and a substantial expansion of existing programs (CWLTH 1997). 
Under the measure other activities include renewable energy; energy market reform; 
the automotive industry incorporating fuel standards; tree planting and revegetation, 
which are based on a voluntary based approach with focus on the 'no regret' measures 
(CWLTH 2000b; Hon et al. 2002; ANAO 2004; and Hunt 2004). The package also 
included establishing the Australian Greenhouse Office [AGO] in April 1998, which 
was the first dedicated greenhouse office in the world. The AGO is responsible for 
undertaking most of the policy measures for nation climate actions regarding GHG 
emission abatement (AGO 2002b ). Later the AGO was upgraded to a separate agency 
within the Commonwealth Government Department of Environment and Heritage 
(Lister 2004), and later a Department of Climate Change. 
In November 1998, the federal government introduced its National Greenhouse 
Strategy [NGS] (CWLTH 1998), which was a significant part of Australia's response 
to Kyoto (Bulkeley 2000), and was also intended to produce a framework for 
advancing Australia's domestic greenhouse initiative into the future. Under the 
Strategy, some 86 individual measures are grouped into eight sectoral 'modules', 
reflecting the whole range of policy actions, from voluntary measures and strategic 
financial supports to regulation and market measures (CWLTH 2000a). Policy 
measures under the strategy mainly focused on three goals: 
• building knowledge and understanding of greenhouse issues 
• preventing greenhouse gas emissions 
• forming the basis for adaptation to climate change 
(CWLTH 2000a) 
This strategy was also expected to implement its measures in conjunction with 
activities among the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments. Furthermore, 
the strategy also aimed to benefit from the efforts of industry, non-governmental 
organisations, and local governments (CWLTH 1998). It was earmarked for review 
during 2002, or earlier, depending on the circumstances in the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto protocol, and it was also committed to providing biennial progress reports for 
the implementation of the NGS. The review has been held and was contained in the 
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Third Communication in 2002 and the Fourth Communication in 2005. However, the 
biennial progress report has not been publicly released since the independent review 
of the AGO in 2002 was released. 
In June 1999, the Commonwealth Government released a series, 'Measures for a 
Better Environment', including a revised tax system package. These programs 
contained new measures to assist photovoltaic and other forms of renewable energy, 
and the use of alternative fuels (CWLTH 2000b)29. A major program, which started in 
July 2000, was the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program [GGAP] (Smith 2002). 
Following these events, another major policy package 'Securing Australia's Energy 
Future' was announced in 2004. The new package was intended to deliver energy 
reliability, competitive energy supplies, and efficient energy markets, encourage 
investment, and secure energy to consider greenhouse emissions, renewable energy, 
bio-fuels, clean fossil fuels, and international partnerships (AGO 2004a). In terms of 
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, a number of measures were introduced with 
government spending over AUD2.5 billion in funding, some of which extended 
beyond previous programs. These measures were: Low Emissions Technologies 
Demonstration Fund (LETDF); Renewable energy technologies such as the Solar 
Cities program; GCAP; GCP; and Mandatory Renewable Energy Target [MRET] 
(CWLTH 2004). 
'Securing Australia's Energy Future' also included a variety of assistance programs 
including: 'renewable energy for remote power generation'; 'solar power on 
residential and community buildings'; 'equity funding such as venture capital for 
innovation' and ; 'R&D and industry development activities'. Other programs 
included MRET and the National Framework for Energy Efficiency (Sullivan 2007). 
A further funding package opportunity called 'Energy Security Initiatives', was also 
provided in August 2006, which was committed to nearly AUDl.6 billion over eight 
years. The key focuses were: 'rebate for LPG vehicle conversions'; 'expanded oil & 
gas exploration program'; 'support for ethanol infrastructure development'; 'develop 
29 This only happened because of negotiations with the Australian Democrats holding balance of power 
in the Senate. 
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a gas to liquids R&D proposal'; and 'extend & expand the renewable remote power 
generation program'(AUSGEO 2006). 
Within the 'Energy Security Initiatives' package, the Howard government emphasised 
that Australia lead the world in clean coal technology (CCT) from 2006. For CCT 
research, development & demonstration in CO 2 storage, CCT provided the 'Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC)', 'Oxy-Fuel Combustion', 'Post Combustion 
Capture', and 'Ultra Clean Coal' (Coal21 2006). In terms of the international 
association with CCT, the package noted associations with the Carbon Sequestration 
Leadership Forum (CSLF), the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate (AP6), and the Methane to Markets Partnerships. At the same time, the 
Commonwealth Government was committed to the AP6. The government was also 
committed to spending AUD 100 million over five years for renewable projects, 
'Chairing Cleaner Fossil Energy and Aluminium Task Forces', and 'Co-chairing 
Renewable and Distributed Energy Task Force with Korea'. As to domestic R&D 
collaboration on CCT, CSIRO, the Co-operative Research Centres (CRCs), the Centre 
for Low Emission Technology (CLET) and the Australian Coal Association Research 
Program (ACARP) have worked together and new collaborative research institutions 
are under further consideration (CWLTH 2007a). 
Therefore, these four major packages of the Australian government during the period 
1997 to 2007 were very important initiatives for the domestic policy, namely: the 
'1997 Safeguarding the Future: Australia's Response to Climate Change'; the '1998 
National Greenhouse Strategy'; the '1999 Measures for a Better Environment 
Package'; and '2004 Securing Australia's Energy Future Measures'. In addition to the 
policy background, the installation of an emission trading scheme at the national level 
was also considered during the same period as a significant policy tool for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, but this ultimately failed to eventuate. It is very important 
to understand how a critical policy tool for climate change policy in a country is 
considered and implemented and how failures arise. The following section describes 
how the proposed emission trading was considered and why it failed. 
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4.3.5 Proposed emissions trading system 
The emissions trading system is a policy tool to enable facilitation of the 'polluter 
pays' concept, which allows companies to pay for emissions and which prices carbon 
into the market. This also awards credits to those who succeed in reducing pollution 
and will also allow tradable permits, with the most common system being the "cap 
and trade" system (CWL TH 2007b ). 
During 1999, the AGO released four discussion papers on em1ss1ons trading, 
including: establishing the boundaries, issuing the permits, crediting the carbon and 
designing the market (AGO 2002a). The concepts and its strategy framed in these 
published discussion papers were expected to deliver the implementation of an 
emissions trading system in Australia (CWLTH 1999). However, the government 
announced that a domestic trading emissions system would not successfully articulate 
with any international trading scheme (AGO 2002a). Despite this fact, the AGO was 
still in a position to advise for the further consideration of the system (AGO 2001), 
but was not in a position to have the power to implement it (AGO 2002a). After the 
federal government decided not to implement a domestic trading emissions system, 
state and territories and non-government environmental organisations chose to start 
another way to encourage possible adaptation for any emission trading system at the 
national level (Baker et al. 2004). In terms of continuous domestic pressure for a 
trading system at the national level, a number of individual initiatives were attempted 
in some states' jurisdictions, rather than waiting for action by the national government. 
The first attempt occurred in NSW, called Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme 
(GGAS) launched in 2003, which was one of the first mandatory greenhouse gas 
emissions trading schemes in the world (IPRT 2004), and later the ACT followed the 
event in 2005 (ICRC 2007). The State and Territory governments also decided to 
establish a working group for further development of a proposed multi-jurisdictional 
emissions trading system called the National Emission Trading Taskforce [NETT], 
which was established in 2004 (STPCM 2005). This was intended to be in a position 
to undertake state-based preparation for the installation of a trading scheme at national 
level (Evan et al. 2007). These suggestions were submitted to the Prime Minister, 
John Howard, (BSSL 2006) without any positive response (Australian Labor 2007). 
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Meanwhile, other strong pressures on the federal government were also given by two 
of the environment ministers in 2000 and in 2003, and the government was also 
pressured by other organisations outside of the country such as the International 
Energy Agency [IEA] (Crowley 2007). In Dec 2006, the Prime Minister finally 
announced the establishment of a joint government body called 'the Prime Ministerial 
Task Group' on national emission trading, and the Task Group Final Report to the 
Prime Minister was released on May 31, 2007 (Commonwealth of Australia 2007). A 
number of recommendations to the federal government to install a national trading 
system were also submitted (Dunlop 2007; NAFI 2007; NFF 2007). The installation 
of the emission trading scheme had not occurred at the national level by the end of the 
period of Howard's political regime, although two independent bodies, the Prime 
Ministerial Task Group at the national level and NETT at the state jurisdictions and 
local level, were separately established as a framework for a national trading scheme 
(COAF 2007). It remained for the Rudd Labor government to pursue a scheme after 
2007. 
4.3.6 Federal government legislation 
In the period of the Howard government, a number of further legislative 
developments were introduced by the national government. One of the significant 
developments at the national level was the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000. 
This legislation was assisted by the Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Act 
2000 (to create a penalty for renewable energy shortfall charge) and the Renewable 
Energy (Electricity Regulations 2001) (the regulations and support for the main Act). 
Under these Acts, the federal government required that an additional 2 per cent of 
electricity would be compulsorily generated from the renewable energy industry and 
this was expected to encourage the sale of electricity generated by accredited 
renewable sources to large electricity retailers and large purchasers of up to 9500 
GWh per annum by 2010 (AGO 2003a). Both Acts and regulations, which were 
amended and came into force in 2006 (CWLTH 2006), reframed structures in relation 
to power station accreditation and baselines; eligibility of renewable energy sources; 
creation, registration, transfer and surrender of Renewable Energy Credits [RECs]; 
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and Renewable Power Percentage [RPP] (to achieve targets as specified in the 
legislation in the interim) (CWLTH 2007c ). 
Another legislative activity was found in environmental legislation. The Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 [EPBC Act] was enacted by the 
federal government in July 2000. This Act covers 'environmental assessment and 
approvals, protects significant biodiversity and integrates the management of 
important natural and cultural places'. A significant aspect of the Act was where it 
occurred. The proposed action must be approved by the Commonwealth Government, 
unless there is a bilateral agreement in the area between the Commonwealth and a 
state (CWLTH 2007d). From subsequent amendment, these regulations can also 
specify that an activity results in producing GHG emissions by a direct consequence 
of actions, particularly in generating or transmitting electricity which is of interest 
here (CWL TH 2006). 
Another significant piece of legislation can also be found for the National Electricity 
Market [NEM] related to GHG emissions, as part of significant energy reform. 
Utilities of energy sources and an increase of greenhouse emissions from the 
stationary energy sector in Australia were required by federal law to be replaced by 
the creation of the NEM in Australia in the 1990s (COAG 2007). The NEM was 
established in 1999. This regulated access to energy linkages and introduced retail 
competition. There are also a number of privatisations within the Victorian and South 
Australian electricity industry, and Queensland's energy retail sector. The NEM was 
installed without incident. Annual investments run at around AUD700 million in 
electricity transmission infrastructure and AUD3 billion in the local distribution 
networks that supply electricity to customers. Real network investment would rise by 
around 40 per cent in the five years to 2007-08, taken up largely by transmission 
expansions and upgrades. For a longer term perspective, the NEM has brought stable 
credibility, developed productive solutions and shown lower energy costs (Willett 
2007). These legislative developments particularly related to the issues of 
environmental protection and sustainable energy sources and assisted to improve the 
frameworks of climate change policy at the national level in the period of the Howard 
government. 
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4.3.7 The financial commitments 
With respect to policy funds for the national climate policy approaches during the 
Howard regime, a large number of investments were made by the national 
government between 1997-2007. The AGO coordinated climate change policy and 
aimed to deliver a number of programs under the greenhouse policy framework. It 
developed a strategic :framework under the National Greenhouse Strategy in 1998. 
This strategy committed nearly AUDI billion by the Commonwealth Government 
(endorsed by State and Territory governments) to meet international commitments to 
tackle climate policy approach. The national government claimed that Australia was a 
world leader because of this government funding for greenhouse on a per capita basis 
(CWLTH 2000a), including AUD180 million for activities under 'Safeguarding the 
Future package' in 1997, and AUD769 million for programs under 'Measures for a 
Better Environment' in 1999 (AGO 2002b ). 
After these initiatives under the National Greenhouse Strategy, additional funding 
approaches were articulated in the 2004-2005 federal Budgets and the Australian 
Government's energy policy paper, the Energy White Paper Securing Australia's 
Energy Future (June 2004). These additional measures underpinned commitment to a 
further AUDl.2 billion (AUD463 million for 11 new measures in the federal Budget 
and AUD749 million for lower emissions and renewable energy technologies in the 
Energy White Paper) for a new climate change strategy, which was publicly reported 
in the fourth national communication to the UNFCCC in 2005 (AGO 2005). Some of 
the program budgets extended previous programs. These included AUD334.4 million 
for greenhouse gas abatements, AUDIOO million for renewable technologies and 
AUD75 million for demonstration Solar Cities (Crowley 2007). The federal 
government further emphasised the development of technology for mitigating 
greenhouse gases. The Low Emission Technology Demonstration Fund (LETDF) 
committed to spend AUD500 million to be distributed between 2006 and 2012 and to 
assist the commercial demonstration of technologies that have the potential to lead 
large-scale greenhouse gas emission reductions in energy sector (MacGill et al. 2007). 
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The chart below illustrates packages introduced by the government and how much 
was spent over the period 1997-2007. 
Table 4.5: Policies, Packages and Expenditure 1997-2007, under the Australian 
Government 
Packages Actual expenditure (AUD) 
Safeguarding the Future· Australia's 149.300 million 
NGS: National Greenhouse Response to Climate Chanf!e in 1997 
Strategy in 1998 (nearly 1 1999-2000 Budget Measures 21.600 million 
billion commitment) Measures for a Better Environment in 796.000 million 
1999 
Securing Australia's Energy Future' 1.2 billion 
in 2004 
334.4 million for greenhouse 
New Climate Change Strategy Additional extended costs on gas abatements, 100 million 
in 2004 (AUDl.2 billion programs for renewable technologies and 
commitment) 75 million for demonstration 
Solar Cities 
Total costs Over 3.0 billon 
Sources: (CWLTH 2000a; AGO 2002b; AGO 2005; Crowley 2007; and MacGill et al. 2007). CWLTH. 
2000a. The National Greenhouse Strategy: 2000 Progress report. AGO, Department of Environment 
and Heritage, Canberra ACT. AGO. 2002b. Australia's Third National Communication on Clzmate 
Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia's Fourth National 
Commumcation on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth 
of Australia. Crowley, K. 2007. 'Is Australia Faking It? The Kyoto Protocol and the Greenhouse Policy 
Challenge', Global Environmental Politics. November 2007, 17(4): 118-139. MacGill, I., H. 
Outhred., and K.Nolles. 2006. 'Some design lessons from market-based greenhouse gas 
regulation in the restructured Australian electricity industry'. Energy Policy 34: 11-25. 
4.3.8 Summary 
This section examined climate policy development by the Australian government over 
the period 1997-2007. In particular, it focused on describing a variety of events in 
terms of outcomes at the international and domestic level. The section also selected 
five major perspectives under the national initiatives, namely: the backgrounds of 
international negotiation (the Kyoto Protocol), domestic policy measures, proposed 
emission trading scheme, legislation under the federal government and financial 
commitments. A variety of national initiatives were instigated by the Howard 
government, such as his four policy packages (1997-2007): the '1997 Safeguarding 
the Future: Australia's Response to Climate Change'; the '1998 National Greenhouse 
Strategy'; the '1999 Measures for a Better Environment Package'; and the '2004 
Securing Australia's Energy Future Measures' . These initiatives represent the 
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Howard government's key contributions to the global effort to reduce emissions. But 
they also represent a middle ground between international and domestic obligations 
that allowed the government to avoid binding international agreements, which would 
have potentially have had a negative impact on economic growth (and possibly 
domestic support for the government as the Rudd Government is now finding). 
The following section will present an evaluation of climate change policy over the 
period 1997-2007. This will cover critiques of the Howard government's policy 
implementation over time and the importance of applying an instrument analysis to 
these circumstances. 
4.4 Instruments and Greenhouse Policy in Australia 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this section is to provide an analysis of the Australian climate change 
policy instruments over the period 1997 to 2007. A number of critiques of the 
implementation of such instruments, designs and outcomes have emerged over time. 
This section covers seven critical aspects of national policy implementation in order 
to evaluate the significant instrument activities which took place in Australia. These 
are: the critical aspects in Australia; implementation, 1997-2007; the lack of global 
challenge; incompatible connections at intergovernmental levels; confusion of the 
inventory data, its concepts, and projection; absence of an Australian reporting system; 
and critiques by formal institutions. After covering each key aspect, this section will 
conclude by discussing the significance of an application of instrument analysis to the 
Australian climate change policy during the Howard regime. 
4.4.2 The critical aspects in Australia 
Of great significance to this thesis's analysis of policy instruments under Australian 
climate change policy is that Australia is one of the most carbon intensive countries 
among the developed nations, although Australia's total national emissions still 
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remains at only 1.4% of world emissions (ACCI 2006). Australia is ranked amongst 
the fifteen highest emitters globally (CANA 2008). Australia has the second highest 
per capita emissions. The nation's per capita emissions in 2004 were 4.5 times the 
global average; which is just below the United States (CES 2008). The carbon 
intensity of energy (based on fossil fuel burned per unit of energy produced) is 20% 
higher than the world average, and 25 to 30% higher than values for the United States, 
Europe and Japan (Raupach 2007). Australia is thus one of the largest of the energy 
intensive and carbon intensive nations. In addition, as found in the previous section 
about national circumstances, a number of reasons account for the Australia's carbon 
intensity including: a rapid population and economic growth but still a small 
population compared to other developed nations; variation of land-use patterns; 
economic resources based on the huge natural resources; long-haul transport across 
vast distances; population densities in a small percentage of its overall territory; 
limited renewable resources; no nuclear energy adaptation; low-cost preservation of 
fossil-fuel for energy creation; being the most mining intensive country due to high 
demand of energy commodities and energy intensive materials; sensitive land 
products (i.e. agriculture) of its environmental systems. These circumstances lead 
Australia to contribute a huge amount in producing greenhouse gas emissions and 
mean that it must therefore take a great responsibility in global action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
A number of significant critiques of climate change policy implementation over the 
period 1997-2007 have emerged, in particular about the voluntary ideology that 
dominated policy instrument design and implementation. A number of critiques have 
also emerged in relation to the effectiveness of the Australian strategy of reducing 
GHG emissions, including: slow performance; inappropriate implementation; lack of 
integration of greenhouse objectives into other policy fields; slow performance; cost-
ineffectiveness; irrelevantly resourced; inadequately designed and implemented 
(CWL TH 2000b ). The following sections will examine not only significant issues 
related to instrument activities, but also a number of critiques of policy activities 
during the 1997-2007 period. 
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4.4.3 Policy implementation, 1997-2007 
Firstly, at the international level, it was clearly acknowledged that the Howard 
government wished to avoid being part of international binding targets which might 
have a negative impact on the Australian economy. It is important to note that the 
government failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol between 1997-2007 (Stavins 1997). 
With non-ratification as the Kyoto treaty as an international binding framework for 
GHG reduction, Australia developed its own policy framework instead, including the 
establishment of the Australian Greenhouse Office [AGO], when developing a broad 
range of programs in conjunction with business and the community, and aiming at 
creating the most beneficial ways to achieve their targets with particular emphasis 
upon their 'no regrets' principle (Curran 2003). In order to create the most 
collaborative approach to climate change policy with other nations, these countries 
must consider their domestic circumstances (Nordlhaus et al. 1996), but also their 
global responsibility (Stavins 1997). Otherwise global aspirations to· reduce GHG 
emissions will never be accomplished (Carraro 1993). 
In national terms, the primary objective of the AGO was to perform policy 
achievements with the greatest cost efficiency under the national strategy [NGS], in 
particular, using alternative options for energy resolution such as a development of 
renewable energy systems (Curran 2003). The Howard government followed Paul 
Keating's Labor government (1991-1996), by attempting to extend a range of actions 
for reducing GHG emissions by spending mostly on voluntary basis programs, 
including research and information (Christoff 2005) and other 'no regrets' measures 
(Curran 2003). 
The AGO accomplished some important objectives and succeeded in introducing 
some important new environmental policy instruments, especially the Greenhouse 
Challenge Program [GCP] with its emphasis upon voluntary involvement, and which 
the Howard government expanded from the previous Keating government. This 
approach aimed to encourage business involvement in federal action for GHG 
abatement. However, it had limited achievements because of its voluntary initiatives 
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and focus on 'no regrets' measures. The main point of the critiques is that there was 
limited enthusiasm for investment in abatement technologies as well as limited power 
for GHG reduction action on the basis of voluntary, self-regulatory efforts, with the 
consequence of minimal emission abatement (Curran 2003). The voluntary concept 
under the GCP was changed slightly midway through the Howard regime with a new 
climate change strategy introduced in the national budget in 2004 (AGO 2005), with, 
however, the same result. 
Under the new strategy in 2004, one of the main changes was to extend the existing 
GCP but with limited regulation (only restricting conditions for participation), which 
can be acknowledged as a mixed instrument, part voluntary and part regulatory. There 
will be a full discussion of the GCP in coming chapters. Sullivan (2007) also 
acknowledged that the Australian government seemed to be avoiding adopting 
stronger policy instruments over time, such as emissions trading (Sullivan 2007). 
With respect to global achievement in reducing GHG emissions beyond the Kyoto 
Protocol (2008-2012), there should also be consideration of cleaner energy initiatives. 
It is very important to emphasise both the emissions targets and policy instrument 
choices of any climate change policy approach in order to reduce the uncertainty of 
their effectiveness. Sullivan (2007) argues that the Australian government would need 
to adopt a legal climate policy framework at the international and domestic levels, 
with long-term targets (over the next 30 to 50 years) in order to adequately reduce 
emissions. He also stresses the importance of improved monitoring and 
implementation systems, such as market instruments (i.e. emissions trading and taxes), 
and further energy efficiency (i.e. less dominance of fossil resources) in the electricity 
generation sector and across the economy. Sullivan concludes that these measures 
could reduce the uncertainty of reducing emissions because they are marketable and 
enforceable policy instruments (Sullivan 2007). 
More specifically, the energy sector in Australia has been criticised on the point that 
the energy reform had a lack of consideration for energy efficiency and has been 
focused only on price. Rather than focusing on reducing greenhouse gas emission, the 
sector concentrated on using more energy sources and reducing prices which 
ultimately resulted in an increase in emissions (AGO 2006). Additionally, another 
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critique concerns the possible loss of competitiveness. This would highly influence 
the development of renewable energy technology. Accordingly, the NEM [National 
Energy Market] did not focus on investing in renewable energy technology in 
Australia, because of the potential impacts on cost ineffectiveness. Such investments 
would be necessary to create potential energy efficiency over the long term, however 
the NEM faced some difficulties such as lack of funding, and institutional interference. 
Given these backgrounds, the government initiated a new framework for energy 
efficiency by utilising the NEM; however, it resulted in increasing GHG emissions in 
Australia (Crawford et al. 1996). 
Another critique of climate policy concerns was the overall financial commitment to 
climate change policy. Australia invested around AUD3.5 billion over the period 
1997-2007, since it first committed AUD180 million in 1997 (AGO. 2007). This was 
acknowledged as a huge investment for climate change policy at the time. However, it 
has finally been shown that Australia's investment has been lower than other 
developed nations, at $4 per capita being well below the United States and Japan 
(Pollard 2003). 
Christoff (2005) argues that the consequences of inadequate policy will be climate-
related ecological catastrophes with a number of environmental negative impacts in 
Australia such as droughts, coral bleaching and the devastation of the Great Barrier 
Reef and expected mass extinctions of native flora and fauna. These elements thus 
need strong national abatement policies or strong demands to set strong targets 
internationally. Furthermore, current measures aimed at significant GHG abatements 
with minimum cost risks have shown no significant effects on the Australian domestic 
climate or energy policy (Christoff 2005). This suggests that appropriate action on 
Australia's climate change policy is critical to protect the environment and prevent 
negative impacts. 
Sullivan also acknowledged that in terms of domestic climate policy in Australia, the 
efforts during Howard's term were neither equitable nor cost-effective. Although the 
government announced expansion of existing measures (i.e. the Greerihouse 
Challenge Program) and a number of new sectoral strategies with new regulatory 
factors to assist implementation, the basis of government policy as 'no regrets' and 
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voluntarism, was not sufficient to achieve reduction targets (Sullivan 2005). 
Furthermore, although the government invested a high level of funding in national 
climate policy approaches, 'no regrets' and voluntarism remained predominant in 
trading and economic affairs and brought benefits to the government's own interests 
(Crowley 2007). 
4.4.4 Lack of global challenge 
Another critique of Australian climate change policy is a lack of universal coverage. 
At the national level, two significant regulatory tools were also considered over the 
period 1997-2007. These were a tax system and a trading scheme. However, neither 
ever occurred (despite consultations for a trading scheme and reports prepared at state 
level) over that time. Hunt criticised the Howard government's policy actions as 
costly, ineffective and burdensome to the tax payer, and suggested that the 
government's adopting of an economy wide tax or allowance of a trading scheme 
would be a sound decision for further emission reduction (Hunt 2004). Reflecting on 
this position causes one to wonder why a government committed to market liberalism 
did not follow this way. However, its priority was to secure their coal industry and to 
trade energy by using modified market styles and by enforcing their preference. As a 
consequence, the Howard government's 'no regrets' or least or no economic cost 
policies resulted in emphasising voluntary initiatives (Crowley 2007). Thus the 
dominance of voluntarism as a policy instrument is highly criticised, because of its 
weakness, ineffectiveness and incapability to comply, with only for example 10% of 
publicly listed companies reducing their GHG activities as a result (CWLTH. 2000). 
In the absence of policy comprehensiveness, the risk that individual states would have 
different targets or engage in unnecessary competition with each other significantly 
increased, without any help from the national government. These resulted in the state 
jurisdictions tending to become more independently active in international relations 
and likely to profit from multinational investments in the decade under study (Marsh 
et al. 2005). For instance, NSW achieved worldwide leadership for its greenhouse 
mitigation efforts over the decade. While the federal government did not accept 
trading schemes on a national scale, this state government initiated a practical solution 
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for the first establishment of a government agency to produce the use and 
commercialisation of renewable energy as a trading scheme, which allows obtaining 
licences and trading credits, based on enacted legislation which settle carbon 
sequestration rights, as separate from traditional rights to land and timber (Forest 
NSW. 2005). In January 2003, NSW also successfully introduced the Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Scheme [GGAS], one of the first mandatory greenhouse gas emission 
trading schemes in the world, which aims to contribute to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with production and electricity uses, and is expected to be 
achieved using projected-based action to offset the producing greenhouse gas 
emissions (IPRT 2006). Following these efforts, NSW further succeeded in creating 
positive trading methods for energy efficiency, by negotiation with other foreign 
companies. For instance, in July 1999, the Tokyo Electric Power Company 
contracted with State Forests of NSW to establish 1000 hectares of new forest in the 
year 2000 with plans projected for a proceeding program of between 10,000 and 
40,000 hectares over the next ten years. At the same time, NSW also attempted to lead 
initiatives for greenhouse gas emissions with other states in Australia (Lyster2004). 
4.4.5 Intergovernmental issues 
A further issue with climate change policy under the Howard government was the 
form of the ineffective integration at the intergovernmental level, in particular the 
relationship between federal and state governments. It was considered a fundamental 
change for the institutional corporation that needs to be adjusted between these two 
jurisdictions over time. Marsh and Y encken (2005) criticised the weak provision for 
better determination based on joint collaborations, associated with joint ministerial 
councils between the Prime Minister, state minister and chief ministers. There is the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) which provides additional formal 
relations between the Commonwealth and states and territories, however, this device 
encountered significant limitations in terms of deliberation. In terms of reasonable 
solutions, it is often the case that high level bodies such as COAG do not 
institutionalise interests as people wish they would. Such joint bodies at the top are 
typically seen to be effective only in order to delay a final policy decision (Marsh and 
Y encken 2005). 
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Crowley (2007) criticised the gaps between instrument uses of the federal and state 
governments for reducing GHG emissions. For instance, in terms of the federal 
government proposing national program implementation with other jurisdictions, only 
NSW entirely followed the federal government's initiatives in greatly reducing 
emissions. In the energy sector, 3.3 Mt CO 2 -e of mitigation was scheduled and 
projected to be achieved from energy efficiency and stationary energy by the federal 
government. Nearly half of the total abatement (20Mt C02-e out of 47Mt C02-e in 
the energy sector) was achieved by states' jurisdictions mainly with regulatory 
measures (reported in the national report); the large number of voluntary measures 
accounted for only approximately 2-6MtCO 2 -e of the federal government programs 
including the GCP for industry, greenhouse and energy efficiency programs. 
Regulatory measures have also been considered by the federal government, but only 
one such measure has been adopted on an entirely regulatory basis which was the 
MRET, projected to achieve abatement of only 6.6 Mt CO 2 -e (Crowley 2007), nearly 
one eighth of the projected total abatement in the energy sector, as a compulsory 
compliance within all the jurisdictions for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
In a broad sense, there are also a number of regulatory programs used by the national 
government. These include: efficiency standards, building codes, labelling, fuel 
quality regulations and licensing agreements, however, these efforts are mostly in 
conjunction with state jurisdictions. 
Another failure was insufficient application of funding for mitigation, namely, at the 
local scale, for example as occurred with the 'Cities for Climate Protection' program 
which was being sponsored by the federal government, and was aiming to associate 
with local government. Especially, in the case of funding money for establishing a 
'local government action module', the federal government's support was justified in 
terms of greenhouse gas policy action. However, there were also a number of 
critiques of the program which saw it as 'Business As Usual', with too much focus on 
economic solutions (i.e. cost effectiveness, and the rationale of additional economic 
benefit). This emphasis resulted in the significant absence of other accomplishments 
such as environmental benefits, which are high priorities for greenhouse action, and 
will also be necessary for more decision making with respect to transport, 
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development and energy. Therefore, the national government should strongly support 
other jurisdictions, otherwise these jurisdictions would not be able to achieve 
meaningful actions (Bulkeley 2000). 
4.4.6 Confusion of inventory data, their concepts and projection 
There has also been uncertainty regarding inventory systems to account for GHG 
emissions. As mentioned before, there are two inventory systems in the UNFCCC to 
account for the amount of GHG emissions in each nation. In terms of meeting 
Kyoto's differentiated targets, Australia has been expected to meet its target (+8% 
Kyoto target) in the first periods using the Kyoto accounting system. Australia has 
been on track to meet its targets without having to reduce GHG emissions, indeed 
with energy increases being offset by high levels of land clearing decrease since 1990 
(DCC 2008c). However, the results would be different if measured by the UNFCCC 
accounting system. In fact the two national inventories have reported the differences. 
By using Kyoto accounting, Australia reported 576.0Mt CO 2 -e in 2006 against 
552.6Mt C02-e in 1990 representing emissions increasing by 4.2% (DCC 2008c) On 
the other hand, the UNFCCC accounting measured 549.9Mt C02-e in 2006 against 
515.9Mt C02-e representing a 6.6% increase (DCC 2008b). The major reason for the 
gap was exclusion of the forestry sinks in Kyoto accounting (DCC 2008c ). The Kyoto 
rules allow the LULUCF to be counted, namely a decrease of 53.9% over the period 
1990 to 2006, which contrasts energy sector increases of 40% over the same period; 
industrial processes also increased 17.7% over the 1990 to 2006 period under both the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto accounting (DCC 2008c ). 
There is another critical aspect which should be recognised in the national inventory 
regarding land clearing. Hamilton (1999) acknowledged that there were still huge 
uncertainties under the emission inventory for land clearing in Australia, though the 
country is one of the world leaders in this research area (Hamilton 1999). The major 
concern was based on the accuracy of land conversion data. Hamilton also considered 
the fact that decline in emissions from land clearing will allow emissions from fossil 
and other sources to be able to increase by 22% and 33%, well above the total 8% 
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Kyoto target (Hamilton 1999). Furthermore, since the fourth inventory for the 
national emission data was submitted, it can be seen that the basis of the accounting to 
comply with rules from UNFCCC to Kyoto Target has changed. This signifies, 
seemingly, that the results showed that Australia still remained on track for its Kyoto 
target of an average of 108 per cent of 1990 emissions levels against the first 
commitment period without any further actions (Macintosh 2007). Given this 
background, it was only the emission offset from the LULUCF sector which 
encouraged Australia to meet its Kyoto target. It is thus imperative that the inventory 
data, particularly for this sector, should be as accurate as possible. However, 
uncertainty has been raised about the veracity of the estimates of emissions from the 
LULUCF sector based in particular on incompatible data between the Federal and 
Queensland Governments' land clearing data (Macintosh 2007). The Federal 
Government's National Carbon Accounting System (NCAS) first appeared in the 
National Greenhouse Gas Inventory in 2000 (NGGI). A concern was raised in relation 
to the fact that the estimated rate ofland clearing of 33% in 1990 was higher than the 
estimate in 2000 NGGI. This shows that the results of estimation under the NGGI 
were changed and not consistent over time 
Another uncertainty is the discrepancy of data results between NCAS and the 
Statewide Landcover and Trees Study (SLATS) which is Queensland's estimate data 
for land clearing. Approximately 70% of the development of land clearing in the total 
emission in Australia is associated with Queensland. However, the data from SLATS 
in Queensland and from NCAS in the Federal government reported different land 
clearing rates. According to the results from the SLATS between 1989/90 and 
2000/01 it was approximately 50 % higher than the amount estimated by the NCAS. 
Significant differences in the trends were identified, with peaks in clearing shown in 
the SLATS data in the late 1990s and early 2000s not evident in the NCAS results. 
The Australia Institute argues that the NCAS is not transparent, because the NCAS's 
land clearing results are not publicly available (e.g. no publicly available map of the 
areas that have been classified as Kyoto forests; no published maps that identify 
where clearing is occurring). In contrast, details published by SLATS show clearing 
maps, and many of its datasets are also included in its reports or are available on 
request. The NCAS therefore appears to have a lack of information, and it is not 
possible to properly compare its outputs against those from SLATS. There is 
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insufficient publicly available information on the NCAS to enable a meaningful 
comparison between the NCAS and SLAT land clearing results to be carried out. 
Therefore, there is significant uncertainty over land clearing rates in Australia 
(Macintosh 2007). 
There are huge uncertainties, therefore, about the federal government initiative in 
terms of strategy for meeting their emission reduction targets and the Kyoto targets, 
such as adapting differentiated targets, and meeting the targets for the nation. The 
economy is highly dominated by fossil fuels and, whilst the economy has expanded, 
so have emissions offset by significant credits from land clearing and which in effect 
have protected the coal industry (ACCI 1997). Furthermore, projections under the 
approaches of the Howard government are estimated on baseline information with the 
Business As Usual [BAU] projections to 2010. This BAU, however, is based on a 
weak target system (Curran 2007). Beside these uncertainties, another significant 
factor concerns the national reports provided mandatorily by the AGO to the 
UNFCCC for the global responsibility. Crowley (2007) indicated that the national 
method for the reports in the periods had been changed over the decade. New 
abatement measures were also expected in future to achieve desired targets, and their 
impact was demonstrated in a recent National Communication Report (Crowley 2007). 
In addition to her recognitions, there are huge uncertainties in projections with the 
numbers of policy programs projected based on the BAU. The latest report in 2005 
showed each policy program was projected on the BAU basis and was illustrated from 
cross-sectoral and sectoral perspectives. These are expected to reduce certain amounts 
of emissions by following certain assumptions. In particular, the projection for the 
energy sector is very controversial as the highest emission producer, and projected to 
be achieved on the BAU by reducing 47Mt C02-e, which involved: 37.6 Mt C02-e in 
stationary energy, 2.2 Mt C02-e in transport and 7.2 Mt C02-e in fugitive emissions 
(Crowley 2007). On the basis of these efforts, it was shown as expected that targets 
would be completed for all programs in all other jurisdictions (AGO 2004b) because 
the targets at the national level would not be achieved without initiatives from each 
state jurisdiction. 
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4.4.7 Suggestions by the formal institutions 
Other critiques were the low level of government's response to issues addressed by 
institutions over the period 1997-2007. In November 2000, when The Heat is On: 
Australia's Greenhouse Future was published, one of the strongest suggestions was 
about the cost ineffectiveness and inadequacy of climate program delivery, 
particularly for the GCP based on voluntary initiatives (CWLTH 2000b). Following 
these points, the AGO's independent progress report was presented and similar 
criticisms made in 2002. In essence, under the AGO concept, a program delivery is a 
significant challenge for the AGO, and it also required designing a successful 
program and promoting effective implementation. However, the 2002 AGO's 
Independent Report again addressed the need to adjust the lack of progress reports for 
implementation delivery, and the insufficient integration with other agencies. 
Furthermore, the independent review was committed to regularly reporting but was 
not released after the 2002 report. Despite this fact, descriptions of a number of the 
programs undertaken by various stakeholders were well addressed following the 
guidelines. However, it also addressed the concern that most of these programs had 
unrealistic targets. For instance, the current expenditure patterns and budget 
allocations showed self management, freed from the initial pressure to deliver. A 
more realistic pattern would need program administrators and also the recipients of 
the funding to receive and conduct actions to meet their targets. Thus, there was a 
need to improve the insufficient implementation framework for the policy to be 
supported by the national government to revise instrument use design, which could 
have resulted in an effective policy (AGO 2002d). 
Following these events, m 2004, the Australian National Audit Office [ANAO] 
evaluated and criticised a variety of the issues of the actions under the AGO, 
including: inadequate, ineffective and inefficient management under the federal 
implementation; and unsatisfactory progress toward reaching their targets of GHG 
mitigation (ANAO 2004). While the ANAO acknowledged the necessity of 
improving transparency and public accountability to the AGO, the ANAO indicated 
lack of transparency under the program by the Greenhouse Challenge Program, which 
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had already been restated in the year 2000 in The Heat is On: Australia's Greenhouse 
Future report (CWLTH 2000b ). The ANAO also reported that most of the issues 
found in the report were unsatisfactory in the articulations for their trends of the 
implementation progress and changes over time in the AGO's reports (ANAO 2004). 
However, the federal government did not take these recommendations seriously into 
account. Following the event, a Senate Review Committee also indicated and 
suggested a range of significant issues, with particular emphasis upon some 
unsatisfied considerations for further actions of 'no regret', and no cost measures. 
However, the government finally refused to adopt this advice given by the committee 
(Lyster 2004). 
Another suggestion concerned the insufficient implementation of the federal climate 
change activities. COAG identified the unsuccessful policy outcomes for energy 
efficiency. The reasons were based on failures including: the low cost of energy 
generation; immature market for gas prices; and irrelevant setting of emissions prices. 
However, most of these reasons identified that electricity restriction for 
implementation caused incomplete implementation delivery, due to the limited 
enforceability (MacGill et al. 2007). Moreover, the fundamental issue was also 
reported in Australian Climate Change Research in 2007. It required establishing a 
better framework for strategic planning, effective policy process and enhanced 
collaboration with other jurisdictions for the national climate change activities 
(CWLTH 2007e). During the Howard regime, appropriate program delivery was 
conducted under federal initiatives over time, yet a number of suggestions by formal 
institutions were not being taken into the consideration. Furthermore, it was obvious 
that there was a range of uncertainties for the relations between the instrument designs 
and their implementations, including: weak power; unclear targets; absence of the 
significant climate instruments; and misleading financial instruments. These resulted 
in ineffectiveness, inefficiency and lack of transparency and identification of 
instrument productivity, unsatisfactory progress towards reaching targets in terms of 
demanding a successful GHG emission mitigation policy by the Australian 
government. 
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4.4.8 Summary 
Over the period 1997-2007, for implementation with respect to climate policy in 
Australia, there are a number of shortcomings identified here as implications for 
policy failure, namely: unclear targets, weak actions, inappropriate adaptation of 
climate policy instrument uses, the failure of global integration, a lack of methods for 
legitimately identifying progress and insufficient policy analysis methods. 
An application of an instrument analysis to Australia over the period 1997-2007 is 
highly significant in terms of developing improved policy activities for climate 
change not only in developed nations but also in developing nations such as Australia. 
One of the most critical reasons for this study is to examine climate change policy in 
Australia, one of the most carbon intensive countries and how it was a better design 
policy. Although the total national emission level is small compared to other 
developed nations, Australia is one of the highest carbon per capita emitters in the 
world. Moreover, during the decade studied, Australia and the United States were the 
only countries failing to ratify the international binding agreement for reducing GHG 
emissions. Furthermore, the approaches under the Australian government over time 
were highly criticised in terms of reliance on voluntary based instruments. Therefore, 
there is a need to evaluate in more detail how particular policy instruments were 
designed and implemented over the period and to examine the extent to which the 
government's approaches met their set targets, and therefore to reflect on the 
effectiveness of the 'no-regrets' principle and voluntary approach. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Through this chapter, the main purpose was to illustrate a clear recognition of the 
background and significance of Australian greenhouse policy activities at the national 
level over the period 1997 - 2007. This thesis selected four major aspects in order to 
meet the objectives; namely: national circumstances, emission records, the history of 
Australian climate change policy and critiques of instruments and policy. 
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Each of these perspectives also presented a number of critical backgrounds under the 
policy activities during the period, namely: unique circumstances in the world in 
terms of leading the global responsibility as a developed nation due to the rapid 
population growth and land use patterns; Australia as one of the most carbon intensive 
nations; large financial commitments under the policy during the time without taking 
global responsibility such as the Kyoto protocol; the basis for voluntary initiatives 
rather than restrictions on activities and huge uncertainties under the policy 
framework such as the 'no-regrets' principle, inventory, projection and 
intergovernmental integration. Given this background, the application of the policy 
instrument analysis to the national initiatives under the Australian greenhouse policy 
during 1997 to 2007, is a critical study and will be very useful not only for carbon 
intensive nations and developed nations but also potentially for other nations. 
The following chapters now examine the case study of Australian Greenhouse Policy 
during 1997-2007 to fulfil the second aim ofthis thesis to determine the influences of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following the two 
methods developed (Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method, and Effectiveness 
Analysis/ Method) in the first aim. 
In the empirical case study, two methods are demonstrated, which are developed in 
Chapters Two and Three, namely: Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method to 
classify and identify trend use of soft and hard instruments; and Effectiveness 
Analysis/ Method to examine the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in a 
policy which aims to reduce GHG emissions. Identification & Trend Analysis/ 
Method assesses how the Australian government allocated their adoption of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions during 1997-2007. 
Effectiveness Analysis/ Method addresses the actual impacts of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument activities on reducing GHG emissions. Case study analysis provides some 
useful empirical data to determine the relative effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in the case of Australia's climate change policy during 1997-2007, and 
allows for some conclusions to be reached regarding the influences of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions, which may subsequently be 
considered more generally. 
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Chapter Five demonstrates the use of Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method in 
assessing how the Australian government allocated their adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions during 1997-2007. This analysis 
demonstrates trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments during the 
period. Chapter Six then demonstrates the use of Effectiveness Analysis/ Method in 
addressing the actual impacts of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument activities on reducing 
GHG emissions in Australia's policy. 
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Chapter Five 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Policy Instruments, 1997-2007 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates the utility of the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method 
in illustrating the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments in 
Australia's climate policy during 1997-2007, in order to fulfil the second aim of the 
thesis to determine the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG 
emissions by applying the methods developed in the first aim. The results in this 
chapter allow this thesis to address how the Australian government allocated their 
adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments during 1997-2007 in terms of reducing GHG 
em1ss10ns. 
The Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method comprises two approaches established 
earlier in this thesis, namely: CCPIC for classifying climate policy instruments and 
DSHCI for distinguishing between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy. 
Thus, this chapter applies the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method in order to 
establish the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments (i.e. CCPIC and DSHCI 
approaches) and provides an analysis of its empirical findings. 
This chapter considers three themes: a) the types of policy instruments utilised by the 
Australian government during the period 1997-2007; b) how such instruments vary 
according to the criteria developed in this thesis for assessing 'hard' and 'soft' policy 
instruments; c) and what the trend of usage of such instruments was over time. The 
results show 'mixed instruments' were highly dominant in national approaches, a 
dominance which tended to increase over the period. 
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The data collection used for the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method is based on 
national communication reports in 2002 and 2005 by the Australian Government to 
the UN. The two national reports are critical for illustrating government initiatives 
between 1997 and 2007. Each communication report listed a number of initiatives and 
described their implementation, but some were incomplete and were never 
implemented during the period. Thus the process of data collection presented some 
difficulties for this analysis, although, concurrently, select interviews were conducted 
and meetings were held with several relevant bureaucrats in relevant areas of the 
federal government. These meetings provided useful advice and material, such as 
additional measures not included in the communication reports up to 2007, to 
supplement the data collection. 
The following chapter is divided into a number of sections, which correspond to the 
three objectives stated above. Firstly, this chapter presents the results of instrument 
use under national initiatives over the period 1997-2007 at the national and sectoral 
level. Secondly, the chapter then examines whether such instruments were 'soft' or 
'hard' according to the criteria developed in this study and applied here. Then this 
chapter concludes with the first aspect of the case study to demonstrate the 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method for illustrating trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' 
climate change instruments in Australia during 1997-2007. 
5 .1 Results Instrument Categories 
5.1.1 Six instrument categories 
Firstly, in order to examine what policy instruments were distributed by the national 
government during the period 1997-2007, we must recall the CCPIC approach, which 
was established here in Chapter Three. In terms of classifying policy instruments, the 
CCPIC approach developed in this thesis has included six instrument categories, 
namely; economic, regulatory, voluntary, R&D, information-based and mixed 
instruments. These categories are based on the categories in the national 
communication reports. This thesis calls 'mixed instruments' those which were 
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classified as various instruments in the national reports. Mixed instruments indicate 
that an introduced program consists of more than one instrument (e.g. economic and 
regulatory, or voluntary and R&D). Table 5.1: (below) describes the basic instrument 
classification. Each description in the table provides a clear picture of the different 
characteristics of each instrument type. 
Table 5.1: Policy Instrument Categories for Climate Policy 
Instruments Elements 
Regulatory Technological standard : Rationing and prescription (e.g. Em1ss1on quota, mandatory 
technologies and procedures) Performance standards and benchmarks (e g total material 
requirement and building performance standards) Financial penalties for non-compliance 
Voluntary/and Voluntary part1c1pat1on, 1mt1at1ves, and act1v1t1es Negotiated agreement between emitters, 
negotiated agreement between emitters and government 
Economic 'Incentives' includes subs1d1es, grants and loan exemptions 'D1sincent1ves' include. emission 
tax and charges, and carbon em1ss1on trading permits and quotas 
Research Research and Technology Development 
Information-based Education, training, awareness and campaigns, publication ava1lab1hty. 
instrument 
Mixed Combined more than one single instrument 
The following section examines how these six instruments were used in Australia 
during the period 1997-2007. 
5.1.2 Policy Instruments at the National Level 1997-2007 
5.1.2.1 Policy instruments at the national level 1997-2007 (exclusive of state instruments) 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the national initiatives between 1997 and 2007 divided 
into the six instrument categories. In Figure 5.1, mixed instruments made up 36% of 
the total instrument uses over the period 1997-2007. This clearly indicates that, during 
the period, a large number of programs under the national initiatives were associated 
with more than one instrument. In terms of single instrument types 30 , economic 
instruments demonstrate the highest percentage of the total national initiatives at 36%, 
followed by voluntary (10%), regulatory (8%), information-based (4%), and R&D 
instruments (5%). 
30 A program consists of one instrument (e.g. regulatory). 
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Figure 5.1: Policy instruments at the national level by percentage, 1997-2007 
6% Voluntary 
10% 
8 % 
Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.2: Policy instruments at the national level by number 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.1.2 .2 The details of mixed instruments at the national level 1997-2007 
Figure 5.3 presents the distribution of mixed instruments. The use of economic 
instruments in the mixed instruments found the highest rate at 32%. Information-
based and vo luntary instruments had relatively higher usages than other instruments 
both at 20%: regulatory (14%) and R&D instruments (11 %). In addition, ' etc ' at 3% 
indicates non-availability of detail in government reports31. 
Figure 5.3: Details of the mixed instruments at the national level, 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
*In the figures, "etc" refers to " mixed instruments" which are not specified in detail within 
official reports. 
5. 1.2.3 Policy instruments at the national level 1997-2007 (including the details of mixed 
instruments) 
Figure 5.4 gives the usage of total instruments at the national level over the period 
1997-2007, including the details of mixed instruments. The use of economic 
instruments again found the highest rate at 33% in total. Voluntary instruments also 
showed relatively higher than other instruments at 21 %, followed by information-
based and regulatory instruments (16%), R&D instruments (12%) and etc (3%). 
3 1 A program was indicated as a use of various instruments in the Fourth National Communication 
Report to the UN reported in 2005 , thus acknowledging 'etc'. 
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Figure 5.4: Policy instruments at the national level, 1997-2007, including the details of the mixed 
instruments 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Austra lian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.1.3 Trend Uses at the National Level 1997-2007 
The following section will demonstrate how the government allocated these six 
instruments during the period. The data collection of the figures below is based on 
national communication reports from 2002 and 2005 by the Australian Government to 
the UN. Additional data was obtained by interviews with several bureaucrats in 
relevant areas of the federal government. These meetings provided useful advice and 
material, such as additional measures not included in the communication reports up to 
2007, to supplement the data collection. 
5.1.3.1 Instrument trend uses under national initiatives 1997-2007 
Figure 5.5 demonstrates the instrument trend use under national initiatives over the 
period 1997-2007. Firstly, the tendency of introducing mixed instruments 
significantly increased over the decade. In terms of single instruments, the use of 
economic instruments showed a tendency to increase rapidly during the period. In 
addition, the usage of R&D and regulatory instruments also tended to rise gradually, 
while the number of information-based and voluntary instruments demonstrated a 
tendency to decline over time. Figure 6 presents the trends by percentage during the 
period. 
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Figure 5.5: The instrument trend uses at the national level, 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.6: Instrument trend uses at the national level by percentage, 1997-2007 
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Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.1 .3.2 Trend use of policy instruments under the national initiatives 1997-2007 
Figure 5. 7 displays the trends of the total initiatives under national initiatives over the 
period 1997-2007, including the details of the mixed instruments. The number of 
economic instruments showed a tendency to increase significantly. While 
information-based and voluntary instruments tended to decline over time, R&D and 
regulatory instruments indicated a tendency to increase gradually. In particular, it 
showed a significant rise in the use of R&D instruments in the second half of the 
decade. Figure 5.8 also presents the trends by percentage during the period. 
Figure 5.7: Instrument trend uses at the national level, 1997-2007, including mixed instruments 
60 
so 
"' ~ 40 
.c E 30 
:J 
z 20 
10 
0 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Years 
• Etc 
• Information-based 
• R&D 
• Economic 
• Voluntary 
• Regulatory 
Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.8: Instrument trend uses at the national level by percentage, 1997-2007, including the details 
of the mixed instruments 
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Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.1.4 Policy Instruments at the Sectoral Level 1997-2007 
5.1.4.1 National initiatives at the sectoral level 1997-2007 
Figure 5.9 presents the numbers of national initiatives at the sectoral level 1997 to 
2007, including energy-stationary, energy-transport, energy-fugitive, industrial 
process, agriculture, waste and LULUCF. The number of initiatives under the sector 
of energy-stationary found the highest usage of the total initiatives, at 27 programs, 
followed by energy-transport, at 23. While there was a relatively high amount of 
introducing mixed instruments in each sector, a variety of single instruments were 
also found . Although showing a relatively low level of dominance in the three energy 
sectors (stationary, transport and fugitive), mixed approaches were largely dominant 
in the other sectors. 
Figure 5.9: Policy instruments at the sectoral level 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia 
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5.1.4.2 National Initiatives at the Sectoral Level 1997-2007 (including mixed instruments) 
Figure 5.10 illustrates the mean percentage scores of the national initiatives at the 
sectoral level over the period 1997 to 2007, including the details of mixed instruments. 
The proportion of the use of economic instruments in the energy-transport sector was 
the largest over the period at over 50%, compared to a relatively low percentage of 
regulatory instruments at approximately 5%, and R&D instruments at less than 5%, 
compared to other sectors. Furthermore, in the LULUCF sector, the proportion of 
information-based instruments was revealed as the highest amount over time at 
approximately 45%. In the same sector there also appeared to be a relatively high rate 
of economic instrument usage. However, the sector did not use regulatory instruments. 
Furthermore, a similarity of instrument use in the LULUCF was found in the 
agriculture sector. In agriculture, there was a high adoption of information-based and 
non-regulatory instruments. Furthermore, it was also revealed in the reports examined 
that the rate of introducing R&D instruments in this sector was the highest of all 
sectors. In the waste sector, the proportion of voluntary instruments indicated the 
highest rates over time at approximately 35%. 
Figure 5.10: Instrument trends 1997-2007 at the sectoral level including mixed instruments 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.1.5 Trend uses at the Sectoral Level 1997-2007 
5 .1.5. I Trend uses in the Energy-Stationary Sector 1997-2007 
Figure 5.11 presents the trend uses in the energy-stationary sector over the period 
1997-2007. The number of energy-stationary voluntary instruments was found to be 
the largest in the total national initiatives in the first half of the decade; however, it 
shifted so that usage of economic instruments had gained the highest dominance in 
the second half of the decade. While the number of voluntary and information-based 
instruments did not show significant changes during the period, the introduction of 
economic, R&D and regulatory instruments tended to increase dramatically in the 
second half of the decade. See Figure 5.12 which also presents the trends by 
percentage during the period. 
Figure 5.11: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the energy-stationary sector 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Austra lia. 
Figure 5.12: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the energy-stationary sector by percentage 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.1.5.2 Trend uses in the Energy-Transport Sector 1997-2007 
Figure 5 .13 displays trend uses in the energy-transport sector over the period 1997-
2007. As mentioned, the number of economic instruments in the sector during the 
period was found to be the largest of the total initiatives and showed a tendency to 
increase significantly over time, with other instruments remaining relatively stable. 
See Figure 5.14 which also presents the trends by percentage during the period. 
Figure 5.13: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the energy-transport sector 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.14: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the energy-transport sector by percentage 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.1.5.3 Trend uses in Fugitive Energy 1997-2007 
Figure 5 .15 presents trend uses in fugitive energy over the period 1997-2007. 
Voluntary instruments largely dominated in the first half of the decade; however, 
economic instruments became more prominent initiatives in this sector in the second 
half of the decade. In addition, the introduction of economic instruments in the sector 
showed a tendency to increase dramatically in the second half of the decade, 
especially 2005-2007. After the use of information-based instruments was 
discontinued in 2004, regulatory instruments were introduced in 2005, while the R&D 
and voluntary instruments remained at relatively the same level through the decade 
1997-2007. See Figure 5.16 which also presents the trends by percentage during the 
period. 
Figure 5.15: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in fugitive energy 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.16: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the fugitive energy sector by percentage 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.1 .5.4 Trend uses in Industrial Processing 1997-2007 
Figure 5.17 illustrates trend uses in the industrial processing sector over the period 
1997-2007. The large number of initiatives under the sector was based on voluntary 
and regulatory instruments. The number of voluntary, regulatory, and economic 
instruments showed a tendency to increase gradually over time, while R&D 
instruments remained at the same level. The use of information-based instruments 
tended to decline over time, and also showed a significant decrease in the second half 
of the decade. See Figure 5 .18 which also presents the trends by percentage during the 
period. 
Figure 5.17: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the industrial processing sector 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.18: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the industrial processing sector by percentage 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.1.5.5 Trend uses in the Waste Sector 1997-2007 
Figure 5.19 presents trend uses in the waste sector over the period 1997-2007. As 
mentioned, under the sector, the largest proportion of the national initiatives was 
based on voluntary instruments, which remained at the same level over time. In 
addition, the use of economic instruments under this sector was not popular during the 
period, compared to other sectors (see other sectors). Despite information-based 
instruments showing a tendency to decline over time especially from 2003, the use of 
regulatory instruments tended to increase from 2005. See Figure 5.20 which also 
presents the trends by percentage during the period. 
Figure 5.19: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the waste sector 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.20: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the waste sector by percentage 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.1.5.5 Trend uses in the LULUCF Sector 1997-2007 
Figure 5.21 gives the trend uses for the LULUCF over the period 1997-2007. As 
mentioned, in this sector, there was no use of regulatory instruments. In this sector, 
the proportion of economic and information-based instruments was highly enhanced 
over time; however, the number of economic instruments showed a tendency to 
increase in the first half of the decade, and to decline in the second half of the decade 
after the peak of 2001-2002. Furthermore, while the information-based and voluntary 
instruments remained at relatively the same level during the period, the number of 
R&D instruments tended to increase dramatically. See Figure 5.22 which also 
presents the trends by percentage during the period. 
Figure 5.2 t: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the LULUCF sector 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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Figure 5.22: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the L LUCF sector by percentage 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.1.5.7 Trend uses in the Agricu ltural Sector 1997-2007 
Figure 5.23 displays trend uses in the agricultural sector over the period 1997-2007. 
As mentioned, there was no use of a regulatory instrument. The use of information-
based, R&D and voluntary instruments, under this sector, dominated initiatives over 
time. In particular, the number of R&D and voluntary instruments also showed a 
tendency to increase over time, while the use of information-based instruments 
remained at the same level. The usage of economic instruments increased 
dramatically from 2001-2004, but tended to decrease after the peak in 2004. See 
Figure 5.24, which also presents the trends by percentage during the period. 
Figure 5.23: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the agricu ltura l sector 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.24: Instrument trends 1997-2007 in the agricultural sector by percentage 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia . 
171 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
5 .2 Determining Soft and Hard Instruments 
5.2.1 Criteria for determining 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
In this section, the proposed criteria, described in Chapter Three, will be used to 
determine three things: 1) the 'soft' or 'hard' instrumental makeup of Australian 
national initiatives for climate change policy over the period 1997-2007; 2) how the 
Australian government distributed a number of instruments during this time; and 3) 
the trend use of such instruments over time. In terms of distinguishing between 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments in climate policy, the thesis has developed the Determination 
of 'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Instruments [DSHCI] approach comprising 17 criteria, 
which focus on the level of instrument dominance with key criteria to classify the 
'soft' and 'hard' instrument designs of a national government in terms of reducing 
GHG emissions. 
Table 5.2 (below) describes the specifications under the criteria of the DSHCI devised 
earlier in this thesis and employed here used for determining whether instruments are 
soft or hard, by examining the level of relative instrument dominance. Relative 
instrument dominance is determined by the level at which an instrument is dominated 
by the characteristics of hard instruments (also described in the Methodology: Chapter 
Three). 
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Table 5 2: Criteria for Determrnrng 'Soft' and 'Hard' Instruments in Climate Policy 
1. Information Provision (e g information support) 
2. Educational Support by Government (e g technical support, training, and education) 
3 Incentives and Subsidies by Government (e g government's financial supports) 
4. Specific and Measurable Emission Reduction Targets in a program (e g. quantified and ideal 1s reahst1c) 
5. T1meframe in a program (e g clear measurable timehne 1dent1fied as short, medium and long term) 
6. Guidance or Guidelines for implementation (e g details of 1mplementat1on audited or licensed by government 
authont1es) 
7. Monitoring (e g act1v1t1es are monitored or certified by government authorities) 
8. Reporting and Certification (e g. periodically, annually and with quant1tat1ve reports on their actions Targets 
are reported or certified by government authont1es) 
9. Auditing, Reviewing and Certification (e g reports are audited, reviewed or certified by government 
authont1es) 
10. Public Disclosure (e g pubhc recognition mandatonly required by governments) 
11. Committed Contractual Improvement (e g mandatonly committed to by government) 
12. Any Market Device or creation of competitiveness (e g em1ss1on trading, tax systems, green certificates) 
13. Government Regulation for Standards (e g. building codes or energy performance standards) 
14. Government Penalty of Polluter Pays (e.g legally required) 
15. Government Penalty for Nonpart1cipation (e g same as above) Level of Instrument Dominance 
16. Government Penalty for Noncompliance (e g same as above) • 0,1-4 Least Dominant (Soft) 
17. Government Penalty for Failure to Meet Targets (e g same as above) • 5-9 Moderately Dominant 
• 10-13 Highly Dominant 
• 14-17 Most Dominant (Hard) 
There are four levels established in the criteria, used for determining whether 
instruments are soft or hard, and these are: least dominant, moderately dominant, 
highly dominant and most dominant. Least dominant refers to the softest instruments, 
whereas most dominant refers to the hardest instruments. The relative levels, 
moderately dominant and highly dominant, divide these two extremes. Instruments 
are categorised within this four level scheme in accordance with their makeup m 
terms of the 17 key elements in the criteria above (Table 5.2). 
The following sections examme 'soft' and 'hard' instruments and their trends in 
Australia during the period 1997-2007 by using DSHCI approach. The data collection 
used for applying the DSHCI approach is based on national communication reports 
from 2002 and 2005 by the Australian Government to the UN. Additional data was 
obtained by interviews with several bureaucrats in relevant areas of the federal 
government. These meetings provided useful advice and material, such as additional 
measures not included in the communication reports up to 2007, to supplement the 
data collection. Each instrument used during the period was carefully ex~ined by 
addressing the 17 criteria under the method. This analysis is very important to reveal 
173 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
how the Australian government allocated the level of instrumental coerciveness 
between 1997 and 2007 in order to reduce GHG emissions. This is the first time that 
such an examination has been used for identifying the levels of instrumental 
coerciveness. 
5.2.2 'Soft' and 'Hard' Instruments at the National Level 1997-2007 
5.2.2.1 'Soft' and ' hard ' instruments at the national level 
Figure 5.25 shows that there is therefore a heavy contrast between the usage of softer-
based instruments (i.e. least and moderately dominant) and hard-based instruments 
(i.e. highly and most dominant). Results of the use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
under national initiatives over the period 1997-2007 are presented in Figure 5.25. 
Moderately dominant instruments were the most common at 42%, followed by least 
dominant level at 39%. Only 2 out of 52 programs were found to be most dominant, 
which is only one eleventh the number of programs at the moderately dominant level, 
and one tenth the number at least dominant. In addition, nearly 80% of the total 
initiatives were found to be at either the least or moderately dominant level. The 
contrast between least and moderately dominant and highly and most dominant can be 
explained by considering much softer-based instruments (less dominant) used at the 
national level during the period. See Figure 5.26, which also illustrates the national 
instruments by number. Figure 5.25 clearly demonstrates that roughly 80% of 
instruments can be classed as softer instruments. 
Figure 5.25: 'Soft' and 'hard' instruments at the national level 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Austra lian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change . The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.26: 'Soft' and ' ha rd ' instruments at the national level 1997-2007, by number. 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change . The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.2.2.2 Trend uses in ' soft' and ' hard ' instruments at the national level 1997-2007 
Figure 5.27 presents the trend uses of ' soft ' and ' hard ' instruments at the national 
level over the period 1997-2007. Although programs at the highly dominant and most 
dominant levels during the period showed a tendency to increase gradually, programs 
at least dominant levels showed a significant program increase over time. As 
mentioned in Figures 5.25 and 5.26, moderately dominant initiatives were the most 
used over time. However, in Figure 5.27, the tendency of adopting the programs at 
moderately dominant fluctuated significantly over time, while increasing gradually. 
Moreover, as can be seen in the graph, (Figure 5.27), programs at least dominant 
levels increased dramatically in the second half of the decade, especially in 2004, and 
programs at highly and most dominant increased slightly over time. The results 
suggest that the tendency of program uses at the national level over the period 1997-
2007 again demonstrates softer-based instrument uses, while increasing the number of 
total programs at any level. 
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Figure 5.27: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, at the national level, 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.2.3 'Soft' and 'Hard' Instruments at the Sectoral Level 1997-2007 
5.2.3.1 ' Soft' and ' hard ' instruments at the sectoral level 1997-2007 
Figures 5.28 and 5.29 illustrate ' soft ' and 'hard' instruments at the sectoral level over 
the period 1997-2007. Firstly, Figure 5.28 presents the total numbers for each sector. 
As can be seen in the figure, most of the sectors utilised programs based on least, 
moderately and highly dominant levels, except the energy-stationary. However, 
although the energy-stationary sector introduced a few programs using instruments at 
the highly and most dominant levels, nearly three quarters of the programs used much 
softer-based instruments (less dominant). In addition, only programs in the energy-
fugitive and agriculture sectors introduced initiatives at the least and moderately 
dominant levels. Figure 5.29 also displays the use of 'soft' and ' hard ' instruments for 
the sectoral level over time with the percentage of the sectoral allocation, which 
reveals exact distribution of the use of instruments in each sector. 
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Figure 5.28: 'Soft' and 'hard' instrument uses at the sectoral level 1997-2007 by number 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.29: 'Soft' and 'hard' instrument uses at the sectoral level 1997-2007 by percentage 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews) . AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.2.3 .2 Trend uses of 'soft ' and ' hard ' instruments m the Stationary-Energy Sector 1997-
2007 
Details of the trend uses of 'soft ' and ' hard ' instruments in the stationary-energy 
sector over the period 1997-2007 by number are presented in Figures 5.30 and 5.31. 
While most of the programs in the sector were based on least and moderately 
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dominant levels during the period, the number of programs at least dominant showed 
a tendency to increase dramatically, especially in 2005. At the same time, programs at 
moderately dominant tended to increase in the second half of the decade but declined 
significantly after. The programs at highly and most dominant levels tended to 
increase slightly, but still remained at lower levels than less dominant (the much 
softer instruments): least and moderately dominant levels over time. See Figure 5.32 
which also illustrates the instrument trends by percentage during the period. 
Figure 5.30: Trend uses of 'soft ' and ' hard ' instruments in the stationary-energy sector 1997-2007 
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Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.31: Trend uses of 'soft ' and ' hard ' instruments in stationary-energy 1997-2007 
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Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.32: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in stationary-energy 1997-2007 by percentage 
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Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.2.3.3 Trend uses of ' soft' and ' hard ' instruments in Transport-energy 1997-2007 
Figure 5.33 and 5.34 illustrate the trend of 'soft' and ' hard' instruments in the 
transport-energy sector over the period 1997-2007 by instrument numbers. The largest 
number of initiatives in the sector was at the moderately dominant level, which 
showed the highest predominance in this sector. There was no initiative most 
dominant over this time. In addition, the initiatives at both least and highly dominant 
showed a tendency to increase gradually during the period. These results may be 
explained by considering softer instrument uses in the transport-energy sector over 
time. See Figure 5.35 also shows the instrument trends during the period by 
percentage. 
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Figure 5.33: Trend uses of 'soft ' and ' hard' instruments in transport-energy, 1997-2007 
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Figure 5.34: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in transport-energy,1997-2007 
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Figure 5.35: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in transport-energy, 1997-2007 by percentage 
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Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.2.3.4 Trend uses of 'soft ' and ' hard ' instruments in Fugitive-energy 1997-2007 
Details of the trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard ' instruments in fugitive-energy over the 
period 1997-2007 are illustrated in Figures 5.36 and 5.37. Initiatives in this sector 
were only based at the moderately dominant level. These initiatives showed a 
tendency to increase over time; however, additional initiatives were discontinued after 
2001. This is consistent with previous findings suggesting that softer-based 
instruments predominated over time. 
Figure 5.36: Trend uses of 'soft' and ' hard ' instruments in fugitive-energy, 1997-2007 
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Figure 5.37: Trend uses of 'soft ' and ' hard ' instruments in fugitive-energy 1997-2007 
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5.2.3.5 Trend uses of ' soft' and ' hard ' instruments in Industrial Processes 1997-2007 
Figures 5.38 and 5.39 illustrate the trend uses of ' soft' and 'hard' instruments in 
industrial processes over the period 1997-2007 by instrument numbers. Moderately 
dominant initiatives dominated in the sector, followed by highly dominant initiatives. 
Initiatives that were at least dominant were introduced until 200 I , with no further 
initiatives after that time. While initiatives at the highly dominant level remained at 
the same level during the period, initiatives at the moderately dominant level tended 
to increase in the first half of the period but then declined slightly. The results may be 
explained by considering that harder instruments were used over time compared to 
other sectors. See Figure 5.40 which also shows the instrument trends during the 
period by percentage. 
Figure 5.38: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, in industrial processes 1997-2007 by number 
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Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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Figure 5.39: Trend uses of 'soft ' and 'hard' instruments, in Industrial Process, 1997-2007, by number 
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Figure 5.40: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, in Industrial Processes, 1997-2007, by 
percentage 
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5.2.3.6 Trend uses of ' soft' and 'hard' instruments in the Waste Sector 1997-2007 
Details of the trend uses of 'soft' and ' hard ' instruments in the waste sector over the 
period 1997-2007 are illustrated by instrument numbers in Figures 5.41 and 5.42. 
Only two levels of initiatives were used in the sector moderately and highly dominant. 
Initiatives at the moderately dominant level increased in the first half of the period but 
tended to decline since 2002. Initiatives at the highly dominant level remained at same 
level over time but with only one program. The results demonstrate that much softer 
instruments dominated the sector over time. See Figure 5.43 which also shows the 
instrument trends during the period by percentage. 
Figure 5.41: Trend uses of 'soft ' and 'hard' instruments, in the waste sector, 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
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Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.42: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, in the waste sector, 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.43: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the waste sector, 1997-2007 by percentage 
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Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.2.3.7 Trend uses of ' soft' and ' hard ' instruments in LULUCF 1997-2007 
Figures 5.44 and 5.45 illustrate the trend uses of ' soft' and ' hard' instruments in 
LULUCF over the period 1997-2007. Initiatives based on moderately dominant level 
tended to increase in the first half of the period but declined after 2004. Initiatives at 
least dominant level remained stable until 2004 when there was a slight increase 
before a return to the previous level. These results showed that moderately dominant 
initiatives declined a little in 2004 before levelling out. An initiative at the highly 
dominant level was introduced but with no further implementation after 2002. See 
Figure 5.46 which also shows the instrument trends during the period by percentage. 
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Figure 5.44: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, in the LULUCF, 1997-2007 
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Figure 5.45: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, in the LULUCF, 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia's Third National Communication on 
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Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
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Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Figure 5.46: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, in the LULUCF, 1997-2007 by percentage 
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Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.2.3.8 Trend uses of ' soft' and ' hard ' instruments in the Agricultural Sector 1997-2007 
Details of the trend uses of ' soft ' and 'hard ' instruments in agriculture over the period 
1997-2007 are illustrated in Figures 5.47 and 5.48. Only two types of instruments 
were used in this sector; least and moderately dominant initiatives. In the first half of 
the decade, initiatives at the moderately dominant level showed a tendency to increase, 
while initiatives at the least dominant level included only one program. However, in 
the second half of the period, initiatives under the least dominant level significantly 
increased after 2002, while initiatives at the moderately dominant level reduced 
significantly. The results demonstrate that the programs under the sector became 
much softer-based approaches over time. See Figure 5.49 which also shows the 
instrument trends during the period by percentage. 
Figure 5.47: Trend uses of 'soft' and ' hard' instruments in agriculture, 1997-2007 
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Change . The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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Figure 5.48: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in agriculture, 1997-2007 
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Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
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Figure 5.49: Trend uses of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in agriculture, 1997-2007 by percentage 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
In terms of evaluating the distribution of ' soft ' and ' hard ' instruments under the 
national initiatives of climate change policy in Australia over the period 1997 to 2007, 
this section utilised two perspectives, namely to look at the national and at the sectoral 
level. This section also reviewed the overall picture and trend uses of 'soft ' and ' hard ' 
instruments, how information was reported by the national government. In a broad 
sense, it is likely that initiatives at the national level were generally based on softer-
based instruments (less dominant), especially as indicated by least and moderately 
dominant over the time considered. Although, all the initiatives at any level tended to 
increase over time, these two softer levels highly dominated the total approaches. In 
specific terms, although these softer instruments at the least and moderately dominant 
levels remained at high levels in each sector over time, some sectors demonstrated 
188 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
fluctuations over time. For example, in terms of the agricultural sector, although the 
total initiatives were soft-based approaches, there was a significant shift to much 
softer based instruments towards 2007 than in the first half of the decade 
5.2.4 Instrument Use at the National Level 1997-2007 
5.2.4.1 Average number of key elements under the criteria at the national level, 1997-2007 
Figure 5.50 presents the average number of the key elements under the criteria for the 
DSHCI approach, described in the Methodology (Chapter Three) in this thesis, which 
is used for determining the trend in ' soft' or 'hard ' instruments over the period 1997-
2007, using selected criteria consisting of 17 elements. This measurement scale 
allows for a simple and clear classification of the level of coercion between ' soft' and 
' hard ' instruments. Thus, it is important to measure the trend in use of the criteria and 
the average number, in terms of evaluating how a government designs the level of 
instrumental coercion for a certain period. The results show that the highest average 
number of the key elements under the criteria was found in 1997 and the lowest in 
2000. As can be seen, all the average numbers of the key elements presented at 
around 6 to 7 out of 17, which means much softer instruments were used at the 
moderately dominant and most dominant levels. Although the tendency of the average 
numbers fluctuated over time, the tendency was to decline overall. This may be 
explained by considering the total average remaining low or one third of the total 
criteria, and also tending to be softer during the period. 
Figure 5.50: Average of the criteria at the national level, 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia's Fourth National 
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Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.2.4.2 Average number of key elements under the criteria at the sectoral level, 1997-2007 
Figure 5.51 displays the average number of key elements under the criteria at the 
sectoral level over the period 1997-2007. The blue line indicates the average number 
of the total elements used in each sector. As revealed by the graph, the average shown 
under both the Agriculture and Industrial Process was higher than the total average. 
This can be explained by considering that these two sectors provided harder 
instruments than instruments used under other sectors. This shows the average 
number of the criteria at the national and sectoral levels above. It demonstrates how 
the country designed instruments during 1997-2007, and the preferences of the 
instrument uses in each sector. It is important to measure how a nation and each sector 
prefer differing relative dominances of their instrumental coerciveness over a certain 
period. 
Figure 5.51: Average number of the criteria at the sectoral level 1997-2007 
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Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.2.5 'Soft' and 'Hard' instruments & Emission Trends at the National Level 
5.2.5.1 ' Soft' and ' hard ' instruments & emission trends (COr equivalent) at the national level 
1997-2007 
This section examines the relationship between 'soft' and ' hard' instruments and 
emission trends at the national level during the period 1997-2007. Results in this 
section will, in particular, show how the 'soft ' or ' hard' instruments used by 
government correspond with emission trends. 
Figure 5.52 displays the comparison between the level of ' soft ' and ' hard' instruments 
used and emission trends ( C02-equivalent) at the national level over the period 
1997-2007. As can be seen in this figure, emission trends in this country gradually 
increased over time, while the number of instrument uses also increased. In terms of 
the use of instruments, most of the instruments used during the period were either 
least or moderately dominant. and the instruments least dominant especially showed a 
tendency to increase significantly. These results indicate that the national government 
preferred softer instruments and gradually increased the usage of soft instruments 
over the period in question, while also experiencing a rapid growth in emissions. 
Figure 5.52: Comparison between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments & emission trends at the national level 
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5.2.6 'Soft' and 'Hard' instruments & Emission Trends at the Sectoral Level 
5.2.6.1 ' Soft' and ' Hard ' instruments & Emission Trends (COr eguivalent) in the Energy 
Sector 1997-2007 
Details of the comparison between ' soft ' and ' hard ' instruments and emission trends 
in the energy sector over the period 1997-2007 are presented in Figure 5.53. The trend 
of emission growth in the sector is a steady increase over time. In regard to instrument 
use, although instrument use at highly and most dominant levels was introduced by 
the government during the period, especially in the second half of the decade, 
instrument use was largely dependent on softer instruments: least and moderately 
dominant; and this also tended to increase over time. Especially, again, the sectors 
preferred softer instruments, and tended to increase to much softer instruments 
significantly over the period, while the greenhouse emissions increased. 
Figure 5.53: Comparison between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments & emission trends in the energy sector, 
1997-2007 
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Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.2.6.2 ' Soft' and ' Hard' instruments & Emission Trends (C02-eguivalent) in the Industrial 
Process Sector 1997-2007 
Figure 5.54 shows the comparison between ' soft' and ' hard ' instruments and emission 
trends in the Industrial Process sector over the period 1997-2007. As shown in the 
figure, emission trends increased slightly over time. In terms of instrument use, 
instruments at moderately and highly dominant levels dominated during the period in 
question. These results show that the industrial process sector used much harder 
instruments than other sectors did, while having a slower increase in their emissions 
growth. 
Figure 5.54: Comparison between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments & emission trends in the industrial 
process sector, 1997-2007 
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Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.2.6.3 ' Soft' and 'hard ' instruments & emission trends (C02) in the Waste Sector, 1997-
2007 
Figure 5.55 reveals the comparison between ' soft ' and ' hard ' instruments and the 
emission trends in the waste sector over the period 1997-2007. Interestingly, the 
emission trends showed a significant increase in emission growth over time, although 
it showed some fluctuation. In terms of instrument uses, the number of instruments 
tended to decline during the period and were based on instruments at moderately and 
highly dominant levels, which are harder instruments than used in other sectors such 
as the energy sector. 
Figure 5.55: Comparison between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments & emission trends in the waste sector, 
1997-2007 
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Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.2.6.4 ' Soft' and ' hard ' instruments & emission trends in the LULUCF Sector, 1997-2007 
Details of the comparison between ' soft ' and ' hard' instruments and emission trends 
under LULUCF over the period 1997-2007 are shown in Figure 5.56. As revealed by 
the graph, emission trends showed a significant decrease over time. In terms of 
instrument use, although the number of instruments increased in the first half of the 
decade, it then decreased slightly. There was also a tendency towards softer 
instruments over time. These results indicate that the LULUCF sector used much 
softer instruments over the above period and tended to be much softer, while showing 
a dramatic decrease in emission growth. 
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Figure 5.56: Comparison between 'soft' and ' hard' instruments & emission trends in the LULUCF 
sector, 1997-2007 
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Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
5.2 .6.5 ' Soft ' and ' hard ' instruments & emission trends (COr equivalent) in Agriculture, 
1997-2007 
Figure 5.57 reveals the companson between ' soft' and ' hard ' instruments and 
emission trends in the sector of agriculture over the period 1997-2007. As can be seen 
in the graph, emissions showed a slight overall increase by the end of the decade, 
although they had shown a significant increase over the first half of the decade. In 
terms of instruments used, the number of instruments increased over time, and these 
instruments were based on the much softer instruments: those least and moderately 
dominant. These results reveal that the agricultural sector used much softer 
instruments than any other sectors and tended to be much softer over time, while 
experiencing a slow increase in emission growth 
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Figure 5.57: Comparison between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments & emission trends in agriculture, 
1997-2007 
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Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
This section examined the relationships between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments and 
emission trends at the national and sectoral levels. These results are critical to 
understanding which instruments the government preferred during a particular period, 
and the impact upon its national emission trends. 
The following section examines what the government preferred most and which were 
its most avoided instruments over the period by analysing each specified element 
under the criteria in the DSHCI approach, used for determining ' soft ' and ' hard ' 
instruments. 
5.2.7 Elements under the Criteria in DSHCI at the National Level 1997-2007 
5 .2. 7 .1 Percentage of each element under DSHCI criteria at the national level 1997-2007 
Figure 5.58 describes the percentage of each element under the criteria in the DSHCI 
approach at the national level l 997-2007 in order to examine what instruments the 
government preferred most and which were most avoided. The highest rate of 
instrument usage was found to be incentives and grant uses at 92%, followed by 
auditing by government at 90%. By contrast, the lowest rate of instrument usage was 
found to be penalties for polluter pays at 2%, followed by committed contractual 
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agreements at 4%. As mentioned, instrument uses under the national approaches 
during the period were strongly based on softer instruments rather than harder ones 
(see previous sections). 
Figure 5.58: Percentage of each Element under Criteria the National Level 1997-2007 
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Sources: (AGO, 2002b; and 2005 ; interviews). AGO. 2002b. Australia 's Third National Communication on 
Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Department of Environment and Heritage. AGO 2005. Australia 's Fourth National 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The AGO within the Department of the Environment and Heritage. Commonwealth of Australia. 
As shown in Figure 5.58, these results can be explained by considering the number of 
the elements as recognised by the highest rate of instrument usage, that were 
dominant: grants (94%), auditing (90%), information provision (65%), education and 
training (65%), and incentives and guidance (65%). This indicates that these elements 
were the most preferred by the government. After these elements, the figure also 
showed other instrument use: i.e. monitoring by government ( 42%), reporting by 
government ( 40%), specific timeframe setting (37%), and specific target settings 
(33%) which can be described as less preferred elements under the national 
approaches. Lastly, the rest of the elements include: regulation and standards (23%), 
market devices (19%), penalties for noncompliance (19%), public disclosure (12%), 
penalties for non-participation and not-meeting targets (6%), committed contractual 
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agreement ( 4%) and penalties for polluter pays (2%) which may be explained as the 
most avoided elements within the national approaches over time. These results reveal 
that the government had preferred approaches in terms of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions at the national level. Relatively preferred approaches by the government 
were shown to be more incentive based, information-based instruments and taking a 
position of responsibility for all the activities rather than imposing strict governmental 
interventions such as monitoring and interventionist actions by government. Moreover, 
these results also indicate that the government avoided instruments in which the 
public sector imposes penalties, public disclosures and competition during the period. 
5.3 Discussion 
The objectives of this section are to discuss the findings obtained under the DSHCI 
approach used for determining whether instruments are 'soft' or 'hard'. This study 
also specifically evaluated instrument use under Australian national climate change 
policy over the period 1997-2007. Building on the results in the previous sections, this 
chapter will next analyse and classify the findings into the three major objectives of 
this study, including: how the method, described in Chapter Three applies in each 
case study; how the Australian government categorised a number of instruments 
during the period; and what the trend uses were over time. Firstly, this discussion will 
demonstrate the major findings of this chapter in terms of instrument categories and 
the proposed method used for determining the level of relative dominance; and 
whether an instrument is 'soft' or 'hard'. Secondly, this section will reflect on why the 
results obtained under the method are important for the field of public policy. Thirdly, 
this section will further discuss alternative explanations of the results obtained. 
Finally, it will conclude with an overview of the application of the method and the 
circumstances surrounding 'soft' and hard' instrument uses under Australia's climate 
change policy initiatives at the national level over the period 1997-2007. 
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5.3.1 Major Findings of the Study 
5.3.1.1 Findings - Instrument categories 
5.3.1.1.1 Tendency to introduce mixed instruments 
Firstly, in terms of sorting 
instrument uses into 
instrument categories, the 
results identified that a 
large number of 
instruments utilised under 
the national approaches 
Volu ntary 
10% 
36% 
over the period 1997 to 2007 were mixed instruments, at 36% of the total (refer 
Figure 5.1, p.135, reproduced here), Mixed instruments can include programs such as 
the Greenhouse Friendly Program (2001-2004,) which contains both information-
based and economic instruments. Furthermore, in terms of the trend use of mixed 
instruments, the results also demonstrate that nearly 35-40%, or over one third, of the 
total initiatives remained in effect over the above timeframe. These results can be 
explained by considering how the government preferred to increase the use of mixed 
instruments in programs during the period. 
5. 3.1.1. 2 High dominance of economic and voluntary instrument approaches 
Secondly, the results sorted by instrument categories also show a high dominance of 
Information -
based 
20% 
R&D 
11% 
Voluntary 
20% 
Etc 
3% 
Economic 
32% 
14% 
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reproduced here). 
Overall , the results 
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identified the use of economic instruments at 33%, followed by voluntary instruments 
at 21 %. Although the rate of information-based instruments was shown to be at 16%, 
regulatory instruments at 16% and R&D at 12%, the tendency of instrument use in 
each sector was to depend highly on the economic and voluntary instruments. These 
results suggest that the government focused on more economic and voluntary based 
approaches rather than others such as regulatory instruments. 
5. 3.1.1. 3 Variety of instrument use in different sectors 
Thirdly, the results also demonstrated that significant trends occurred with a variety of 
instrument uses in each sector over the period. Some sectors introduced more 
economic instruments, and some utilised regulatory instruments or information-based 
instruments. For instance: the waste sector introduced regulatory instruments with an 
average of nearly 30% over time rather than economic instruments at just above I 0%. 
On the other hand, the energy sectors introduced relatively more economic 
instruments, especially the transport-energy sector which showed that over 50% of the 
instruments were based 
on economic 
instruments, especially 
in the second half of the 
decade (refer Figure 
5.14, p.143 reproduced 
here). 
LULU CF 
Moreover, 
maintained 
nearly 40% of its 
instruments as 
information-based. 
Interestingly, m the 
LULUCF sector, the use 
of R&D instruments 
became increasingly 
popular over time, while 
showing a parallel 
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significant tendency to decrease the use of economic instruments (refer Figure 5.21, 
p.14 7 reproduced here). In spite of all the initiatives being under the same government, 
these results demonstrate that each sector has a different preference of instrument uses . 
. 3.1.1. 4 Understanding the level of relative dominances among different instruments 
Lastly, having identified a range of findings in the results, the instrument categories 
still present some difficulties when attempting to identify the level of relative 
dominances among different instruments. An instrument's relative dominance 
represents how much that instrument is dominated by the characteristics of hard 
instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions. Although results sorted by the 
instrument categorisation may be a useful tool in the broad sense of understanding of 
which instruments are used by national government, this categorisation still seems to 
be incapable of demonstrating the level of relative dominances between 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments. As mentioned, this thesis proposed and applied a method to 
determine whether instruments are 'soft' or 'hard' in the case studies. The following 
sections will present the major findings obtained by this method, especially focusing 
on identifying the level of relative dominance under the national approaches. 
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5.3.1.2 Criteria #I: The method used for determining whether an instrument is 'soft' or 
' hard ' 
5. 3.1. 2.1 Soft-based instrument approaches by the government 
Firstly, the method used for determining whether instruments were ' soft ' or ' hard' 
instruments under the national approaches over the period 1997-2007, reveals a clear 
identity of the most dominant 
use of instrument. These 
figures from the results show 
the exact level of national 
instrument use during the 
period (refer: Figure 5.25, 
p.151; and Figure 5.26, p.152; 
reproduced here). Least 
dominant represents the 
softest level and most 
dominant the hardest level. 
This result clearly 
demonstrates that the 
majority or nearly 80% of 
the total national initiatives 
for climate change policy 
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during the period were based on softer instruments at least and moderately dominant. 
These results confirm that the government focused more on soft based (less dominant) 
instrument approaches over time. 
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5.3.1.2.2 Tendency to use much softer instruments over time 
Secondly, the results 
obtained here clearly 
exhibit the trends of the 
class of instrument 
coerciveness, under the 
national policy over the 
period 1997-2007. They 
reveal that there is a 
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trend for the government to rely on softer based instruments over time; as mentioned 
in the previous findings, the figures on the right show instruments at a softer level 
such as least and moderately dominant level, were strongly preferred over time under 
the approaches (refer Figure 5.27, p.153 , reproduced here). The results also reveal that 
although harder instruments, such as highly and most dominant initiatives increased 
slightly, the softer instruments at highly and most dominant levels dramatically 
increased at the same time, especially in terms of the percentage of level one 
instruments as shown m 
figures with a significant 
growth in the second half 
of the period (refer Figure 
5.29, p.154, reproduced 
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softer instruments so that they remained highly dominant under the national policy 
over the period 1997 to 2007. 
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5. 3.1. 2. 3 Different trends of the level of instrument uses in each sector 
Lastly, the results also show a 
variety of instrument uses in 
each sector during the period. 
Although the initiatives in 
each sector remained the basis 
for using softer instruments 
over time, some sectors were 
more likely to introduce much 
harder instruments than others. 
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For example, the industrial process and waste sectors used a high percentage of instruments at 
highly dominant levels, at approximately 40%, and 20 -30% over time, although there were 
some fluctuations (refer Figure 5.39, p.159, reproduced here). On the contrary, some sectors 
ended up with a rate of softest 
instruments at the least 
dominant level in 2007 such 
as agriculture (over 70%), 
energy stationary (over 40% ), 
and LULUCF (over 30%) 
(refer Figure 5.49, p.164, 
reproduced here). These 
results show that the 
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government differentiated their approach in different sectors. 
5.3.1.3 Criteria #2: Comparison of the results for the Instrumental Categories and the Criteria 
used for ' Soft' and "Hard' instruments 
This study compared the results for the CCPIC and the DSHCI approaches used in 
this thesis for determining whether they are 'soft' or 'hard ' instruments in order to 
demonstrate what could be said about the relative differences of the power relations 
between these two results. The figure on the left below contains the total numbers of 
instruments used in each policy over the period 1997-2007. 
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National Initiatives, 1997-2007 
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The figure on the right below 
shows, the percentage of 
instrument coercive level of 
each instrument during the 
period (refer Figure 5.2, 
p.135, reproduced here). As 
can be seen in the same 
figure, the percentage under 
the regulatory instruments 
showed the hardest 
instruments used (refer Figure 5.29, p.154, reproduced here). Economic instruments 
and R&D instruments were found to be much softer instruments than the other 
instruments over the period. These results can be explained by considering that 
regulatory instruments are relatively harder than other instruments. Moreover, 
voluntary and information-
based instruments used 
under the policy, were 
relatively softer but not too 
soft. The use of economic32 
and R&D instruments by 
Australian government over 
the period can be explained 
by considering them as the 
softest instruments m the 
context. 
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32 The use of economic instruments, during 1997-2007, was based on incentive-based instruments. 
Thus, the results could be differentiated if the market-based economic instruments (i .e. carbon tax and 
emission trading scheme [ETS]) were implemented. 
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5.3.2 Significance of the Findings 
This section will discuss why the results obtained by criteria used for determining 
whether instruments are 'soft' or 'hard', are important. There are three major benefits 
of using such criteria in order to provide policy makers with a clear picture of 
instrument characteristics and their effectiveness. Firstly, this study clearly 
demonstrates the level of relative dominance between instruments, which have been 
used by the national government for the climate change policy over the period 1997-
2007. The criteria also help policy makers appreciate which level of policy 
instruments were used under the government initiatives during the specific periods 
when there was a reduction in GHG emissions. Results obtained by categorising 
instruments can explain what sort of instruments were used under the policy but not 
their level of relative dominance. As governments use more mixed instruments in 
public policy, policy makers must recognise which instruments are hard or soft in 
terms of clear instrument characteristics and their effectiveness. Namely, policy 
makers can fail to recognise that voluntary measures are not always soft instruments, 
and that regulations are not always hard instruments. In addition, the results from this 
analysis can also assist policy makers to identify the trend uses of instruments over 
time, which may help in reviewing instrument trends and government's instrument 
approaches. The criteria used for determining whether instruments are soft or hard are 
therefore a very useful tool for policy makers in terms of providing a clear 
understanding of instrument effectiveness. 
Secondly, the results clearly demonstrate the level of relative dominances at the 
national and sectoral level. As previously mentioned, the criteria provide information 
that shows the level of relative dominance under each instrument. This will help 
policy makers to understand which instruments are utilised by government to 
intervene at the national and sectoral level. Each instrument is employed by the 
national government and is intended to meet their individual goals, but with differing 
levels of government control. There is thus a need for reviewing all instruments by the 
level of government controls and the effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions. This 
is critical prior information for policy makers before policy implementation. 
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Finally, the results obtained under the criteria create a clear picture of the preferences 
of the government's own instrument approaches in terms ofreducing GHG emissions. 
As shown in the results, a range of initiatives in each sector implemented a variety of 
instruments, using different instrument levels. The results indicated that some 
preferences for particular instrument approaches already existed in the policy 
approach of the national government. Therefore, understanding the government's 
preferences instruments may allow policy makers to recognise what level of 
instrument coerciveness (by adopting different instrument elements i.e. penalties, 
monitoring and competition), should be applied and whether the level needs to be 
revised to better achieve policy effectiveness and emission reduction. The possible 
influences of the choices of policy made during the given periods are an important 
consideration. However, the primary purpose of this study focuses on describing to 
classify relevant instruments and to address the level of coerciveness, and the 
outcomes of such instruments. 
This section describes three major significances of using the criteria, namely: the 
criteria can; (i) analyse relative dominance between instruments (i.e. regulatory, 
economic, and mixed instruments), (ii) identify the level of relative instrument 
dominance at national and sectoral level (i.e. 'soft' or 'hard' instruments) and (iii) 
review the preferences of instrument use by government in terms of reducing GHG 
emissions (i.e. incentive-based, monitoring, penalties and competition). 
The criteria used for determining whether instruments are 'soft' or 'hard' are thus a 
very significant tool especially for policy makers who review climate change policy 
and the national initiatives from an instrument point of view in order to examine a 
clear picture of instrument characteristics and their effectiveness in order to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
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5.3.3 Alternative Explanations of the Findings 
In this section, the study will present two alternative explanations of the findings 
drawn from the results by the proposed method used for determining whether 
instruments are ' soft ' or ' hard '. Firstly, results obtained by the method also show a 
comparison between trends of instrument relative dominance and emission trends. 
This study provided the comparison based on the Australian national initiatives for 
climate change policy over the period 1997 to 2007. As can be seen in the results in 
Comparison of Trends between Soft and Hard Instruments at the National Level, 1997-2007 
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the figure above, the number of national initiatives tended, at the same time as 
increasing the adoption of much softer instruments over time, to witness significant 
emission growth (refer Figure 5.52, p.167, reproduced here). This clearly reveals that 
the number of instruments contained in the national approaches during the period did 
not reduce the GHG emissions overall. 
In terms of trends at the sectoral level , the results also reveal interesting relations 
between trends of instrument dominance and emission trends. The results in the figure 
below for the energy sectors are the most critical as the largest GHG emitting sector 
in the country, demonstrating significantly increased emissions, despite the 
introduction of a number of instruments varying in power from soft to hard (refer 
Figure 5.53 , p.168, reproduced here). 
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On the other hand, the comparison under LULUCF at the national level, shown in the 
figure below, demonstrates significant reductions in GHG emissions over time, 
although the level of instrument dominance was relatively softer than in the energy 
Comparison of Trends between Soft and Hard Instruments and the National Emissions under 
LULUCF, 1997-2007 
~---------------------~ 35 
Y e ars 
and other sectors (refer Figure 5.56, p.170, reproduced here). 
30 ~ 
a; 
25 J.., 
0 
2 0 0 
15 - Most Dom in a nt (ha rd) 
1 0 
- Hig hly Domina nt 
5 
0 - Mode rate ly Domina nt 
- Le a st Domina nt (soft) 
-41-- Emission Tre nd 
An explanation for the reduction in emissions might be that this resulted from a few 
state governments such as Queensland and New South Wales, establishing regulations 
banning land clearing (AGO 2005 ; Forest NSW; 2005; IPRT 2006; and Crowley 
2007). Their approaches could be much harder instruments compared to the national 
ones (as mentioned in Chapter Four). 
Secondly, results obtained by the criteria can also illustrate government' s preference 
for instrument frameworks through the selected criteria (i.e. selecting which are most 
preferred less preferred and most avoided), while evaluating the Australian national 
initiatives contained in the climate change policy over the period 1997-2007. These 
results shown in the fi gure below, suggest that during the period the government used 
soft-based instrument approaches (refer Figure 5.58, p.172, reproduced here). 
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Criteria for Soft and Hard Instruments 
In addition, the results are likely to have been based on three levels of instrument 
framework selection, including: most preferred, less preferred and most avoided 
elements for instrument. Firstly, the national initiatives have shown a strong 
preference for incentive based, information-based and auditing based approaches. 
Secondly, the approaches may have less preferred elements by strict governmental 
interventions: monitoring and reporting, and clear target frameworks: specific target 
setting and timeline. Thirdly, the results also indicate that government may have 
avoided instrument elements such as penalties, public disclosures and competition 
during the period; these elements are normally imposed by government on 
stakeholders to create a more competitive and more enforceable environment. 
In this section, therefore, this thesis discovered these two alternative explanations 
including: that criteria can present a comparison between trends of relative instrument 
dominance relations and emission trends, and that the method can illustrate the 
government's preference for instrument frameworks utilising the selected criteria, (i .e. 
which are most preferred, less preferred and most avoided). These results are 
significant, in terms of determining the level of policy instrument activities, however, 
these points are nevertheless important and can be considered as a critical part of 
210 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
policy analysis. Therefore, this analysis will prove useful in future studies in policy 
instrument analysis and may be applied more broadly in other fields of public policy. 
5.3.4 Summary 
In summary, the objective of this section was to discuss the findings obtained under 
the criteria used for determining whether Australian Climate Change Policy 1997-
2007 was 'soft' or 'hard' and also to evaluate the trend uses. Five objectives were 
established in the sectional discussion, namely: the major findings of this chapter; 
significance of the findings and alternative explanations of the findings. Firstly, in 
respect of the major findings, interestingly, these results by instrument categories 
found a tendency to increase mixed instruments, which demonstrates policy makers 
encounter more difficult understandings of determining which instruments are 'soft' 
and 'hard'. Another finding also suggests that Australian national initiatives during 
the period 1997-2007 were largely reliant on relatively softer instruments, showing a 
tendency to increase softer instruments over time. In light of the significance of the 
findings, this section concluded that the criteria are a very useful tool to examine a 
clear picture of instrument characteristics and their effectiveness, especially for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, this section also suggests alternative 
explanations of the findings by: looking at a comparison between trends of instrument 
power relations and emission trends; and an illustration of government's preference 
for instrument frameworks, through the selected criteria (i.e. which are most preferred; 
less preferred; and most avoided). With respect to the study' s limitations, this section 
describes a few limited activities throughout this study, namely: different instrument 
categories between UNFCCC and Australian national reports; and limited data 
collections. Lastly, a number of suggestions for further study were identified, 
including: a horizontal evaluation of instrument uses among other nations, or a 
vertical evaluation among different jurisdictions at the domestic level. The following 
section presents the conclusion of this chapter. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the_ case study to assess how the Australian government 
allocated their adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments during the period in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions during 1997-2007. 
It has met the primary objective of this chapter to demonstrate the Identification & 
Trend Analysis/ Method for illustrating trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy 
instruments, in order to fulfil the second aim of the overall thesis to determine the 
influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following 
the methods developed in the first aim. Furthermore, the Identification & Trend 
Analysis/ Method comprises two approaches devised in this thesis, namely: CCPIC 
for classifying climate policy instruments and DSHCI for distinguishing between 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy. 
In order to achieve this objective this chapter applied the two approaches for the trend 
use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments and examines analysis of its empirical case 
studies. This chapter also considered three aspects of the above policy analysis, 
including: a) the types of policy instruments utilised by the Australian government 
during 1997-2007, b) how such instruments vary according to the criteria developed 
in this thesis for assessing 'hard' and 'soft' policy and c) what was the trend usage of 
such policy over time. 
The results in this research presented a clear picture of distributing instruments under 
the national initiatives, and also found that 'mixed instruments' were highly dominant 
in the national approaches and tended to increase over the period. The results further 
found that the national government utilised much softer instruments for its policy to 
reduce GHG emissions. In terms of the last target, the government tended to increase 
its use of much softer instruments during the period. 
The following chapter further demonstrates the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method to 
address the actual impacts of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument activities on reducing GHG 
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emissions in the Australia's climate policy during the period, in order to fulfil the 
second aim of this overall thesis to determine the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following the methods developed in the 
first aim of the overall thesis. 
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Chapter Six 
'Soft' versus 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
6.0 Introduction 
The primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the Effectiveness Analysis/ 
Method for identifying the effectiveness of both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in 
reducing GHG emissions in the case of Australia's climate policy during 1997-2007, 
in order to fulfil the second aim of this overall thesis to determine the influences of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following the methods 
developed in the first aim of the overall thesis. The results in this chapter allow this 
thesis to conduct a further discussion on the relative effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments for reducing GHG emissions, which will be further discussed in the 
following chapter. 
For the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method, this thesis has devised the Synthesised 
Instrument Analysis [SIA], which includes a variety of key aspects into five analytical 
perspectives, namely: Descriptive perspective; Transformative perspective; Analysis 
of instrument design; Evaluation of actual effectiveness; and Discussion. Chapter Six 
demonstrates the application of SIA for evaluating the effectiveness of the 'soft' and 
'hard' instrument activities in the case of Australia's climate policy. 
In order to accomplish the primary objective of this current chapter, two case studies 
are presented. As identified in Chapter Five, the MRET is a 'hard' instrument and the 
Greenhouse Challenge Program [GCP] is a 'soft' instrument (See Appendix 4.1). 
Both programs were well known major initiatives for reducing GHG emissions. The 
MRET was intended to have a strong governmental and legislative intervention. On 
the other hand, the GCP was intended to have less intervention. This study evaluates 
these critical instruments in order to determine the relative effectiveness of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments. This chapter concludes with the demonstration of the study's 
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method for the analysis of the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments m 
reducing GHG emissions in the case of Australia. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, it describes the general 
background of these two cases. Secondly, it presents the results of the analysis of the 
MRET. Thirdly, the chapter examines the results of the analysis of the GCP. Finally, 
it finishes with the analysis of these two case studies. 
6.1 The MRET and The Greenhouse Challenge Program 
[GCP] 
The first section of this chapter describes the significance of the two case studies: the 
MRET and the GCP. The MRET and the GCP were announced in the 1997 
Safeguarding the Future Package, and were intended to be highly effective long term 
instruments to reduce GHG emissions at the national level (AGO 2002b). In 2001, the 
then Prime Minister, John Howard, introduced the MRET, the only regulated program 
entirely mandated by federal initiatives during the Howard regime (AGO 2003d). On 
the other hand, the GCP was an entirely voluntary measure and an extension of a 
previous program. It was expected to be a strong driver for reducing GHG emissions 
by increasing the number of voluntary agreements between government and industry 
(CWLTH 1997). In 2004 the Prime Minister announced the GCP Plus, which updated 
the existing Greenhouse Challenge to integrate with other existing programs, the 
Generator Efficiency Standard (GES) and the Greenhouse Friendly Program to reduce 
GHG emissions (DHH 2006). Although the framework of the GCP Plus33 was slightly 
changed (DEH 2006), it largely continued the original voluntary approach (AGO 
2005). 
In terms of determining whether instruments are 'soft' or 'hard', the previous chapter 
has revealed the MRET as a 'hard' instrument and the GCP as a 'soft' instrument (See: 
Appendix in Chapter Five). Given this, the MRET was an entirely mandatory 
33 The GCP Plus involved a limited requirement for penalty for non-participation: the GCP Plus 
required that Australian companies join, where a company receives fuel excise credits of more than 
AUD 3million and requires the proponents oflarge energy projects to participate. 
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framework, a ' hard' instrument. In contrast, the GCP was intended to be a completely 
voluntary framework, a ' soft ' instrument. Both were expected to be the most 
important instruments under national initiatives during the period, which is partly why 
they have been chosen for this study, in terms of resulting in a strong contribution to 
the reduction of GHG emissions over the long term. It is therefore appropriate to 
determine the relative effectiveness of these ' soft' and 'hard ' instruments in reducing 
GHG emissions. The following section will examine the effectiveness of the MRET. 
6.2 TheMRET 
This section seeks to understand the effectiveness of the MRET (2001-2007) as a 
' hard' instrument using the previously explained method (Chapter 5). The case study 
will be examined firstly from a 'descriptive perspective ', and secondly from 
'transformative perspective ' . The ' instrument design' will be addressed, and the 
' actual effectiveness ' evaluated. Finally key aspects of the case study will be 
discussed. 
6.2.1 Descriptive perspective 
The descriptive perspective includes consideration of primary targets, time lines, 
instrument approaches and performance indicators 
The primary targets of the MRET were: 
• to encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources; 
• to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases; and 
• to ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable. 34 
Specifically, the program aimed to increase the functions of renewable energy sources 
in Australia's electricity mix by an additional 2%, or 9,50035 GWh, per annum by 
34 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 200 I, s3 
35 The number of9,500 GWh per annum was found as an inappropriate count and revised. The estimate 
of future electricity requirements used by the Working Group in 1999 (205 ,000GWh in 20 I 0) on which 
the 9500GWh target was chosen is out of date. A more recent estimate puts the figure at 230,000GWh 
(ABERE, 2003). An additional 12,820 G Wh, not 9500 G Wh, will be required just to maintain the 2% 
increase in renewable since l 997(Kant and Mercer 2006). 
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2010 (AGO 2002b). The program also aimed to achieve an additional 2% in energy 
generation targets during the period from 2001 to 2010 (AGO 2005), with the targets 
remaining in place until 2020, when the MRET was to end (CWLTH 2003). 
With respect to this approach, the MRET was introduced as a regulatory instrument 
by the federal government during the Howard era (AGO 2002b ). The method used in 
this thesis recognises that the MRET was a hard instrument (at the most dominant 
level) in terms of the national initiatives over the period, to achieve reductions in 
GHG emissions. Figure 6.1 below illustrates the detail of the key criteria used in the 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method in order to judge the MRET' s instrument 
level. 
F" 12ure 61 I t . ns rumen t I I & K 'S ft' d 'H d' C "t . eve ey 0 an ar ri er1a 
Instrument level Criteria 
Information Provision -v 
Educational Support by Government 
" Incentives and subsidies by Government -v 
Specific and measurable Emission Reduction Targets in a -v 
program 
Timeframe in a program 
" Guidance or Guidelines for implementation -v The most dominant level Monitoring -
14/ 17 
Reporting and Certification -v 
Auditing, and Reviewing and Certification -v 
Public Disclosure (mandatory) 
" Committed Contractual Improvement -v 
Any Market Device or creation of competitiveness -v 
Government Regulation for Standards 
" Government Penalty of Polluter Pays -
Government Penalty for Nonparticipation -
Government Penalty for Noncompliance 
" Government Penalty for Failure to Meet Targets -v 
Adapted by Chapter Five 
Figure 6.1 shows that most of the criteria under the Identification & Trend Analysis/ 
Method were covered in the MRET, which could therefore be defined as a hard 
instrument at the most dominant level. However, a few criteria were not involved, 
namely: monitoring, penalties for polluter pays, and penalties for non-participation. 
The program required governmental authorities to provide certification and audits but 
not a monitoring process. It basically imposed penalties on not meeting individual 
targets, and on noncompliance, but not on polluter pays and non-participation. 
However, on balance, this method above shows that the program is a hard instrument. 
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In terms of reducing GHG emissions, the major performance indicator of the MRET 
is the increase in Australia's renewable electricity generation, which represents the 
amount of renewable electricity generated and potentially eligible under the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000, expressed as a percentage of the mandated 
target over time (ORER 2004b ). The following section will consider the 
transformative perspective of the MRET. 
6.2.2 Transformative perspective 
With respect to the transformative perspective, Figure 6.2 below also describes the 
instrument trends in the level of instrument use of the MRET. It can be concluded that 
the Australian government basically continued the same level of strong instrument 
dominance in the MRET from 2001-2007 in order to reduce GHG emissions. 
Figure 6.2: Trends in the Level oflnstrument Use, 1997-2007 
Programs Duration 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
-MRET 2001-2010 -I Regulatory I 
Adapted by Commonwealth of Australia 2002, 2005 ; and interviews. AGO 2002b. 
Australia's Third Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. URL:<http://www.greenhouse.gov.au>. 
Consulted on 15 August 2008. AGO. 2005. Australia 's Fourth Communication on Climate 
Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
URL:<http://www.greenhouse.gov.au>. Consulted on 15 August 2008 
The following section will consider the instrument design of the MRET. 
6.2.3 Instrument design 
The 41h National Communication Report introduced the MRET as a regulatory 
instrument.36 According to the method used for classifying instrument designs in this 
thesis, this instrument is a mixed approach with regulatory, incentive-based economic, 
research and information-based elements. 
36 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 200 I, s3 
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The program requires companies to be licensed, set their targets, and be strictly 
audited if liable parties receive their Renewable Energy Certificates [RECs] and 
interim targets and perform at the level of these targets (CWLTH 2003). A 
'performance standard' sets minima/maxima for particular goods/services and 
production techniques with respect to the use of renewable energy sources and GHG 
emissions (IPCC 2007b). Thus the instrument can be structured as a 'performance 
standard' type of regulatory instrument. Furthermore, the MRET also involved other 
instrument elements, namely economic and research. It can be classified as a pure 
incentive oriented program within the category of incentive-based instruments. 
Incentive-based economic instruments are government programs to reduce costs for 
development and diffusion of new technologies by imposing cost on the consumer 
with industry paying in order to stimulate the development and diffusion of new 
technologies (Bemelmans et al. 1998). Research instruments generate innovative 
approaches to a low carbon society with reduced greenhouse gas emissions (European 
Communities 2007). In practice, the Federal Government has implemented a variety 
of cooperative financial support programs through the MRET such as REEF 
[Renewable Energy Equity Fund] and REDI [Renewable Energy Development 
Initiative] (AGO 2005). The MRET also provided information and education 
(CWLTH 2003). These can be recognised as information-based instruments (see 
Chapter Three). In light of these supports, the program was not only purely regulatory 
but also included economic, research and information-based elements. 
In terms of instrument design from a theoretical perspective, the MRET program 
involved a mixed approach with performance standards as a regulatory instrument; as 
an incentive-based economic instrument, with research and information-based 
elements. Although economic, research and information-based elements can be seem 
to be supportive of the achievement of GHG reduction, the most dominant function of 
this program is its regulatory element. Thus, this thesis assesses the instrument design 
of the MRET according to the criteria for regulatory instruments. Figure 6.3 below 
describes the theoretical effectiveness of regulatory instruments against key criteria 
for assessing reduction in GHG emissions. 
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Figure 6.3: Instrumental Effectiveness for: Regulatory Instruments 
Criteria Re2ulatorv instruments 
Environmental Effectiveness High 
Cost-Effectiveness Low 
Distributional Equity High 
Political Acceptability Medium 
Administrative Feasibility High 
[ Adapted from Chapter Three] 
Firstly, this theoretical assessment shows that regulatory instrnments may present: 
high environmental effectiveness (reducing GHG emissions), low cost effectiveness, 
high promotion of distributional equity, medium level political acceptability, and a 
high level of administrative feasibility. A later section will compare the actual 
effectiveness of the theoretical assessment. This will reveal the relationship between 
the two and demonstrate the differences between theory and practice in terms of 
effective programs for GHG reduction. The following section will consider the actual 
effectiveness of the MRET. 
6.2.4 Actual Effectiveness 
The following section will analyse the actual effectiveness of the MRET in terms of 
environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, political 
acceptability and administrative feasibility. 
6.2.4.1 Environmental Effectiveness (reducing Greenhouse Gases) 
According to annual reports by the Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator [the 
ORER]37, the level of program effectiveness for the renewable energy industry can be 
assessed by consideration of both the amount of renewable energy generation 
accredited and the number ofRECs created. 
Figure 6.4 below presents the progress of these indicators during the period 2001 to 
2007. The results show a tendency to increase in both areas over the period with an 
37 The ORER is a statutory authority appointed by the government, and has played a role in managing 
the implementation of the MRET. 
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increase in renewable energy generation by number of accredited renewable energy 
power stations and number of created RECs 2001-2007. 
Figure 6.4: Number of Accredited Renewable Energy and Created RECs, 2001-2007 
Year Number of accredited renewable energy power stations Number of RECs created 
2001 124 619,906 
2002 175 2,191,676 
2003 196 7,719,189 
2004 211 11,043,587 
2005 228 15,749,644 
2006 237 21,359,038 
2007 253 28,190,050 
[Adapted from the ORER Annual Reports. 200la, 2002a, 2003a, 2004a, 2005a, 2006a and 2007a. Canberra. 
Australia] 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the Interim Targets set in the MRET, the actual results against 
these targets and the percentage of achievement level. The results in 2001, 2002, 2008, 
and 2009 are not publicly available; however results are available from 2003 until the 
end of 2007. These results clearly demonstrate a high level of achievement in meeting 
the targets allocated each year toward the primary target of an increase of renewable 
energy sources, of 9,500Mwh per year by 2010. 
Figure 6.5: Achievement oflnterim Targets, 2001-2007 
Year Interim Target (Mwh, or Actual Results (Mwh, or Percentage of the achievement 
RECs) RECs) level 
2001 300 Not available Not available 
2002 1,100 Not available Not available 
2003 1,800,000 1,708,951 94.94 
2004 2,600,000 2,502,229 96.24 
2005 3,400,000 3,335,040 98.09 
2006 4,500,000 4,500,005 100 
2007 5,600,000 5,741,131 102.52 
2008 6,800,000 Not available Not available 
2009 8,100,000 Not available Not available 
2010 9,500,000 Not available Not available 
[Adapted from the ORER Financial Reports, 2004b, 2005b, 2006b, 2007b and from 2008b Canberra. 
Australia] 
From these results it can be concluded that the MRET program had a strong 
environmental effectiveness in response to the goal of reduction in GHG emissions, 
indicating the instrument had reduced GHG emissions, though the primary goal of 
this program has not been completed yet. The following section will describe the level 
of cost effectiveness. 
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6.2.4.2 Cost-Effectiveness 
In terms of examining the level of cost effectiveness, data between the interim targets 
and actual results can be compared over the period. Figure 6.6 describes the value of 
both interim targets and the actual results. Figure 6. 7 then presents a comparison of 
cost effectiveness between the interim targets and the actual results over the period. 
Again, the data in 2001 and 2002 are not available . 
Figure 6.6: Values for Interim Targets and Actual Results, 2001-2007 
Year Interim Tar •ets Actual Results 
Targets/Costs ($) Values Targets/Costs($) Values 
2001 Not availab le Not available Not availab le Not available 
2002 Not avai lable Not available Not available Not available 
2003 1800/1 605 1121.5 1,708,951 / 1605 1064.8 
2004 2600/2684 968.7 2,502,229/2684 932.3 
2005 3400/2423 1403.2 3,335,040/2423 1376.4 
2006 4500/2384 1887.6 4,500,005/2384 1887.6 
2007 5600/2781 20 13.7 5741 , 131 /2781 2064.4 
[Adapted from the ORER Annual Reports. 200 I a, 2002a, 2003a, 2004a, 2005a, 2006a and 2007a; and the 
Financial Reports 2003b, 2004b, 2005b, 2006b and 2007b Canberra. Australia. 
Figure 6.7: A Comparison of Cost-Effectiveness: Targets vs Results, 2001-2007. 
Cost-Effectivenes: Targets vs Results, 2001-2007 
2 500 
I 2000 -1500 ~ ~ ---+--- Targets I - ------ Reuslts 1000 -j 500 
0 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Vear 
Adapted by the ORER Annual Reports. 200 I a, 2002a, 2003a, 2004a, 2005a, 2006a and 2007a; and the 
Financial Reports 2003b, 2004b, 2005b, 2006b and 2007b Canberra. Australia. 
These results show that the program seemed to achieve these targets, as intended over 
time. The MRET was highly cost effective. The following section will examine the 
distributional equity. 
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6.2.4.3 Distributional Equity 
In terms of equity, the program provided a range of grants for additional renewable 
sources. For instance, the government spent more than AUD300 million on 
encouragmg the development of existing renewable technologies, the 
commercialisation of new technologies and industry capacity building towards the 
2010 target level, such as Renewable Energy Action Agenda (CWLTH 2003). It also 
involved stakeholders improving their understanding of the program through public 
forums, strong linking with government agencies, and sharing information with 
interest groups at community levels (ORER 2008a). This provided equity. In terms of 
responsibility, the program did not level any penalty on polluters. In terms of 
environmental sustainability, the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (s.3) states 
that an object of the MRET is to reduce GHGs38. The program was primarily intended 
to be a long-term greenhouse response measure achieved through the development of 
industry capacity, although it generated direct greenhouse emission reductions in the 
medium term' (CWL TH 2003). It could be said therefore that the program was 
concerned with environmental sustainability. These three aspects, equity, 
responsibility and environmental sustainability, suggest that the program considered a 
variety of elements for meeting the demands for distributional equity. The following 
section will examine the political acceptability. 
6.2.4.4 Political Acceptability 
The MRET involved a tradable system, called RECs under the Act at the national 
level. It was expected to have a positive influence domestically and internationally in 
providing global contributions (Rossiter and Amarjot 2006). In terms of market 
ideology, the trading system was a new form of 'currency' used to demonstrate 
compliance with the government's new mandatory targets and additional renewable 
electricity generation for the environmental benefits held in the domestic market pool 
(Rossiter and Amarjot 2006). Market ideology was thus largely dominant in this 
program. A number of flexibilities can be found in the modification of the MRET, 
including: adapting a range of renewable energy sources and technologies to be 
38 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act s.3 
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eligible over time such as hydro and wind (ORER 2008a); and adapting a voluntary 
domain called 'voluntary surrender' 39, which allowed that voluntary surrenders have 
also been eligible to register since 2006 (ORER 2008a). These incremental changes 
indicate the MRET was flexible. These three aspects, global contribution, market 
ideology and flexibility, suggest that the program involves various factors of political 
acceptability. The following section will examine the administrative feasibility of the 
program. 
6.2.4.5 Administrative Feasibility 
In terms of administration and transaction, flexibilities such as the tradable domain 
(CWLTH 2003) and updating the eligibility of renewable energy sources over time 
(ORER 2008a), may have encouraged industry technological innovation and 
adaptation. The 'voluntary surrender' system (ORER 2008a) and variety of 
government incentives (CWLTH 2003) allowed the program to have more cost 
efficient processes. The program involved sharing responsibility with stakeholders 
(the ORER 2008a), which may have also avoided extra complexity and costs. 
In terms of enforceability, imposing penalties on participants for non-compliance 
ensures the maintenance of the integrity of the program. For instance, the ORER 
enforces compliance with the Act, by assessing the number of RECs surrendered and 
by paying discharge liabilities. Furthermore, the ORER annually operated a reporting 
process noting whether the program worked or not (ORER 2008b).40 Another factor is 
39 
'"Voluntary surrender' means extinguishing the many renewable energy certificates that had built up 
under GreenPower but it also allows any registered owner to be eligible to surrender. In September 
2006, the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 was amended with additional rules so that any 
registered owner of a renewable energy certificate may now surrender that certificate to the Regulator. 
40 The period, over which each annual target must be achieved, which, except for 2001, is a full 
calendar year. The reports are based on a full calendar year's acquisitions of electricity. 'These 
liabilities are then acquitted 6 weeks later by 14 February (annual compliance date) unless it is a 
weekend.' Furthermore, the Act places obligations on both eligible and liable parties to report their 
activities during the calendar compliance year. In addition, liable parties also surrender RECs or pay a 
Renewable Energy Shortfall Charge [RESC] to meet their liabilities. This process is subject to 
receiving, where required, third party or other data to verify compliance statements. 'The liability 
compliance element is the key support mechanism for the MRET because without a requirement to 
surrender RECs to the Australian government each year, the incentive to register and trade RECs in the 
REC market would be reduced' (ORER, 2008b, p.6). 
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the penalty for not meeting targets. A penalty of $40/MWh41 was imposed on any 
current owners who did not meet their targets (ORER 2008a). Figure 6.8 below 
illustrates the level of program compliance in terms of program outputs against 
performance standards 2001-2007. 
Figure 6.8: Enforcement and Compliance under MRET, 2001-2007 
Output Peiformance Standard 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number ofRECs vahdly created m the year 4,245,008 4,013,462 5,123,958 5,663,467 7,435,046 
Total REC hab1lity as a percentage of the annual 9505% 9624% 9809% 100% 100% 
renewable energy target 
Total number ofRECs surrendered m the year as a 95 82% 9695% 9901% 9997 9945% 
percentage of the target 
The percentage of accreditation applicatmns (w1thm six 9333% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
weeks of receipt of completed applicat10ns and other 
necessary mformatmn) 
The percentage of RECs annually created that are 82 70 9837% 9861% 9612% 9804% 
validated 
The number of liable parties havmg shortfalls 4 6 6 5 4 
The sum of all shortfalls expressed m RECs 1638 2,827 8,486 1,082 31,338 
[Adapted from the ORER Annual Reports. 2001a, 2002a, 2003a, 2004a, 2005a, 2006a and 2007a. 
Canberra. Australia] *No data available for 2001 or 2002. 
These results show a high compliance rate by industry. At the same time, a large 
amount of renewable energy sources were covered each year. This shows that the 
MRET was enforceable in its own terms, and also achieved successful compliance. 
In terms of transparency and credibility, the ORER was covered by legislation, and 
was responsible for preparing two annual reports, including: the financial annual 
report 42 and annual report (AGO 2004c). The ORER enforced penalties and 
conducted audits according to the legislation to ensure that the program was 
conducted as intended (ORER 2008c). Such strong governmental intervention can be 
expected to involve high transparency. Figure 6.9 below describes reporting 
compliance by government authorities, as indicated by publicly available annual 
reports and financial reports 2001-2007. Although a review by an independent panel 
41The penalty for meeting targets though 10% of the total requirement can be carried forward to the 
following year's REC liability (ORER 2008a). 
42 In accordance with section 63 of the Public Service Act 1999, the ORER must present the Annual 
Report of the Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator. This report is supplementary to the annual 
report produced in compliance with section 105 of the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 which 
reports on the operation of the Act over a calendar (or compliance) year. This annual report outlines the 
activities of the Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator as they relate to the financial year funding 
cycle (ORER, 2003b). While the ORER has been established since 1 April 2001 this report is the first 
financial year annual report for the Office, as prescribed agency status was granted from 1 July 2003. 
Previous reporting on the financial performance of the Office has been included in the Department of 
the Environment and Heritage's annual reports. 
42 The annual report, which is an administrative report completed for a calendar year and provides 
various data about the administration of the MRET, such as: the number of RECs that have been 
created, registered and surrendered (AGO 2004). 
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was conducted in 2003 only, the result shows the total level of transparency and 
credibility was likely to have been high. 
Figure 6.9: MRET Reporting Compliance 
Report 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Annual Report -.../ -.../ -../ -../ -../ -../ -../ 
Financial Report -../ -../ -../ -../ -../ -../ -../ 
Independent Review -../ 
[Adapted from the ORER Annual Reports. 200Ia, 2002a, 2003a, 2004a, 2005a, 2006a and 2007a; and the 
Financial Reports 2003b, 2004b, 2005b, 2006b and 2007b; and CWLTH 2003.] 
In terms of practicability, a number of critical recommendations were made by an 
independent Senate Committee review and Working Group in 2003 (CWLTH 2003). 
The major issues were as follows: the intention of the Act to accept a national 
emission trading scheme; changing target parameters of the scheme (i.e. targeting 
10% of renewable energy by 2010, increasing the target beyond 2010, and continuing 
the scheme beyond 2020); and encouraging efforts beyond 'business as usual'(Kant 
and Mercer 2006). Later, the government acknowledged 30 recommendations from 
the independent review and agreed with the 14 recommendations (AGO 2004c). This 
shows that the government recognised and acted upon urgent issues. It follows from 
this that the MRET had a certain level of practicability. Given these four key aspects, 
namely, minimising administrative and transaction costs, enforceability, transparency, 
credibility, and practicability, the MRET may have been administratively feasible. 
This section considered instrument effectiveness. The following section will present a 
discussion reflecting the results of the MRET, to determine the effectiveness of it as a 
'hard' instrument. 
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6.2.5 Discussion 
In discussing the MRET's effectiveness, four perspectives are presented, including: 
the significance of the MRET; major criticisms of the MRET; the MRET's overall 
effectiveness; and the summary of the discussion and this study' s contribution. This 
section will then present a short summary for this section. 
6.2.5.1 Significance of the MRET 
The MRET was one of the most significant programs in Australia's climate change 
policy. This thesis has classified it as a hard instrument. The primary goal of the 
program was to increase the amount of renewable energy generation. In specific terms, 
the government played a central role in its implementation with legislation. Under the 
legislation, the program created a tradable unit (RECs ), and was also capable of 
charging for not meeting targets, and/or a lack of compliance. These features show 
that the program was expected to have strong governmental and legislative 
intervention, in terms of reducing GHG emissions. However, various critiques of the 
MRET have emerged, which will now be discussed. 
6.2.5.2 Major criticisms of the MRET 
Criticisms of the MRET include that: 
• the targets are too low and too short term; 
• there is a lack of funding support for renewable energy technology; 
• the weak charge for shortfalls imposed on retailers has resulted in less 
responsibility and low motivation; 
• the uncertainties of the evaluation report43 ; and 
• the uncertainty of the 'business as usual'approach in the MRET to actual 
emissions abatement under the total reliance of the 'business as 
usual' approach. 
43 A number of uncertainties under the MRET evaluation framework were also criticised: (a) a lack of 
clarity and purpose in the Act itself (b) reviewing the effectiveness after only 2 years of operation was 
too soon ( c) and too much consideration of claims by stakeholders (Kent and Mercer 2006). 
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The following section will discuss aspects of this study's methodology. It will also 
illustrate relationships between its findings and the above criticisms. 
6.2.5.3 MRET's overall effectiveness 
This section will summarise the results from four elements of this study' s method: 
'descriptive· perspective', 'transformative perspective', 'instrument design' and 
'actual effectiveness'. 
The descriptive perspective gave an overview of the MRET, as a 'hard' instrument. 
The transformative perspective presented the trend in the level of instrument use of 
the MRET. This showed that the trend remained at the most dominant level over time. 
Regarding instrument design, the method found the program actually was a mixed 
instrumental approach (regulatory, incentive-based economic, and research 
instruments), although a national report defined the MRET as a regulatory instrument 
(AGO 2002b; 2005). However, it recognised that the regulatory instrument was the 
most dominant element in the program, due to its primary focus on strong government 
and legislative intervention to achieve its goals. It thus concluded that the theoretical 
assessment of regulatory instruments would be most appropriate for estimating 
effectiveness. The criteria adopted here suggest that regulatory instruments may 
present high environmental effectiveness (reducing GHG emissions), low cost 
effectiveness, high promotion of distributional equity, medium level political 
acceptability, and a high level of administrative feasibility. 
In terms of actual effectiveness, the results here show that the program met the 
demands for its performance indicators (see: environmental effectiveness). This 
reveals that the MRET achieved environmental effectiveness for reducing GHG 
emissions in 2001-2007. However, in practice, criticisms still remain that the program 
targets were always too low and too short term to influence emissions abatement. For 
example, the existing registration of RECs could already see the target being met as 
early as 2010. This would lead to less motivation for suppliers and retailers for further 
actions (Warwick and Smith 2002). Such low targets may be a reason for short term 
targets, and it was suggested that these should be changed to longer periods with 
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higher targets (Riedy 2005). The MRET is the first mandatory national certificate 
program. The target is a modest initial GHG emission reduction goal and does not 
represent a significant renewable initiative in Australia (Kelly 2007). The MRET 
target is certainly lower than that of some countries in Western Europe that have also 
established renewable energy targets. A key policy instrument must guide a strong 
initiative by setting a strong target (MacGill et al 2006); the MRET is a mandatory 
instrument, however, it fails to recognise this. Although questions about the target 
level and term still remain for future improvement, this method helped to identify 
whether the program met the demands for GHG reductions over time, as intended. In 
tem1s of cost-effectiveness, the results showed that the MRET met its cost value 
against targets, as intended. Achievement of cost effectiveness in a program 
represents the largest influence on cost values or on cost efficient provision toward an 
outcome (Vedung 2005). These factors suggest that the MRET achieved the least cost 
impact in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
The results from the distributional equity applied in this study showed a number of the 
elements in the MRET, namely a variety of incentives for renewable technology; 
extra incentives from the trading system; and equally shared responsibility among 
stakeholders. Although the program provided elements for responsibility with no 
penalties for polluter pays, it considered the capacity of environmental sustainability 
to direct greenhouse emission reductions in the medium and long term, in developing 
social capacity. However, in terms of the incentives, there was a lack of funding 
support for renewable energy technology by the federal government (AGO 2002a). 
For instance, the federal government invested unequally in energy and transport 
subsidies between the fossil fuel industry (97% of total energy and transport subsidies) 
and the renewable energy industry (3 % ) for improving energy efficiency. This 
represents the absence of funding support by government in the MRET (ISF 2007). 
This also results in less opportunity for competitiveness and job creation, which 
discourages the creation of additional renewable energy sources (AGO 2001 b; 2002c ). 
Furthermore, insufficient incentives from the government discourage significant 
development of renewable technologies. For example, a new power station and 
smaller renewable generators, such as Photovoltaic cells require high costs in terms of 
the infrastructure. On the other hand, refurbishing an existing power station such as a 
hydro energy plant does not incur such costs (MacGill et al. 2006; Lewis et al. 2007). 
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These factors suggest that although this study has found that a number of elements in 
the program involved distributional equity, in practice, the absence of incentives by 
government seems to have undermined equity. 
Results from the political acceptability aspect of this study showed a number of 
elements involved in the MRET. There is a strong contribution to global action by the 
proposed tradable system at the domestic level; flexibilities in the Act by updating 
eligible renewable sources over time and adapting the voluntary domain such as 
'voluntary surrender'; and market ideology by including the domestic market pool in 
renewable electricity generation. However, in practice, the MRET is still open to 
criticism for not allowing more global access. The MRET in Australia is the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard type, where governments manage a mandatory system 
by purchasing a certain amount of renewable energy sources (Berry 2002). However, 
such a significant market-based instrument should not only create a domestic target 
and market pool, but should also be based on an international standard, which would 
allow more access to a global market in the future (e.g. New Zealand's renewable 
energy target is based on the Kyoto target, but is not mandated) (Kelly 2007; Lewis et 
al 2007). From this perspective, the MRET seems to be a weak global action. 
In terms of flexibilities of the limited effectives, the Act needs to be improved. Most 
of the developed renewable technologies installed in Australia are owned and 
facilitated by the same operators that hold coal-fired power stations. If we are to 
realise the significant benefits of renewable energy, then the government must 
establish more decentralised generation (Crawford and Angel 2002). Moreover, there 
is always a demand for new renewable energy sources that should be recognised with 
more flexibility. New technologies such as bioenergy and biomass sources can be 
helpful for creating renewable technologies. However, the current system still allows 
only limited eligibility for registrations for these new technologies (Saddler et al 
2004). In terms of market ideology, the market design in the RECs system seems to 
have loopholes and weaknesses. There was uncertainty for negotiations between 
energy producers and the ORER. The data in the ORER making a decision to create a 
baseline for calculating additional energy productions for each company is 
confidential. This may create unfair market benefits amongst companies (MacGill et 
al 2006). Furthermore, the total reliance on the 'business as usual' approach in the 
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MRET results in uncertainty for actual emissions abatement, such as a less 
competitive market price (ACCI 2003; MacGill et al 2006). The conservative 
approach creates less funding opportunities, which may not be long-term and 
predictable (Greenpeace Australia Pacific 2007; MacGill et al 2006; Lewis et al 2007). 
Such a fundamental structure results in minimum contributions to reducing GHG 
emissions (Bailey 2006). 
These factors suggest that this study identified a number of elements for political 
acceptability in the program, namely global actions, flexibilities and market 
classification. However, it also identified some particular issues: the level of 
flexibility in the Act for example in terms of acceptance of eligibility; the level of 
global access; and the fundamental outline in the program such as the instrument 
relying on the 'business as usual' approach, still remains uncertain in terms of its 
effectiveness. 
Results from the administrative feasibility aspect of this study showed a number of 
elements involved in the MRET. The strong assistance for technological innovation 
and adaptation were considered by allowing suppliers to be eligible anytime, 
obtaining voluntary domains, and avoiding complexity by sharing responsibility 
amongst stakeholders. Strong government and legislative intervention would create 
less pressure on the overall administrative and transaction costs. The enforceability 
was also considered by imposing penalties on participants for noncompliance. In 
terms of enforceability, the MRET provided for small charges to be imposed on 
retailers, which results in creating weak levels of responsibility (CWLTH 2000c). It 
would be necessary to have larger charges imposed on retailers if they failed the target 
levels (CWLTH 2003). The balance should thus be considered. If the penalty rate is 
set too low, then the environmental target will not be achieved. If it is set too high, 
then society as a whole may incur high costs in order to meet the target. However, in 
practice, investment in and output of, renewable energy was meeting the graduated 
targets (Nolles 2006). 
In addition to the results from feasibility, this study also found that enforceability 
provided a high level of compliance for achieving the target levels. Although the 
study found a number of elements of administrative feasibility in the MRET, it is 
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difficult to judge the most appropriate level of enforceability. Kant and Mercer (2006) 
also point out that, if the level of compliance met the demands, it would not be 
necessary to change the level. Another aspect of administrative feasibility indicated 
that the MRET provided a high level of practicability, and the government agreed to 
legislate for most of the recommendations. However, a question has emerged about 
the reviewing processes which only take account of the views of stakeholders for the 
recommendations, which should also consider other parties' ideas such as 
environmental NGOs (Kant and Mercer 2006). Given these issues, whilst this study 
identified a high level of practicability in the program, a question still remains about 
the way policy actors can contribute to further improvements though the review 
process. 
6.2.5.4 Summary of discussion 
In summary, the discussion summarised the findings of MRET effectiveness from 
four other key stages in the method, including 'descriptive perspective', 
'transformative perspective', 'instrument design', and 'actual effectiveness'. 
According to theoretical assessment, regulatory instruments should have a high level 
of environmental effectiveness (i.e. in reducing GHG emissions), low cost 
effectiveness, high promotion of distributional equity, medium levels of political 
acceptability, and a high level of administrative feasibility. However, the actual 
results above have showed something slightly different. Most importantly, this 
examination revealed that the MRET, as one of the hardest instruments in Australia 
apparently met its goals (i.e. environmental effectiveness, and cost effectiveness), as 
intended, in terms of reducing GHG emissions. However, in terms of distributional 
equity, political acceptability, and administrative feasibility, the results did not present 
a clear picture of effectiveness, although these showed that the MRET involved a 
number of these key elements. Furthermore, discussion here also considered 
relationships between the findings and major criticisms of the MRET in practice. As 
a consequence, although this study's method does not aim to solve specific issues of a 
program, some of these issues seem to be linked to the findings in this study' s method. 
This could suggest that this study' s method may be helpful for clarifying and 
supporting some ideas in these criticisms, but may not access details of specific issues. 
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The second section of this chapter has presented an analysis for examining the 
effectiveness of the MRET program as a hard instrument in Australia's climate 
change policy 1997-2007. The following section will examine the effectiveness of the 
Greenhouse Challenge program as a soft instrument employed over this time. 
6.3 The Greenhouse Challenge Program 
This section seeks to understand the effectiveness of the Greenhouse Challenge 
Program [GCP] as a 'soft' instrument, firstly from a 'descriptive perspective', and 
secondly from a 'transformative perspective'. The 'instrument design' will then be 
addressed, and the 'actual effectiveness' evaluated. Finally key aspects of the case 
study will be discussed. 
6.3.1 Descriptive perspective 
The descriptive perspective includes pnmary targets, time lines, instrument 
approaches, and performance indicators. The primary targets of the original GCP 
were: 
• to achieve maximum practicable greenhouse abatement performance by 
members; 
• to drive continuous improvement by members of their management of 
greenhouse gas emissions; 
• to develop knowledge and experience of measuring, monitoring, managing, 
reporting and verifying greenhouse gas emissions and sinks; and 
• to strengthen knowledge and understanding between government and industry 
about practical and cost-effective ways of managing greenhouse gas emissions 
(AGO 2003b ). 
Specifically, the program aimed to reach the target of 500 participating organisations 
by the year 2000 and 1000 participants by 2005, with the expectation that the program 
would achieve emissions abatements of 22 Mt C02-e by the year 2000. The program 
was designed and implemented as a voluntary co-operative partnership between 
government and industry to reduce GHG emissions (AGO 1999a). In 2005, the GCP 
was updated again to become the GCP Plus program. The GCP Plus largely continued 
the original Challenge's voluntary-based approach (AGO 2005). 
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With respect to instrument approach, the original GCP was an extension by the 
Howard Government of an initial voluntary program instigated by the Labor Prime 
Minister, Paul Keating in 1995 (AGO 2005). Howard supported the GCP as a 
voluntary and negotiated agreement with industry 1997-2005 (AGO 2002b). The 
updated program, the GCP Plus, started in 2005 and was described as a voluntary, 
economic and regulatory instrument in the 2005 Fourth National Communication 
Report (AGO 2005). The method used in this thesis has recognised that GCP was a 
soft instrument (at the moderately dominant level) in the national policy initiatives 
over the period, and was intended to achieve reductions in GHG emissions. 
Figure 6.10: Criteria for Evaluating Instrument Level in the GCP/ GCP Plus 
Moderately Moderately 
Instrument Criteria Dominant Dominant 
level 5/17 5/17 
The GCP The GCP/ 
(1997-2005) GCP Plus44 
(2005-2007) 
Information Provision 
" " Educational Support by Government 
" " Incentives and Subsidies by Government 
" " Specific and Measurable Emission Reduction - -
Targets in a program 
Timeframe in a program - -
Guidelines or Guidelines for implementation 
" " The Monitoring - -
moderately Reporting and Certification - -
dominant Auditing, Reviewing, and Certification 
" " level Public Disclosure (mandatory) - *14) 
Committed Contractual Improvement - -
Any Market Device or creation of competitiveness - -
Government Regulation for Standards - -
Government Penalty of Polluter Pays - -
Government Penalty for Non-participation - *24b 
Government Penalty for Non-compliance - -
Government Penalty for Failure to Meet Targets - -
44The number of criteria under the GCP Plus is larger than the original GCP; because the GCP Plus was 
mixed with other programs. However, the extent of the original GCP itself in GCP Plus was not largely 
changed through the GCP Plus over time, except in its limited requirements for mandatory participation 
and its incentive-based approach (i.e. if a company wants to receive fuel credits back, the company 
must join the program). Thus the transformative perspective only shows the extent of the original GCP. 
45
*1:'the GCP Plus Leaders' system required that once companies were nominated as leaders, the 
program provided publicly discloses their emission profiles, strategies, and future directions. However, 
the mandatory requirement does not impose a disclosure on all firms. Thus, this element does not meet 
the criteria. 
46
*2: In fact, the GCP Plus involved a limited requirement for penalty for non-participation: it required 
that Australian companies join, if a company receives fuel excise credits of more than AUD 3million 
and for the proponents of large energy projects to participate. However, the mandatory requirement 
does not impose a penalty on all firms. Thus, this element does not meet the criteria. 
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[Adapted from Chapter Five] 
The chart above shows the number of criteria covered in the GCP, which could be 
defined as a soft instrument at the moderately dominant level. The program mainly 
required government authorities to provide information, educational support, 
guidelines, and auditing, but did not impose any penalties, mandatory requirements, 
or market devices in its implementation. The GCP Plus program then involved a 
conditional mandatory requirement for imposing penalties on non-participation; 
however, the penalty was not imposed on all the participants, so this study's method 
did not conform to the criteria but still addressed significant aspects. Although the 
instrument was slightly changed to become a less soft instrument, it can be concluded 
that the GCP remained a relatively soft instrument over time. 
In terms of reducing GHG em1ss10ns, the major performance indicators 47 of the 
original GCP were the number of participating organisations and the amount of 
emissions abatement. The major intention of this analysis is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the GCP, though this thesis evaluates the instrument framework of 
both the original GCP and GCP Plus. There were two parts in the program: the first 
was the original GCP, and the second was the GCP Plus. A government report on the 
GCP Plus in 2005 suggests that a certain indicator in the original GCP is no longer 
applicable48 • This thesis agrees, but the concept of the original GCP was not changed 
over time to raise industry participation and emissions abatement; thus the indicators 
developed in the original GCP will be used to evaluate the entire program (both the 
original GCP/ and GCP Plus), in order to determine the effectiveness of this soft 
instrument. The following section will consider the entire Challenge from a 
transformative perspective. 
6.3.2 Transformative perspective 
With respect to the transformative perspective, figure 6.12 below also describes the 
instrument trend uses of the GCP. Although the instrument was slightly changed to 
47 Although, the program looked at compliance with corporative agreements between government and 
industries; such as the rate of submissions and meeting of forecasts, the number of participation and 
emission abatements is the most priority for the program goals. 
48The AGO stated that the mandatory requirements to join GCP Plus covers that the government's 
target of 1000 GC members by 2005. This is no longer accepted as a useful target (AGO 2005. p27) 
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become a less soft instrument, it can be concluded that the Australian government 
basically continued the same low level of instrument dominance in the GCP during 
the period in order to reduce GHG emissions. The following section will consider the 
instrument design of the GCP. 
Figure 6.11: Transformative Perspective and the GCP (1997-2005)/GCP Plus (2005-2007) 
Programs Duration 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 1 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
. I Voluntary and negotiated agreement I ~ Greenhouse 1997-2007 Regulatory Challenge 
Program 
. 
I I Voluntary and economic 
I 
The moderately dominant level 
Adapted by Commonwealth of Australia. AGO 2002b. Australia 's Third Communication on Climate 
Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
URL:<http://www.greenhouse.gov.au>. Consulted on 15 August 2008 . AGO 2005 . Australia's Fourth 
Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. URL: <http://www.greenhouse.gov.au>. Consulted on 15 August 2008 
6.3.3 Instrument design 
The 3rd National Communication Report by the Australian Government to the 
UNFCCC introduced the GCP as a voluntary and negotiated agreement (AGO 2002b), 
and as a voluntary, economic, and regulatory instrument in the 4th Report (AGO 2005). 
According to the method used for classifying instrument designs in this thesis, this 
instrument can be seen as a mixed approach with voluntary, incentive-based economic 
and information-based instruments. 
The original GCP was an entirely ' voluntary co-operative partnership between 
government and industry' (AGO 2003b ). The instrument can be categorised as 
'voluntarism/ negotiated agreement' type of voluntary instrument, which 1s 
characterised by setting formal contracts between industry, sectors and authorities, but 
not imposing penalties for failing to achieve a target (Borkey and Leveque 2000). 
Furthermore, the program involved incentives for administrative and technical support 
for industry to conduct GHG mitigating actions (AGO 2003b). It can also be 
classified as an incentive-based instrument. A ' grant' type of incentive-based 
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economic instruments means that government reduces the costs by imposing costs on 
the consumer so that industry pays in order to stimulate new mitigating activities 
(Bemelmans et al. 1998). The GCP also provided information and education; for 
example it consulted members about making more energy efficient plans with less 
cost impacts (AGO 2003b). It can be recognised that the GCP Plus used information-
based instruments (see Chapter Three). However, the instrument framework in the 
GCP Plus is slightly different to the original GCP, but possesses very similar 
characteristics. 
The GCP Plus included a limited compulsory requirement for compulsory 
participation by companies receiving fuel excise credits of more than AUD 3million 
and for the proponents of large energy projects (AGO 2003b ). However, the majority 
of companies in Australia still had free choice as to whether to participate, and the 
agreement did not impose penalties for non-participation, non-compliance or for not 
meeting targets (AGO 2003b). Thus the program still broadly retained its voluntary 
approach, providing information-based instruments (i.e. information and education). 
In addition, although the program retained a 'grant' type of incentive-based economic 
instrument, it introduced another type of incentive which was the 'GCP Plus Leaders'; 
where the government recognises companies as leaders if they achieve beyond the 
minimum requirements of the program (AGO 2005). Such reward incentives can be 
categorised as a 'subsidy' type of incentive-based economic instrument, where the 
government subsidises companies as a reward (Bemelmans et al. 1998). Furthermore, 
the 'leaders' system also requires that once companies were nominated as a leader, 
they would publicly disclose their emission profiles, strategies, and future directions 
(AGO 2005). The program thus introduced additional information-based instruments 
in the interests of 'public disclosure', and by which governments could inform 
consumers or polluters of the environmental consequences of their activities (IPCC 
2007b ). This resulted in the GCP Plus comprising: a voluntary instrument (i.e. 
'voluntarism'); incentive-based economic instruments (i.e. 'grant' and 'subsidy'), and 
an information-based instrument (i.e. 'information', 'education' and 'public 
disclosure'). 
In terms of instrument design from a theoretical perspective, the GCP, in total, 
involved a mixed approach with voluntary, incentive-based economic and 
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information-based instruments. Although these incentive-based and information-
based instruments seem to be more supportive of the achievement of GHG reduction, 
the most dominant function of this program was as a voluntary instrument. Thus, this 
thesis has categorised the instrument design of the GCP according to the criteria for 
voluntary instruments. 
Figure 6.13 below describes the theoretical effectiveness of voluntary instruments 
against key criteria for achieving a reduction in GHG emissions. 
Figure 6.12: Theory based Instrumental Effectiveness for voluntary instruments 
Criteria Voluntary agreements 
Environmental Effectiveness Medium/Low 
Cost-Effectiveness High 
Distributional Equity Medium/ high 
Political Acceptability Medium/low 
Administrative Feasibility Low 
[Adapted from Chapter Three] 
Firstly, the criteria show that a voluntary instrument may possess: relatively weak 
environmental effectiveness, high cost-effectiveness, medium level distributional 
equity, low-medium level political acceptability, and a low level of administrative 
feasibility. A later section below will compare the actual effectiveness of this 
theoretical assessment. This discussion will reveal the relationship between the two 
and demonstrate the differences between theory and practice, in terms of effective 
programs for GHG reduction. The following section will consider the actual 
effectiveness of the GCP. 
6.3.4 Actual effectiveness 
The following section will analyse the actual effectiveness of the GCP in terms of 
environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, political 
acceptability, and administrative feasibility. 
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6.3.4.1 Environmental Effectiveness (reducing Greenhouse Gases) 
According to annual reports 1999-200749, the level of program effectiveness of the 
GCP/ GCP Plus can be assessed by consideration of both the extent of participation 
between the Commonwealth government and industry and GHG emission reductions 
in carbon dioxide equivalent50 per year (C02-e per year). 
Figure 6.14 below presents the extent of participation created by the GCP/GCP Plus 
between 1998 and 2007. The results show a tendency for participation to increase in 
the first half of the period but to decrease from the middle to the end. In terms of 
reaching target levels, the results met the targets in the year 2000 of 500 participants 
but clearly failed in 2005. In that year there was a target of 1,000 participants, but 
only around 740 participants was achieved, due to a significant decrease in 
participation. The GCP therefore failed to make its participation targets over the 
period. 
Figure 6.13: Achievement of targets in the GCP/GCP Plus, 1998-2007: number of participants 
Year Targets for participants Total number of Percentage of 
Participants Participants 
1998 224 47% 
1999 337 Not indicated 
2000 500 agreements by the year 2000 574 Not indicated 
2001 773 Not indicated 
2002 824 Not indicated 
2003 778 Not indicated 
2004 more than 770 Not indicated 
2005 1,000 agreements by the year 2005 more than 7 40 Almost 50% 
2006 720 Almost 50% 
2007 approximately 650 more than 40 % 
Adapted from Annual Reports: AGO [Australian Greenhouse Office] 1999b; 2000; 2001; 2002c; 
2003b; 2004b; DEH [Department of the Environment and Heritage] 2005; 2006; DEWR [Department 
of the Environment and Water Resources] 2007; DEWHA [Department of Environment, Water, 
Heritage, and the Arts] 2008. 
Figure 6.15 below describes the progress of GHG emissions abatement by the GCP. 
The program recognised that emissions abatement was linked to the number of 
49 Annual reports were provided by AGO [Australian Greenhouse Office] 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 
2003; 2004; DEH [Department of the Environment and Heritage] 2005; 2006; DEWR [Department of 
the Environment and Water Resources] 2007; DEWHA [Department of Environment, Water, Heritage 
and the Arts] 2008. 
50 
'Carbon dioxide equivalents: Scientists express the warming potential of various gases in carbon 
dioxide equivalents. For example over the next 100 years, compared with one kilogram of carbon 
dioxide released into the atmosphere today, one kilogram of methane will result in about 21 times more 
warming.' (AGO 2004d p.153). 
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participants, and thus intended to increase the numbers. However, the results ofthis 
study show that most of the annual reports addressing the reduction of GHG 
emissions in terms of Annual Carbon Equivalent were not available. Thus this study is 
unable to collect sufficient data to make a precise evaluation of the environmental 
effectiveness in these critical terms. 
Figure 6.14: Achievement of Targets, 1998-2007: reducing growth of emissions (carbon dioxide 
equivalent per year) 
Year Expected targets for reducing growth of emissions carbon dioxide equivalent per year 
(Mt C02-eper year) 
1998 Not indicated 
1999 Not indicated 
2000 23 Mt ofC02 equivalent by the year 2000 Not indicated 
2001 19.2 Mt C02-e per year 
2002 More than 20 Mt C02-e per year 
2003 Not indicated 
2004 Not indicated 
2005 At least 25 Mt ofC02 equivalent by the year 2005 Not indicated 
2006 26 Mt C02-e per year 
2007 Approximately 26 Mt C02-e per year 
Adapted from Annual Reports: AGO [Australian Greenhouse Office] 1999b; 2000; 2001; 2002c; 
2003b; 2004b; DER [Department of the Environment and Heritage] 2005; 2006; DEWR [Department 
of the Environment and Water Resources] 2007; DEWHA [Department of Environment, Water, 
Heritage, and the Arts] 2008. 
In terms of meeting target levels, the target of 23 Mt C02-e of GHG emissions for the 
year 2000 was not met. A 2007 report noted that the program had achieved 
approximately 26 Mt C02-e, which met the year 2005 target of reducing the growth 
of emissions at 25 Mt C02-e. However, it was not met in time, and data for 2005 was 
not reported. These results show that the program failed both to increase the number 
of participants and to meet the targets for reducing GHG emissions as intended. Thus, 
a det~rmination of environmental effectiveness cannot be made here due to 
insufficient data. The following section will describe the level of cost effectiveness. 
6.3.4.2 Cost Effectiveness 
In order to examine the level of cost effectiveness, the study method 51 requires a 
determination of cost value, which accounts for relationships between a level of 
achievement in a program and its output costs invested in the program. However, 
individual output costs for the program were not reported in the program's annual 
51 See the method for determining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, described in 
Chapter Three. 
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reports. This is because there is a complication with collaborative investing in 
programs with other programs such as Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program (1997-
present). Thus, the analysis failed to identify52 the level of cost effectiveness of the 
GCP. The following section will examine the distributional equity. 
6.3.4.3 Distributional Equity 
The GCP/ GCP Plus primarily focused on cost-effective, flexible, and voluntary based 
approaches. These programs also provided incentive support and information for the 
GCP members over time, to encourage more efficient and effective mitigation 
activities (AGO 1999a; 2005b ). This provided equity. Moreover, the primary 
intention of developing long term sustainable approaches in response to climate 
change concerns in both of these programs (AGO 1999a; 2005b) suggest that the GCP 
involved an environmentally sustainable approach. On the other hand, the GCP did 
not impose any penalties on the members for pollution activities (AGO 1999a), 
although the Greenhouse GCP Plus considered limited restriction with a mandatory 
requirement for the large companies' participation in the program (AGO 2005). It can 
be said that the GCP broadly considered the distributional equity, but promoted 
relatively little corporate responsibility. The following section will examine political 
acceptability. 
6.3 .4.4 Political Acceptability 
In terms of making a global contribution, Australia initiated the GCP in response to 
international obligation requirements from the UNFCCC's (AGO 1999a). On the 
other hand, the introduction of an Emission Trading Scheme [ETS] was crucial. 
Whilst implementing the GCP, it was also intended to implement an ETS (AGO 
1999a); however, after a consultation period, the government decided not to introduce 
such a scheme, due to possible impacts on the national economy (AGO 2002A). This 
suggests a failure in meeting the global challenge to introduce market based pricing 
carbon. In terms of market ideology, the GCP did not involve any tradable system 
52Some annual reports have acknowledged the level of cost effectiveness by a different method from 
the thesis method, e.g. an expression for the program rate of dollar per tonne C02-e (e.g. AGO 2002c; 
2003b). 
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(AGO 1999a), although some aspects of market classification could exist in the 
program such as the GCP Plus's 'Greenhouse Friendly' certification and 'Greenhouse 
Challenge Leaders' 53 . The GCP/ GCP Plus are both of a voluntary nature. They 
promote a diverse range of actions across a wide range of sectors and organisational 
sizes and implementation designs (AGO 1999a; 2005b). Industry choices were thus 
expected to fit different circumstances, with the preferred GCP and GCP Plus 
approach including inventory information, emissions forecasts, incorporated 
approaches, and partnerships with industry associations (AGO 1999a; 2005b ). These 
suggest that the program may have been flexible enough to restructure the program's 
framework. In sum program can be said to have involved various factors of political 
acceptability. 
6.3.4.5 Administrative Feasibility 
In terms of administrative and transaction costs, the GCP/ GCP Plus used voluntary 
approaches to make it cost effective in order to reduce GHG emissions by increasing 
participation in the agreements (AGO 1999a; 2005b ). In terms of enforceability, 
although the GCP was an entirely non-mandatory initiative, the GCP Plus facilitated 
limited enforcement for example with a limited restriction with mandatory 
participation. However, these programs did not provide other penalties such as not-
meeting targets, and penalties for pollutants. This suggests that there was weak 
enforceability in the GCP (DEH 2006; DEQHA 2008). In terms of transparency and 
credibility, as required under subsection 70(2) of the Public Service Act 1999, an 
annual report54 was required to be submitted to Parliament towards the end of each 
year 55 (AGO 1999b). Furthermore, in 1995, industry and government jointly 
developed an Implementation Plan committed to an evaluation of the program in 1998 
53 
'Greenhouse Friendly' certification: provides a trademark (logo) to market a greenhouse-neutral 
product or service, which may result in GHG emissions reduction, whilst giving greater and greener 
p,urchasing choice (AGO 2005). 
4 Annual reports were provided by AGO [Australian Greenhouse Office] 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 
2003; 2004; DEH [Department of the Environment and Heritage] 2005; 2006; DEWR [Department of 
the Environment and Water Resources] 2007; DEWHA [Department of Environment, Water, Heritage, 
and the Arts] 2008. 
55 An evaluation of the GCP commenced early in 1999 and was expected to report towards the end of 
the year. The evaluation was a review of the operation and of its financial statements and was overseen 
by a joint government-industry steering group. It included a major industry survey of Greenhouse 
Challenge members and non-participants, a data analysis and a comparison of similar international 
programs (AGO 1999b). 
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(AGO 1999a). The numbers of progress reports of the Greenhouse Challenge were 
conducted by government are contained in Fig. 6.16. In March 1999, the Greenhouse 
Challenge Evaluation Report was made publicly available as a response to the 
Implementation Plan. A further review of the GCP was undertaken in 2003, but not 
released to the public, with many recommendations said to be already in train (Rae 
2004). This lack of data shows that the GCP had little transparency and therefore 
credibility. 
Figure 6.15: Number of progress reports under the GCP by the Government, 1998-2007 
1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2002- 2003- 2004- 2005- 2006- 2007-
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual .y .y .y .y .y .y .y .y .y .y 
report by 
Australian 
government 
Greenhouse .y 
Challenge 
Evaluatwn 
Revort 
Adapted from Annual Reports: AGO [Australian Greenhouse Office] 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002c; 2003; 
2004b; DEH [Department of the Environment and Heritage] 2005; 2006; DEWR [Department of the 
Environment and Water Resources] 2007; DEWHA [Department of Environment, Water, Heritage, and 
the Arts] 2008, and by Greenhouse Challenge Evaluation Report by AGO 1999. 
In terms of practicability, although an early report (the 1999 evaluation report) 
provided some recommendations, the following report in 2003 was not publicly 
available. In 2004, the GCP Plus came out as an extended program of the GCP. 
However, this extended program still did not provide an individual evaluation process 
which was publicly available, even though some reviews of it appeared in government 
annual reports. This insufficient data makes it impossible to determine the level of 
practicability. Given these four key aspects: minimising administrative and 
transaction costs; enforceability; transparency and credibility and practicability, these 
results failed to determine the program's level of administrative feasibility, due to 
insufficient data being available. 
This section considered instrument effectiveness. The following section will present 
the discussion of the results of the study reflecting on the effectiveness of the GCP as 
a 'soft' instrument. 
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6.3.5 Discussion 
In discussing the GCP's effectiveness, four perspectives are presented, including: the 
significance of the GCP, major criticisms of the program, the program's overall 
effectiveness, and a summary of the effectiveness of the GCP and this study's 
contribution. 
6.3.5.1 Significance of the Greenhouse Challenge/ GCP Plus 
The GCP/ GCP Plus was one of the most significant programs in Australia's climate 
change policy under the Howard Government. This thesis classifies it as a soft policy 
instrument. The original GCP aimed to reduce GHG emissions by increasing industry 
participation, and since 2005, GCP Plus largely retained the original structure of the 
program. In specific terms, the government played a central role in implementation 
over time, and the basis for the program's approach voluntary without mandatory 
target settings, penalties for polluter pays, not-meeting targets, and non-compliance. 
This signifies that the program was likely to provide weak governmental and 
legislative intervention, in terms of reducing GHG emissions. In practice, a number of 
critiques about the GCP/ GCP Plus have emerged. The following section will present 
overview criticisms of the program. 
6.3.5.2 Criticisms of the GCP/ GCP Plus 
A number of criticisms of the GCP/ GCP Plus have been made. Namely that the 
program 1s: 
• a 'no regret' voluntary measure with 'business as usual'approach standards 
creating weak influence on reducing GHG emissions; 
• a weak enforcement measure for effecting compliance with agreements, which 
can not achieve the target level; 
• missing a market device, which is a significant tool for reducing GHG 
em1ss1ons; 
• lacking transparency and accountability under the program due to the lack of 
information details by program participants; 
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• a costly burden lacking financial support; 
• lacking implementation progress reports; and 
• insufficiently integrated with other stakeholders (such as including 
environmental NGO for better decision-making). 
The following section will discuss both its own findings to date and the relationships 
between these findings and these criticisms. 
6.3.5.3 The Greenhouse Challenge/ GCP Plus Effectiveness 
This section will summarise the results from those four elements which comprise the 
study method, namely the 'descriptive perspective', 'transformative perspective', 
'instrument design', and 'actual effectiveness'. 
The descriptive perspective described the GCP/ GCP Plus as a soft instrument. The 
transformative perspective identified trends in the level of instrument use of the 
program. It showed that use of instrument design remained at the same dominant level 
over time (i.e. the moderately dominant level). In instrument design, the method 
found the program contained mixed instruments: a voluntary, incentive-based 
economic and information-based instrument, despite being defined both as a 
voluntary and negotiated agreement (AGO 2002b ), and as voluntary, economic, and 
regulatory instruments (AGO 2005). However, it recognised that the voluntary nature 
of the program dominated. It thus concluded that a theoretical assessment of voluntary 
instruments would be the most appropriate in estimating the effectiveness of the 
program. The following criteria characterise voluntary instruments: relatively weak 
environmental effectiveness, high cost-effectiveness, medium level distributional 
equity, low-medium level political acceptability, and a low level of administrative 
feasibility. 
The results here could not determine the actual environmental effectiveness of the 
program due to insufficient data. Limited data showed that it may not meet 
performance indicator demands. Therefore, the analysis concluded that the program 
had weak environmental effectiveness in terms of reducing GHG emissions 1997-
2007. Bailey (2008) has indicated that there has been a conflict about the level of 
reduction targets. Australia had a significant increase of net industry and energy 
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emissions by 15% and 31 % respectively between 1990 and 2003, with an 8% increase 
in industrial emissions between 2002 and 2003. In contrast, the AGO reported that the 
GCP had produced a reduction of more than 21 Mt C02-e in 2002 compared with 
business as usual (AGO 2003c). The report also predicted a further annual reduction 
of 15.8 Mt C02-e by 2010 (DEH 2005a). However, the 21 Mt C02-e reported by the 
AGO falls short of the intended target for 2000, which was 23 Mt C02-e (See: Figure 
6.14). 
Moreover, the results also suggest that a predicted annual reduction of 15.8 Mt C02-e 
by 2010 is unachievable given that only approximately 6 Mt C02-e per year was 
actually achieved between 2002 and 2007, which represents less than 40% of the 
further predicted target (See: Figure 6.14 ). Furthermore, in terms of the achievement 
of target levels, the Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology 
and the Arts Committee [SECITAC] (2000) pointed out several criticisms: the early 
program did not include a clear distinction between emissions reductions from normal 
business activities and those arising through extra efforts as a result of government 
investment in industry programs; only a small number of companies met forecast 
emissions where these were set; and emissions targets and levels of achievement were 
not addressed in sectoral abatement benchmarks. These criticisms also largely 
remained in GCP Plus (Taplin 2004; Sullivan 2006; Bail_ey; 2008). These 
uncertainties emphasized that the GCP I GCP Plus had a very weak performance in 
terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, the analysis here failed to identify the level of cost 
effectiveness of the program, in the absence of sufficient data. It was expected to be 
an economically efficient program. It has been argued here that there is limited 
published data on the costs and benefits of energy or greenhouse expenditures by 
Australian organisations in the public or private sectors. Owing to such limitations, 
the GCP/ GCP Plus also provided limited interpretation of the costs and benefits of 
GHG emissions reduction measures (Sullivan 2006). 
The results from distributional equity here showed that the GCP/ GCP Plus, was 
broadly considered in terms of a variety of incentives and information provision to 
encourage participants to create more efficient and effective mitigation activities; the 
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primary intention of developing long term sustainable approaches in response to 
climate change; and no penalties was imposed on the members by pollution activities. 
However, in practice, the GCP/GCP Plus has been criticized for creating weak 
incentives for producing more energy efficient products or activities (Hunt 2004; 
Taplin 2004). Furthermore, a cost burden and insufficient funding support from the 
federal government were also both critical (CWL TH 2000d). The use of a voluntary 
approach, in general, could be economically efficient by not measuring and would not 
pressure participants to take strong risks in economic terms. However, due to the lack 
of incentive support for the program, the majority of projects being implemented by 
participants tended to be low-cost projects or measures, because the incentive support 
to require a high return on them was lacking (Sullivan 2005b ). Such a costly 
ineffective government program does not encourage the reduction of GHG emissions 
(Bailey 2008). There is also the issue that the approach aimed to meet demand only 
for the 'business -as-usual' targets and 'no regret' standards over the long term. These 
approaches did not provide strong incentives for the program to voluntarily reduce 
GHG emissions (Sullivan 2006). Given these criticisms, although the analysis here 
found the program had considered distributional equity, it could also be argued that 
the lack of incentive support :from government based on 'business as usual'targets and 
'no regret', in practice, seems to have resulted in the program having little influence 
on reducing GHG emissions. 
The results from the analysis of political acceptability here showed, despite the fact 
that the flexibility by the voluntary nature of the instrument used could be positive 
aspect, there were several negative factors involved in the program, namely: failures 
to meet the global challenge and the market ideology and a failure to implement an 
emission trading scheme. Regarding the global challenge and market ideology, the 
program did not articulate with a significant market device such as an emission 
trading scheme. An ETS would not only create further incentives to support program 
activities, but would also stimulate participation which may result in reduced GHG 
emissions (Sullivan 2006). Without such a market device, it can be said that the 
program has less influence on the political acceptability in terms of reducing GHG 
emissions (Although a market based system may not be compatible with a program 
such as the Greenhouse Challenge). 
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The results from the administrative feasibility analysis here concluded that it was not 
possible to determine the level of feasibility, due to insufficient data being available. 
The results found the program had relatively weak enforceability. Without 
compulsory approaches such as mandatory reporting, setting targets or penalties for 
activities (i.e. compliance), the program again directly relates to a general failure to 
reduce GHG emissions (OECD 2001d). In general, the GCP/ GCP Plus included less 
enforceability, including independent verification reports, non-mandatory 
participation, and non-penalties for meeting targets and compliance, even though the 
GCP Plus later included independent verification and limited mandatory participation 
(by only large emitters). While many of the participants in the program created 
outcomes such as involvement of members by large emitters, these outcomes would 
probably have been achieved anyway (Sullivan 2006). Making a balance of 
enforceability is important in order to ensure levels of compliance and to create 
mitigating activities. However, the Australian Government did not create binding 
agreements between the government and industry in the program, because these may 
have created unacceptable burdens on energy and carbon intensive industries (Bailey 
2008). Given these aspects, enforceability seems to be ineffective in achieving 
reduction in GHG emissions. 
Another finding concernmg administrative feasibility here was the lack of 
transparency and credibility, due to a lack of consistent data in evaluation reports. 
This study concluded that the program was relatively ineffective in this sense. In 
practice, the lack of transparency and accountability has been criticized. More 
specifically, the Senate's independent report offered a number of recommendations. 
Many of these suggestions required that the program should facilitate the reporting of 
more details concerning company activities, which would then demonstrate the 
integrity of the GCP members, and inspire public trust (CWLTH 2000d). However, 
the administration of the GCP/ GCP Plus did not extend to this level of transparency. 
As a result, it did not either encourage participants to adopt systematic or 
comprehensive approaches or to provide significant reductions in GHG emissions 
(ANAO 2004). Bailey (2008) pointed out four further major criticisms, which can be 
related to lack of transparency and accountability. First, the GCP/ GCP Plus did not 
require strong consultation for the setting and monitoring of targets between 
government and emitters. Second, it did not mandate obligations on the participants to 
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submit a report. Thirdly, the program continued its strong emphasis on participants 
protecting their commercial information, restricting their level of information 
disclosure and avoiding from reporting all of their evidence. Lastly, the program 
avoided the consolidation of a strict reporting system, which would have resulted in a 
negative impact on transaction costs. Considering these aspects, the program cannot 
be seen to be transparent and credible. 
In terms of administrative feasibility, this study failed to determine the level of 
practicability, in the absence of available data. However, in practice, a number of 
recommendations were made about the program. 
Since the government extended the GCP in 1997, the Australian Senate report The 
Heat is On: Australia's Greenhouse Future in 2000, addressed the lack of 
transparency and accountability of the program (CWLTH 2000d). The following year, 
the OECD (2003b) also criticized the insufficient enforcement of target setting, and 
penalties for not meeting targets and compliance, and for not directly contributing to 
GHG emissions reduction (OECD 200ld). In 2002, Australia's Third Communication 
Report to the UNFCCC further criticized the program for imposing a costly burden on, 
and for lack of financial support from, the Commonwealth Government (AGO 2002b ). 
In the same year, the AGO's independent progress report (2002) also indicated the 
lack of progress reports on implementation and as well as insufficient integration with 
other agencies such as environmental NGOs (AGO 2002d). In 2004, the ANAO also 
reported that most of the issues raised in the annual reports were poorly specified and 
that the description of trends and changes over time was unclear, concluding that there 
was insufficient reporting processes in place. For instance, reports illustrated results 
showing a comparison of the level of emission abatement from the GCP/ GCP Plus 
which confused readers trying to understand actual progress and outcomes (ANAO 
2004). 
Although the GCP/ GCP Plus later included independent verification and mandatory 
participation by large emitters, it largely continued the existing approach with a 
consideration of voluntary approaches (Sullivan 2006). Furthermore, the program 
retained minimum requirements for agreements, including public disclosure, reporting, 
and development, and in terms of having limited incorporation and technological 
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assistance (Bailey 2008). These criticisms and recommendations were not acted upon 
over the life of the program, which signifies that it provided less practicability. In the 
light of these aspects, namely weak enforceability, the lack of transparency and 
credibility, and the absence of practicability, it can be said that the level of 
administrative feasibility in practice, was relatively ineffective in reducing GHG 
em1ss1ons. 
Finally, as a result of this study's contribution, 'discussion' summarises the findings 
of the GCP/ GCP Plus effectiveness in terms of four elements, namely 'descriptive 
perspective', 'transformative perspective', 'instrument design', and 'actual 
effectiveness'. In terms of theory, voluntary instruments should have: relatively weak 
environmental effectiveness, high cost-effectiveness, medium level distributional 
equity, low-medium level political acceptability, and a low level of administrative 
feasibility. In respect to these assumptions, although some results in this study showed 
similar effectiveness as the theoretical assessment, the examination here has failed to 
clearly determine instrument effectiveness with regard to GHG emission reduction. 
One major reason was the lack of sufficient data. Partly because of this, it can be 
concluded that the program had weak environmental effectiveness due to not-meeting 
its targets; less distributional equity in the absence of a strong incentive support from 
government based on 'business as usual' targets and 'no regrets'; less influence to the 
political acceptability due to the failure of global challenge and market ideology; and 
less administrative feasibility, due to the weak enforceability, transparency and 
credibility, and the absence of practicability. Although insufficient data was available, 
some of these results seem to show similar effectiveness as the theoretical assessment. 
In summary, the third section of this chapter has presented analysis for examining the 
effectiveness of the GCP/ GCP Plus, as a soft instrument in Australia's climate 
change policy regime 1997-2007. The following section will conclude with this 
chapter. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the actual impacts of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument activities on 
reducing GHG emissions in Australia during 1997-2007. 
It has met the primary objective of this chapter, which is to demonstrate Effectiveness 
Analysis/ Method for identifying the effectiveness of both 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in reducing GHG emissions, in order to fulfil the second aim of this 
overall thesis to determine the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing 
GHG emissions by following the methods developed in the first aim of the overall 
thesis. For the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method, this thesis has demonstrated the 
application of the SIA for evaluating the effectiveness of the 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument activities in the case of Australia's climate policy. 
In order to accomplish the primary objective of this current chapter, two case studies 
are presented. The MRET is a 'hard' instrument and the GCP is a 'soft' instrument. In 
terms of making an examination of the effectiveness of each program, five aspects by 
the SIA analysis were used for evaluating the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments. These five aspects were also considered in each case study: a) descriptive 
perspective; b) transformative perspective; c) analysis of instrument design; d) 
evaluation of actual effectiveness; e) discussion. 
The results have shown 'hard' instruments were relatively more effective in reducing 
GHG emissions than 'soft' instruments over the period. In addition, both the MRET 
and the GCP included a number of elements in their instrument approaches, including 
government incentives, market devices, and information provisions. However, the 
study has failed to make a clear distinction in the effectiveness of 'soft' instruments, 
due to insufficient details available about the GCP in the government reports. The 
results in this chapter allow this thesis to conduct a further discussion on the relative 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments for reducing GHG emissions. 
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The next Chapter Seven continues the analysis presented in this current chapter and 
conducts a further discussion on the relative effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments for reducing GHG emissions. This examination expands on the findings 
from the analysis in this current chapter by discussing the results from these five 
elements of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in order to determine the relative 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in Australia's climate policy during 
1997-2007. It will also present a discussion on the overall importance of the thesis. 
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Chapter Seven 
Discussion 
This chapter presents two discussion topics. The first part of this chapter will discuss 
the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments and conduct a further discussion on 
the results of analysis of the 'soft' and 'hard' instruments identified in Chapter Six. 
This discussion addresses the second major aim of this thesis, namely to determine the 
influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following 
the methods developed. The second part of this chapter draws together and develops 
the arguments of main importance to this thesis. These discussion in Chapter Seven 
leads this thesis to its conclusions. 
7 .1 Part One: Discussion on 'Soft' versus 'Hard' Climate 
Policy Instruments 
The first part of this chapter discusses the Greenhouse Challenge Program (GCP) as a 
'soft' instrument versus the MRET as a 'hard' instrument. This section concludes 
with a discussion on the relative effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments 
adopted by of Australia's climate policy between 1997-2007. 
In terms of environmental effectiveness, results for the MRET showed that the 
primary target of an increase of renewable energy sources was successfully met. 
However, other criticisms demonstrate that, in practice, the program targets were too 
low and too short term to influence emission abatement (Warwick and Smith 2002; 
Riedy 2005). These criticisms suggest that an achievement of target level is not only 
the goal of mitigating activities, the balance of target levels and timelines also needs 
to be considered. On the other hand, results for the GCP showed a failure to 
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accomplish set targets: i.e. an increase in the number of industries participating, and 
growth in emission abatement in annual carbon equivalents. Approaches without 
interventions such as 'legally-binding commitments' and 'enforcement procedures' 
may not be strong drivers for accomplishing target levels (Hertin et al. 2004). One of 
the clear distinctions between regulated and nonregulated instruments regarding 
environmental policy is the level of social and cost pressure on polluters (Macdonald 
et al 2006). In fact, the clear distinctions between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in this 
study56 are mainly based on government intervention and legal requirements. Given 
this, in terms of achieving target levels, these results show that 'hard' instruments 
seem to be more effective in reducing GHGs than 'soft' instruments. Furthermore, it 
can be said that the failure of 'soft' instruments to meet targets in the cases discussed 
here was because the instruments were largely dominated by weak legal requirements, 
and weak government intervention. 
In terms of cost effectiveness, the study has revealed that the MRET had a high level 
of meeting its targets against the cost values expected. However, the complete results 
from the GCP could not be identified due to the unavailability of cost details in annual 
reports. This examination has, therefore, failed to establish a comparison of cost 
effectiveness of a 'soft' versus a 'hard' instrument in these circumstances. Levels of 
program investment depend on what they intend to, but appropriate levels of cost 
expenditure toward intended goals also need to be ensured and ascertained (OECD 
2004). Although it is important to determine levels of cost expenditure for policy 
measures, governments often neglect to report on the cost of measures, such as the 
expected or actual GHG reductions supported by each policy program (UNFCCC 
2002). Given this, it can be said that 'hard' instruments may be a better supporter to 
enable to report a level of cost effectiveness of programs than 'soft' instruments. 
As regards to distributional equity, the study found that both the MRET and the GCP 
had a variety of incentives. However, the GCP seemed to emphasize more cost-
effective approaches (i.e. information provision and limited public disclosure) by 
56This thesis considered distinguished the level of coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, 
using a number of functional elements for 'soft' and 'hard' instruments are mainly based on 
government intervention and legal requirements, namely: government intervention; legal requirements, 
financial penalties, administrative rules; prohibitions; market solutions; specific demands in 
environmental and climate change policy; and consideration of studies by analysts on the coerciveness 
of policy instruments. 
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allowing contracting members to select their most preferred approaches to reducing 
GHG emissions. Neither programs imposed any penalties for polluting activities on 
polluters. However, both programs encouraged the development of long term 
approaches in responding to climate change, which fulfilled the meaning of 
environmental sustainability. Given this, although the study revealed that both 
programs involved a number of elements for distributional equity, in practice, the 
criticism of both programs in terms of their insufficient incentives from the 
government, means that the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on 
distributional equity remains uncertain. 
With respect to political acceptability, the study found that the MRET involved a 
tradable system (i.e. RECs ), which was considered a positive influence domestically 
and internationally in reaching global contributions achieved through the adoption of 
the market ideology of the tradable system. This tradable system also imposes 
legislative penalties on retailers for not meeting specific target retailers. On the other 
hand, the GCP was not accompanied by an emission trading scheme, which would 
have helped global contributions and market ideology. The examination also 
identified elements of flexibility in both the MRET and the GCP. The MRET had 
frequent updates on the eligibility of a range of renewable energy sources and 
technologies over time; and contained a voluntary domain called 'voluntary 
surrender', which helped to efficiently update the program. On the other hand, the 
GCP adopted the voluntary base, giving free choice in terms of approach to 
participants, including on inventory information, emissions forecasts, incorporated 
approaches and partnerships with industry associations. Given this, the results seemed 
to show that the 'hard' instrument could be considered relatively more politically 
acceptable than the 'soft' instrument, due to a consideration of potentially strong 
global contributions, market ideology and flexibility. However, in practice, both 
programs have been criticized for contributing to the dominance of the 'business as 
usual' approach and for contributing to a weak framework for mitigating activities 
(ACCI 2003, Greenpeace Australia Pacific 2007, Bailey 2008 and Sullivan 2006; 
2008). Based on such a conservative framework for actual emissions abatement, few 
competitive market opportunities seemed to form in practice, which resulted in weak 
funding opportunities. It remains uncertain as to whether both programs can be said to 
255 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
have created a minimum influence of political acceptability with such a minimalist 
and conservative policy framework for reducing GHG emissions. 
In terms of administrative feasibility, the MRET was a strong instrument for 
promoting technological innovation and adaptation. For example, it allowed suppliers 
to be eligible anytime for the registration of renewable energy generation, to obtain 
voluntary domains and to avoid any complexity by sharing responsibility amongst 
stakeholders. These aspects would help overall administrative and transaction costs. 
On the other hand, the GCP had insufficient data due to limited information in annual 
reports. Thus administrative and transaction costs cannot be clearly identified in this 
study. The study further revealed that the MRET involved enforceability; it imposed 
penalties on participants for non-compliance, and required participants to conduct a 
regular evaluation on their efforts and progress, which would then be audited by 
government authorities. Furthermore, the program presented a high level of 
compliance against the required standards. In the GCP, on the other hand, no level of 
enforceability was established. Moreover, the analysis here could not determine the 
level of compliance, due to the unavailability of reporting data from the members and 
the government. Regarding transparency and credibility, although it has remained 
uncertain whether the balance of penalty rates was too low or too high for the MRET 
(Nolles 2006), the results of this study showed that the MRET provided high level 
reporting performance annually. In contrast, the GCP is distinguished by a lack of 
transparency and credibility, due to lack of consistent data available in evaluation 
reports. 
As regards the last element for feasibility, this study has also found that the MRET 
provided a certain level of practicability in that the government recognised and acted 
upon urgent issues. It has also found that most of the recommendations57 have been 
acted upon and amended in legislation. In contrast, in the GCP, a number of 
suggestions emerged from official or scientific reports, but were not acted upon. 
57 A number of critical recommendations were made by an independent Senate Committee review and 
Working Group in 2003 (CWLTH 2003). The major issues were as follows: the intention of the Act to 
accept a national emission trading scheme; changing target parameters of the scheme (i.e. targeting 
10% of renewable energy by 2010, increasing the target beyond 2010, and continuing the scheme 
beyond 2020); and encouraging efforts beyond 'business as usual'(Kant and Mercer 2006). Later, the 
government acknowledged 30 recommendations from the independent review and agreed with the 14 
recommendations (AGO 2004a). 
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Therefore, it can be said that the 'hard' instrument may be administratively feasible 
where there are less administrative costs, incentives, market systems, high compliance 
by participants, and high reporting availability. However, this study was unable to 
complete an analysis of the relative effectiveness of administrative feasibility of' soft' 
versus 'hard' instruments due to insufficient information. 
In the light of these findings, it can be concluded that 'hard' instruments seem to 
achieve their intended targets with potentially more effectiveness than 'soft' 
instruments. The degree of government intervention and legal requirements58 may be 
key drivers toward achieving targets. The 'hard' instrument showed a high level of 
cost effectiveness. However, the study could not clearly distinguish the level of cost 
effectiveness of the 'soft' instrument, due to limited evidence. Further, the study 
revealed that both programs involved a variety of elements for other significant 
criteria, namely distributional equity, political acceptability and administrative 
feasibility. However, the study remains unable to make a clear distinction of the 
relative effectiveness of these aspects of the 'soft' versus the 'hard instruments, due to 
insufficient information. Following these findings, a number of critical aspects can be 
further discussed. 
First, the study has revealed external influences on the effectiveness of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments by addressing criticisms of the MRET and GCP, such as: political 
influence on the level of target settings, timelines and penalty rates; and influences of 
fundamental framework type (i.e. 'business as usual') and the type of institutional 
frameworks (i.e. ownership by government or industry). The relationship between 
these criticisms and the results of this study represent a gap in the review process 
undertaken here. This study focused on seeking a clear indication of the 'success or 
failure' of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, which this research has, and acknowledges 
success or failure as one of the most significant aspects in this study. However, in 
practice, any instrument activities are also related to a variety of influences, including 
government's 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches, in terms of political, 
58 This thesis has concluded that the level of government intervention is the major elements of 
classifying whether policy instruments are 'soft' and 'hard'(Chapter Three 3 .1.2.2.1 ). Moreover, one of 
the clear distinctions between regulated and nonregulated instruments regarding environmental policy 
is the level of social and cost pressure on polluters (Macdonald et al 2006). Approaches without 
interventions such as 'legally-binding commitments' and 'enforcement procedures' may not be strong 
drivers for accomplishing target levels (Hertin et al. 2004). 
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administrative and institutional influences, and international and domestic influences. 
Neither is it possible to ignore the influences of other internal and external factors 
(Hood 1986; Linder and Peters, 1989; De Bruijn and Hufen, 1990; Sinclair 1997; 
Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998; Perrels 2001; Annandale et al 2004). The study here is 
not capable of addressing total effectiveness due to such external factors, but can be 
used for a basic understanding of the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
Understanding external influences will further make a clear linkage to the gap, which 
will be a more comprehensive analysis. Furthermore, choices for policy instruments 
depend on the particular circumstances of a nation such as its political and 
international relations (Tews et al. 2003) and institutional circumstances (Macdonald 
et al. 2006). The values and effectiveness of the instrument choices are also 
differentiated in each nation (Howlett et al. 2003). Given this, it can also be said that 
the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments is different in different countries, 
depending on their national circumstances. 
The other critical point is that it is generally difficult to analyse the environmental 
effectiveness of policy instruments because of the unclear definitions of instruments, 
and the different targets, different data on corporate performance, and issue of mixed 
instruments (Bailey 2006). Therefore, although this study has concluded that 'hard' 
instruments seem to perform better in reducing GHG emissions than 'soft' 
instruments, the use of a 'soft' instrument does not mean total ineffectiveness in 
environmental outcomes. A good policy also needs to achieve social goals 
(Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998). In terms of social improvement such as behavioural 
change and capacity building for reducing GHG emissions for a long term perspective, 
it is often required and expected that instruments would go beyond the parameters of 
governmental control, regulations and public pressure (OECD 2003). 
Social approaches can provide better interpretive frames and encourage organisations 
to acquire the knowledge that leads to better environmental outcomes (Hertin et al 
2004). An instrument choice depends on a different focus on the different targets and 
some GHG mitigation activities do not target direct emission reduction effects but 
others do, impacts of direct emission reduction should not only become the central 
solution for reducing GHG emissions, but also targets for indirect reduction for social 
improvement (EEA, 1996; Aldy et al., 2003; OECD, 2001). However, a rational 
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choice of policy instruments means accomplishing policy goals for a particular issue 
(Elmore 1987; Salamon et al 1989; Bagchus 1998). In terms of climate change policy, 
policy instruments able to achieve policy goals have been urgently required to reduce 
GHG emissions (Stavins 1997; IPCC 2007b; and Okinomous and Jepma 2007). If a 
program is not carefully assisted by strict monitoring, and reviewing via legislative 
and regulation for contractual progress towards achieving goals, it will risk being only 
symbolic policy (Edelman 1964). Furthermore, it is essential that if an instrument is to 
be truly effective, it will ensure quality of reporting, consistent data provision, precise 
data illustration against targets, materiality threshold and ideally the provision of a 
level playing field for all players. The GCP seems to meet none of these criteria and 
thus can be said to act as a symbolic policy (Taplin 2004). From this perspective, 
'soft' instruments will likely fail to provide the bottom line of reducing GHG 
emissions, due to symbolic commitment, insufficient information availability and lack 
of information consistency. 
Given these findings, there is arguably a need for the balance between the degree of 
power relations between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in order to choose the most 
effective instruments for reducing GHG emissions, depending on different policy 
targets such as direct or indirect targets. However, policy makers must establish the 
means for ensuring that each target is met. There is also a need to examine the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in other countries, because the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments will be different in different countries, 
depending on their economical, political and institutional circumstances. 
The first part of this chapter has presented the second aspect of the case studies by 
examining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments and conducting a further 
discussion on the results from Chapter Six analysis, in order to fulfil the second major 
aim of this current thesis which is to determine the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following the methods developed in the 
first aim. The following section presents the second part of this chapter, as discussed 
above. 
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7.2 Part Two: Discussion of Thesis Arguments 
The second part of this chapter aims to draw together and develop the arguments of 
main importance to this overall thesis in terms of the thesis aims, as outlined in 
Chapter One. Most of this thesis has treated the methods and case studies 
independently. The aim of this Chapter, before moving into the final conclusion, is to 
integrate the methods and case studies into a more inter-linking picture in order to 
expand the major findings of this thesis. 
The Thesis Outline 
A key issue for climate change policy, central to the current thesis, is the right choice 
of policy with the appropriate balance between non-coercive and coercive instruments 
(i.e. voluntary and regulatory-based instruments). These are referred to as 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments59 in this thesis. Leaders in each country are seeking to make the 
relevant, right choices at domestic and international levels, and a study such as this 
thesis presents on 'soft' and 'hard' instruments is necessary for improving these 
decisions in terms of immediate actions for reduction of GHG emissions. However, 
there has not yet been a method developed for clearly and simply defining which 
instruments are 'soft' and 'hard' instruments and their influences. This significant 
background motivated the primary purpose of this thesis, which is to examine the 
influence of both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms ofreducing GHG emissions. 
In order to achieve its purpose, this study has established two inter-related aims. The 
first aim is to develop methods for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions, which help distinguishing whether 
an instrument is 'soft' or 'hard' in terms of evaluating its influence. The second aim is 
959 All instruments contain a certain level of coerciveness and are based on two individual streams: 
'mandated and voluntary' (Hatch 2005). This supports the notion of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
adopted in this study. Each instrument should be positioned based on its level of coercion (i.e. the 
degree of 'soft' and hard' instruments in this thesis is viewed according to the level of government 
power and intervention, regulations/ legal binding and penalties). 
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to determine the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG 
emissions by following the methods60 developed in the first aim. 
Figure 7.1: Aims 
Primary purpose: to examine the influence of both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions. 
Inter-related aims 
i) Developing methods 
ii) Applying methods 
In terms of developing methods, this thesis has addressed three elements of 
instrument analysis for identifying the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in 
terms of reducing GHG emissions which need to be addressed and developed, namely: 
(a) the lack of classification of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments; (b) the lack of 
examination of the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments; and (c) the lack of 
examination of the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments. In considering the 
three elements which have been addressed in order to develop methods, this thesis has 
selected two analytical methods for further examination. 
The first analytical method was adopted for identifying the trend use of 'soft' and 
'hard' climate policy instruments, i.e. developing the first and second elements: (a) 
the instrument classification and (b) examination of trend use. This method addresses 
how a nation allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments over a certain 
period. The second Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method is for evaluating the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy, i.e. supporting the 
third element: (c) the examination of the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' 
instruments. This method addresses the actual impacts of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument 
activities on reducing GHG emissions. 
60Two methods were developed in this thesis, namely: (i) Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method for 
identifying the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments; and (ii) Effectiveness 
Analysis/ Method for evaluating effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy. 
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In order to further develop the two analytical methods, this thesis has explored policy 
instrumentalist theory, and subsequently has focused on approaches to, and critiques 
of, 'soft' and 'hard' instrumental theory, especially in terms of relevance to climate 
change policy. After the development of the two methods, this thesis then applied the 
methods for examining two empirical case studies in order to accomplish the second 
aim of this thesis (i.e. applying methods). 
/ 
Figure 7.2: Two Analytical Methods 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method: to assess how a nation allocated its adoption 
of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments for reducing GHG emissions over a certain period. 
i) Method for identifying the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments 
Effectiveness Analysis/ Method: to evaluate the actual impacts of the instrument activities 
on reducing GHG emissions. 
ii) Method for evaluating effectiveness of'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy 
In terms of applying the two analytical methods as the second aim, a special focus is 
placed on Australia's climate policy and upon two policy instruments in particular. 
This thesis has suggested that there is a compelling need for an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in Australia's climate policy. One of the 
major criticisms is whether the national initiatives emphasis upon voluntary-based 
instruments between 1997-2007 actually encouraged domestic action to reduce GHG 
emissions (CWLTH 2000; Hon et al. 2002; Curran 2003; ANAO 2004; Hunt 2004; 
Christoff 2005; Sullivan 2007 and Crowley 2007). Thus, an examination of the 
relationship between the voluntary-based initiatives and the influences of 'soft' & 
'hard' instruments is the key issue in the case studies. 
Throughout the analysis, two outcomes were expected from the development of the 
two analytical methods incorporated with their application to Australia's case study, 
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These outcomes address how the government allocated 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, 
and examine the relative effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments. Findings 
from the two examinations allow this thesis to answer its primary purpose, which is to 
examine the influence of both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG 
emissions. 
In considering its hypothesis, this thesis has argued that the government has tended to 
use more mixed instruments in its climate policy, resulting in the situation where 
policy makers cannot easily address or distinguish the absolute power 
relations/coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. This thesis has also 
argued that 'soft' instruments largely dominated in Australia's climate policy during 
1997-2007, and did not encourage reduction of GHG emissions. The two arguments 
were thus expected to reflect the findings of this thesis examination. 
The following details reflect on the examination of the two analytical methods 
(Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method and Effectiveness Analysis/ Method) 
applied in the empirical case study. Each method describes in further detail the 
developing methods and the results from the applying methods in order to make a 
clear linkage of major findings from this study. 
Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method: to identify the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments 
In order to assess how a nation allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments 
for reducing GHG emissions over a certain period, the method for identifying the 
trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments has been further developed. 
The thesis developed a study of the classification of policy instruments, drawing upon 
the instrumentation approach: in order to address its aim of evaluating the 
effectiveness of policy instruments in the field of public policy. In terms of classifying 
policy instruments, this study has used 'instrumentalism' (Anderson 1977; Stavins 
1997; Vedung and van der Doelen 1998; Okinomous and Jepma 2007) incorporated 
with 'coercive analysis' (Cushman 1941; Anderson1977; Hood 1986; McDonnell and 
Elmore 1987; Doem and Phidd 1992; Ayers and Braithwaite 1992; Howlett and 
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Ramesh 1995 ; Gunningham and Grabosky 1998 ; Sullivan and Wyndham 2001 
Welch and Hibiki 2003 ; and Price 2005). 
In terms of developing the method, this thesis addressed two key aspects, namely: 
classifying policy instruments and distinguishing 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. In a 
study of instrumentalism, Anderson acknowledges that identifying characteristics of 
policy instruments is essential in terms of understanding the abilities and limitations 
of government resources (1977). Categorising instruments means identifying 
resources that governments can use to achieve their policy goals, which is very 
important when analysing a government policy approach (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 
1998). In terms of categorising instruments, policy actors need to select instrument 
categories depending on particular policy objectives (Stavins 1997). Thus categorising 
policy instruments is essential in terms of analysis here. However, such categorisation 
is useful in identifying general trend use in climate change policy but is not sensitive 
to levels of coerciveness between instruments in policy programs, which is an 
important factor to consider when looking to analyse policy use and effectiveness of 
both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
This thesis then further explored key analytical elements from the historical context of 
'coercive analysis' I 'degree of coercion' and 'instrument categorisation' including the 
field of public policy, environmental policy and climate change policy (Cushman 
1941; Anderson 1977; Hood 1986; McDonnell and Elmore 1987; Schneider and 
Ingram 1990; Doern and Phidd 1992; Braithwaite 1992; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; 
Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Welch and Hibiki 2003; Price 2005; Sullivan and 
Wyndham 2001). However, a clear means of illustrating how to distinguish whether 
an instrument is 'soft' or 'hard' was not established by this literature. Thus there is a 
critical question: how to develop a simple and clear method of identifying how 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments can be classified. The key criticism is that illustrating the 
relations between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments including policy influences and 
outcomes, tends to lead to uncertainty, especially where mixed instruments are 
applied. This is because regulatory or voluntary instruments generally do not exist 
individually in a given context and are usually combined with a variety of other 
instruments, which again will depend on policy targets (Sullivan and Wyndham 2001 ). 
This circumstance also becomes more common in environmental policy, where 
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complex instrument designs are demanded to mirror complex issues at local and 
global levels. 
These difficulties led this thesis to reflect on the ideology of the level of power 
relations/ coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the historical policy 
context. The study has addressed a number of key elements dominating in the 
ideology, which can be defined as: the level of governmental power and government 
intervention in terms of a particular policy target. From these key elements, this thesis 
attempted to distinguish the level of instrumental coerciveness by examining key 
measurable criteria from several perspectives through government intervention; 
environmental and climate change policy; and consideration of studies by other 
analysts on the instruments' power relations, in order to devise a simple and clear 
method of identifying whether an instrument is 'soft' or 'hard'. 
Given this background, in terms of developing the method for identifying the trend 
use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments, this thesis has adapted two 
approaches here, namely: i) Classification of Climate Policy Instrument Categories; 
and ii) Determination between 'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Instruments. The detail of 
these approaches is further described below. 
Figure 7.3: Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method: to identify the trend use of policy 
instruments 
i) Method for identifying the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments 
a) Classification of Climate Policy Instrument Categories [CCPIC]; and 
b) Determination of'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Instruments [DSHCI]. 
a) Classification of Climate Policy Instrument Categories [CCPICZ 
In terms of classifying policy instruments, the CCPIC approach developed in this 
thesis has induded six instrument categories [regulatory, voluntary/voluntary 
agreement, economic, research, information-based and mixed instruments]. There are 
two reasons for this determination. These six classifications were adopted as those 
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used in the Australian national reports to the United Nations in 2002 and 2005 (AGO 
2002 and 2005). These classifications also avoid overcomplication. Kirschen et al. 
(1964) suggest that too much classification merely provides a more precise 
categorisation. These classifications are useful in identifying the general trend use in 
climate change policy but are not sensitive to levels of government coercion and other 
significant features in policy programs, which are important to consider when looking 
to analyse policy use and effectiveness. Thus, the following DSHCI approach helps 
this study to determine the level of coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
b) Determination of 'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Instruments [DSHCil 
In terms of distinguishing between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy, the 
thesis has developed the DSHCI approach with 17 criteria61 , which focuses on the 
level of instrument dominances with key criteria to classify the 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument designs of a national government in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
The criteria also help policy makers appreciate which levels of coerciveness of policy 
instruments were employed by government initiatives. This thesis considered 
distinguishing the level of coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, using a 
number of functional elements for 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, namely: government 
intervention; legal requirements, financial penalties, administrative rules; prohibitions; 
market solutions; specific demands in environmental and climate change policy; and 
consideration of studies by analysts on the coerciveness of policy instruments. This 
approach then considered the four levels established in each criteria, used for 
determining whether instruments are 'soft' or 'hard', namely: least dominant, 
moderately dominant, highly dominant and most dominant. This measurement scale 
was devised to allow for a simple and clear classification of the level of coercion 
between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
61The 17 Criteria include: Information Provision, Educational Support by Government, Incentives and 
Subsidies by Government, Specific and Measurable Emission Reduction Targets in a program, 
Timeframe in a program, Guidance or Guidelines for implementation, Monitoring, Reporting and 
Certification, Auditing, Reviewing and Certification, Public Disclosure, Committed Contractual 
Improvement, Any Market Device or creation of competitiveness, Government Regulation for 
Standards, Government Penalty of Polluter Pays, Government Penalty for Nonparticipation, 
Government Penalty for Noncompliance, Government Penalty for Failure to Meet Targets. 
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The method for identifying the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' _climate policy 
instruments therefore comprises two approaches, namely: CCPIC and DSHCI, and 
was then applied in the empirical case studies. 
Chapter Five applies the methods for the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments (i.e. 
CCPIC and DSHCI approaches) and examines analysis of its empirical case studies. 
This chapter considered three themes: a) the types of policy instruments utilised by 
the Australian government during the period 1997-2007; b) how such instruments 
varied according to the criteria developed in this thesis for assessing 'hard' and 'soft' 
policy instruments; and c) what the trend usage of such instruments was over time. 
In terms of the types of policy instruments utilised by the Australian government, 
results obtained by the CCPIC approach explain what sorts of instruments were used 
under the policy. The results clarify that the large numbers of policy instruments that 
were used during the period were mixed instruments and that the analysis of the six 
instrument categories was able to illustrate types of instruments but not their level of 
coerciveness (i.e. 'soft' and 'hard'). The case studies also confirmed that the 
government uses more mixed instruments in climate policy, showing that policy 
makers cannot easily recognise which instruments are 'soft' or 'hard' in terms of clear 
instrument characteristics and their effectiveness, which has satisfied one of the thesis 
arguments62• In other words, it can be said that policy makers can fail to recognise 
that voluntary measures are not always applied as 'soft' instruments, and that 
regulations are not always applied as 'hard' instruments, depending on the degree of 
power relations/ coerciveness particularly in terms of: government intervention, 
regulation/legal bindings, and penalties. 
Following the results, this analysis further identifies whether instruments are 'soft' or 
'hard' instruments in climate policy and examines their trend use. Trend use refers in 
this thesis to assess how a nation allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments for reducing GHG emissions over a certain period. Results obtained by 
the DSHCI method show the Australian national initiatives during the period were 
62 This thesis has argued that the government uses more mixed instruments in climate policy and policy 
makers cannot easily address the absolute power relations/coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments. 
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largely reliant on relatively 'soft' instruments, showing a tendency to increase the use 
of softer instruments over time. The results have satisfied the thesis argument63 that 
'soft' instruments largely dominated in climate policy. The results clarify that national 
initiatives with the voluntary-based instruments were largely dominated by 'soft' 
instruments. Moreover, the results also show that most of the instruments used in this 
period were also designed without strong incorporation with government intervention, 
regulation/legal binding or penalties. Moreover, there was a strong preference by 
government to focus on incentive-based, information-based and auditing based 
approaches (i.e. information, education, incentives, guidelines and auditing). 
These findings of the CCPIC and DSHCI approaches have clarified the trend use of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments in a climate change policy, and have also allowed this 
thesis to classify whether a program was 'soft' or 'hard' in order to be able to select 
particular case studies, examining both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. The following 
section presents outcomes in the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method, which is to evaluate 
the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
63 This thesis has argued that 'soft' instruments largely dominated in Australia's climate policy during 
1997-2007. 
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Effectiveness Analysis/ Method: to evaluate the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments 
In order to evaluate the actual impacts of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument activities on 
reducing GHG emissions, the method for evaluating effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in climate policy has been developed. The idea was derived largely from 
the ideas of Hood (2007) and Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007). 
The study of developing an analysis for 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments in 
this thesis is intended to develop a simple and basic instrument analysis. Hood 
suggests that every instrumentation approach is related to a 'generic approach'. This 
generic approach aims to consider the roots of instrumentation management with what 
are the most basic and key elements of instrumentation analysis (2007). Instrument 
analysis itself is always a central issue in public policy. However, the study of 
instrumentation needs to be developed in terms of what the fundamental components 
demand for instrumentation analysis, in order to interpret policy behaviour (Hood 
2007; and Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007). The main analytic approach adopted is 
derived from the thinking of Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007), who acknowledge five 
fundamental approaches that exist as the basis of instrumentation study: a) focusing 
on instrument analysis is a central issue in public policy and represents political 
behaviour over a certain period; b) analysing relevant instrument choice is critical for 
meeting policy objectives; c) evaluating the effectiveness of instruments is also a key 
concern; d) seeking innovative, effective, instruments applicable to particular policy 
development is a central aim; and e) focusing on the influences of instruments for a 
particular policy network is a worthwhile effort. This thesis has adopted these five 
fundamental instrumental approaches as its main analytic approach. Meanwhile, Hood 
also suggests that the generic approach should consider different principles for 
different policy purposes (2007). This thesis has then considered principles in terms 
of the most appropriate instrument analysis of climate policy. 
Two key principles have been adapted here in terms of climate policy instrument 
analysis. The first principle is priorities, whereby policy makers need to identify 
specific priorities in the field of policy (Hood 2007), in order to ensure the most 
appropriate instruments are chosen for climate change policy for the best emission 
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reduction achievement (SY.KE et al. 2007). This thesis has elaborated and adapted 
four such priorities namely: instrument design, successful GHG mitigation, program 
achievement and economic efficiency. These priorities help to analyse climate policy 
instrument design. The second principle is criteria to determine which evaluative 
criteria are the most suitable for application to environmental policy, in particular to 
climate change policy (IPCC 2007b ). This thesis has again selected four criteria, 
namely: effectiveness for reducing GHGs, cost effectiveness, administrative feasibility 
and political acceptability. Each criterion measures a different aspect of climate 
change policy, and is required in order to achieve successful GHG mitigation. 
These theoretical thoughts regarding methodology and the two principles above 
(priorities and criteria), have led here to the establishment of the most relevant 
approach to methods for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in 
terms of reducing GHG emissions. This thesis has furthermore synthesised a variety 
of key aspects into five analytical perspectives: Synthesised Instrument Analysis [SIA] 
in considering these theoretical thoughts. The following section describes further 
detail of SIA. 
Figure 7.4: Effectiveness Analysis/ Method: to evaluate the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instrument activities on reducing GHG emissions 
ii) Method for evaluating effectiveness of'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy 
Synthesised Instrument Analysis [SIA] 
a) Descriptive perspective 
b) Transformative perspective 
c) Analysis of instrument design 
d) Evaluation of actual effectiveness 
e) Discussion 
Synthesised Instrument Analysis [SIA/ 
The refined method, SIA, is fundamental in determining the actual impacts of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instrument activities on reducing GHG emissions during a particular period. 
SIA has considered the three key issues from the theoretical thoughts discussed above, 
namely: a need for simple and fundamental instrumentation analysis; a need for 
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identifying specific priorities of instrument analysis in terms of climate policy for the 
best emission reduction achievement; and a demand for finding the most suitable 
evaluative criteria for application to climate policy. In considering these theoretical 
thoughts, the SIA has developed five analytical phases, namely: Descriptive 
perspective; Transformative perspective; Analysis of instrument design; Evaluation of 
actual effectiveness; and Discussion. 
Each phase evaluates a different aspect of influence of a particular policy instrument 
in order to achieve successful GHG mitigation. The Descriptive perspective is the first 
stage of the method aims and describes the background of a case study evaluating the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. The Transformative perspective is the 
second stage and illustrates trend use of policy instruments for case studies. The 
Analysis of instrument design is the third stage, which examines theoretical instrument 
analysis for the instrument design in terms of GHG emission reduction. The 
Evaluation of actual effectiveness is the fourth stage and aims to examine the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate change policy. The 
Discussion is the fifth stage and aims at reflecting on all the results from each stage of 
the instrument analysis (See Chapter Three). The SIA has thus been developed in this 
thesis, as a simple but fundamental and relevant method, in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
Chapter Six has demonstrated the application of the SIA method for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the 'soft' and 'hard' instrument activities in the case of Australia's 
climate policy. First, two case studies were selected from the results in Chapter Five: 
The MRET is identified as a 'hard' instrument and the Greenhouse Challenge 
Program as a 'soft' instrument. This thesis has examined these two case studies as the 
most relevant to its analysis. This thesis has then applied the SIA method to the case 
studies. The results from the SIA in this chapter also allowed this thesis to conduct a 
further discussion (Chapter Seven) on the determination of the relative effectiveness 
of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the case of Australia's climate policy. 
Both programs: the MRET and GCP were well known major initiatives for reducing 
GHG emissions in Australia's climate policy during 1997-2007. In 2001, the then 
Prime Minister, John Howard, introduced the MRET, the only regulated program 
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entirely mandated by federal initiatives during the Howard regime to increase the 
functions of renewable energy sources in Australia's electricity (AGO 2003c). On the 
other hand, the GCP was an entirely voluntary measure. The original GCP was an 
extension by the Howard Government of an initial voluntary program instigated by 
the Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating (AGO 2005). The program was intended to 
increase the number of voluntary agreements between government and industry 
(CWLTH 1997). In 2004 the Prime Minister announced the GCP Plus, which updated 
the existing GCP to integrate with other existing programs, such as the Generator 
Efficiency Standard (GES) and the Greenhouse Friendly Program to reduce GHG 
emissions (DHH 2006). Although the framework of the GCP Plus was slightly 
changed (DEH 2006), it largely continued the original voluntary approach (AGO 
2005). Therefore, during the period, both programs were expected to be the most 
important instruments in terms of national initiatives, and expected to result in a 
strong contribution to the reduction of GHG emissions over the long term. Whilst one 
program was an entirely mandatory framework as a 'hard' instrument, the other was 
intended to be a completely voluntary framework, as a 'soft' instrument. It is 
therefore appropriate to determine the relative effectiveness of these 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in reducing GHG emissions. 
The analysis concludes that although the overall emission trends show that Australia 
increased emissions over time, the few 'hard' instruments employed were relatively 
more effective than 'soft' instruments in reducing GHG emissions in the country. 
However, it failed to make a clear distinction in the relative effectiveness of 'soft' 
versus 'hard' instruments, due to insufficient details available about the GCP in 
government reports over the period. In specific terms, in relation to analysing the 
'success and failure' of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, the 'hard' instrument considered 
constantly met its intended targets over time, whereas the 'soft' instrument failed to 
meet its targets. Furthermore, the 'hard' instrument showed at high level of cost 
effectiveness. However, the study could not clearly distinguish the level of cost 
effectiveness of the 'soft' instrument due to limited evidence. Moreover, the study 
revealed that both programs involved a variety of elements in terms of other 
significant criteria, namely distributional equity, political acceptability and 
administrative feasibility. However, the study remains unable to make a clear 
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distinction of the relative effectiveness of these aspects of the 'soft' versus the 'hard 
instruments, due to insufficient information being available from government. 
Overall, however, it can be concluded that the key policy design based on voluntary-
based instruments during 1997-2007 did not encourage a significant reduction of 
GHG emissions, which confirms the thesis argument64• 
The study also concluded that 'soft' instruments have fundamentally failed at a basic 
level to provide the desired outcomes of reducing GHG emissions, because they 
tended to be symbolic policies, which gave insufficient information and lacked 
information consistency, in comparison to 'hard' instruments. Furthermore, the study 
finds that the SIA is not capable of addressing total effectiveness in terms of a variety 
of external factors such as government's 'top-down' and 'bottom-top' implementation 
approaches, as well as political, administrative and institutional influences, and 
international and domestic influences. However, the methods can be used to illustrate 
the fundamental idea of the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. More 
broadly, thus the understandings of the effectiveness by the SIA used in this thesis 
and other external factors will make a more comprehensive analysis. And in order to 
more broadly apply SIA analysis, there would also be a need to examine other 
countries. The effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments may well be different in 
different countries. Although the UNFCCC secretariat broadly reviews policy 
instruments used in contracting countries, the comparison of the effectiveness of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments among different states and countries using the analysis 
proposed here, would also contribute significantly to understanding the ability of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments to reduce GHG emissions of each country, with 
particular significance in carbon intensive countries. 
This section has drawn together and developed the arguments of main importance to 
this overall thesis, in terms of the aims outlined in Chapter One. The primary purpose 
of this thesis is to examine the influence of both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms 
of reducing GHG emissions. The outcomes of the two inter-related aims, developing 
methods (namely Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method and Effectiveness 
64 This thesis has argued that Australia's climate policy during 1997-2007 did not encourage reduction 
ofGHG emissions. 
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Analysis/ Method and applying these methods in the case of Austria's climate policy, 
have been described in this section. The outcomes described here show a clear inter-
linking picture of the major findings of this thesis. 
The results from the analyses conclude that large numbers of policy programs used 
during the 1997-2007 period were mixed instruments, which clarifies that the 
government uses more mixed instruments in Australia's climate policy. This has 
meant that policy makers are not easily able to recognise which instruments are 'soft' 
or 'hard' in terms of clear instrument characteristics and their effectiveness. The 
national initiatives with the voluntary-based instruments were also largely dominated 
by 'soft' instruments, and showed a tendency to increase the use of softer instruments 
over time. Furthermore, although the overall emission trends showed the country 
increased emissions over this time, the few 'hard' instruments employed were 
relatively more effective than 'soft' instruments in reducing GHG emissions in the 
country. Given this, it can be concluded that Australia's climate policy design based 
on voluntary-based instruments was largely reliant on 'soft' instruments during 1997-
2007 and did not encourage a significant reduction of GHG emissions. 
These outcomes allow this thesis to achieve its primary purpose, which is to examine 
the influence of both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG 
emissions. The following section presents the conclusions of this chapter. 
7 .3 Conclusion 
This chapter has conducted two discussions. The first part of this chapter continued to 
discuss the results of the analysis of the 'soft' and 'hard' instruments identified in 
Chapter Six. The discussion in the first part of this chapter has fulfilled the second 
major aim of this current thesis, namely to determine the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following the methods developed. 
The discussion in the first part concludes that 'hard' instruments were relatively more 
effective in reducing GHG emissions than 'soft' instruments in the case of Australia's 
Climate policy during 1997-2007, although the study has failed to make a clear 
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distinction between the relative effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments, due 
to insufficient details available about the GCP in the government reports over the 
period. In specific terms, in relation to analysing the 'success and failure' of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments, the 'hard' instrument met its intended if modest targets over time, 
but the 'soft' instrument failed to meet its targets. The study also concluded that 'soft' 
instruments have failed at a fundamental level to provide the desired outcomes of 
policy initiatives towards reducing GHG emissions, because they tended to be 
symbolic policies, which gave insufficient information and lacked information 
consistency, in comparison to 'hard' instruments. However, the influence of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments on reducing GHG emissions can be different in different countries, 
depending on their economic, political and institutional circumstances. Furthermore, 
there is a need for the balance of the degree of instrumental coerciveness between 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments in order to choose the most effective instruments for 
reducing GHG emissions, depending on different policy targets such as direct or 
indirect targets to reducing GHG emissions. 
The second part of this chapter has drawn together and developed the arguments of 
main importance to this overall thesis, especially of the thesis aims. In each aspect, 
this section has demonstrated the discussions amongst the main arguments, 
responding to their arguments and contributions. These discussions in this chapter are 
very important to lead this thesis to its conclusions. 
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis presentation. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusions 
This chapter concludes this thesis. It will present a summary description of the 
background, significance and major purpose of this study. It will summarise findings 
of each chapter and shall also reach some broader conclusions about the influence of 
'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments. 
A key issue for climate change policy, central to this thesis, is the right choice of 
policy with the appropriate balance between non-coercive and coercive instruments 
(i.e. voluntary and regulatory-based instruments). These are referred to as 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in this thesis. However, there has not yet been a method developed 
for simply defining the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions. Leaders in each country are seeking to make the right 
choices at domestic and international levels, and a study such as this thesis presents 
on 'soft' and 'hard' instruments is critical to improving these decisions. Nowhere is 
this more evident than in the case of Australia. 
A study on Australia's climate change policy during 1997-2007 is critical, the country 
being one of the most carbon intensive countries in the world. When the rest of the 
world was demanding strong initiatives from developed nations in terms of 
immediately implementing actions to reduce greenhouse gases, Australia, during the 
period, was taking predominantly voluntary action. There is a need for examining the 
effectiveness of how the 'soft' and 'hard' instruments adopted by the government 
influenced reduction of GHGs during the period, and for analysing whether the 
voluntary based actions encourage mitigation activities. 
Given this background, three significant issues were considered, namely: a) the 
further development of the relevant field of public policy; b) analysis of climate 
change policy instruments; and c) the study of countries which must consider the 
reduction of GHG emissions. 
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This study firstly contributes to further development of this field of public policy, 
especially with its examination of coerciveness in policy instruments. As described in 
Chapter One, there is a need to develop methods to classify the degree of 'softness' 
and 'hardness' of instruments in the study of policy instruments, and in terms of the 
illustration of their effectiveness in order to examine the influences of both 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions. This is because there had 
been neglect by researchers of recognition of the actual class of coerciveness 65 
between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. This better recognition enables policy makers 
to classify various policies and their impacts (Okinomous and Jepma 2007) and to 
determine the actual class of coerciveness (i.e. policy relations are also referred in this 
thesis) and to clearly interpret its effectiveness (Macdonald 2001). However, causality 
between policies and outcomes is unclear, in particular, where mixed or various 
instruments are applied in order to achieve policy goals (Sullivan and Wyndham 
2001). Too much focus on mixed instruments (more than one instrument combined) 
also results in complicated combinations and difficulty in classification (Okinomous 
and Jepma 2007), since 'optimal mix': right combination of instruments makes a 
better policy outcome (Howlett 2004) as effective policy instrument design has 
become an accepted idea in common thinking (Van Nispen and Ringeling 1998; 
Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair 1998; and Howlett 2003, 2004). When 
analysing instrument mixes, researchers have also neglected the actual class of 
coerciveness or the degree of regulation in the shift between 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments. Therefore, there is a need for further development of methods to classify 
the degree of 'softness' and 'hardness' of instruments in the study of policy 
instruments and the illustration of their effectiveness, which this study has undertaken. 
The second contribution of this study is to develop ideas for climate policy analysis. 
An understanding of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments represents a manner of appreciating 
governmental control by instrument choice (Hatch 2005). The balance of power 
between coercive and non-coercive instrument type is essential in terms of reducing 
GHG emissions (Edenhofer et al. 2009). A clear identification of the influences of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments thus helps to address the extent of governmental control 
65 The actual class of instrument coerciveness/ power relations is regarded as the level of social control 
exerted by an instrument adopted by governments, which is intended to achieve a particular policy goal 
in this thesis. 
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during a certain period of time, and to identify weaknesses and strengths of instrument 
design by government in terms of urgent action in order to reduce GHG emissions. 
The results of considering the significance of this study for instrument analysis theory 
also allows policy makers to develop ideas for further discussion about the most 
appropriate climate change policy. 
The third significance of this study is to offer a contribution to countries which must 
consider the reduction of GHG emissions. In terms of identifying the influence of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the reduction of GHG emissions, an examination of 
Australia's climate policy is critical to policy development elsewhere. The domestic 
climate policy of this Australian era concerns one of the most carbon intensive 
developed countries, which must consider a significant reduction in GHG emissions, 
and be responsible for leading a strong global initiative. However, Australia has 
chosen a largely voluntary pathway when much of the world was demanding strong 
initiatives from developed nations in terms of immediately implementing actions to 
reduce GHGs. There is a need for revealing whether the policy reliant upon voluntary 
based actions encourages a significant enough reduction of GHG emissions. This 
thesis is the first study to explore the design and effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in Australia, but can also generate results applicable to other countries, in 
terms of developing methods for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments in the reduction of GHG emissions. Therefore, this study does not only 
help better instrument choices for the future in Australia, but also future instrument 
choices of other carbon intensive countries. 
These three significant issues were thus developed throughout this thesis. Given this 
background and significance, this thesis established a primary purpose. The primary 
purpose of this thesis was to examine the influences of both 'soft' and 'hard' climate 
policy instruments, especially in reducing GHG emissions. The thesis has established 
two inter-related aims. The first was to develop analytical methods for identifying the 
influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG emissions. In 
doing so, it aimed to clarify which aspects of these methods should be addressed in 
order to examine influence in the context of climate policy and how the methods can 
be developed by the most relevant disciplines in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
The second aim was to determine the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments by 
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applying the methods developed in the first aim. In order to achieve this objective, a 
special focus was placed on Australia's climate policy from 1997 to 2007, which was 
developed under the Howard Government 
This thesis has argued that the government has tended to use more mixed instruments 
in climate policy, and that policy makers cannot easily address the absolute power 
relations/coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. Here, power relations/ 
coerciveness refers to the level of social control by instrument uses by governments in 
terms of climate policy. The results clarify that the large numbers of policy 
instruments used during the period were predominantly mixed instruments. It 
established that policy makers can fail to recognise that voluntary measures are not 
always applied as entirely 'soft' instruments, and that regulations are not always 
applied as entirely 'hard' instruments, depending on the relative dominance of 
elements of instrument coerciveness namely: government intervention, 
regulation/legal bindings, and penalties. 
This thesis has also argued that 'soft' instruments largely dominated Australia's 
climate policy during 1997-2007, and did not encourage any meaning for reduction of 
GHG emissions. The analysis has demonstrated that the Australian national initiatives 
on the climate policy during the period 1997-2007 were largely reliant on relatively 
'soft' instruments, indeed showing a tendency to increase the use of softer instruments 
over time. Most of the instruments used in this period were also designed without 
strong incorporation with government intervention, regulation and penalties. 
Moreover, there was a strong preference by government for focusing on incentive-
based, information-based and auditing based approaches (i.e. information, education, 
incentives, guidelines and auditing). In terms of the effectiveness of instruments, 
although the overall emission trends showed the country increased emissions over this 
time, it was established that the few 'hard' instruments employed were relatively 
more effective than 'soft' instruments in reducing GHG emissions in the country. This 
research also shows that policy designed on voluntary-based instruments during 1997-
2007 did not encourage a significant reduction of GHG emissions. 
To assist in analysing the influences of both 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate 
policy, this thesis has focused on the policy instrumentalist literature in order to 
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achieve its first aim of developing reluctant methodological approaches derived from 
the public policy literature. The policy instrumentalist literature has been used to 
provide frameworks to create the most suitable approach for the policy instrumentalist 
analysis. 
Chapters Two and Three fulfil the first aim of this thesis, which was to develop 
analytical methods for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in 
terms of reducing GHG emissions. This thesis firstly addressed three elements of 
methods for identifying the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments which need to 
be developed, namely (i) overcoming the lack of classification of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments; (ii) overcoming the lack of examination of the trend use of 'soft' and 
'hard' instruments; and (iii) overcoming the lack of examination of the effectiveness 
of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments. In considering the three elements which have been 
addressed in order to develop methods, this thesis has selected two analytical methods 
for further examination. 
The Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method was adopted for identifying the trend 
use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments, which addresses how a nation 
allocated its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments over a certain period. The 
Effectiveness Analysis/ Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method is for evaluating the 
effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy, which addresses the 
actual impacts of both instrument activities on reducing GHG emissions. 
In terms of developing the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method, this was derived 
from the instrumentalist approach using 'instrumentalism' incorporated with 'coercive 
analyses'. This thesis established two key analytic aspects, namely: classifying 
climate policy instruments and distinguishing 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. This 
thesis has devised two approaches here, namely: i) Classification of Climate Policy 
Instrument Categories [CCPIC]; and ii) Determination of 'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate 
Instruments [DSHCI], in terms of developing its method for identifying the trend use 
of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments, 
The CCPIC approach developed in this thesis, in terms of classifying policy 
instruments, has included six instrument categories [regulatory, voluntary/voluntary 
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agreement, economic, research, information-based and mixed instruments]. These are 
useful in identifying the general trend use in climate change policy but are not 
sensitive to levels of government coercion in policy programs, which it was argued an 
important factor to consider when looking to analyse policy use and effectiveness. 
With regard to distinguishing between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in climate policy, 
the thesis has also developed the DSHCI approach with 17 criteria, which focus on 
the level of instrument dominances with the number of key criteria to classify the 
'soft' and 'hard' instrument designs of a national government. This approach also 
indicated four levels established in the criteria, used for determining whether 
instruments were 'soft' or 'hard', and these were: least dominant, moderately 
dominant, highly dominant and most dominant. This measurement allows policy 
makers to determine a simple and clear classification of the level of coercion between 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments. The Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method for 
identifying the trend use of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments developed in 
this thesis therefore comprises two approaches, namely: CCPIC and DSHCI. 
In terms of examining the actual impacts of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument activities on 
reducing GHG emissions, the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method has been used to 
examine the effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments in the policy. The main 
analytic approach developed in this thesis was selected to use a fundamental 
approach 66 derived from the thinking of Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007). Two 
principles have been considered as principles for the policy analysis. The first 
principle is priorities, which policy makers need to identify specific priorities of the 
field of policy (Hood 2007), in order to ensure the most appropriate instruments for 
climate change policy for the best emission reduction achievement (SYKE et al. 
2007). This thesis has adopted four priorities namely: instrument design, successful 
GHG mitigation, program achievement and economic efficiency. These priorities help 
to analyse instrument design. The second principle is criteria to determine which 
evaluative criteria are the most suitable for application to environmental policy, in 
66 fundamental approach from the theoretical ideas of Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007), namely: a) 
focusing on instrument analysis is a central issue in public policy and represents its particular political 
behaviour for a certain period; b) analysing relevant instrument choice for meeting the policy 
objectives sets; c) evaluating effectiveness of instruments; d) seeking innovative, effective, instruments 
applicable to particular policy development; and e) focusing on discussing influences of instruments for 
a particular policy network. 
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particular to climate change policy (IPCC 2007). This thesis has selected four criteria, 
namely: effectiveness for reducing GHGs, cost effectiveness, administrative feasibility 
and political acceptability. Each criterion measures a different aspect of climate 
change policy,. and which is required, it is argued here, in order to achieve successful 
GHG mitigation. 
These theoretical thoughts regarding the fundamental approach and the two principles 
of a climate policy instrument analysis (priorities and criteria), have led this thesis to 
establish an approach to . answer the question of the methods of which are best for 
identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms of reducing GHG 
emissions. Finally, the thesis has synthesised a variety of key aspects into five 
analytical phases: Synthesised Instrument Analysis [SIA] in considering these 
theoretical thoughts. The five phases are, namely: descriptive perspective; 
transformative perspective; analysis of instrument design; evaluation of actual 
effectiveness and discussion. The SIA has been developed in this thesis as a simple 
but fundamental and relevant method, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments. 
Chapter Two and Three determine the most relevant approach to developing the 
analytical methods (i.e. Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method and Effectiveness 
Analysis/ Method) for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in 
terms of reducing GHG emissions. 
The Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method devised for identifying the trend use of 
'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments comprises two approaches, namely: the 
CCPIC and DSHCI. The Effectiveness Analysis/ Method was devised for examining 
the actual impacts of 'soft' 'hard' instrument activities, and led to the SIA approach 
being developed. The development of the methods in these chapters completes the 
first aim of this thesis, which was to develop methods for identifying the influence of 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments. These methods have allowed this thesis to examine the 
second aim of this thesis, namely to determine the influences of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments on reducing GHG emissions by following the methods developed in the 
first aim. 
282 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
Before moving on to the second aim of this thesis, Chapter Four explored the 
development of Australia's climate change policy as an empirical case study. This 
Chapter established the need to consider the effectiveness of the climate change 
policy in the chosen period of 1997-2007. The Australian government designed and 
implemented an individual domestic approach largely dominated by voluntary-based 
activities during the period, without taking global responsibility as a developed nation 
for reducing GHG emissions through its failure to ratify the global international 
agreement on climate change action (i.e. Kyoto protocol). Australia's domestic 
climate policy of this era reflects one of the most critical periods in terms of GHG 
mitigation policy by one of the most carbon intensive nations. This Chapter has 
addressed the unique circumstances in Australia, including, the rapid population 
growth and land use patterns, and the dominance of economic resources by large 
energy intensive and carbon intensive manufacturing and products. These findings 
were essential context for the following case studies in order to address and appreciate 
their background and the significance of this. 
Chapter Five turned to the second aim and presented analysis of the empirical case 
studies. These studies were intended to accomplish the second aim of this whole 
thesis, by applying the method developed in the first aim to determine the influences 
of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments on reducing GHG emissions. In this chapter, this 
thesis applies the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method for identifying the trend 
use of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments (i.e. CCPIC and DSHCI approaches) and 
examines analysis of its empirical case studies. This chapter considered three themes: 
a) the types of policy instruments utilised by the Australian government during the 
period 1997-2007; b) how such instruments varied according to the criteria developed 
in this thesis for assessing 'hard' and 'soft' policy instruments and c) what the trend 
usage of such instruments was over time. 
Results obtained by the CCPIC with the six climate instrument categories explain 
what sorts of instruments were used under the policy. The results clarify that large 
numbers of policy instruments used during the period were mixed instruments 
although the analysis with the six instrument categories simply illustrates types of 
instruments but not their level of relative dominance (i.e. 'soft' and 'hard'). The case 
study also shows that the government used more mixed instruments in climate policy 
283 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
and that policy makers cannot easily recognise which instruments are 'soft' or 'hard' 
in terms of clear instrument characteristics and their effectiveness. In other words, 
policy makers can fail to recognise that voluntary measures are not always applied as 
'soft' instruments, and that regulations are not always applied as 'hard' instruments. 
Following the results, this analysis further identified whether instruments were 'soft' 
or 'hard' instruments in climate change policy and examined the trend use namely: 
how a government allocates its adoption of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
Results obtained by the DSHCI approach to classifying of the level of coercion 
between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments with 17 evaluative criteria showed that the 
Australian national initiatives on the climate change policy during the period 1997-
2007 were largely reliant on relatively 'soft' instruments, with a tendency to increase 
the use of softer instruments over time. Most of the instruments used in this period 
were also designed without strong incorporation with government intervention, 
regulation/legal binding and penalties. Moreover, there was a strong preference by 
government to focus on incentive-based, information-based and auditing based 
approaches (i.e. information, education, incentives, guidelines and auditing) as many 
commentators have noted. 
Chapter Six and Seven further demonstrated the Effectiveness Analysis/ Method for 
examining the actual impacts of 'soft' and 'hard' instrument activities on reducing 
GHG emissions during the period 1997 to 2007 in Australia. Chapter Six 
demonstrated the application of the SIA method for the case of Australia's climate 
policy. First, two case studies were selected from the results in Chapter Five: The 
MRET is identified as a 'hard' instrument and Greenhouse Challenge Program as a 
'soft' instrument. This thesis has examined these two case studies as the most relevant 
to its analysis but also has two significant Australian programs. This thesis has then 
applied the SIA method to the case studies. The results from the SIA in this chapter 
also allowed this thesis to conduct a further discussion (Chapter Seven) on the 
determination of the relative effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in the case 
of Australia's climate policy. 
The results show a number of findings from the SIA approach that 'hard' instruments 
were relatively more effective in reducing GHG emissions than 'soft' instruments 
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over the period, although the study has failed to make a clear distinction in the relative 
effectiveness of 'soft' versus 'hard' instruments, due to insufficient details available 
about the GCP in government reports over the period. In specific terms, in relation to 
analysing the 'success and failure' of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, the 'hard' 
instruments met their intended targets over time, where they were not ambitions, but 
the 'soft' instruments failed to meet their targets at all. The study also concluded that 
'soft' instruments have fundamentally failed at a basic level to provide the desired 
outcomes of policy initiatives towards reducing GHG emissions, because they tended 
to be symbolic policies, which gave insufficient information and lacked information 
consistency, in comparison to 'hard' instruments. 
Chapter Seven draws together and develops the arguments of main importance to this 
thesis, in terms of aims, arguments and significance. These discussions in Chapter 
Seven led this thesis to its conclusions. It considered the key aims. The first was to 
develop methods for identifying the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in terms 
of reducing GHG emissions; and the second was to determine the influences of 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments by following the methods developed in the first aim. The 
fulfilments of the two inter-related aims now lead this thesis to answer the main 
purpose of this whole thesis. 
In response to the main purpose of this thesis, which is to examine the influences of 
'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments in climate policy, especially in reducing GHG 
emissions, this study has firstly recognised that seeking the degree of power relations/ 
coerciveness between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments helps to distinguish whether 
instruments are 'soft' and 'hard'. This thesis has established that the degree of power 
relations/ coerciveness depends on the level of relative dominance (i.e. 'soft' and 
'hard'), namely whether an instrument includes government intervention, 
regulation/legal bindings and penalties. Although the method may have some 
limitations, which potentially include the level of regulations, the level of emission 
targets and the level of governmental interventions, this thesis has simply identified 
the distinction. 
In its empirical case studies, the results in this thesis show that the Australian national 
initiatives on the climate policy during the period 1997-2007 were largely reliant on 
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relatively 'soft' instruments, with a tendency to increase the use of softer instruments 
over time. In addition, the results concluded that 'hard' instruments were relatively 
more effective in reducing GHG emissions than 'soft' instruments in the case of 
Australia's climate policy during the period. 
Although this thesis found these influences in the case of Australia's climate policy 
during the period, this thesis has concluded that the influence of 'soft' and 'hard' 
instruments on reducing GHG emissions can be different in different countries, 
depending on their economic, political and institutional circumstances. Furthermore, 
this does not mean that using 'soft' instruments is always ineffective nor that 'hard' 
instruments effective: there is a need for the balance of the degree of power relations 
between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in order to choose the most effective 
instruments for reducing GHG emissions, depending on different policy targets (i.e. 
direct or indirect targets67). Moreover, in practice, any instrument activities are also 
related to a variety of influences, including government's 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' 
approaches, in terms of political, administrative and institutional influences, and 
international and domestic influences. 
Neither is it possible to ignore the influences of other internal and external factors 
(Hood 1986; Linder and Peters, 1989; De Bruijn and Hufen, 1990; Sinclair 1997; 
Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998; Perrels 2001; Annandale et al 2004). The study is thus 
not capable of addressing total effectiveness from these external factors, but can be 
used for a basic understanding of the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
This study has intended to provide a basic and simple approach, and can be a good 
start to further development of the 'coercive analyses' in public policy, especially in 
climate policy. Thus understandings of these external influences will make a clear 
linkage to the gap68 , which will create further comprehensive analysis. 
67 Social approaches can provide better interpretive frames and encourage organisations to acquire the 
knowledge that leads to better environmental outcomes (Hertin et al 2004). Instrument choice depends 
on a different focus on the different targets and some GHG mitigation activities do not target direct 
emission reduction effects but others do, impacts of direct emission reduction should not only become 
the central solution for reducing GHG emissions, but also targets for indirect reduction for social 
improvement (EEA, 1996; Aldy et al., 2003; OECD, 2001). 
68 This study has revealed external influences on the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments by 
addressing their criticisms, such as: political influences on the level of target settings, timelines and 
penalty rates; and influences of fundamental framework type (i.e. 'business as usual') and the type of 
institutional frameworks (i.e. ownership by government or industry). The relationship between these 
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Finally, this thesis has emphasised developing policy instrument analysis in relation to 
climate policy, especially with regard to the reduction of GHG emissions. It has been 
argued that it is thus essential to consider the relationships between immediate policy 
actions on reducing GHG emissions and the right choice of policy instruments. 
Furthermore, the right choice of policy with the appropriate balance between non-
coercive and coercive instruments, referred to as 'soft' and 'hard' instruments in this 
thesis, is one of the most critical issues in order to achieve significant reduction 
targets at the domestic level and therefore contributes to reducing emissions globally. 
Leaders in each country still need to seek the appropriate choices at domestic and 
international levels, and a study such as this thesis has shown that an analysis for 
'soft' and 'hard' instruments is thus essential for improving future policy decisions. 
The Strengths and Limitations of the Methodological/ Analytical Tools Developed 
Analytical methods (i.e. the Identification & Trend Analysis/ Method and 
Effectiveness Analysis/ Method ) were developed and applied in empirical case 
studies in this thesis, can be useful evaluative method for instrument study and have 
clearly demonstrated the illustration of the degree of 'softness' and 'hardness' of 
instruments and their effectiveness. The Identification of Trend Analysis allows 
policy makers to determine a simple and clear classification of the level of coercion 
between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. This method may also help policy makers to 
address the extent of governmental control during a certain period of time. 
The Effectiveness Analysis, which allows policy makers to identify strengths and 
weaknesses of instrument design by government in terms of urgent action in order to 
reduce GHG emissions. The developed methods overcome a critical question in the 
instrument study: how to develop a simple and clear method of identifying how 'soft' 
and 'hard' instruments can be classified. The key criticism is that illustrating the 
relations between 'soft' and 'hard' instruments including policy influences and 
outcomes, tends to lead to uncertainty, especially where mixed instruments are 
applied in such areas as environmental policy. Thus, these methods are regarded in 
criticisms and the results in this study still represent a gap in the review process. This study focused on 
seeking a clear indication of 'success or failure' of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments, which this research 
has and acknowledges this success or failure as one of the most significant aspects in the field of study. 
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this thesis, as very significant evaluative methods for evaluating the influence of 
policy instruments, especially for climate change policy. 
On the other hand, there is still a number of limitations on the developed methods. 
First, the usual limitations that affect the instrumentalist methodological approach 
have been identified here and attempts have been made to improve the relative lack of 
theoretical analysis. The method derived from 'Instrumentalism' is incorporated here 
with 'coercive analysis', and a new synthesised Identification & Trend Analysis/ 
Method developed for examining the effectiveness of 'soft' and 'hard' instruments. 
This analytic approach is intended to be regarded as a new, all-encompassing 
theoretical approach for analysis of climate change policy in Australia and potentially 
other nations. In addition to the limitation of methods, this thesis emphasises 
determining the simple classification of 'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments. It 
focuses on establishing the specific key elements of functional policy activities, such 
as examining whether a national program is a 'soft' or 'hard' instrument, by looking 
at a number of key elements such as setting targets and monitoring systems, rather 
than measuring degrees of carbon reduction targets, reliability of persuasion or 
regulation/ legal bindingness or the balance between the restriction and cost 
effectiveness under an instrument. These latter concerns, whilst significant, are not 
without their own analytic challenges but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Another limitation of the analysis is the application of instrument categories, based on 
the instrument category in the UNFCCC guidelines. 69 The data in the Australian 
National Communication Report (2002, and 2005) acknowledged a range of national 
initiatives including existing and future programs. However, the definitions of policy 
instruments under the UNFCCC instrument category are not the same as those 
proposed by this thesis. The intention of this study was not to categorise all the 
national initiatives during the period; instead thus this thesis uses selected instrument 
categories similar to instrument categories from the Australian national 
communication reports. The other reason for selecting these instrument categories is 
that there has not yet been a strong move to adopt a clear, simple and formulated 
69 UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change]. 1999. Review of the 
Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions of the Convention. 
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categorisation of types of climate policy instruments 70 at the international level, for 
contracting parties to the UNFCCC to use for their national reports. Indeed different 
countries have used different instrument categories in such reporting (UNFCCC 2003; 
and 2007). 
Despite their limitations, the findings from the analyses help policy makers to 
understand how a national government designs policy instruments and their influences. 
The analyses also reveal that each instrument is employed by the national government 
and intended to meet its individual goals, but with differing levels of government 
control. The study in this thesis is thus not only a very significant tool for policy 
makers who review climate policy but also an examination of coerciveness in policy 
instruments in the field of public policy. Furthermore, a clear identification of the 
influences of 'soft' and 'hard' climate policy instruments helps to address the extent 
of governmental control during a certain period of time, and to show a clear picture of 
the instrument design and preferences of the government's own instrument 
approaches in terms of reducing GHG emissions. The findings from this study will 
assist policy makers who review climate policy and the national initiatives from an 
instrument point of view, to more properly appreciate instrument characteristics. 
Outline of Future Areas of Research from This Work 
This thesis has had a special focus on Australia's climate policy 1997-2007. An 
examination of countries which must consider the reduction of GHG emissions is 
critical. The domestic climate policy of the decade in question reflects actions in one 
of the most carbon intensive developed countries, which must consider a significant 
reduction in GHG emissions, and be responsible for leading strong global action. The 
study concludes that the policy design based on voluntary-based instruments during 
1997-2007 did not encourage a significant reduction of GHG emissions, while overall 
emission trends showed that the country increased emissions over this time. However, 
this study intends not only to help better instrument choices for the future in Australia, 
70 The instrument categories used in the national communication reports are based on the 'UNFCCC 
guidelines on reporting and reviewing', which have been provided by the UNFCCC for Annex I parties. 
These guidelines suggest what a national communication report should contain, and include 
illustrations of 'type of policy instrument' (UNFCCC 1999). Although these guidelines show that 
Annex I parties should describe their instrument types, they do not clearly formulate the categories of 
according to international standards. Moreover, their suggestions do not apply to all the contracting 
countries. The Complication and synthesis report also describes the difficulty of a review of 
instrument activities, especially of an classification of instrument types (UNFCCC 2003; and 2007) .. 
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but also the future instrument choices by other carbon intensive countries which seek 
significant reductions of GHG emissions. 
Future research could apply the methods developed in this thesis to other case studies 
in climate change policy. Further study may be continued by employing the 
application of the developed methods in this thesis for other nations, particularly 
carbon intensive countries. This may result in creating a broader picture of the 
influence of soft and hard instruments on the reduction of GHG emissions across 
nations and may also allow policy makers to enable to identify a clear view of 
strengths and weakness of a government in each nation in order to achieve in such a 
global contribution. 
Lastly, a range of future areas of research may be considered following this study. 
First, a research may improve the ideas and/or concepts of the methods developed in 
this thesis. In specific terms, this may expand the views of analytical method used in 
this thesis and employ a more comprehensive analytical method for the classification 
of coerciveness between soft and hard instruments than a simple method; including, 
measuring degrees of carbon reduction targets, reliability of persuasion or regulation/ 
legal bindingness or the balance between the restriction and cost effectiveness under 
an instrument. This type of research may also require a new data collection process, in 
order to establish the most relevant approach of this study. Second, research may 
develop instrument categories not only for climate change policy, but also for other 
related environmental and/or energy policy. As mentioned before, there has not yet 
been clear definition of instrument categories, even under the UNFCCC guidelines 
established. This results in an unclear mapping of instrument selections and designs in 
each nation, which is necessary for further improvements; especially for a 
comparative policy analysis is undertaken for addressing a picture of policy 
instrument designs at international level. 
Further research of this kind has the potential to improve climate change policy 
instrument design. 
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Appendix 
1 National Initiatives, 1997-2007 
1.1 National Initiatives 1997-2007 
No Programs Time-line Instrument Host Level 
1 Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program 1999-2007 Economic Cwlth MD 
2 Greenhouse Friendly Program 2001-2004 Information /economic Cwlth MD 
3 
Low Em1ss1ons Technology Demonstration 
2005-2006 Economic Cwlth LD 
Fund 
lnformat1on(1 e 1nformat1on & 
4 International Climate Change 1998-2007(ongo1ng) 
education) /voluntary /R&D 
Cwlth MD 
/economic 
Greenhouse GCP Plus 2005-2007(ongo1ng) 
Voluntary /regulatory 
Cwlth MD 5 
/economic 
6 Local Greenhouse Action 1997-2007 
Voluntary 
Cwlth,S&T,L MD (nego!lated)/1nfo(educat1on) 
1997-2003/2005-
7 Government Operation Voluntary (negotiated) Cwlth,S&T MD 
ongoing 
8 Energy Market Reform 2001-2007 (ongoing) Regulatory Cwlth,S&T MostD 
9 Generator Efficiency Standard 2000-2004 Voluntary (negotiated) Cwlth MD 
10 
Renewable Energy Development Initiative 
2005-2007 (ongoing) Economic/research Cwlth LD (REDI) 
11 Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) 2001-2007 (ongoing) Regulatory Cwlth MostD 
12 
Energy Performance Codes for domestic 
1997-2007 (ongoing) 
appliance (NAEEEP) Regulatory/voluntary Cwlth,S&T HD 
13 
Energy Efficiency Best Practice and 
1998-2003 Voluntary (negotiated) Cwlth MD 
Benchmarking Program (EEBP) 
14 Eco-Effic1ency Program 2005-2007 (ongoing) Voluntary (negotiated) Cwlth LD 
Queensland Centre for Low Em1ss1on 
15 2003-2007 R&D Cwlth, Qld LD 
Technology 
16 
National Framework for Energy Efficiency 
2004-2007 
Regulatory/information (1.e 
Cwlth,S&T HD (NFEE) education) 
17 
Energy Efficiency Opportunities Program 
2006-2007 (ongoing) Regulatory Cwlth HD (EEO) 
18 
Low Emission Technology and Abatement 
2006-2007 (ongoing) Economic Cwlth LD 
Program (LETAP) 
19 
Advanced Electnc1ty Storage Technologies 
2005-2007 (ongoing) Economic Cwlth LD 
Program (ARSTP) 
20 Solar Cities 2005-2007 (ongoing) Economic Cw Ith LD 
21 Wind Energy Forecasting Capability lrnt1at1ve 2004-2007 (ongoing) R&D/Econom1c Cwlth LD 
22 Strategic Development of Renewable Energy 1997-2007 Economic Cwlth,S&T LD 
23 START Program 2002-2007 Econom1c/R&D Cw Ith MD 
24 Australia's Onshore Energy Secunty Program 2007- Economic Cwlth MD 
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1994-2004/2005-2007 
25 National Cycling Strategy (NCS) (ongoing) Economic Cw Ith MD 
26 
Motor Vehicle Environment Committee (MVEC) 
1999-2001 1nformation/regulatory/voluntary Cwlth MD 
Strategy 
27 Diesel and Alternative Fuels Grants Scheme 2000-2002 (ongoing) Economic Cwlth LD 
28 Alternative Fuels Conversion Program 2000-2007 (ongoing) Economic Cwlth HD 
29 CNG Infrastructure Program 2000-2004 Economic Cwlth LD 
30 Energy Grants (credits) Scheme 2003-2005 Economic Cw Ith LD 
31 810-fuels Capital Grants Program 2003-2004 Economic Cwlth MD 
32 350ML 810-fuels Target 2003-2007 (ongoing) Economic Cwlth HD 
33 Ethanol D1stnbut1on Program 2006-2007 (ongoing) Economic Cwlth MD 
34 LPG Conversion Grants 2006-2007 (ongoing) Economic Cw Ith MD 
35 Strategic Transport Planning & Development 2004-2007 Vanous Cwlth,S&T,L MD 
36 Plantations for Australia-the 2020 vision 1997-2007 Economic /information Cwlth MD 
37 The Farm Forestry Program by NHT 1996-2002 Economic /information Cwlth HD 
38 Bush for Greenhouse 1998-2004 Economic /information Cwlth LD 
39 
National Action Plan for Salinity and Water 
2001-2007 
Quality 
Information /R&D Cwlth MD 
40 Greenhouse Action in Regional Australia 2004-2007 Information /R&D Cwlth LD 
41 National Landcare Program 1996-2007 Economic /information Cwlth,S&T LD 
42 Greenhouse and Agriculture Taskforce 1997-2002 Information Cwlth,S&T MD 
43 Rumen Modifiers 1997-2007 ongoing R&D Cwlth,S&T LD 
44 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS) 
2003-2007 
under NHT 
Economic/voluntary Cwlth LD 
Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse 1989-/1997-
45 Regulatory Cwlth HD 
Gas Management 2007(ongoing) 
46 NHT-waste management awareness program 1996-2002 Information Cwlth MD 
Australian Government state and local waste 1992-/1997-2007 
47 Voluntary/regulatory Cwlth,S&T HD 
strategies (ongoing) 
48 Greenhouse Challenge 1997-2004 Voluntary (negotiated) Cw Ith MD 
49 Ethanol Production Program 2002-2007 Economic Cwlth, S&T LD 
50 COAL 21 National Action Plan 2003-2007 R&D Cwlth MD 
51 Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme 1999-2002 Economic Cwlth LD 
52 Tax Fuels Scheme 2006-(ongoing) Economic Cwlth LD 
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1.2. National Initiatives by Sectors 
1.2.1 Cross-Sectoral 
Names TtmeLme Instrument Host 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program (GGAP) 2000-2007 Economic Cw Ith 
Low Em1ss10ns technology Demonstrat10n Fund 2005-2006 Economic Cwlth 
Intemat10nal chmate change 1998- Informat10n/ Education/ Cw Ith 
Voluntary/ Research 
Greenhouse GCP Plus 2005-2007 ( ongomg) Voluntary/ Regulatory (fuel Cwlth 
tax credits smce 2006) 
Local Greenhouse Action 2004-2007 ( ongomg) Voluntary/ Negotiated Cwlth, S&T, 
agreements/ Education L 
Greenhouse Challenge Program 1997-2004 Voluntary/negotiated Cwlth 
agreement 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 2001-2004 Informat10n/ Economic Cwlth 
122 E S .. ner2}'- tat10nary 
Names Ttmelme Instrument Host 
Government Operations 1997-2003 Voluntary/ Negotiated Cwlth, and 
2005-ongomg agreement S&T 
Local Greenhouse Act1on-stat1onary energy element 1997-2007 ( ongomg) Voluntary/ Negotiated Cwlth, and 
agreement/ Educat10n S&T 
( mforma1ton) 
Energy Market Reform 2001-2007 ( ongomg) Regulatory Cwlth, and 
S&T 
Generator Efficiency Standard 2000-2004 Voluntary/ Negotiated Cwlth 
agreement/ 
Renewable Energy Development In1t1at1ve (REDI) 2005-2007 ( ongomg) Economic Cw Ith 
MRET 2001-2007 (ongomg) Regulatory Cwlth 
Energy Performance Codes for domestic apphance (NAEEEP) 1997-2007 (ongomg) Regulatory/ Voluntary Cwlth, S&T 
Energy Efficiency Best Practice and Benchmarkmg Program 1998-2003 Voluntary/ Negotiated Cw Ith 
(EEBP) agreements 
Eco-Effic1ency Program 2005-2007 (ongomg) Voluntary/ Negotiated Cwlth 
agreement 
Low Em1ss10ns Technology Demonstration Fund (LETDF) 2005-2006 Economic Cwlth 
Queensland Centre for Low Em1ss1on Technology 2003-2007 Research Cwlth, 
Queensland 
Nat10nal Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE) 2004-2007 Regulatory/Information/ Cwlth,S&T 
Education 
Energy Efficiency Oooortumties Program (EEO) 2006-2007 ( ongomg) Regulatory Cwlth 
Low Em1ss10n Technology and Abatement Program (LETAP) 2006-2007 ( ongomg) Economic Cwlth 
Advanced Electnc1ty Storage Technologies Program (AESTP) 2005-2007 (ongomg) Economic Cwlth 
Solar Cities 2005-2007 (ongomg) Economic Cwlth 
Wmd Energy Forecastmg Capab1hty Institutive 2004-2007 (ongomg Research Cw Ith 
uoto 2009) 
Strategic development ofrenewable energy 1997-2007 Economic Cwlth and 
S&T 
GGAP 1999-2007 (ongomg Economic Cwlth 
upto 2013) 
Greenhouse Challenge Program 1997-2004 Voluntary/negotiated Cwlth 
agreement 
Greenhouse GCP Plus 2005-2007 ( ongomg) Voluntary/ Regulatory Cwlth 
(fuel tax credits smce 
2006) 
START program 2002-2007 Economic and R&D Cwlth 
Renewable Energy Eqmty Fund (REEF) 1997-2007 economic Cw Ith 
Austraha's Onshore Energy Secunty Program 2007 Economic Cwlth 
COAL 21 Nat10nal Act10n Plan 2003-2007 R&D Cwlth 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 2001-2004 Information/ Economic Cwlth 
International chmate change 1998- Information/ Educat10n/ Cwlth 
Voluntary/ Research 
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123 T rt . . rans po 
Names Ttmelme Instrument host 
National Cyclmg Strategy (NCS) 1999-2004 Economic Cwlth 
2005-2007 ( ongomg upto 
2010) 
Motor Vehicle Environment Committee (MVEC) Strategy 1999-2001 Informat10n/ Cw Ith 
Regulatory Voluntary 
Diesel and Alternative Fuels Grants Scheme 2000-2002 Economic Cw Ith 
Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme 1999-2002 Economic Cwlth 
Energy Grants (credits) Scheme 2003-2005 Economic Cwlth 
Tax Fuels Sheme 2006-( on go mg) Economic Cwlth 
Alternative Fuels Convers10n Program 2000-2007 (upto 2008) Economic Cwlth 
CN G Infrastructure Program 2000-2004 Economic Cwlth 
B10-fuels Capital Grants Program 2003-2004 Economic Cwlth 
350 ML B10-fuels Target 2003-2007 (upto 2010) Economic Cwlth 
Ethanol D1stnbut10n Program 2006-2007 (upto 2014) Economic Cwlth 
Ethanol Production Program 2002-2007 Economic Cwlth,S&T 
LPG Convers10n Grants 2006-2007 (upto 2014) Economic Cwlth 
Strategic Transport Planmng & Development 2004-2007 Vanous Cwlth, S&T, 
and L 
GGAP-transport energy elements 1999-2007 (ongomg upto Economic Cwlth, 
2013) 
Greenhouse Challenge 1997-2004 Voluntary/Negotiated Cwlth 
Greenhouse GCP Plus 2005-2007 (ongomg) Voluntary/ Regulatory Cwlth 
(fuel tax credits smce 
2006) and Economic 
Greenhouse Friendly Program 2001-2004 Informat10n/ Cwlth 
Economic 
Local Greenhouse Action-transport energy elements 2004-2007 (ongomg) Voluntary/ Negotiated Cwlth,S&T, 
agreements/ Educat10n L 
Low Em1ss10ns technology Demonstration Fund 2005-2006 Economic Cwlth 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 2001-2004 Informat10n/ Cwlth 
Economic 
Internat10nal climate change 1998- Information/ Cwlth 
Educat10n/ Voluntary/ 
Research 
12 4 F "f . . u21 1ve 
Names T1melme Instrument Host 
Low Em1ss10n Technology Demonstration Funds-Fug1t1ve 2005-2006 Economic Cwlth 
em1ss1ons elements 
GGAP-fug1t1ve em1ss10ns elements 1999-2007 (ongomg upto Economic Cwlth 
2013) 
Greenhouse Challenge-fug1t1ve em1ss10ns elements 1997-2004 Voluntary/negotiated Cwlth 
Greenhouse GCP Plus -fugitive em1ss10ns elements 2005-2007 ( ongomg) Voluntary/ negotiated Cwlth 
agreement/ Regulatory 
(fuel tax credits smce 
2006) and Economic 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 2001-2004 Informat1on/ Cwlth 
Economic 
Internat10nal climate change 1998- Informat10n/ Cwlth 
Education/ Voluntary/ 
Research 
1.2.5 Industrial Process 
Names T1me-lme Instrument Host 
Ozone Protect10n and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management 1989-( ongomg) Regulatory Cwlth 
1997-2007 
NHT-waste management awareness program 1996-2002 mformat1on Cwlth 
Australian Government State and Local Waste Strategies 1992-/1997-2007 Voluntary/regulatory Cht,S&T 
(ongomg) 
GGAP 1999-2007 ( ongomg upto Economic Cwlth 
2013) 
Greenhouse Challenge 1997-2004 Voluntary/Negotiated Cwlth 
Greenhouse GCP Plus -mdustnal processes elements (mcludmg 2005-2007 ( ongomg) Voluntary/ Regulatory Cwlth 
Best Practice Management of SF4) (fuel tax credits smce 
2006) and Economic 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 2001-2004 Informat10n/ Cwlth 
Economic 
International climate change 1998- Information/ Cwlth 
Education/ Voluntary/ 
Research 
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126 A It . . .encu ure 
Names T1me-lme Instrument Host 
Greenhouse and A1mculture Taskforce 1997-2002 Information Cwlth,S&T 
Agnculture Sector Work Program 1997-2002 Information Cwlth,,S&T 
Rumen Modifiers 1997-2007 ( ongomg) Research Cwlth, S&T 
Greenhouse Action m Regional Austraha 2004-2007 ( ongomg) Information/ Research Cwlth 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS) 2003-2007 Economic/ Voluntary Cwlth 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 2001-2004 Information/ Cwlth 
Economic 
Intemat10nal chmate change 1998- Information/ Cwlth 
Educat10n/ Voluntary/ 
Research 
1.2.7 Waste 
Names Timelme Instrument Host 
Waste management awareness program NHT 1996-2002 Informat10n Cwlth 
Austrahan Government state, temtory, and local government 1992- Voluntary/ Regulatory Cwlth, S&T 
waste management strategies local waste strategies 1997-2007 
Greenhouse Challenge-waste elements 1997-2004 Voluntary /Negotiated Cwlth 
Greenhouse GCP Plus -waste elements 2005-2007 ( ongomg) Voluntary/ Regulatory Cwlth 
(fuel tax credits smce 
2006) and Economic 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 2001-2004 Informat10n/ Cwlth 
Economic 
Internat10nal chmate change 1998- Information/ Cwlth 
Education/ Voluntary/ 
Research 
1.2.8 LULUCF 
Names Time !me Instrument Host 
Plantat10ns for Austraha-the 2020 v1s1on 1997-2007 Economic/ Cwlth 
Information 
The Farm Forestry Program by NHT 1996-2002 Economic/ Cwlth 
Information 
Bush for Greenhouse 1998-2004 Economic/ Cwlth 
Informat10n 
National Action Plan for Sahmty and Water Quahty 2001-2007 Informat10n/ Research Cwlth 
Greenhouse Act10n m Regional Austraha 2004-2007 Information/ Research Cwlth 
GGAP-land use, land use change and forestry elements 1999-2007 ( ongomg upto Economic Cwlth, 
2013) 
Nat10nal Landcare Programmes 1996-2007 Economic Information Cwlth,S&T 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 2001-2004 Information/ Cwlth 
Economic 
International chmate change 1998- Informat10n/ Cw Ith 
Education/ Voluntary/ 
Research 
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2 Results sorted by Instrument Categories 
2.1 National Initiatives 1997-2007 
Economic Regulatory Voluntary R&D Information-based Various 
National Initiatives 1997-2007 19 4 5 3 2 19 
2.2 Distribution of various instruments 1997-2007 
Economic Regulatory Voluntary R&D Information-based etc 
Various 11 5 7 4 7 1 
2.3 The instrument trend uses under the national initiatives 1997-2007 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Regulatory 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 
Voluntary 1 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 
Economic 2 2 4 7 7 8 9 9 10 13 14 
R&D 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
Information-based 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Mixed 6 8 9 9 11 10 10 15 15 15 15 
2.4 The instrument tren d uses un d 1 . . . . er the natmna m1tiatives 1 997-2007 includine: various instruments 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Regulatory 3 3 4 4 6 5 5 6 7 8 8 
Voluntary 4 7 8 9 9 8 9 7 8 8 8 
Economic 5 7 9 12 13 15 16 17 17 20 21 
R&D 1 2 2 2 3 4 6 8 9 9 9 
Information-based 5 7 8 8 10 9 7 9 7 7 7 
Etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
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2.5 The national initiatives at sectoral level 1997-2007 including various 
Energy-stationary Energy-transport Energy-fugitive Industrial Process Agriculture Waste LULU CF 
Economic 9 14 2 1 0 0 1 
Regulatory 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Voluntary 5 2 1 1 0 1 0 
R&D 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Information-based 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Vrious 7 7 3 5 4 5 8 
2.6 The national initiatives at sectoral level 1997-2007 
Energy-stationary Energy-transport Energy-fugitive Industrial Process Agriculture Waste LULUCF 
Economic 11 16 4 3 2 2 6 
Regulatory 6 2 1 3 0 2 0 
Voluntary 9 6 3 5 2 4 1 
R&D 5 1 1 2 3 0 3 
Information-based 4 4 2 3 4 3 8 
Etc 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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3 The instrument trend uses at sectoral level 1997-2007 
3.1 Energy-stationary 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Economic 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 9 10 11 
Regulatory 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 5 6 6 
Voluntary 3 6 6 7 7 7 7 5 6 6 6 
R&D 0 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 5 5 5 
Information-based 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 
Etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.2 Energy-transport 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Economic 0 0 3 6 7 8 9 9 8 10 9 
Regulatory 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Voluntary 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 
R&D 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Information-based 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
3.3 Energy-fugitive 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Economic 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Regulatory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Voluntary 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
R&D 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Information-based 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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3.4 Industrial Process 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Economic 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
Regulatory 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Voluntary 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 
R&D 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Information-based 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 
Etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.5 Waste 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Economic 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Regulatory 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Voluntary 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
R&D 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Information-based 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 
Etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.6 LULUCF 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Economic 3 4 5 5 6 6 5 5 3 3 3 
Regulatory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Voluntary 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
R&D 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Information-based 3 5 5 5 7 7 6 7 5 5 5 
Etc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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3.7 Agriculture 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Economic 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 
Regulatory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Voluntary 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
R&D 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Information-based 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 
Various 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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4. Results by the DSHCPI method for the level of Soft and Hard Instruments 1997-2007 at the National Level 
4.1 Results by the DSHCPI method for the level of Soft and Hard Instruments 1997-2007 at the National Level 
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Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
1999-2007 1 . . . . . 5 MD Program 
2 Greenhouse Fnendly Program 2001-2004 . . . . x x . 7 MD 
3 
Low Emissions Technology 
2005-2006 . x . LD 3 Demonstration Fund 
4 International Climate Change 199S.2007(ongolng) x x x x x x x 7 MD 
5 Greenhouse GCP Plus 2005-2007(ongolng) x x x x . x x x x 9 MD 
6 Local Greenhouse Action 1997-2007 x x x x x x x 7 MD 
1997-200312005 
7 Government Operation . x . x . x . x x 9 MD (ongoing) 
8 Energy Market Reform 2001-2007 (ongoing) . x x x x . . x x x . . . x . 15 MostD 
9 Generator Eflic1ency Standard 2000-2004 x x . . x . x 7 MD 
10 
Renewable Energy Development 
2005-2007 (ongoing) x . LD 2 REDI) 
11 
Mandatory Renewable Energy 
2001-2007 (ongoing) x . x . . . . x x . x x . . MostD 14 Target (MRET) 
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12 
Energy Performance Codes for 
1997-2007 (ongoing) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 HO domestic appliance (NAEEEP) 
13 
Energy Efficiency Best Practice and 
1996-2003 . . . . . 5 MD rl<mg Program (EEBP) 
14 Eco-Effic1ency Program 2005-2007 (ongoing) . . . 3 LO 
Queensland Center for Low 
2003-2007 LO 15 . . 2 Emission Technology 
16 
Nahonal Framework for Energy 
2004-2007 . . . . x . . . . . . . 12 HO Efficiency (NFEE) 
17 
Energy Efficiency Opportunities 
2006-2007 (ongrnng) . x . . . . . . . . 10 HO Program (EEO) 
18 
Low Emission Technology and 
2006-2007 (ongoing) . . LO 2 Abatement Program (LET AP) 
19 
Advanced Electnc1ty Storage 
2005-2007 (ongoing) . . LO Technologies Program (ARSTP) 2 
20 Solar Cities 2005-2007 (ongoing) . . 2 LO 
21 
Wind Energy Forecasbng Capability 
2004-2007 (ongoing) . x 2 LO 
22 
Strategic Development of 
Renewable Energy 
1997-2007 . x 2 LO 
23 START Program 2002-2007 . . . . . . . . 8 MD 
24 
Australia's Onshore Energy Security 
2007- . . . . . . . . B MD Program 
1994-200412005-
25 Nabonal Cycling Strategy (NCS) . . . 
bomg) . . . x B MD 
Motor Vehicle Environment 
1999-2001 MD 26 . . . . . . . . B Committee (MVEC) Strategy 
Diesel and Alternabve Fuels Grants 
2000-2002 (ongmng) . LD 27 . . . 4 Scheme 
Alternative Fuels Conversion 
28 2000-2007 (ongoing) . . . . . . 
Program 
. . x . . . 12 HD 
29 CNG Infrastructure Program 2000-2004 . . 2 LD 
30 Energy Grants (credits) Scheme 2003-2005 . x . . 4 LO 
31 Bio-fuels Capital Grants Program 2003-2004 . x x x x 5 MD 
32 350ML Bio-fuels Target 2003-2007 (ongoing) x . . . . . x . x x 10 HD 
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33 Ethanol D1stnbut1on Program 2006-2007 (ongoing) x x x x x x x 7 MD 
34 LPG Conversion Grants 2006-2007 (ongoing) x x x x x 5 MD 
35 
Strategic Transport Planning & 
2004-2007 x x x x x x 6 MD Development 
Plantabons for Australia-the 2020 
36 1997-2007 x x x x x x x x 8 MD 
37 The Farm Forestry Program by NHT 1996-2002 x x x x x x x x x x 10 HD 
38 Bush for Greenhouse 1998-2004 x x 2 LD 
39 
National Acbon Plan for Salinity and 
2001-2007 x x x x x x x x x 9 MD Water Quality 
40 
Greenhouse Act.Jon in Regional 
2004-2007 x x x x 4 LD Australia 
41 National Landcare Program 1996-2007 x x x x 4 LD 
42 
Greenhouse and Agnculture 
1997-2002 x x x x x x 6 MD Taskforce 
43 Rumen Modifiers 1997-2007 ongoing x x x 3 LD 
44 
Environmental Management 
Systems (EMS) under NHT 2003-2007 
x x x x x x 4 LD 
45 
Ozone Protection and Synthetic 
Greenhouse Gas Management 
1989-/1997- ongoing x x x x x x x x x x 10 HD 
46 
NHT-waste management awareness 
1996-2002 x x • • . 5 MD Program 
Australian Government state and 1992-/1997-2007 - HD 47 x x x x x x x x x x 10 local waste strategies ongoing 
48 Greenhouse Challenge 1997-2004 x x x x x 5 MD 
49 Ethanol Producbon Program 2002-2007 x x x x 4 LD 
50 COAL 21 Nabonat Acbon Plan 2003-2007 x x x x x x 6 MD 
51 Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme 1999-2002 x x x x 4 LD 
52 Tax Fuels Scheme 2006-(ongolng) x x x x 4 LD 
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4.2 
Level of instruments 1997-2007 
Level of Sort and Hard 1997-2007 Numbers 
Least dominant [LO] level 20 
Moderately dominant [MD] level 22 
Highly dominant [HO] level 8 
Most dominant [MostD] level 2 
Total 52 
Economic Regulatory Voluntary R&D Information-based Various 
LO 11 0 1 2 0 6 
MD 6 0 4 1 2 7 
HO 2 2 0 0 0 4 
MostD 0 2 0 0 0 0 
4.3 Soft and Hard Instruments 1997-2007 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LD fsoft1 3 4 5 7 7 8 9 11 14 15 14 
MD 7 9 11 12 12 14 14 13 11 13 14 
HD 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 
MostD (hard) 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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5 Soft and Hard Instruments 1997-2007 at the Sectoral-based 
5.1 Soft and Hard Instruments 1997-2007 at the Sectoral-based 
Industrial 
Stationary Transport Fugitive Process Agriculture Waste LULUCF 
LD 10 6 0 1 3 0 3 
MD 12 13 6 5 3 5 5 
HD 3 2 0 2 0 1 1 
MostD 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.2 Ener!!V-S 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LD 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 9 10 9 
MD 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 8 7 7 8 
HD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 
MostD 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
5.3 Ener!!V-Transport 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LD 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 
MD 2 2 5 6 7 7 7 9 7 8 8 
HD 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 
MostD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.4 E 
- - - ------., 
,F ... 
-----
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MD 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
HD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MostD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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5.5 Industrial Process 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LO 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MD 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
HO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
MostD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.6 Waste 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MD 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 
HO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MostD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.7 LULUCF 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LO 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
MD 1 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 
HO 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
MostD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.8 A!!ricult 
-
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LO 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 
MD 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 
HO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MostD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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6 Results for Soft and Hard Instrument and The Emission Trend 1997-2007 
6.1 Soft and Hard Instruments 1997-2007 and the Emission Trends 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LD 3 4 5 7 7 8 9 11 14 15 14 
MD 7 9 11 12 12 14 14 13 11 13 14 
HD 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 
MostD 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Emission trend 481 90 503.3 508.3 524.9 534.6 542 8 528.9 540 2 554 8 549.9 
6.2 Soft and Hard Instruments 1997-2007 at the Sectoral-based 
Stationary Transport Fugitive Industrial Process Agriculture Waste LULU CF 
LD 9 6 0 1 3 0 3 
MD 12 13 6 5 3 5 5 
HD 3 2 0 2 0 1 1 
MostD 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
63 E . ner!!V 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LD 1 1 2 3 3 3 4 5 10 12 10 
MD 5 9 12 13 16 17 18 16 15 14 15 
HD 0 0 0 2 2 4 4 
MostD 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Emission trend 329.7 342.4 349.5 357 364 5 368 4 381.1 386.7 395.1 400.9 
332 
'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
6.4 Enerev-Staf 
-·· 
.. 
1997 1998 1999 2aaa 2aa1 2aa2 2aa3 2aa4 2aa5 2aa6 2aa7 
LD 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 8 9 8 
MD 3 5 6 7 8 9 1a 8 7 7 8 
HD a a a a a a a 1 1 2 2 
MostD a a a a 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
6.5 E 
--- -
-· 
T rt 
1997 1998 1999 2aaa 2aa1 2aa2 2aa3 2aa4 2aa5 2aa6 2aa7 
LD a a 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 
MD 2 2 5 6 7 7 7 9 7 8 8 
HD a a a 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
MostD a a a a a a a a a a a 
6.6 Enerev-Fu!!it' 
--· -
1997 1998 1999 2aaa 2aa1 2aa2 2aa3 2aa4 2aa5 2aa6 2aa7 
LD a a a a a a a a a al a 
MD 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 41 4 
HD a a a a a a a a a al a 
MostD a a a a a a a a a al a 
6.7 Industrial Process 
1997 1998 1999 2aaa 2aa1 2aa2 2aa3 2aa4 2aa5 2aa6 2aa7 
LD 1 1 1 1 1 a a a a a a 
MD 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
HD 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
MostD a a a a a a a a a a a 
Emission trend 24.4 25.8 26 26.2 27 3 27.9 28 7 29.6 28 6 28 4 
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6.8 Waste 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MD 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 
HD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MostD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Emission trend 17.5 17.1 17.3 17.3 15.6 17.8 17 16.7 17.6 16.6 
6.9 LULUCF 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LO 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
MD 1 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 
HO 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
MostD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Emission trend 22.5 30.2 24.3 29.7 27 33.1 10.8 16 25.3 13.8 
6.10 A!!:ricult 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
LO 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 
MD 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 
HO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MostD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Emission trend 87.8 88 91 94.7 98.2 95.6 91.2 91.3 89.3 90.1 
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7 The Average oflnstrument Numbers at the National Level 
7.1 The scores under sectoral at an average 1997-2007 
Average 
Energy-Stationary 7.043065 
Energy-Tran sport 7.192446 
Energy-Fugitive 6.012121 
Industrial Process 7.469697 
Agriculture 5.068182 
Waste I 7.365152 
LULUCF 6 25303 
Total average 6.629099 
Total numbers 17 
7.2 Total scores of national levels 1997-2007 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 7 7 7 7 
Low Emissions Technology Demonstrat10n Fund 3 3 
International Climate Change 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Greenhouse GCP Plus 9 9 9 
Local Greenhouse Action 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Government Operation 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 
Energy Market Reform 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Generator Efficiency Standard 7 7 7 7 7 
Renewable Energy Development Initiative (RED!) 2 2 2 
Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Energy Performance Codes for domestic appliance (NAEEEP) 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Energy Efficiency Best Practice and Benchmarking Program (EEBP) 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Eco-Efficiency Program 3 3 3 
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'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
Queensland Centre for Low Emission Technology 2 2 2 2 2 
National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE) 12 12 12 12 
Energy Efficiency Opportunities Program (EEO) 10 10 
Low Emission Technology and Abatement Program (LETAP) 2 2 
Advanced Electricity Storage Technologies Program (ARSTP) 2 2 2 
Solar Cities 2 2 2 
Wind Energy Forecasting Capabihty Initiative 2 2 2 2 
Strategic Development of Renewable Energy 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
START Program 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Australia's Onshore Energy Security Program 8 
Nat10nal Cycling Strategy (NCS) 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Motor Vehicle Environment Committee (MVEC) Strategy 8 8 8 
Diesel and Alternative Fuels Grants Scheme 4 4 4 
Alternative Fuels Conversion Program 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
CNG Infrastructure Program 2 2 2 2 2 
Energy Grants (credits) Scheme 4 4 4 
Bio-fuels Capital Grants Program 5 5 
350ML Bio-fuels Target 10 10 10 10 10 
Ethanol Distribution Program 7 7 
LPG Conversion Grants 5 5 
Strategic Transport Planning & Development 6 6 6 6 
Plantations for Australia-the 2020 vis10n 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
The Farm Forestry Program by NHT 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Bush for Greenhouse 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
National Act10n Plan for Salinity and Water Quality 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Greenhouse Action m Regional Australia 4 4 4 4 
National Landcare Program 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Greenhouse and Agriculture Taskforce 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Rumen Modifiers 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS) under NHT 4 4 4 4 4 
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'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
Ozone Protect10n and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
NHT-waste management awareness program 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Australian Government state and local waste strategies 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Greenhouse Challenge 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Ethanol Production Program 4 4 4 4 4 4 
COAL 21 National Action Plan 6 6 6 6 6 
Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme 4 4 4 4 
Tax Fuels Scheme 4 4 
73 Th . d th E e score on er e nerl!V-St f a 10narv 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Government Operat10n 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Local Greenhouse Action-stationary energy element 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Energy Market Reform 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Generator Enfficiency Standard 7 7 7 7 7 
Renewable Energy Development Initiative (RED!) 2 2 2 
MRET 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Energy Performance Codes for domestic apphcance (NAEEP) 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Energy Efficiency Best Practice and Benchmarkeing Program (EEBP) 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Eco-Efficiency Program 3 3 3 
Low Emissions Technology Demonstration Fund (LETDF) 3 3 
Queensland Center for Low Emission Technology 2 2 2 2 2 
Naitonal Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE) 12 12 12 12 
Energy Efficiency Oppurtunities Program (EEO) 10 10 
Low Emission Technology and Abatement Program (LETAP) 2 2 
Advanced Electricity Storage Technologies Program (ARSTP) 2 2 2 
Solar Cities 2 2 2 
Wind Energy Forecasting Capability Institutive 2 2 2 2 
Strategic development of renewable energy 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
GGAP 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Challenge Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
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'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
Greenhouse Challenge Plus 9 9 9 
START program 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Australia's Onshore Energy Security Program 8 
COAL 21 National Action Plan 6 6 6 6 6 
-
Greenhouse Friendly Program 7 7 7 7 
International climate change 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
74 Th . d th E e score un er e ner!!V-T rans no rt 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
National Cycling Strategy (NCS) 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Motor Vehicle Environment Committee (MVEC) Strategy 8 8 8 
Diesel and Alternative Fuels Grants Scheme 4 4 4 
Energy Grants (credits) Scheme 4 4 4 
Tax Fuels Scheme 4 4 
Alternative Fuels Conversion Program 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
CNG Infrastructure Program 2 2 2 2 2 
Energy Grants (credits) Scheme 4 4 4 
Bio-fuels Capital Grants Program 5 5 
350ML Bio-fuels Target 10 10 10 10 10 
Ethanol D1stribut10n Program 7 7 
Ethanol Production Program 4 4 4 4 4 4 
LPG Conversion Grants 5 5 
Strategic Transport Planning & Development 6 6 6 6 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Challenge Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Challenge Plus 9 9 9 
Greenhouse Friendly Program 7 7 7 7 
International climate change 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Low Emissions Technology Demonstrat10n Fund 3 3 
Local Greenhouse Act10n 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
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'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Policy Instruments 
75 Th . d F 'f e score un er 021 1ve 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Low Emissions Technology Demonstration Fund 3 3 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Challenge Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Challenge Plus 9 9 9 
Greenhouse Friendly Program 7 7 7 7 
International climate change 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
7.6 The score under the Industrial Process 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Ozone Protect10n and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
NHT-waste management awareness program 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Australian Government state and local waste strategies 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Challenge Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Challenge Plus 9 9 9 
Greenhouse Fnendly Program 7 7 7 7 
International climate change 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
77 Th . d A It e score un er .2r1cu ore 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Greenhouse and Agriculture Taskforce 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Rumen Modifiers 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Greenhouse Action m Regional Australia 4 4 4 4 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS) under NHT 4 4 4 4 4 
Greenhouse Friendly Program 7 7 7 7 
International climate change 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
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'Soft' and 'Hard' Climate Poficy Instruments 
7 .8 The score under the waste 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
NHT-waste management awareness program 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Australian Government state and local waste strategies 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Greenhouse Challenge Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Challenge Plus 9 9 9 
Greenhouse Friendly Program 7 7 7 7 
International climate change 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
7.9 The score under the LULUCF 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Plantations for Australia-the 2020 vision 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
The Farm Forestry Program by NHT 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Bush for Greenhouse 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
National Action Plan for Salmity and Water Quality 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Greenhouse Action in Regional Australia 4 4 4 4 
Nat10nal Landcare Program 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Greenhouse Friendly Program 7 7 7 7 
International climate change 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
8 Percentages of Using Elements by the Criteria 
Public Contractnal Penalty of Penalty for 
Information Education Incentives Target Timeframe Guidelines Monitoring Reporting Auditing Disclosure Improvement 
Market Regulation polluter Penalty for Penalty for Failure to 
settings (mandatory) (mandatory) Device Nonparticipation Noncomphance Meeting pays Tar!!ets 
65% 65% 94% 33% 37% 65% 42% 40% 90% 12% 4% 19% 23% 2% 6% 19% 6% 
65.4 65 4 94 2 32 7 36 6 65 4 42 3 40 4 90 4 II 5 3 9 19 2 23 I I 9 58 19 2 5 8 
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